Berkshire's Puts: Not Such a Great Idea 10 comments
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Andrew Clavell delves into the murky world of Berkshire Hathaway's (BRK.A) equity put contracts, and concludes:
The put owner has been forced into purchasing a lot more credit cover in a nasty cross gamma effect. No wonder BRK's credit spreads have gone bananas; they will likely remain volatile as there is a short cross gamma hedger out there for the next 20 years.
Moreover, as a result of the credit hedger's scramble for CDS protection, his mark to market on the original option is potentially worth only half the value had he been fully collateralised.
And you thought Warren Buffett was clever. In hindsight, he clearly never hedged against the impact of creating a short cross gamma hedger.
What's more, there's a good reason for the hedger to be cross: thanks to his hedging, his $4.5 billion put is today worth only $5 billion, despite the fall in the market and the rise in volatility. If only he'd got some collateralization, it would be worth $10 billion, and he'd be much more likely to get a hefty annual bonus.
It'll be interesting to see how the details of how Buffett values the put in his next annual report. Although Berkshire's CDS spreads make the put worth only $5 billion to the hedger, it's still a $10 billion liability to Buffett, at today's volatility levels. What's more, the $4.5 billion that Buffett received for selling the put is almost certainly worth substantially less than that today, especially if Buffett invested it in Goldman Sachs (GS).
Whitney Tilson still thinks this was a spectacular deal for Buffett:
We don't know the details of how the puts are structured, but let's assume the payouts are on a straight-line basis, such that if the indices are down 50% 13.5 years from now - another 17% from today's levels - then Berkshire will have to pay $18.5 billion (half of the $37 billion maximum). That would be a painful loss, to be sure, but one that Berkshire could easily afford: the company's earning power today exceeds $10 billion per year and, as of the end of October, its net worth exceeded $111 billion, both figures that will be much higher more than a decade from now.
It's also important to understand that the loss in this doomsday scenario would not be $18.5 billion minus $4.85 billion because Buffett can invest the $4.85 billion for the entire period. If he earns a mere 7% return for 13.5 years, $4.85 billion becomes $12.1 billion (at a more likely 10% annually, it would be $17.6 billion).
I find this unconvincing, because Tilson ignores the fact that Buffett's investments are highly correlated with the stock market as a whole. Even the biggest Buffett fan, I think, would have a certain amount of difficulty swallowing the idea that Buffett can get a +10% annualized return on his $4.85 billion over a long period of time in which the stock market falls by 50%.
I don't think the equity puts come anywhere near to threatening the future of Berkshire Hathaway. But equally, I'm not at all sure they were such a great deal for Buffett: not only did he write puts at the top of the market, but he also invested the up-front premium at the top of the market as well, raising a significant possibility that he would lose money on both the puts and his investments simultaneously.
Disclosure: Author has no position.
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This article has 10 comments:
Sure, looking back, the puts were not such a great idea. But even WORST case--all pertinent indexes down to ZERO--would reduce future book value of BRK by 15 to 20 percent. An unpleasant, but far from disastrous scenario. But then again, no one expects the indexes to go to ZERO.
Does this guy read the annual reports? Sure, BRK's EQUITY INVESTMENTS are highly correlated to the market. But in recent years the company's income from its operating businesses far outweigh the growth in equity investments. And the Operating businesses are doing just fine.
Focusing on the put option issue is like the guy who is unable to enjoy the Christmas lights because he is so distracted by the one string that is not lit.
9% of outperformance per year shows that Buffett can likely earn back the entire loss with the upfront $4.5B alone. And that's assuming that the market is still down 50% in 14 years.
this article is nonsense...
Of course BRK could have made more money selling puts today, but their invested capital/collateral is zero, meaning as long as stocks don't stay low for 20 years whatever profit they make will equal an infinite ROIC.
Disclosure: I'm not a Buffet or Berkshire fan.
jegan
Could you return the favor? Thank you.
On Nov 26 02:05 AM najdorf wrote:
> Alex: As has been discussed many times, they're European-style puts,
> exercisable only as expiration. The whole point of the investment
> was that the length of the option prevented any short-term market
> risks. BRK has sold someone an insurance policy against long-term
> stock market depreciation. As always, the company continues to operate
> as a moderately bullish long-term stock-market investor that attempts
> to take short-term volatiiity or risk in order for long-term profits
> in excess of what it will have to pay out in insurance.
>
> Of course BRK could have made more money selling puts today, but
> their invested capital/collateral is zero, meaning as long as stocks
> don't stay low for 20 years whatever profit they make will equal
> an infinite ROIC.
If your reference to liability is made in the accounting sense, you're sort of correct.*
However, in the economic sense, I don't see how you can separate these issues** -- after all, the mark-to-market value of these puts _has_ to take into account the huge embedded exposure to BRK credit risk. If BRK blows up, the maximum value of these puts is whatever collateral BRK had to put up -- and that's not much, even in a drawn out, gradual downgrade-type situation.
*-Kind of like how GM's bonds may have to show up on their books at par, even if they're trading in the market at cents on the dollar (and in theory, GM could go out and buy them in the open market at that level and retire them)
**-I'd maybe agree with the general principle that CDS markets are more illiquid/more likely to be distorted, etc