GE at a Crossroads: Business Model Becoming Obsolete 17 comments
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Last week, GE (GE) Money India decided to shut down 50% of its branch network, effectively abandoning lofty plans to aggressively expand its $1.1 billion retail lending portfolio; the company’s management did not disclose data on forecasted loan delinquencies in an environment where huge segments of India’s middle class are confronting, for the first time in India’s history, the evils of leverage on family balance sheets. Almost simultaneously, GE's India unit announced that it was relying on the prospects of selling windmills, steam turbines and diesel locomotives to meet its 2010 revenue target of $8 billion.
Is India a precursor of GE’s future in the sense that GE’s internationally diversified business model is fast become obsolete?
This week, Fitch cut it ratings outlook for Thailand’s Bank of Ayudhya, in which General Electric holds a 33% stake, due to heightened political risk; the bank’s share price has, in any event, declined significantly in the wake of the political turmoil in the country. Twenty thousand General Electric workers in the United Kingdom were recently warned about forthcoming retrenchments due to worsening economic conditions. Given the sharp falls in oil prices, it is highly unlikely that GE’s $8 billion joint venture with the Abu Dhabi Investment Agency (Mubadala Development), announced in July, will make any contributions to improve 2007 revenues ($5 billion) from the Middle East.
The list of “qualitatively compromised” non-US assets goes on and on; General Electric operates in more than 100 countries. What is abundantly clear is that the company is betting on a significant turnaround in the global economy in late 2009. If that turnaround is delayed, General Electric simply cannot meet revenue benchmarks in its latest guidance reports. But, more critically, will stability, if and when it materializes, within the global business spectrum come at an exceedingly high price for numerous post-WW II multinational business models in terms of a long overdue rationalization in both, disposable incomes and national growth rates in the emerging markets?
The emerging markets contributed 20% to GE’s 2007 revenues; in its report accompanying the 2007 financial statements, the company confidently predicts that emerging-market revenues will grow from $33 billion (in 2007) to $50 billion in 2010. But, upon closer scrutiny, that 50% increment falls squarely into the highly speculative category; on the contrary, management will find it a challenge preserving revenues close to the $25 billion mark in 2010. For example, the $8 billion India target appears grounded primarily on hope and optimism.
One the one hand, given well-known inefficiencies in the Indian bureaucratic machinery, there is absolutely no reason to believe that any major government-baced, energy-related projects will be implemented (as opposed to being announced) in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the present government is not likely to be in power after mid-2009, and the coalition expected to take power in New Delhi has absolutely no credible green agenda whatsoever.
This is not the forum to enter into too much detail on several underlying economic emerging-market trends which, in the opinion of this writer, will thoroughly destroy the risk-reward parameters which have justified American investments in the emerging markets for nearly five decades. In the briefest of terms, access to government bailout facilities regardless, GE’ foreign investments must pressure its share price in the weeks and months ahead. And, in view of the highly uncertain impact on domestic asset values of Washington’s stimulus packages, no mathematical assessment of the company’s US business is possible at this point.
But look for renewed tensions between two ends of the valuation spectrum, between those who are convinced that GE’s multinational business model is no longer tenable (and requires deliberate contraction almost immediately) and those who continue to regard this global recession as a cyclical event with a life-span of 12-18 months. This writer will again start executing short General Electic trades Monday morning, with a comfortable first-half 2009 target of $10, and below.
Disclosure: Author holds a short position in GE
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I would rather see the shutting down of non contributing lines-as a positive sign for proper opeartional navigation.
Most of the most dire forecasts seem to be already priced in. In 2007 GE was trading at well over 40, now it is barely above the mid-teens.
The domestic infrastructure stimulus package being proposed by Obama is likely to benefit GE immensely. It is also risky to bet on current liquidity issues, which is the prime reason for sudden and violent contraction in global share price decline, to remain at these levels for an extended period of time.
The author seems to read too much into the near-term perturbations such as those in Thailand. These may not last more than a few days, let alone have a perceptible impact on earnings.
In my opinion, GE is a much safer bet in this market than most other equities. When the markets recover, GE stock will recover the fastest.
Having said that, why bother with this mish-mash of a dinosaur. Why not buy focused companies that can deliver. Buy the best company out there (with no debt and a business moat) that meets the separate parts of GE. You will do much better when the economy rolls out.
Wouldn't it be better to own Boeing than the GE aerospace. How about Wells Fargo if you want a bank. ABB, Siemens or HAL if you want construction and engineering.... And well... Forget the household appliance part.
Happy motoring!!!
jegan ;-)
The GE Money Bank on the international scope is good idea. It is needed in many nations where banking is either: crooked or non-existent. Or sometimes just not up to the times. If GE does not stick to the plan here. It will be future loss.
I'll bet he's got a couple of PUTs (maybe only one) for Jan and Feb...contracts under $1.00...gotta have a little more ba--s when you make strong bearish statements like this.
So he thinks GE should be priced just like GM ..how about saying something about GMs business model!
Simply put...if the US consumer cuts their spending by 1/3 or even 1/2...we are speaking of 3-5 trillion of year on year reductions. There are not enough emerging countries, new products or fancy marketing campaigns that will be able to make up that amount over the course of 12 months.
Even though I'm not a big short fan, I do recognize the necessity of that force in a free market. Clearly the good should be rewarded and the weak weeded out...that's how economies thrive.
As far as GE goes, they dodged a huge bullet on their AAA rating when they announced yet another change in their structure....but specifically outlined their reduction on the dependence of GE Capital for earnings. The sad part of this announcement was that it would happen anyway...whether they planned for it or not.
The stock will at least retest the lows in the mid-12's, but probably will go a bit lower before bottoming out. By that time, perhaps the board will have a more objective view of the anemic performance of GE's leadership and set some new expectations. The shareholders have expressed their dissatisfaction for some time now...unfortunately, the timing of any change is now at the worst possible time (another consistent "core value" of leadership it appears). Well good luck out there....and good hunting.
On Dec 07 08:29 PM Chemist29 wrote:
> What is GE's competitive advantage? Cost of capital. GE borrows money
> cheaper than even Berkshire Hathaway because of its credit ratings,
> this low cost of capital allows GE to finance companies buying of
> the big ticket items like locomotives, turbines, etc etc, thereby
> giving a steady revenue stream which supports the ratings. How is
> that a flawed model?
On Dec 07 08:29 PM Chemist29 wrote:
> What is GE's competitive advantage? Cost of capital. GE borrows money
> cheaper than even Berkshire Hathaway because of its credit ratings,
> this low cost of capital allows GE to finance companies buying of
> the big ticket items like locomotives, turbines, etc etc, thereby
> giving a steady revenue stream which supports the ratings. How is
> that a flawed model?