Market Prices: The Great Chasm 8 comments
-
Font Size:
-
Print
- TweetThis
At first, I was going to title this article "The Great Divide," which somehow sounds catchier… but just doesn’t have the right connotation. "Divide" suggests a gap that is difficult to bridge, whereas "Chasm"... well now, that's a place things fall into.
Back in June, my thinking went like this: If the “sub-prime” debacle is worse than realized, and if consumer discretionary spending (XLY) is at least correlated to home valuations, then wouldn’t there be more downside to the spending index, as well as the broader markets (IYY, SPY), as investors connect the dots?
Now fool me once, shame on me… fool me twice shame on… wait, no…
Anyway, in the search for a real estate bottom, many folks are missing the huge disconnect between low-end properties that are selling at rock bottom anyway you slice it, and high-end properties that haven't even corrected yet.
Since global market meltdowns are a tricky thing, we can let smarter pundits debate variables like illiquidity, de-leveraging, energy costs, unemployment, consumer spending, deficit spending, and market psychology… but regarding the big one - capitulation - dude, what’s everyone smoking, and where can I get some?
I cringe when folks talk about the inevitability of the subprime collapse. Not so much because it evokes a lame, Monday-morning, holier-than-thou, I-can’t-stand-you, do-you-even-annoy-yourself-when-you-speak-like-that sort of feeling, but rather because of how glaringly obvious it spotlights the rest of the iceberg.
Today, my thinking goes like this: If the “prime” debacle has not even happened yet, and if the market hasn’t baked this in, then wouldn’t there be more downside?
A huge percentage of homeowners, in the $750k to $2m market, have ARMs. None have re-set yet. They will.
Prime loan re-sets potentially pose a triple whammy threat of payment shocks:
Conversion to principal-and-interest (from interest-only).
Forced re-amortization over 25 years, not 30.
Margins that immediately increase the fully indexed rate.
An $800k loan re-set that forces payments to re-amortize to principal- and- interest (from interest-only) over 25 years goes to $4,912 (from $3,667)… that’s $1,245/mo higher - and that’s with the same interest rate.
Some loans allow five more years of I/O payments after switching to adjustable, but keep in mind they will be re-amortized later over 20 years (not 25, not 30).
Some marginal folks will need to sell. And when they do, since there is exactly zero market for making loans in this segment, people will face increasing pressure to get out. And that’s with LIBOR staying low. Longer term rates could double.
We just saw the blueprint of how this plays out in “subprime”. It is not a socio-demographic thing, but rather a math thing. “Prime” homes will also decline in value. My call is 35%-40% off peak prices. Only this time, the real drivers of economic stimulus, the small business class, will cut back spending for real. And lay people off. And cash out investments. And sell assets below value.
And, speaking of assets, what about those shady Level III assets that banks are using to understate exposure? Echemm!! (SKF)… excuse me.
Major banks who have just received unprecedented amounts of cash infusions to plug up cartoon-like, bullet-ridden lending ratios will have to address the fact that depreciation of portfolios to date only reflects subprime default-related losses.
Maybe I should have entitled this article, “Market Prices: Which Chasm is Greatest?”
Disclosure: no positions currently held
Related Articles
|






















This article has 8 comments:
I also see a wide gap between high and low-end market segments. As high-end falls from grace, some lower-end homes are trading below intrinsic value. I expect they will hold their own, or come up a bit to bridge the gap, as foreclosure displacement puts upward pressure on the rental market. Plus, while the historically low rates are only good for low-end purchases, it does present great buy and hold opportunities… especially now, while folks scramble to preserve their ass…ets.
other 'n that - i like your perspective.
Like Carl I lived through a real estate depression in Anchorage, AK during the late 80's. In a three year period from roughly 1986 through 1989, the total assessed value of ALL property in the Municipality of Anchorage fell by 35%, seven out of ten banks failed, and the population fell by 15%. Hmm, wonder if it's just a coicidence that TX and AK are both oil dependent.....
When I moved back to CA in 2002, I would occasionally mention my AK real estate experience to friends. Poeple would look at me like I was nuts and sneer that this is CA and therefore that could never happen here. Never say never....
Anyway, what I believe Paulson and Bernanke are NOT telling us is that there is still a massive wave of bank failures to come. This is the impending disaster behind the 'critical need' for TARP.