10 Stupid Moves That Created This Mess 32 comments
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1. Securitized Debt. Call it mortgage backed securities, CDOs, CDOs squared, CDOs cubed, CDOs quadrillionthed or whatever, but the process of those underwriting the risk not keeping the risk led to, well, lots of risk. All was fine and well while housing continued to climb, or at least appeared to be fine and well. You know the rest of the story.
2. Rating Agencies. The rating agencies were being paid to rate the securitized debt, and when you are paid handsomely to do something you do it. Seems the money making aspect of the process was perhaps the driver for some ratings that, at least in retrospect, were foolish at best. I don't care what tranch you are talking about, subprime mortgages, like liar loans and 100% LTV loans, never deserved triple A ratings or anything close.
3. Credit Default Swaps. Credit default swaps are to blame for AIG's demise. Otherwise they have not been the biggest player in creating the mess but may be the biggest player in cleaning it up. It would be nice to be able to let some of these players fold in an orderly fashion and support just those that survive. The problem is that the folding process will undoubtedly trigger some of the CDS contracts, which may result in taking down other entities in the process. With what was once estimated to be $62 trillion in CDS contracts in play, this is no small problem.
4. Commodity Futures Modernization Act. Try saying that five times real fast. While the act, which was enacted in 2000 in the final days of Clinton's presidency with no debate in either the House or the Senate, did various things, the key thing it did was legalize CDSs, which arguably were illegal before then. To the extent someone bought a CDS to protect them on a bond, for example, that was insurance and should have been regulated as such. To the extent the person buying the CDS had no interest to protect, they were simply betting that a company would default, which is gambling. The Commodity Furtures Modernization Act made sure CDSs did not get treated as insurance or gambling.
5. SEC. In 1975 a regulation was passed that limited the leverage certain financial institutions could take on, in relation to capital, to a 12-to-1 ratio. A few years ago the SEC provided an exemption to a handful of institutions, including Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch (MER) and Goldman Sachs (GS), allowing them to go up to 40-to-1. Oops.
6. Liar loans, 100% LTV loans, option ARMS and the like. Closely tied to the securitization issue was the scope of mortgage products being made available. People could get mortgages with no or minimal documentation, with no money down, with payments that did not even keep up with interest accrual and with poor credit ratings. If you could fog a mirror, you could get a loan. Those taking out these foolish loans, on the expectation that prices would continue to rise, are as much to blame as anyone.
7. The Fed. The Fed, under Greenspan, kept interest rates too low for too long following the dot com bubble burst. It also was a staunch advocate for deregulation and free market principles. Greenspan spoke openly on how CDSs for example, were good for the economy because of the reduced risk. Having $62 trillion in obligations out there waiting for the shoe to drop is not my version of reducing risk, but to each his own.
8. Special Purpose Entities. These are orphan companies set up by a company, such as a bank of financial institution, that keeps certain assets and/or risks off of the sponsoring entity's balance sheet. Financial institutions have been able to hide a great deal of loss this way. Enron is a prime example of how these off-balance sheet entities can be abused.
9. Ben and Henry. They downplayed the problems for far too long and when they did react their plans were poorly conceived and executed. We seem to be following the Japanese play book and everyone can see how well that worked out. Throwing money at the institutions that created the problem is not helping anyone but those institutions. We would be better off to stand in their shoes and lend the money instead of giving it to them and hoping they will lend (which of course they are not doing).
10. The Shadow Banking System. You know who they are. Some of them are gone and some have had to merge. Some have now agreed to change their form and be regulated. These entities went unregulated and self-supervised for way too long and we are all paying the price. Some of the problem here is their compensation scheme that handsomely rewards large profits, even when they are earned at the expense of future stability. These behemoths should be dismantled, but instead we are supporting their attempts to become bigger. Iceland learned what happens when financial institutions get to big to fail and too big to save, but we never learn.
This is by no means a complete list but it is a nice start. Feel free to make suggestions.
Disclosure: None.
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This article has 32 comments:
> jack
slowly. There is still some way to go.
The government said initially:
1. The crisis arose because of sub-prime lending in the US
2. Northern Rock's loan book was fine, but its dependence on
wholesale borrowing was at fault
Subsequently, it has emerged Northern Rock's Together mortgage [1]
was by no means the only bad lending occurring, so that the first
part of [2] was simply not correct.
Speaking at this year’s Council of Mortgage Lender’s annual
conference in London on Tuesday 2nd December, Vince Cable said,
“the admission came after a dinner two years ago from the chief
executive of one of the banks which is now part-nationalised.”
He said: “I had dinner with a chief executive of one of the now
recently part-nationalised banks and we argued for an hour about
his lending practices. Finally he accepted his bank’s lending was
foolish and dangerous, but he would have been sacked by his board
if he didn’t lend these mortgages.”
Cable told delegates that mortgage lenders were not the only ones
to blame for the current financial turmoil.
He said: “It is easy to point fingers, but the political class are
just as responsible for the situation. It has pursued irrational
owner-occupier aspirations with ridiculous religious fervour and
now the dream has burst very painfully.”
What we need to know is in what respect was the lending of the
banks 'foolish and dangerous'?
If the CEO of a large bank was aware of it two years ago, who else
knew?
On Wednesday 26th November 2008, in a debate in the House of Lords,
Lord Myners [Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury] said,
"foreclosures are higher in Northern Rock than in other mortgage
lenders because its lending was more irresponsible. It is as simple
as that."
Lord Turner, the FSA Chairman, had previously told the Treasury
Committee of the House of Commons on Monday 3rd November 2008 that, "looking at the average figures at that time, whether it was loan
to value ratios or whether it was the arrears' experience then
being experienced, you would not necessarily have seen Northern
Rock as an outlier in terms of quality of mortgages."
This seems to be the opposite of what Lord Myners is now saying.
Lord Myners is the first member of the government to admit that
there was an inherent weakness in the Northern Rock loan book,
though the description 'irresponsible' does not explain what the
weakness was.
The Council of Mortgage Lenders Housing Finance Issue [November
2005 "Trends in mortgage borrowers' repayment difficulties"]
explains, 'Married households tend to have the lowest incidence of
repayment difficulties, whereas divorce and separation tend to
increase mortgage repayment problems.'
Earlier research has suggested, 'You're more likely to get into
serious debt because your relationship fails than by
overspending........ A survey by Alliance & Leicester [in 2006]
show[ed] that people who are divorced or separated owe twice as
much as married people. A typical couple owes £5,200 on loans and
credit cards between them - an average £2,600 apiece - while
divorcees owe £5,000 each and the separated £6,300......... A [firm
of] insolvency practitioners ..... found that 30 per cent of people
with debt problems blamed divorce or relationship breakdown."
The financial crisis, both here in the UK and in the US, may well
have been triggered by excessive lending to cohabiting couples
whose relationships are significantly less stable than those of
married couples. The easy credit was a contributory factor, but
'irresponsible' lending which was 'foolish and dangerous' to the
increasing number of couples with unstable relationships was
probably the prime cause.
What is becoming clearer is that the crisis is not just a 'sub
prime' problem emanating from the US – as the government claimed at
first - nor is it caused in the UK simply by over dependence by
Northern Rock on the wholesale money market, nor is primarily the
result of the creation of sophisticated but unstable financial
instruments which have increased the availability of credit.
Since the taxpayer owns Northern Rock and the Bradford and Bingley,
and now has a majority holding in RBS, surely it is only reasonable
that these banks should reveal the marital status of those in
arrears with their mortgage payments?
If we are going to understand the real nature of the crisis, the
full facts should be published, not just a misleading subset of
them.
Maybe there should be a limit of how big a company can get and have healthy competition among medium size providers/suppliers.
God help us if Walmart asked for TARP money.
I await a meaningful analysis of who changed the rules and how to get them out of positions that allow them to screw-up again.
On Jan 01 09:15 AM CautiousInvestor wrote:
> What about the congress, HUD and the GSE's. In pursuit of social
> justice and eager to put more low-income and minority families into
> their own homes, HUD required that two government-chartered mortgage
> finance firms purchase far more "affordable" loans made to these
> borrowers. There were also accounting scandals within the GSE's and
> shortly before they broke the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
> Oversight (OFHEO)--the agency that regulates the GSEs--had pronounced
> Freddie's internal controls "accurate and reliable."
Yes we did it to ourselves, they did it to themselves by pricing themselves out of their own markets, the oil "crisis" fueled the flames that have been faning since before my birth. Best way to get out of it? Let the failures fail and rebuild out of the rubble, hopefully wiser and better planned.
Economic stimulus was a joke!! Seriously, unless you have 17 children what is $300 going to get you? ($600 if your married)...
Point 5, the SEC and leverage: The Crash of '29 was caused by allowing 90% margin (10:1 leverage). What did the bureaucrats expect when they allowed 40:1 leverage? "Those who fail to learn from history are destined to repeat it."
We have dishonest people in Washington. Of course, we've always known that.
This is widely quoted to total $62 trillion in notional value. These "insurance" instruments have been widely created and traded within the financial industry. Is it possible to set up an industry board that would allow for the negotiation among multiple parties to cancel a network of interrelated CDS to remove them from the system. An example:
A holds CDSs on debt obligations of B and C. B holds CDSs on debt obligations of A and D. C holds CDSs on debt obligations of A, B and D. D holds CDSs on debt obligations of C.
The network of interrelated CDSs will be much larger, but you should get the idea.
The industry board would establish a negotiating table for multiple party trading to cancel out CDSs.
Comments would be welcome on this idea. Does any one know if anything like this has been considered or is actually going on?
It seems to me that many firms would be happy to get rid of an obligation to pay for someones else's default in return for giving up their default protection, payment of which might be problematic.
The driving force was the desire to live beyond ones means. Therefore, the only long run solution is a combination of adjusting life style expectations and increasing real sustainable earned income levels.
Drive (use them) with care. We gonna get a lot of new traffic rules (regulation) coming soon. But the cars will not go away.
It's nice to go to a party and finally not having people ask why don't I own
This is why I never bought a place. Now everyone knows why.
Free markets are great at innovation and it's associated excesses. As someone said above, building debt on debt is just reckless excess, in my view. Its harmful in that it creates capital to fuel bubbles and debases our currency. It's okay to live a little beyond our means, but there has to be a gray line somewhere.
I believe stability and sustainability are key to creating real lasting wealth, versus these "quick buck" bubbles. Insiders tend to make it rich, they know when the thing will take off and when it's will burst. Most everyone else get's in and out too late.
We need regulation not to thwart money making innovations, but to keep them stable and sustainable. Transparency is only a part of the issue, surely one should know what one is buying. But limiting the potential of such instruments in creating voluminous amounts of new debt money is key, too. The enslavement of consumers in fractional banking with lots of easy credit is both boom and bust. And, the period bust hurts too much to validate efficiency or desirability of bubble economies.
On Jan 01 08:16 AM john s. gordon wrote:
> right on.
In my hometown, once-nice condo complexes are undergoing change. Repossessed or still-owned, they're increasingly being rented to Section 8 subsidized renters: better a guaranteed monthly payment than infrequent ones or even months of non-payment. Condos and houses are being bought by HUD, about the only buyer in town, which brings professional dole recipients into workers' areas. In all these cases, the crime and decay associated with government housing is metastasizing into previously normal communities. Thanks, Uncle Sam.
"But those that believe in totally unregulated markets, like to blame it all on their favorite red herring -- low income people."
I'm old enough to remember a time when most people knew that ad homimim attacks were a poor excuses for a reasoned argument. But, since that's the new standard, I might as well get down with everyone else: work on your reading comprehension, Hoover. Neither Cautiousinvestor nor I were "blaming" low income people.We were blaming the politicians for their misguided idea about how to treat low income people. And since you know the exact percentage of the problem that consists of "social justice" (whatever that is) loans, why didn't you share it with us? And how do you know that either of us believes in "totally unregulated markets? Do you think that because we can see where that particular kind of regulation led us that we therefore believe in no regulation at all? I'm surprised that someone as smart as you could make such a fundamental logical error.
We never fail to learn from the past! We need regulations which would alleviate more ownership from the US Government. It is strange how everyone thought that Mr. Greenspan was such a genius!! We all know that George W was never elected to be our President. Let us all hope that we are in for a change but a mess for President-elect Obama to clean up or whoever would have been elected!
On Jan 01 12:12 PM Aryamehr wrote:
> As a mortgage banker I saw it all. In 1998 I decided to enter the
> mortgage lending business for a third time. Initially wholesale lending
> worked its cogs, according to the prevailing market parameters. Securitization
> as intended brought about the efficiencies purported by those free
> market advocates of deregulation and the world took heed. As we now
> know securitization of the mortgage industry was on the 'menu de
> fare' of almost every member of the OECD countries. During this same
> period the 'world's central bank,' the Federal Reserve, and I say
> this with emphasis, took a reckless glide path towards lower interest
> rates, even when small bubbles began to manifest themselves in the
> latter part of 2003. The Economist magazine did a perfect job of
> heralding a brewing bubble, however most of those in the financial
> community continued to enjoy the party under its host, Mr. Greenspan.
> Since Mr. Greenspan was given complete latitude under his supervisor,
> Mr. Bush, a nincompoop of the first order; probably and hopefully
> the only one in US history. To make matters worse traditional lending
> standards were compromised: lenders no longer were obligated to hold
> on to the MBS and the CDO they created, once the loans were originated
> they were sold off to disparate investors; AIG, GE, Pension Funds,
> Private Hedge Funds, the GSE’s (FNM & FRE) and many Foreign Investors.
> The investors hedged their losses by buying credit default swaps
> (CDS) under the presumption that this instrument insured them against
> any possible defaults. This all worked well so long as the assets
> they were securitizing performed, however you would have to be an
> idiot to believe real estate values would continue to climb at 20%
> a year while most peoples wages were barely keeping up with the artificial
> rate of inflation (2-3%). In retrospect the media didn’t take much
> time to promulgate the underpinnings of an investment community gone
> wild. The dominos began to fall; Countrywide, Bear Stearns, Lehman
> Brothers, Indymac, Uncle Freddie and Aunty Fannie, AIG, Washington
> Mutual, Wachovia et al. To put things in a laconic perspective: what
> these entities did was create conduits off their balance sheets called
> structured investment vehicles (SIVs) that allowed them to avoid
> banking and insurance regulators. The Banking and Insurance industry
> have rules and regulations that would have barred a lot of the business
> practices that took place had the regulators done their jobs, however
> allowing the financial community to do as they please under the pretext
> of financial innovation is what got us into this mess. Now that the
> underpinnings of this feeding frenzy have been divulged we know that
> CDS are not ersatz forms of insurance and ABS absent of traditional
> governance and regulation are very risking investments. Had it not
> been for the Tax payer benevolence under the troubled asset relief
> program (TARP), I would surmise that the entire financial community
> would have been brought to their knees and the mighty dollar would
> have been toppled from its vaunted mantel. Nevertheless, the bail
> out will do its job, given sufficient time but the financial community
> will need to go through a metamorphosis, from opacity to unequivocal
> transparency if faith in these surviving entities is to be restored.
Nominal GDP is measured by monetary flows (means-of-payment money times it's rate of turnover). The only valid velocity figure (bank debits) was discontinued in 1996. I.e., all transactions cleared thru demand deposits except for Mutual Savings Banks. MSB's are a story in themselves (they are thrifts, not commercial banks).
It is actually mathematically impossible to miss economic forecasts. And the proof that the FED is ignorant stems from their statements that there are variable economic lags. I.e., all economists are stupid.
See William McChensey Martin’s monetary policy during the Korean War, i.e., before deregulation:
Stock market margin requirements were raised from 50% to 70%, Regulation W (housing), The Board used its power to regulate real-estate credit by fixing down payments at from 10 to 50 per cent of the value of the residential property. (The higher the price of the property the larger the proportionate down payment) and setting the maximum maturity at 20 years. Installment credit down payments were set at 10.5% to 33.3% with maximum maturities limited to 15 months. These were restrictions that led this country to a decade of prosperity, growth and low inflation.
Liar loans, by the way, are NOT instruments..They were intiated by Congressional pressure on FNMAE to increase home ownership among groups that had NO business buying homes..this was seen as a great opportunity by Real Estate agents to "assist" (help them lie) clients in applications to loan officers who had phony appraisers seal the deal..NO INSTRUMENTS! ALL PEOPLE!
On Jan 01 06:35 PM Gtarras wrote:
> I believe all the blame people put on the instruments in the article
> are similar to blaming a car in a traffic accident.
>
> Drive (use them) with care. We gonna get a lot of new traffic rules
> (regulation) coming soon. But the cars will not go away.