How Did Satyam Get Away with It? 9 comments
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How Did Satyam Fool The Auditors?
One would think that with the number of business frauds, Ponzi schemes and other financial deceptions exposed over the last decade that auditors would have a more skeptical and cautious attitude.
The Satyam (SAY) case is particularly perplexing when considering one of the major fraud aspects of the case. Satyam reported cash balances of approximately $1.11 billion when in fact they had 94% less, or only around $66.6 million.
What makes this fraudulent reporting of cash balances so strange is how the auditors could possibly miss over a billion dollars. Verifying cash balances is a routine step in the audit process. In addition, routine "topside" analytical procedures are usually employed to verify that a large number on the balance sheet makes sense.
For example, if a company reports a cash balance of $1 billion dollars, does that cash balance look reasonable compared to the interest income reported? A quick check on what rate of interest the company was earning should have resulted in determining if the interest income the company reported from its cash holdings was reasonable. Perhaps Satyam fraudulently inflated the income earned on their phantom cash as well, in which case this procedure may not have led to suspicion. A routine financial audit is not conducted with the intention of discovering management fraud.
Verifying cash balances, however, is an entirely different matter. Cash balances are easily verified by sending a balance confirmation request directly to the banking institutions in which the cash is held. Cash confirmations are a simple and routine audit procedure. A company holding over $1 billion in cash and conducting business worldwide would have accounts with many different banks. The odds of having someone at many different banks intercept and falsify a bank confirmation is highly unlikely; so how did the auditors miss $1 billion?
The most plausible explanation is that the auditors did not comply with standard audit procedures. Once the bank confirmations are prepared by the auditors, procedure requires that they be taken directly to the postal service by the auditors. Instead, I suspect that a very cooperative and friendly staff at Satyam offered to take care of mailing the bank confirmations, thereby saving the auditor the extra effort of independently mailing the confirms. This breakdown in a routine audit procedure most likely resulted in the bank confirms never being mailed to the banks. The confirmations were retained and fraudulently completed by Satyam, and then mailed back to the unsuspecting auditor. The doctored confirmations examined by the auditors matched what the company said they had in cash and everyone was satisfied.
Result: simple audit rule violated and huge fraud goes undetected.
Disclosure: no positions
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This article has 9 comments:
Create a ficticous bank statement using photoshop. Tell your auditors the bank is in a bank haven jurisdiction way out of the way from civilization (on one of the british or dutch virgin islands perhaps) and when the confirm is never returned, because there is no bank there, then give the auditors the photoshopped bank statement. Now see how easy that was.
And to your question on the interest income - they created a ficticous interest receivable for I believe i heard 72 million USD to cover that. The age of the receivable would have been a major tell, but they may have covered up, not sure.
Kind regards
Ctrip's accounts receivable, investment are all inflated!!!!
A word for author:- A factual information provides more credibility then an assumption. Only purpose an assumption serves is to mislead the audience.
Tell me - does Satyam by any chance have an autocratic md?
I would submit, that the audit standards are actually well written and what is needed is not more standards, but instead auditors need to understand how confirmation fraud happens and update their confirmation processes to limit the risk of confirmation fraud. If auditors would actually validate where they are sending the confirmations and authenticate the authorization and identity of the person who responded to the confirmation, or use a service like Confirmation.com which does that for them, then we as a profession can reduce our exposure to frauds involving fake confirmations. Otherwise frauds involving fake confirmations - like Parmalat, Satyam, Ahold, Take-Two Interactive, Just-for-Feet, CF Foods, ZZZZ Best and others - will continue to happen.
Brian Fox, CPA
confirmation.com