John Hussman: Applying Ockham's Razor to the Current Crisis 9 comments
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Excerpt from the Hussman Funds' Weekly Market Comment (1/26/09):
There is a time-honored principle called Ockham's Razor, which states that the explanation for any phenomenon should focus only on the essential and relevant elements, avoiding as many unnecessary “second-order” factors as possible. Albert Einstein put it this way: “A theory should be a simple as possible, but no simpler.”
There is certainly a wide range of important programs and objectives that the new Obama administration was elected to pursue, including investments in alternative energy, infrastructure, health care, and other programs. But from the standpoint of economic stimulus, Ockham's Razor suggests that we will fail as a nation to address the current economic crisis if we fail to address the source of that crisis. Again, this means focusing first on bank capital and mortgage foreclosures.
Although the troubled assets relief program (TARP) was originally based on an ill-considered idea to purchase distressed assets directly from financial institutions, the Treasury somewhat inadvertently discovered what we had strongly argued from the beginning – that providing capital directly to financial institutions was the most effective use of TARP funds. (see You Can't Rescue the Financial System if You Can't Read A Balance Sheet). Unfortunately, neither Treasury nor Congress has made an attempt to address foreclosure abatement. Without that, financial institutions will face a continued need to replenish capital, and far more Americans than necessary will lose their homes.
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In short, the essential problem is not “insufficient aggregate demand” but rather risk-aversion and anticipatory saving triggered by fear of financial instability. Ockham's razor cuts straight to bank capital and foreclosure risk. We can address a much wider range of interests in the cause of economic stimulus, but if we fail to address the central cause of the present economic crisis, the attempt to increase “aggregate demand” will predictably fail.
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Let them go out of business or merge. Even having the government nationalize the Banking industry might not be such a bad idea and might be the only way to economically get rid of excessive baggage in this industry. MarvinMBA
If you want a good example of government making financing horribly wrong look at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. They are still buying mortgage bonds from banks that will inevitably default. They were also at the crux of programs to direct banks to sell mortgages to low income families that turned into selling to people they knew couln't pay their mortgage in the long run. And they abused their tacit consent that the government would make good on all of their paper to grow out of control.
Sadly all those that took TARP money are in essence nationalized, because 1) the government won't let them go broke 2) they must do anything the government says now 3) they are all kissing Fed Treasury and Congressional butt to do anything for more free cash. Thus these banks are already becoming more like eunuchs chasing royalty around in a forbidden castle to see what they can steal than businesses considering the outside economic factors.
It's true that we need to address the cause of the problem and not merely the symptoms. The cause of the problem is not people's fear of financial instability. This is a relatively recent phenomenon, caused by layoffs and bank failures. The problem has been caused by the bank's failure to lend, which was caused by the opaque debt structures on their balance sheets.
As you point out, you can't fix the financial system if you can't read a balance sheet. This is precisely the problem: Financial institutions can't read their balance sheets because of the opaque and questionable securities that are on them.
Yet, you object to removing the offending organ:
> an ill-considered idea to purchase distressed assets directly from
> financial institutions, the Treasury somewhat inadvertently
> discovered what we had strongly argued from the beginning –
> that providing capital directly to financial institutions was the
> most effective use of TARP funds.
OK, so the banks can borrow money from the Fed, but they *still* don't know what's on their balance sheets, and are therefore have incentive to use the money to increase shareholder equity against the big unknowns on their balance sheet, rather than lend the money.
The cause of the problem is that the banks have stopped lending, pulling vast amounts of money out of the economy. A review of the economic data clearly shows this process beginning back in 2006 (you can check the Fed's G20 data), long before there was any fear of financial instability.
You're right, we need to fix the cause of the problem. It's not foreclosures which, while huge from an individual perspective, are a drop in the bucket of the larger economy. As long as the banks can't evaluate their own balance sheets due to the opaque debt on them, they can't lend in a fiscally responsible manner.
I assure you that getting the bad debt off of the books of the banks is not ill-considered, but was in fact thought through very carefully. The problem is that it was unpopular to a broader (and largely uneducated in economic matters) public that doesn't want to help the people that got us into this mess. But that's just rhetoric. We still need to clear-up the balance sheets off the banks so that they can be properly valued and begin lending again.
Resumption of lending will inject far more capital into the economy than the government (read taxpayers) can do on their own.
There is an well-written primer on the subject at:
seekingalpha.com/artic...
The other HALF that was forgotten was MARKET-MARKET accounting. Put yourself in the banks shoes. Why in the world would you loan out capital when you may need to market your assets down and need the very capital you just loaned out? You wouldn't and neither will the banks.
Moreover, if its hard enough to know whats on your books there is no way in the world your going to trust whats on another banks books. Hence, no lending.
If we had MARKET-MARKET accounting in the early 90's with the S & L
crisis not a single bank would have survived.How much capital has to be destroyed before someone somewhere realizes to either take a time out or eliminate MARKET-MARKET.
The essential problem is that many banks are, in reality, insolvent.