Roubini's Wacky Wells Loss Estimate: It's Not Just Academic 16 comments
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Commenting on our piece yesterday that pointed out that Nouriel Roubini botched his arithmetic in tallying Wells Fargo’s expected cumulative loan losses, reader T e-mails, and provides a succinct summary of conventional wisdom among the bears:
The main points of this discussion are that WFC’s ultimate charge-offs cannot be predicted with a high level of confidence. Dr R’s estimate is within the realm of possibility, whether his math was correct or not.
It is also interesting to note that it does not wipe out Wells, but certainly will require some dilutive capital raising.
Dr. R is also correct, as we pointed out, that WFC is no longer a super well capitalized [bank] after doubling assets in this acquisition.
So whether Roubini screwed up the math or not, his number is nonetheless “within the realm of possibility” since the future is unknowable. Anything could happen! That’s true, I suppose. But only in the most profoundly trivial way: the Roubini’s loss estimate is possible because anything’s possible. Rigorous!
If Roubini had come up with his bogus number as a purely academic exercise, to be debated among his colleagues down at NYU, I’d have no argument with T’s point, or any problem with what he has to say. I’ve certainly made my share of dumb mistakes putting together loss models.
But Roubini’s not just chin-pulling with other eggheads. Instead, he’s traipsing from media outlet to media outlet telling anyone who’ll listen that Wells Fargo—a federally guaranteed financial institution that you, dear taxpayer, would be on the hook for if Roubini’s rantings ever became a self-fulfilling prophecy—will shortly be on the verge of collapse. “Zombie” is his preferred term of art.
And now we see he has no basis to make that claim. He screwed up his math! And the best his defenders can come up with to support him is the anything-might-happen argument, above.
Sorry, not good enough. Roubini needs to a) pipe down about Wells, and b) fix his model pronto. He might also c) go back to the Journal and Time and all those other places and tell them he was wrong in the first place. But I somehow doubt that last is going to happen.
Disclosure: No position in WFC
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Careful about casting stones....
The author of the article simply took Dr. Roubini's rough-cut estimates on likely loan losses -- and personally applied them to the individual banks. I don't see evidence in the Time article that Dr. Roubini directly participated in this process.
If anything, his estimates are low, base don what's happening to portfolios like Alt A and jumbo loans right now.
At first, I thought your oversight was just a mistake, Tom. Now I think it's disgraceful. If you can't bother to get your own facts right, why should anyone believe what you write?
I have a dream...
"We relied on the loan-loss estimates of New York University professor Nouriel Roubini, a.k.a. Dr. Doom, who has been sagelike in his predictions about the credit crisis so far...
"Home buyers owe [Wells Fargo] $360 billion, up from about $150 billion just three months ago. Next, Wells has $154 billion in commercial real estate loans, as well as $200 billion in other types of commercial debt. Apply Roubini's overall 13% loss projection, and the conclusion is that Wells may be sitting on a $117 billion loss."
Roubini's not even quoted in the article. It is quite clear that any error here is not his.
On Feb 27 06:57 AM fatcat wrote:
> Think Mr. Brown needs to go back and read his own articles for the
> last year and a half....he was wrong all the time about the banks.
>
>
>
> Careful about casting stones....
Bottom line: It's tough business "guessing" what will happen to these banks - there are simply too many variables involved: how many more folks will become unemployed and not be able to pay their mortgages?; which banks will be the unlucky ones to have their loans impacted by the next "wave" of the unemployed?; to what extent will small or midcap (however we could define that now) or "mom 'n' pop" businesses with now weaker income statements be able to convince banks to extend new or replacement loans or lines of credit?; and if the bnaks do not lend for this reason, will their only income be limited to existing potentially risky or problem loans?; and when the stock prices of the banks reach certain low single digits will Moody's or S&P significantly reduce their credit status to "junk", like they did with WaMu, and thereby create an identical "run" on the deposits such as that which caused WaMu's Tier 1 melt-down and eventual seizure?; etc. ad infinitim, ad nauseum.
You can argue both sides, all aspects - endlessly. And each day brings a new piece of information which just adds to the quagmire analyses.
In the end I believe that all of these larger banks are "too big to fail" and that the federal government will continue to "prop them up" as needed; not that such will, in the long run count for much, as I see in all of this a much larger threat to the dollar and the basis of value in this country.
There is no doubt that we can continue to paint and reconstruct and refurbish and argue about the various structural aspects of those deck chairs...... In the end, Roubini may be right, if for no other reason, because he seems to be focused on the iceberg.
There is a possibility that the man is less than infallible...
Does he realize it?