Live Discussion: Treasury's Bank Recovery Plan 27 comments
-
Font Size:
-
Print
- TweetThis
At 2:30pm Eastern time today, we hosted a live discussion on the Treasury Department's recently-announced bank recovery plan. Panelists are the following 4 Seeking Alpha contributors, and here are links to posts they've written on the plan:
• Felix Salmon of Portfolio.com: Geithner's Doomed Bailout Plan • How Treasury's Bank Bailout Could Make Things Worse
• James Kwak, co-founder of The Baseline Scenario: The Toxic Assets Plan - Yes, It's a Subsidy • In Private/Public Partnership, Why Not Let the People In? • Geithner's Plan Isn't Money in the Bank (@ LA Times)
• Brad DeLong, professor of economics at the University of California at Berkeley, former deputy assistant secretary of the U.S. Treasury: The Geithner Plan FAQ • Why I Think Paul Krugman Is Wrong
• Mark Thoma, faculty, Economics Dept., University of Oregon: The Geithner Plan: Will It Work and How to Tell • Which Bailout Plan Is Best
You can replay the entire discussion in the box below.
~ Mick Weinstein, SA Editor-in-Chief
Related Articles
|






















This article has 27 comments:
seekingalpha.com/artic...
Why wouldn't a private investment fund assume that it will be the target of future populist outrage, and become a target for clawback legislation down the line?
Absent any guarantee on the part of the government that private funds with which it co-invests will not be subject to confiscatory legislation in the future, I don't see why a fund would choose to participate in this.
How long before the Dollar crashes?
Max
seekingalpha.com/artic...
On Mar 24 10:21 AM Armin Stuk wrote:
> Just planking a trillion bucks on the table doesn't necessarily mean
> whether it's spring overall or resolving the banking crisis will
> suddenly become any faster. In recent weeks, President Obama and
> Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner have come under fire from US lawmakers
> and Wall Street for being slow in coming up with a detailed plan,
> though.
Brad DeLong should never be invited to one of these again...he was obviously distracted, treated the discussion as a joke, used in-phrases and obscure acronyms rather than trying to be understood, name-dropped, and dissed the heartland of the country. His contribution was less than zero, negative. It's difficult to see why he agreed to participate.
Part 1 – private party buys bank stock (which is holding toxic assets) and/or options cheap.
Part 2 – private party purchases toxic assets from said bank(s) via treasury program with participation and guarantee by Treasury and FDIC. The private party pays high or par value for toxic assets to ensure that lots of money flows into the bank they now own and because their liability is limited to initial investment in the toxic assets.
Part 3 – bank gets rid of toxic assets and has massive inflow of payments (mostly from the government) to improve their balance sheet and value of stock rises dramatically.
Part 4 – private party takes loss on the toxic assets and tax payer picks up the losses.
Best solution? Buy NOW and take 100% risk AND participate with the Gvt in a few weeks time!
On Mar 24 02:07 PM Dave Friedman wrote:
> One thing I do not understand is this: what incentive does a private
> investment have to co-invest with the government?
> Why wouldn't a private investment fund assume that it will be the
> target of future populist outrage, and become a target for clawback
> legislation down the line?
> Absent any guarantee on the part of the government that private funds
> with which it co-invests will not be subject to confiscatory legislation
> in the future, I don't see why a fund would choose to participate
> in this.
Conversely , they can also decide to go short on a bank, buy CDSs' on that bank's stock, and refuse to make a realistic bid for the bank's toxic crap. This would require collusion with other hedge funds to be successful, but they do that anyway.
On Mar 24 03:50 PM observer2 wrote:
> Here's a thought on how this process gets twisted.
>
> Part 1 – private party buys bank stock (which is holding toxic assets)
> and/or options cheap.
>
> Part 2 – private party purchases toxic assets from said bank(s) via
> treasury program with participation and guarantee by Treasury and
> FDIC. The private party pays high or par value for toxic assets to
> ensure that lots of money flows into the bank they now own and because
> their liability is limited to initial investment in the toxic assets.
>
>
> Part 3 – bank gets rid of toxic assets and has massive inflow of
> payments (mostly from the government) to improve their balance sheet
> and value of stock rises dramatically.
>
> Part 4 – private party takes loss on the toxic assets and tax payer
> picks up the losses.
It is hard to forecast anything other than emotional response from the murky outlines we have.
Right now the biggest, most successful, most storied, biggest profit potential, biggest payroll teams are still paying for players like the World Economy is on an upswing. The Yankees just committed about $500 million to 3 players over the next 8 years(numbers may not be exact, but that's not the point). At the moment "who cares". These teams are still strong, baseball hasn't felt the crunch yet.
Lets say next year smaller teams(whose team salaries are 10-30% of the biggest) cut back, some teams even go under. The Yankees, Red Sox, Angels, Dodgers keep on overpaying for good, mediocre and even bad players compared to the other teams. Maybe they even buy some teams.
Let's say all of a sudden no one is going to games. Let's say the owners businesses in real life are tanking. Over the next 10 years small teams are on average on the hook for $100-$200 million dollars while the big teams are on the hook for $2-$5 billions of player contracts. The owners money and the money these teams made off of TV contracts and stadium and goods drys up.
All of a sudden we have the same situation we have with the banks. The big banks bit off more than they could chew and their costs(for banks loans) are just of such an immense number it overwhelms the cushion they started off yet.
SOOO...the multi-trillion dollar question is....Do you just wipe these teams out, wipe out the contracts and start over with new teams but with new names, new statdiums, new uniforms, etc???
Answer: Absolutely NOT.
I think nationalizing the banks will destroy the whole system. These economists don't seem to realize human beings interact with the markets. The fallout and panic that would be caused Nationalizing any of the big banks cannot be measured. Forget about starting over, it would be a full scale mess.
Don't forget, the bankers are going to be the same before and after nationalization. The top few people may change but no one has proved in any case they are more to fault than anyone else(ahem Congress...this means you).
Nationalization is a terrible idea and will crush profit power ALL banks. Regional and smaller banks will be crushed by runs as people irrationally lump all banks togeter. The only option afterwards will be to recreate large banks.
Not sure why laws and regulations can't be put into place with the system already. Restarting is assanine on every level.
Either way it looks like we could be months from seeing it unfold. These economists better get their appearance fees while they can. They could soon be the people holding the bag for the next leg of the crisis they help create.
This isn't Sweden with 5 banks and sane citizens. This isn't 10,20,30, years ago with no internet and press and blogosphere intent on rumor-mongering and promiting failure as opposed to solving problems.
Sorry, to be so frank but this last decade has been the biggest *ucking swindle ever perpetrated on a population in global history. If this is what being an American is, I am ashamed to call myself one.
To me the political side of the equation and the ramifications for the decision makers will likely extend beyond just being fired by the U.S. citizenship or being sued in a court of law.
On Mar 24 03:40 PM David Van Knapp wrote:
> Thanks to Brad and Felix...at least they tried to mount a discussion.
> Nice of Mark to drop in from his busy day.
>
> Brad DeLong should never be invited to one of these again...he was
> obviously distracted, treated the discussion as a joke, used in-phrases
> and obscure acronyms rather than trying to be understood, name-dropped,
> and dissed the heartland of the country. His contribution was less
> than zero, negative. It's difficult to see why he agreed to participate.
To have missed the fact that CDO^2 are not covered under the plan is huge. This is where most of the problem is. The AAA mortgage securities should be OK (will not lose 100%) but a CDO^2 AAA backed by BBB is 100% loss already.
This is part of the systemic problem in this country. People are too lazy to take the time to truly understand things and still feel they are qualified to talk about them. It is a diservice to everyone to allow this.
Moderate inflation will not solve the default problem. People are assuming that inflation will create wage increases, which it may but only if it is out of control. Otherwise, inflation will kill the middle class through reduced purchasing power and you still have a housing problem.
The only worthwile question (comments from observer2 and BIG AI45 are quality) was "[Comment From Steven]
Still wondering why there has been no administration discussion of bank bondholders versus taxpayers in absorbing bank losses? At a minimum we are owed an explanation, don't you think?"
And it wasn't even answered except for "scared to do that." If we are throwing out any risk in bank senior, sub or preferred, then the government might as well fund it all and make the income. Anything less is a farce.
I am Steven from the chat.
Here's a link to my story about today's discussion.
dailybail.com/home/no-...
The only worthwile question (comments from observer2 and BIG AI45 are quality) was "[Comment From Steven]
Still wondering why there has been no administration discussion of bank bondholders versus taxpayers in absorbing bank losses? At a minimum we are owed an explanation, don't you think?"
I was a little upset by some of his comments. Especially when he asked Felix not to use the word 'dishonest' and instead 'creative'.
Damnit, Brad. Dishonest is the correct word.
I'm sorry but it's true.
Read my rebuke of Delong in this piece.
dailybail.com/home/the...
The Great Unclog of 2009: Who's Bringing The Industrial Strength Drano.
Steve
Will it help recapitalize and return banks and credit back to health, probably not. Let's stop trying to stretch the inevitable pain by taking the strong medicine decisively now and put it behind us for good. At the end, bank creditors will have to share in the pain under an orderly restructuring.
This reasoning would not have applied to Fannie and Freddie, however, yet PIMCO and others were heavily into Fannie and Freddie bonds and I believe made out well.
The other reason I believe I read somewhere is that a lot of insurance companies hold these bonds and there is concern with their financial stability.
> I am Steven from the chat.
>
> Here's a link to my story about today's discussion.
>
> dailybail.com/home/no-...
>
>
> The only worthwile question (comments from observer2 and BIG AI45
> are quality) was "[Comment From Steven]
> Still wondering why there has been no administration discussion of
> bank bondholders versus taxpayers in absorbing bank losses? At a
> minimum we are owed an explanation, don't you think?"
>
>
On Mar 24 02:07 PM Dave Friedman wrote:
> One thing I do not understand is this: what incentive does a private
> investment have to co-invest with the government?
> Why wouldn't a private investment fund assume that it will be the
> target of future populist outrage, and become a target for clawback
> legislation down the line?
> Absent any guarantee on the part of the government that private funds
> with which it co-invests will not be subject to confiscatory legislation
> in the future, I don't see why a fund would choose to participate
> in this.
On Mar 25 01:30 AM The Daily Bail wrote:
> To be honest, and not to impugn Brad Delong, but I thought he sounded
> like a shill for the Treasury.
>
> I was a little upset by some of his comments. Especially when he
> asked Felix not to use the word 'dishonest' and instead 'creative'.
>
>
> Damnit, Brad. Dishonest is the correct word.
>
> I'm sorry but it's true.
>
> Read my rebuke of Delong in this piece.
>
> dailybail.com/home/the...
>
>
> The Great Unclog of 2009: Who's Bringing The Industrial Strength
> Drano.
>
> Steve
OK... did some back of the envelope math.... if the total amount that will be bought off the books of the banks is ~$1TLN and the monry requied from the investors is $30BLN then we are talking about leverage of roughly 33X for the investors.
So here is my question:
If you have massive exposure to corporate and bank bonds or are soverign wealth fund with a gigantic stake in Citibank, at what point is it worth it for your investment to grossly overpay for debt that will be cleared from the bank's books in order to have the downside liabilty owned by the fed and the company not have to write down the asset to a fair value?
With 33X leverage it really is not much if you are the tool from the Abu Dabi investment fund that bought 10% of Citi, right? If you dropped $2BLN and bought the debt at par (which it would not sell for half of in a real market) you could clear $66Bln of toxic waste from Citi's balance sheet by bidding par on the debt - Citi has no write down and your equity stake will appreciate by much more than the $2BLN you laid out. The Fed eats the whole loss on the debt and you paid $2bln to ensure Citi never goes into bankruptcy and has a massive increase in the stock price.
Even if you were to do it below par it would work... but if you had a big stake in a particular firm (or in bonds or preferred shares in a firm) that opened you to a massive exposure it would actually be optimal to pay as much as you could. For example, if you owned 10% of Citi and you actually paid over par you would see the extra you paid return 33X, and your return from an equity position would not only be the upside for the stock, you would actually be recapitalizing Citi with the excess you paid (in theory anyway).
Am I missing something? Even without collusion would it not be possible for an investor or group of investors to get together and game this?
Please be merciless with replies, I am trying to figure out how someone is going to screw the taxpayer, because you know it is going to happen.
Thanks!
I think your general train of thought is on the right track, but you should rework the back of your envelope with new numbers.