John Hussman: The Danger of Inaction 18 comments
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Excerpt from the Hussman Funds' Weekly Market Comment (3/30/09):
If there is any good news at present, it is that the capital infusions of late-2008 have temporarily stabilized the banking system, and that the U.S. economy is presently enjoying a brief and modest reprieve from the financial crisis. This is largely the result of an ebbing in the rate of sub-prime mortgage resets, which reached their peak in mid-2008, with corresponding mortgage losses and foreclosures a few months later. Since this crisis began, the profile of mortgage resets has been well-correlated with subsequent foreclosures.
Unfortunately, the reset schedule above depicts only sub-prime mortgages. As the recent housing bubble progressed, the profile of mortgage originations changed, so that at the very peak of the housing bubble, new originations took the form of Alt-As (low or no requirement to document income) and Option-ARMs (teaser rates, with no required principal repayments).
A broader profile of mortgage resets is presented below (though even this chart does not include the full range of adjustable mortgage products).
This reset profile is of great concern, because the majority of resets are still ahead. Moreover, the mortgages to which these resets will apply are primarily those originated late in the housing bubble, at the highest prices, and therefore having the largest probable loss. Though many of these mortgages are tied to LIBOR, and therefore benefit from low LIBOR rates, the interest rates on the mortgages are typically reset to a significant spread above LIBOR, and this spread remains constant as interest rates change. Undoubtedly, some Alt-A and option-ARM foreclosures have already occurred, but the likelihood is that major additional foreclosures and mortgage losses lie ahead. If we fail to address foreclosure abatement during the current window of opportunity (early to mid-2009), there may not be time for legislative efforts to contain the resulting fallout.
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This article has 18 comments:
Check it out...the Dow dropped 90% from 1929 to mid-1932. Think it couldn't happen again? The similarities between the '20's and the 00's is striking. These are the only two points in the last century we were ever so in debt.
Please stop saying socialized. Its a buzzword and it doesn't make you right just because you use it in your comments.
The world leaders at some point will realize, quicker than you silly people who can't comprehend things, that forgiving debt is the quickest and easiest way out of this mess. The damage is done, so eliminate the damage.
Of course a better framework and accountability are necessary to stop this from occurring again. But that is a far better outcome then a bunch of poverty and suffering in the name of sticking it to those who got us in this mess(when those people won't suffer anyway).
Its like getting through 20 levels of a video game, screwing up a level and instead of starting the level over and moving on you take the game console and punt it into the river. What's the point?
On Mar 30 04:49 PM clam75 wrote:
> Mr. Hussman, are you suggesting, then that the losses of the banks
> be socialized across the taxpaying base? Can you provide me a single
> reason that the losses shouldn't be internalized by the lenders and
> borrowers of the debt that encumbers these properties? The losses
> should be borne by those who are most responsible. Said another way:
> who had the best opportunity to avoid the losses that have accrued?
> The answer: the borrowers and lenders.
It is not so easy to write off the loans - the amounts are staggering. Who will take the losses, even the might US taxpayer can't handle 5 - 10 Trillion dollars. There is too much political backlash, would lead to class warfare (we might be heading that way anyway)
Yes I agree we need more accountability and punishments (debtor prisons), no recourse loans should be simply banned.
On Mar 30 10:20 PM CJJ wrote:
> Those people don't have the capital to shoulder the losses. I love
> how people think if you just bankrupt a few people and a few banks
> everything will be honky dory.
> Please stop saying socialized. Its a buzzword and it doesn't make
> you right just because you use it in your comments.
> The world leaders at some point will realize, quicker than you silly
> people who can't comprehend things, that forgiving debt is the quickest
>
I agree with your point, but I think unemployment going forward will be the "wild card" in this particular game. After all, even if the rate were to drop to 0%, it doesn't help much if the mortgage holder is unemployed. There seems to be a near unanimous consensus that we're not done, as far as rising unemployment goes....the only question being how high the spike goes, and how long it lingers.
On Mar 31 02:15 AM SB-tiger wrote:
> What the author is not telling is what the new reset rates likely
> to be. We know it is LIBOR + some constant. We can see LIBOR coming
> down (low interest rates + deflation etc etc). Will the net rates
> increase or decrease is the issue. If they increase (as they would
> for teaser or similar loans) – then we are in more trouble. However
> if it is a standard ARM then rate would actually decrease – that
> would be good for the borrowers.
If rates rise the resets will mean further housing devastation.
If rates can remain suppressed through the resets we get more of the capital destruction inherent with prolonged sub-market rates.
Twisting the markets to keep people in houses they cannot afford is economic "scorched earth" policy. We should have learned that by now.
And then google "Armageddon".
On Mar 30 04:49 PM clam75 wrote:
> Mr. Hussman, are you suggesting, then that the losses of the banks
> be socialized across the taxpaying base? Can you provide me a single
> reason that the losses shouldn't be internalized by the lenders and
> borrowers of the debt that encumbers these properties? The losses
> should be borne by those who are most responsible. Said another
> way: who had the best opportunity to avoid the losses that have accrued?
> The answer: the borrowers and lenders.
You make one point in particular that I've long believed but have not really seen written up elsewhere. That is, that the effort to save banks is misguided, and instead should be to identify and save critical investments (such as pension funds) within those banks. Certainly far less money, and much better directed towards general economic stability.
On Mar 31 09:26 AM old trader wrote:
> tiger,
>
> I agree with your point, but I think unemployment going forward will
> be the "wild card" in this particular game. After all, even if the
> rate were to drop to 0%, it doesn't help much if the mortgage holder
> is unemployed. There seems to be a near unanimous consensus that
> we're not done, as far as rising unemployment goes....the only question
> being how high the spike goes, and how long it lingers.