The Mark-to-Market Myth

By James Kwak

On Thursday, the Financial Accounting Standards Board voted - by one vote - to relax accounting standards for certain types of securities, giving banks greater discretion in determining what price to carry them at on their balance sheets. The new rules were sought by the American Bankers Association, and not surprisingly will allow banks to increase their reported profits and strengthen their balance sheets by allowing them to increase the reported values of their toxic assets.

This makes no sense, for three reasons.

1. Investors and regulators are not idiots. They know what the accounting rules are. If banks claim they were forced to mark their assets down to “fire-sale” prices, investors can look at the facts themselves and apply any upward corrections they want. Now that banks will be able to mark their assets up to prices based solely on their own models, investors will get the downward corrections they want. It’s a little like what happened when companies were forced to account for stock option compensation as expenses; nothing happened to stock prices, because anyone who wanted to could already read the footnotes and do the calculations himself.

However, the situation is not symmetrical, and the change is bad for two reasons. First, fair market value (”mark to market”) has the benefit of being a clear rule that everyone has to conform to. So from the investor’s perspective, you have one fact to go on. The new rule makes asset prices dependent on banks’ internal judgment, and each bank may apply different criteria. So from the investor’s perspective, now you have zero facts to go on. It’s as if auto companies were allowed to replace EPA fuel efficiency estimates with their own estimates using their own tests. We all know the EPA estimates are not realistic, but we can find out exactly how they were obtained and make whatever adjustments we want. If each auto company can use its own criteria, then we have no information at all.

Second, this takes away the bank’s incentive to disclose information. Under the old rule, if a bank had to show market prices but thought they were unfairly low, it would have to show some evidence in order to convince investors of its position. Under the new rule, a bank can simply report the results of its internal models and has no incentive to provide any more information.

So what we get is less information and more uncertainty. That was all reason number one.

2. Between the two options, this is the unsafe choice. Accounting in general is supposed to embody a principle of conservatism. Given plausible optimistic and pessimistic rules, you are supposed to choose the pessimistic one. But think about what happens here. Let’s say the bank has to mark to market, but it turns out the economy recovers and the asset increases in value. In this scenario, the writedown reduced the bank’s capital, so it had to get more. When the asset recovers, the bank is profitable and can buy back the shares it sold.

In the opposite scenario, the bank marks to its own imagination, but in reality the market price was the long-term price. At some point in the future, the bank will have to write down that asset, but it may not have the capital to absorb that writedown, in which case it will fail.

The choice is between the risk of raising too much capital and the risk of not raising enough capital. FASB chose the latter.

3. Mark-to-market is a red herring to begin with. Accounting rules are much more complex than “all assets must be marked to market” and “all assets can be marked to model.” There are different types of assets (Level 1, 2, and 3); different types of impairments to asset values (temporary and other-than-temporary); different accounting impacts (some writedowns on the balance sheet affect income statement profitability, some don’t); and, most importantly, different ways of holding assets. How a bank accounts for an asset depends in part on whether it says that asset is held for trading purposes, is available for sale, or will be held to maturity. Wharton has a high-level discussion of some of these issues, but if you really want to understand them you should read Sections 1.B-D of the SEC’s study of mark-to-market accounting, which I helpfully summarized for you in an earlier post.

The SEC’s conclusions were, in short:

• Most bank assets are not marked to market to begin with, and half of the ones that are marked to market are the type that don’t affect the income statement.
• Marking assets to market had only a very small impact on bank capital through September 2008.
• The bank failures of 2008, including Washington Mutual, were not caused by marking assets to market (increasing loan loss provisions were a bigger culprit). In each case, stock prices started falling before the banks took writedowns, implying that investors already knew something was fishy before the accountants did anything.

I don’t know any of the back-room dealing, but it seems like the banking industry is taking advantage of the confusion to push through a change it wants, because it will make it easier for banks to massage their balance sheets and harder for investors to see what is really going on.

Update: Here’s a thought. What if the function of these rule changes is to make it easier for banks to ignore the results of the PPIP auctions? For example, Bank A puts up a pool of loans for auction, but doesn’t like the winning bid and rejects it; Bank A doesn’t want to be forced to write down its loans to the amount of the winning bid. Or, alternatively, Bank B sells a security to a buyer, and Bank A holds the same security; Bank A doesn’t want to be forced to write down the security to the price of Bank B’s transaction.

The change to fair value accounting (Rule 157) may make it easier to claim that the sale by Bank B was a “distressed sale,” meaning it can ignore it for valuation purposes. Even if it can’t ignore the sale, the change to other-than-temporary impairment may make it easier for Bank A to classify any impairment as temporary and therefore avoid an income statement hit. You’d have to be a specialist to know the answers for sure, but in any case these rule changes don’t make it any harder.

Comments

[eieinli:]

"Investors and Regulators are not idiot". Are you trying to be funny?
Madoff, AIG, BAC, C, Dodd, Barney, Gaithner, Bernanke, and now:
et tu Brute Obama!!!

Apr 03 02:36 PM

[wobatus:]

The problem is regulatory capital requirements tied to mark to market. It has very little to do with what the accounting value of the assets is claimed to be.

Apr 03 04:06 PM

[Consider_this:]

RE is coming back this year, or soon; don’t doubt it.

With the new FASB mark to fantasy ruling, the following changes to key statistics is under way:

1. Banks capital ratio is now fantasy ratio, and will allow them to lend.
2. Banks can now hold onto REOs, indefinitely. There’s no incentive to sell at market. By holding REOs, banks can rate that REO asset at 2007 level. Sure they’ll have to put taxes and maintenance, but that’s going to be like a cost of business to keep 2007-model alive.
3. Similarly, Banks can now DRAGGG ON the NOD and foreclosure process. Expect things like allowing people to stay, semi-permantly (as in for months and years at a time), rent free; without any foreclosure NODs or auctions or what not. Next few months you’ll see a sharp decline in new foreclosures as the banks adapt.
4. Commercial RE (CRE) was going to be a bomb in 2009, because all those commercial loans are due and the market valuation means no bank will refi them. Well no more, we’re not using market valuation anymore, so those model all says these CREs are awesome profits, so there’ll be increased refi of CREs and the crisis averted.
5. With the new model, HELOCs may even be a viable source of credit for consumers now; Those on the margin may find banks offering HELOC now, the home ATM is now open!
6. Ditto to Credit Card ABSs, the model says much better profitability; In fact, there’ll be more solicitations for people to own more cards; coz the model says it’s such good business, plus the customer can use one card to pay off another — further enhancing default rate for their model!
7. The obvious is that all the bank’s financial releases for the rest of 2009 will beat expectation now. So now permabulls have ammunition to say recession is over.

Bears are fighting a losing cause with the deck to heavily stacked against them.

Are these going to be a permanent solution, or actually save us from impending doom? Heck no. It’s the same playbook from Japan that pretty much sealed their fate to the 20 year economic decline. *BUT* it’ll drag everything into SLOW MOTION decline.

Kinda like treating an acute disease that *MAY* kill you, by taking a poison that kills the bacteria and the short term disease problem, but guarantees you will die SLOWLY. We just did that.

I thought I could time the market and buy a house in 2010 or 2011; I can see my folly now. The govt will make it a money losing proposition to own a house for 20 years. The govt will stretch it out so long, so maximum number of people are bearing the housing decline and nobody can “time” and get “out” — in the end you need a place to stay, and that is their trump card.

I think I’m so depressed I’ll go jump off a bridge somewhere now.

Apr 03 04:31 PM

[Slim Shady:]

Thank you k9s - finally, somebody on this site who understands the real economic impact of unrealistic not so "fair value" accounting . The accounting wasn't the initial cause of the problem, but it has severely exacerbated the problem. Expanding on what you said about your home equity, how many of those staunch defendants of the current accounting rules would purchase a home with a mortgage if they were forced to mark the "value" of that home on a quarterly basis? Let's say their irresponsible speculator neighbor defaulted on his loan on a 500k property and the bank sold that house in foreclosure at a 50% discount. Even though the staunch defendant is current on his mortgage and has no intentions of selling at that discounted price, he would lose their house if the bank came back to them and asked them to put up an additional 40% of the original purchase price ($500k price, $400k mortgage, now worth $250k, need another $200k to keep equity at 20% of the current "market value"). Only those who are willing to live by those rules with their own home mortgage are able to defend the current accounting practices.


On Apr 03 10:15 AM k9s-4-k8 wrote:

> It seems to me the reason for altering mark to market wasn't so that
> banks could hoodwink investors. It wasn't even about earnings though
> they certainly will be positively affected. The problem is more to
> do with huge sums of taxpayer dollars going into these companies
> so as to offset their diminished reserves. When banks write down
> performing assets to values that don't represent discounted cash
> flow values their reserves are taken down another notch thus affecting
> their abilities to lend or invest. In comes the Treasury with billions
> more to prop up their diminished capital base. Take any one mortgage
> backed security. If 90% of the underlying mortgages are performing
> why should it be marked down to 25% of par value just because the
> marketability has disappeared.? And why are we infusing more capital
> on account of a not well thought out accounting standard? Good thing
> we aren't forced to use mark to market standards on our personal
> home equity. Uh oh, I need a taxpayer bailout to bring my home equity
> back up to 20% or I lose my home.

Apr 03 05:53 PM

[Fighting Yoda:]

Totally in agreement with the author’s view.
1. Different companies will use ‘different’ judgments – balance sheets will become totally unreliable (they largely are already)
2. The changes will have very little impact on profit statements.
Very few assets are under MTM – by some estimates only 1-3% of the total. Rest of the assets are either not under MTM or have observable market prices.

The original rule was “less of market or purchase price’ – keeping with the basic accounting principle “conservative”. The rule of was changed, not too long ago, at the behest of the industry that wanted to mark UP the assets. Hey showed profits, took bonuses, now the tables have turned – want the rule removed.

FASB was arm twisted into agreeing for the change, Congress in its audacity of stupidity is indulging in general populism. The same populism that got us into this trouble.

Apr 03 06:51 PM

[ClydeDNA:]

Isn't it bad timing to change the Mark to Market rules now? I thought the rule was a big factor that accelerated the rapid asset value decline and resultant credit squeeze. Since things seem to be getting a bit better this year I had expected Mark to Market to have the reverse effect, giving the bear a helping hand. But now I'm going to attribute any "surprise" increases on asset value games.

Apr 03 07:11 PM

[dcb:]

Based on my observations I think that at this point the government does not deserve the benefit of the doubt when examining their actions. As a rule I try not to think badly of others or even their motivations, but after a while I am left with little other choice. Additionally, based on the multiple errors in these programs having a critical eye and being a watch dog is warranted.


On Apr 03 07:34 AM CautiousInvestor wrote:

> The decision to change M2M was a poliitical decision and one designed
> to buy time and forestall harsh realities; don't try to divine some
> guiding brilliance.
>
> I suspect modifications to M2M and the PPIP legacy programs were
> designed on their own...........giving very little thought to the
> possible interplay between the two initiatives. This has been a distinguishing
> hallmark feature of Treasury efforts; nobody has articulated an overarching
> strategy and how all the myriad actions work together and serve some
> higher purpose.

Apr 03 07:16 PM

[dcb:]

I wrote this piece because I was a vanguard guy and while my gut told me to get out of the market at the peak (when china was a pe/60) I got all this mumbo jumbo of time horizon, etc. I also asked about puts and shorting, which they couldn't really help me)

as things started heading down later in the year I bailed, but by end of may I had learned enough technical analysis to bail and short. I also got an MBA in order to learn a thing or two.

At no pint was the company of any help to me, at no point were they able to help me with what I wanted to do with my money. I didn't even know what etfs were, that there was a way to invest in foreign currency, or that I could buy inverse etf's.

In the vanguard world (which is the world most people are told about) there is only dollar cost averaging and asset reallocation. there is no information about cyclical PE ratios, technical analysis, trading strategies, etc.

There is a huge information gap, and unless you are someone with OCD like me you would never even know sites what is out there.

Read what the investment advice they have been giving is. when bonds were dirt cheap in this crisis they were telling people not to sell. I had to write them that bonds at the level they were was something we would never see in our lifetime and they should be urging customers to buy.

While they are the largest mutual fund group I have never seen them embark on anything for shareholder rights either.

If I am trusting my pension and retirement money with a company I should be getting better advice than this. I know because I was one of the victims and that is why I have attempted to learn as much as I can. In truth I am very angry, but I feel worse for the people who have bought into their propaganda. They have been told the same old story for so long they can't do anything else. I know I was one of them.




On Apr 03 08:57 AM dcb wrote:

> Equity investors made the mistake of trusting mutual fund managers
> to do the work for them. we made the mistake of thinking they were
> advocates of the shareholder's interests. We learned. There are people
> who are paid professionals (highly paid) who were being paid to do
> this for us. they failed and this in my view is an issue just as
> significant as the whole financial crisis. the market failure is
> just on CDS, etc. It is a breakdown in the entire system and mainly
> a failure to act in and protect the interests of the shareholder
> (owner).
>
> This is the anger you see in the streets manifested. then to add
> to it you see our elected government not acting in the best interests
> of the electorate (shareholder). I am advising all of my friends
> to never touch an american stock (mutual fund) again. if they want
> to have an etf so they can have a stop loss OK. I advocate not participating
> in the american market place as a form of protest.

Apr 03 07:39 PM

[Jolly_Rancher:]

The problem is that financial insitutions don't trust each other because they believe bad loans are on the books that are not being reported. How is weakening FASB 157 going to change that reality?

Apr 03 08:21 PM

[petyaczar:]

Jolly Rancher IMO Mark to Market was an idiotic theory, one that made the Great Depression of the 30's Great, and that is why the govt got rid of M2M in the 30's.

FASB 157 should not be weakened, it should be destroyed, eviscerated, killed off, dismembered.

M2M is merely mark to model where the model is the last sale.
and that is beyond stupid IMO

You apparently forget the basic accounting equation ALE
Assets = Liabilities + Equity
And you forget the nature of the relationship between the P&L and the balance sheet.

Go ahead, try an example of a company with $100 in assets generating cash flow)profit) of 10% a year, and a capital structure of $50 in liabilities and $50 in equity.

Now mark down those performing assets to $50 on the balance sheet. - even though they are still generating $10 in profit per year.
Now look at your capital structure needs. No lender will lend you money as you have no equity left in the business and you are over leveraged on your balance sheet., You no longer make a profit as you need to reserve the $10 against balance sheet losses.

Stupid stupid stupid is what M2M is all about. It stunk in the 1930's when it exacerbated the Great Depression, and M2M stinks in the 2008 when it exacerbated, and caused, the GREATER DEPRESSION of the 21st Century and fiacilitated the Coup deTat of the free Enterprise System by the ingnoramuses in Congress who want to bring in socialism so they can increase their power over everything.

IE Congress is a bunch of left winger DIM/LIBS who want to run everything because they don't know how anything works.

Really!!!!!!!!!!

Apr 03 08:41 PM

[ifuwish2:]

how stupid a comment "1. Investors and regulators are not idiots. They know what the accounting rules are. If banks claim they were forced to mark their assets down to “fire-sale” prices, investors can look at the facts themselves and apply any upward corrections they want."
so the banks are forced to mark iot down and show huge loses and put economy into recession but if the investor think its worth more its ok?????????
come on wake up if banks show huge losses the banks fail,,you really think nthat it matter if i think the investment is worth more? where you get your education too?

Apr 04 12:37 AM

[ArtfulDodger:]

I think you're pretty close to the money on this one, petyaczar; but if something not done to stop the Fed from printing fiat money at will, then the system has to blow out one day no matter what rules they implement or abrogate.


On Apr 03 08:41 PM petyaczar wrote:

> Jolly Rancher IMO Mark to Market was an idiotic theory, one that
> made the Great Depression of the 30's Great, and that is why the
> govt got rid of M2M in the 30's.
>
> FASB 157 should not be weakened, it should be destroyed, eviscerated,
> killed off, dismembered.
>
> M2M is merely mark to model where the model is the last sale.
> and that is beyond stupid IMO
>
> You apparently forget the basic accounting equation ALE
> Assets = Liabilities + Equity
> And you forget the nature of the relationship between the P&L
> and the balance sheet.
>
> Go ahead, try an example of a company with $100 in assets generating
> cash flow)profit) of 10% a year, and a capital structure of $50 in
> liabilities and $50 in equity.
>
> Now mark down those performing assets to $50 on the balance sheet.
> - even though they are still generating $10 in profit per year.
>
> Now look at your capital structure needs. No lender will lend you
> money as you have no equity left in the business and you are over
> leveraged on your balance sheet., You no longer make a profit as
> you need to reserve the $10 against balance sheet losses.
>
> Stupid stupid stupid is what M2M is all about. It stunk in the 1930's
> when it exacerbated the Great Depression, and M2M stinks in the 2008
> when it exacerbated, and caused, the GREATER DEPRESSION of the 21st
> Century and fiacilitated the Coup deTat of the free Enterprise System
> by the ingnoramuses in Congress who want to bring in socialism so
> they can increase their power over everything.
>
> IE Congress is a bunch of left winger DIM/LIBS who want to run everything
> because they don't know how anything works.
>
> Really!!!!!!!!!!

Apr 04 09:26 AM

[Marcap:]

I agree with Henarl. The whole system does need an overhaul. There should be a new method to value assets which falls somewhere in between mark-to-cost and mark-to-market concepts.

While mark-to-cost can often understate the true value of fixed assets such as real estate property, it can also severely overstate them during times of declining values as we are now experiencing in many parts of the Country. Therefore it is obviously not a very reliable method to reflect reality.

Mark-to-market on the other hand, while in theory should show a more accurate asset valuation, in reality it is more complex and often lends to even more confusion and inaccuracy, as it does not take into account distressed (or premium) sales where the value of property was only temporarily pushed down (or up) often for reasons not even related to the state of the economy. i.e. The owner of a business dies, and the business closes. Building and property is sold for 30% less than true market value in an effort to quickly finalize estate holdings. Would it be fair for other businesses in the area to immediately mark-down their properties to match that single 30% off sale? I don't think so. Nor would it be fair to force other businesses to mark up the values of their properties based on a single sale which perhaps went at a significant premium for any of a number of reasons again not related to economic conditions.

In my opinion, a much more accurate valuation method would be to keep the assets on the books at cost, but to also set up an additional account similar to the accumulated depreciation account, in which anticipated gains or losses based on today's market values could be recorded. This account could then be adjusted up or down as the times would suggest, but rather than adjust it based on only 1 sale, use say the last 3 (or more) sales and take a weighted average of those sales to get a more accurate picture of market direction. This method would then show assets on the balance sheet at more realistic values, with their offsetting adjustments reflected in the various income statements for the periods in which the adjustments were realized and recorded. Food for thought!

Apr 04 11:40 AM

[nmelendez:]

Gold going up :)

Apr 04 12:18 PM

[partnerj:]

If the bank has to mark performing loans to the secondary market trading prices (trading market is secondary vs origination market, which I consider to be the primary loan market), then:

1. Bankers will slow down lending until secondary prices improve.

2. The accounting exercise of marking performing loans to secondary trading prices can cause a violation of the bank's capital requirements and restrict future lending.

The Banks' capital requirement issue can be fixed with more TARP funds, so keep the new SFAS 157 and M2M, force the banks to lend and pony up more TARP funds. Unfortunately, if the new loans get immediately marked down, the banks will probably find a way to reduce lending.

IMO, if the FASB won’t throw out SFAS 157, then at least re-name it to “Valuations based on Comparisons to Secondary Trade Prices in Markets that are not Dysfunctional”, or VCSTPMD.

Thursday's change was the FASB's fourth or fifth try at fixing M2M. To find out if the FASB’s latest "fix" is working, call your favorite banker and ask if they will do a jumbo mortgage. The odds are that their auditors and accountants are still insisting on the most conservative valuation methods.

Apr 04 01:03 PM

[partnerj:]

This Blog seems to have some astute participants, so maybe I can get some questions answered:

1. Would someone please define “toxic assets”? Are these assets where the related trading market is impaired or are these assets where the cash flow, of the asset itself, is impaired? Has anyone found a FASB or Government source for such a definition?

2. Can anyone tell me how “toxic assets” are supposed to become “legacy assets”, with the Government adding subsidized leverage and turning the assets over to unregulated hedge funds? Just how is that supposed to work?

3. In hundreds of pages of FASB explanations related to SFAS 157 & SFAS 159, and their amendments, I can’t find a definition of “active market”. The FASB requires trade prices from active markets for both Level 1 and Level 2 valuations, but they seem to have ommitted a definition of the term. Could the FASB be ignoring the issue in favor of the 40+ years of tax court cases that have litigated the active market issue for estate tax appraisals? Or is the FASB’s definition different from the IRS and tax court’s definition? Does the FASB want us to start all over in defining this term? Does anyone know?

4. Does anyone know if the FASB investigated to see why a similar M2M accounting system was thrown out in 1938? Did they ever mention why such an accounting system might work now when it was found to be lacking in the 1930’s?

I appreciate any insight that you can provide.

Apr 04 01:30 PM

[RATHER FISH:]

Who checks the checkers? The banks are still giving advise on what to buy, the very banks WHO ARE BROKE.
I invested in stocks on my own and lost 20% my wife had her invested in a very very big fund and lost 67%. The funds made money.
Day after day I read about ta's ba's chartist giving advice.. .yet they are broke. How many banks have the word trust in their name. WHO CAN YOU TRUST?

Apr 04 02:37 PM

[ed233:]

If mark to market rules have an insignificant effect on the balance sheets of the banks then why have they so regorously advocated their change. And why wouldn't the international accounting standards go along with the US suggestions for changing to mark to market. You've already seen that there is absolutely no transparency with the banks. What ever happened to the stress tests? Were they waiting to get these accounting rules changed first so they have something to hide behind? The banks refuse to disclose what's really on their books. Don't be fooled if the cook the books!!!!

Apr 04 03:53 PM

[partnerj:]

SFAS 157 Fair Value Accounting Measures and the subset M2M was originally issued to be effective for financial statements after 11-15-07, then amended and delayed to financial statements after 11-15-08. Kwak's comments were about financial statements thru September 2008. If you are curious about the affect -

The chart that accompanied a Nov 15th WSJ article showed some of the difference, for Fannie and Freddie, between the GAAP accounting in effect on 9-30-08 and the new “Fair-Value” accounting (SFAS 157). Fannie & Freddie had roughly $70 billion less equity using the new method of accounting. online.wsj.com/article...

A key issue is whether the cash flow from the assets is impaired, or is the reduction due to an impaired secondary market?

Apr 05 01:12 PM

[wobatus:]

Good. Go rent and see what a great deal that is. I bought in '99, sold in 2005, made 5x my initial investment, but the folks who bought from me are still above water, getting their mortgage interest break. They are happy. Ya gotta live somehwre. You sound like a vulture, and how you didn't realize the gov't. hasn't always subsidized home buying is beyond me.


On Apr 03 04:31 PM Consider_this wrote:

> RE is coming back this year, or soon; don’t doubt it.
>
> With the new FASB mark to fantasy ruling, the following changes to
> key statistics is under way:
>
> 1. Banks capital ratio is now fantasy ratio, and will allow them
> to lend.
> 2. Banks can now hold onto REOs, indefinitely. There’s no incentive
> to sell at market. By holding REOs, banks can rate that REO asset
> at 2007 level. Sure they’ll have to put taxes and maintenance, but
> that’s going to be like a cost of business to keep 2007-model alive.
>
> 3. Similarly, Banks can now DRAGGG ON the NOD and foreclosure process.
> Expect things like allowing people to stay, semi-permantly (as in
> for months and years at a time), rent free; without any foreclosure
> NODs or auctions or what not. Next few months you’ll see a sharp
> decline in new foreclosures as the banks adapt.
> 4. Commercial RE (seekingalpha.com/symbo...) was going to
> be a bomb in 2009, because all those commercial loans are due and
> the market valuation means no bank will refi them. Well no more,
> we’re not using market valuation anymore, so those model all says
> these CREs are awesome profits, so there’ll be increased refi of
> CREs and the crisis averted.
> 5. With the new model, HELOCs may even be a viable source of credit
> for consumers now; Those on the margin may find banks offering HELOC
> now, the home ATM is now open!
> 6. Ditto to Credit Card ABSs, the model says much better profitability;
> In fact, there’ll be more solicitations for people to own more cards;
> coz the model says it’s such good business, plus the customer can
> use one card to pay off another — further enhancing default rate
> for their model!
> 7. The obvious is that all the bank’s financial releases for the
> rest of 2009 will beat expectation now. So now permabulls have ammunition
> to say recession is over.
>
> Bears are fighting a losing cause with the deck to heavily stacked
> against them.
>
> Are these going to be a permanent solution, or actually save us from
> impending doom? Heck no. It’s the same playbook from Japan that pretty
> much sealed their fate to the 20 year economic decline. *BUT* it’ll
> drag everything into SLOW MOTION decline.
>
> Kinda like treating an acute disease that *MAY* kill you, by taking
> a poison that kills the bacteria and the short term disease problem,
> but guarantees you will die SLOWLY. We just did that.
>
> I thought I could time the market and buy a house in 2010 or 2011;
> I can see my folly now. The govt will make it a money losing proposition
> to own a house for 20 years. The govt will stretch it out so long,
> so maximum number of people are bearing the housing decline and nobody
> can “time” and get “out” — in the end you need a place to stay, and
> that is their trump card.
>
> I think I’m so depressed I’ll go jump off a bridge somewhere now.

Apr 06 03:04 PM