Wells Fargo Earnings: What's Real, What's Not? 22 comments
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Wells Fargo (WFC) -- what a press release, eh?
The company blew some serious smoke last Thursday to brag about earnings and indirectly tout its stock. "Brag" and "tout" are strong words - and purposely chosen. The focus on "three billion in profits" and "fifty five cents per share" and some of the adjectives in the press release sent the stock soaring this morning. I tend to focus on some other things -the balance sheet among them - and I zeroed in on "provision expense of approximately $4.6 billion, including $1.3 billion credit reserve build, bringing the allowance for credit losses to $23 billion." Twenty three billion, wow, what a big reserve! Not really.
Wells bought Wachovia and with that purchase came options ARMs - lots of option ARMs, the majority (analysts estimate 60%) in California. Total exposure at Wells to option ARMs was $122 billion at time of purchase and if I read their incredibly complex financial documents correctly their exposure is now between $90 and $100 billion. Let's say $95 billion. Wells stated $59 billion were "credit impaired" and wrote down $24 billion in Q4 related to the Wachovia purchase. They are forecasting a 29% default rate going forward. Wow! Aren't they conservative.
Home owners with option ARM mortgages that will reset in 2009 and 2010 face an average monthly mortgage payment increase of 63 percent. These resets peak - get this - in August of 2011 based on the dates option ARMs were let. So, given these realities, what is the ultimate default rate going to be in the coming quarters? Is it going to be just 29%?
Ratings agency Fitch sees it at around 45%. Goldman Sachs says 61%. Whitney Tilson, an analyst with Amherst Securities covering this market better than most, believes option ARM defaults, as a class, could go as high as 70%. Moody's recently downgraded Wells in part due to option ARMs, saying the 29% number is probably too low and will have to continue to mark down assets through 2009 and 2010.
Who is right, Wells at 29%, Fitch at 45%, Goldman at 61% or good old Whitney at 70%? Fitch is a ratings agency, Goldman makes money trading these forecasts, so, let's split the difference and say it is 53% of $95 billion. That is roughly $50 billion - or $20 billion dollars more than their internal models are projecting.
Those projections have prompted them to reserve $23 billion for future losses - in everything, not just option ARMs. The bank also held $118 billion in home equity lines and $138 billion in commercial real estate loans at year end 2008. Simply put, WFC has a great many more write downs coming and their shareholders will be significantly diluted as they raise more capital either from Uncle Sam - most probably the case - or the private sector, although I don't see Warren Buffett stepping to the plate with more dough, do you?
Agreed, their write downs will come over time as they hold these mortgages and these only have to be written down as they are truly impaired. That means shareholders face many more quarters of greater than anticipated write downs.
Bottom line: I believe WFC is blowing some serious smoke here. The operating earnings they discussed are real -- but the possibility they will need more capital never made it into their press announcement. Stay away - and when the market stabilizes a bit, put WFC on your short list of short prospects.
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The case to short WFC is not clear at all. In fact, this stock has a habit of disapppointing short sellers everytime they announce earnings.
The stock is doomed, but so is the short: the Street seems to have ways to squeeze the shorts out periodically, even though there's no real improvement in the fundamentals.
I don't believe you can apply the default rate directly to the value of the loans to get a write-off value. Even in default, a mortgage is worth more than zero since the property securing the loan has some value.
Lets assume the average defaulted loan balance is 150% of the underlying property value. That puts the average loss on a loan default at 1/3 of the asset value. That would put the loan losses from your 53% default rate at $16.8 billion.
Disclosure - long WFC.
On Apr 14 11:04 PM Russ Krull wrote:
> "..so, let's split the difference and say it is 53% of $95 billion.
> That is roughly $50 billion"
>
> I don't believe you can apply the default rate directly to the value
> of the loans to get a write-off value. Even in default, a mortgage
> is worth more than zero since the property securing the loan has
> some value.
>
> Lets assume the average defaulted loan balance is 150% of the underlying
> property value. That puts the average loss on a loan default at 1/3
> of the asset value. That would put the loan losses from your 53%
> default rate at $16.8 billion.
>
> Disclosure - long WFC.
Remember that though CMO's were selling at less than 30 cents on the dollar, over 90% of the mortgages were performing. Even if those homes in default sold for 50 cents on the dollar, since they only paid 3o cents for that 50 cents, the profit is there. Do the math. Assume an average of 6% interest, mortgage life of 6 years, 10% default, and a loss of 50% of face value on foreclosed homes. RESULT: MUCHO PROFIT.
> jack
Prior to closing, WFC wrote off $24.3 billion against Wachovia's (formerly Golden West's) option ARM portfolio that had current face value of ~$59.8 billion, or a 41% discount. As of closing on 12/31/2008 these particular loans were carried in a separate liquidation portfolio. For WFC to "use up" the $24.3 billion reserve, they would need a foreclosure rate of around 75% with losses of around 50%+ per foreclosed loan. In real world terms, 50% losses means that ...
... loans were originated at an average 80% LTV, ALL at the peak with no assumption of paydown
... housing prices have fallen 46% peak to trough and WFC unloads these properties only at trough pricing.
... an additional 10% foreclosure charge to cover rehabilitation, agent fees etc.
Remember, WFC bought Wachovia in December 2008, not July 2007. Given their track record, and at that particular point in time, there is very low probability in my mind that they would have under-estimated the coming wave of Option ARM resets, which people had started to wail about in 2006.
- FED provided the banks with fresh cheap funds and quantitative easing and this lend at healthy rates on credit cards, auto loans and even mortgages.
- It doens't take a good CEO to borrow at 3% or 2% and lend at 5% making a profit.
- Banks (GS is taking the lead) now want to pay TARP funds and free themselves of federal restrictions on compensation (most big clients don´t like banks depending of FED).
- Wells originated mortgages that it knew could be shipped on over to the government’s coffers for a handsome fee, and refinancing bank loans can’t be considered a sustainable
For those who don't know their history, Wells Fargo got hurt in the real estate melt down in the 1990s. They were will prepared for this melt down and purchased distressed asset when they thought it was prudent. Did they over pay? We will find out on April 22.
www.thehardmoneypros.c...
Its also interesting looking at their REO bank owned home inventory
www.thehardmoneypros.c...