The Perfect Storm: Three Forces to Undo the Recovery 17 comments
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Beyond the immediate, investment in building productive capacity must occur if the U.S. is to prosper and if higher national debt levels are to be serviced. Three forces that have built up in recent months and that will interact ferociously now make this almost impossible.
Let's be optimistic and assume that any new debt default problems (e.g. from commercial real estate) can be absorbed by the reformed and refinanced financial sector. Yet, the cards are now stacked against sustained recovery.
First, the rule of law has been abandoned for swathes of financial contracts. International research has found that successful economies are those that have well established property rights and law. This gives investors confidence to invest and, if things go wrong, they know the path to follow in seeking redress or unwinding positions. This is what distinguishes the U.S. from Venezuela and Russia. Or used to.
With the crisis, the U.S. rule of law has eroded for investors. Because of the housing loan crisis, there were various proposals for mortgage cram-downs and the like. Whilst the need was and is to help stranded homeowners, and force lenders to ease off or contribute, the effect is also to undermine confidence in the basic mortgage contract. The legal deal between lender and borrower, with the property as security, is now subject to third party intervention by the government with the lender having uncertain recourse to the property. Perhaps all this is just for a short time for certain mortgages, or perhaps not. The sanctity of the contract is gone.
Similarly, the Chrysler deal saw bond holders’ legal position in the queue of claimants overturned. Bond holders were forced by the government to give up part of their entitlements to the union, and castigated by Obama for resisting. So, now in the U.S. bond holders cannot rely on their legal position in the queue in the event of default or bankruptcy. This makes loans to large unionised firms much riskier than hitherto.
Of course, there were good reasons in these cases. Maybe it won't happen again. But at the end of the day, lenders’ legal entitlements have effectively been cancelled by the government in an ad hoc fashion.
Of course, it all depends who you are. As I've commented before, the very protective treatment that bond holders in the big banks have received may be connected to the large bond holdings in the banks by some major overseas sovereign wealth funds. By contrast, the hedge funds lambasted by Obama over Chrysler will predominantly have been representing domestic savers and pension funds.
This first factor interacts ferociously with a second, moral hazard. There's been much discussion over the zombie banks and their recovery. Being too big to fail, they have received both directly and via AIG large sums of public money. They have been allowed to renegotiate their stress test results and now can deduct any profits they make (e.g. from AIG handouts) from the stress test requirements.
In a May 7 interview with Charlie Rose, Geithner speaking of the stress tests on the big banks said:
all Americans should be confident that these institutions are going to be viable institutions going forward…. So it's like precautionary insurance against the risk of a deeper recession. That'll help make recovery more likely, because then banks won't have to keep behaving against the possibility that they have to protect themselves against things getting worse.
So, Secretary Geithner wants to assure all Americans that the big banks are safe. Which means they are. Ordinary financial institutions – banks or otherwise – might have to worry about mortgage lending or buying corporate bonds. But not the big banks because they have a total government guarantee.
Smaller but sound financial institutions will face risks from the government regardless of their legal protections. But the big banks, funded by taxpayers will receive only protections from the government. The inevitable result will be that the big banks gain market share not because of any superiority of performance but because of who they know. Returns on investment will necessarily be secondary to nurturing the relationship with the government.
The third force contributing to the perfect storm is government borrowing and spending. Set aside worries (well founded in my view) about the future of the $ and inflation. Again, let’s be optimistic and assume all that can be handled.
Government debt and government spend as a share of GDP will rise. The compensatory savings proposed by the administration were so small as to be derisory – the government is scarcely even concerned to appear to be looking to save money. And if you believe in the mega savings promised from health try and get your doctor or hospital to undertake to reduce or freeze the real costs of your health care in the future.
There will be massive Treasury bond issues by governments worldwide and a likely reducing Chinese trade surplus and taste for U.S. $. Hence, domestic purchases of bonds will be far more important to fund rising U.S. government debt.
But that may be OK as U.S. households are expected to save more. Setting aside, the consequent drag on consumption, consider the dynamic created.
Financial institutions outside the big banks are subject to extra risk from government confiscation of their loans if the debtor is in difficulty. This curtails their lending. The big banks have no such problem as they are supported by the government. They will respond to government preferences in their lending. And the government soaks up household savings into Treasury bonds which can then be used to fund or partner with the big banks’ lending.
In short, a corporatist approach. So much for the markets and Anglo-Saxon type capitalism. Some might say good riddance, but this removes the strengths of the U.S. economy and hence its growth potential. And consider who will benefit from the change.
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But as I have pointed out before the recovery from this recession is by no mean a slam dunk.........meaning I believe improvement in employment will be painfully slow as employers have adopted leaner organizations and consumers will be spending less of what they earn. Thus, recovery is still not at hand.
As to the cozy relationship between heads of large banks and Treasury and the Fed, I would not be surprised......after this economic tsunami blows by.........to see the Fed invested with broad authority to manage systemic risk. Should this be the case and in the interest of avoiding what we have just been through, the Fed could actually increase the reserve requirements of these larger institutions to both contain their growth and make them stronger, safer institutions.
The legal deal between lender and borrower was only valuable in the market because both parties expect the government to enforce the contract. That's a fundamental assumption for the rule of law. The problem is, enforcement has its price, and the government has its quite evident limitations. When a creditor implements millions of contracts on the expectation of exploiting limited enforcement capacity, then sells the risks to still other parties on the expectation that once again, enforcement limitations will protect them, they effectively take a free ride while shifting risks to all other contracting parties.
Yep, it's a complex issue. So are all the financial products that made this mess possible.
And you please keep in mind that 'enforcing sensible regulation of leverage, lending, and derivatives' will also have intended, positive consequences for the US economy.
Might the benefits of such regulation outweigh the potential costs? Why do you automatically assume that any regulation is bad regulation, and that any regulation is a net drag on the overall system?
I might like to trade a bit of alpha for a lower beta, when we're talking about the U.S. and global economy. [an economy that is less volatile = lower beta, lower potential GDP growth rate = lower alpha, vis-a-vis a hypothetical base-case of an economy ex-US regulatory reform]
It all depends, of course, on the broadness and market effects of the regulatory framework enacted. I posit that based on the 'costs' of the last 12 months, a move towards more financial markets oversight would be a net benefit to society. Yes, we might lose 0.5% of annual GDP growth, but what was the last 5 years of GDP growth based upon? (Hint: unsustainable credit expansion, and without Mortgage Equity Withdrawals, the U.S. had virtually ZERO organic GDP growth - it was all fiction, bought on credit that is becoming worth less, or worthless).
While I don't want to go all the way to a European-style economy, some reigning is required of 'highly-levered money center banks', of 'too-big-to-fail', of 'use depositors money to increase IB's capital to borrow S-T so they can do prop. trades on CDO^2s, and ask for a bailout if it doesn't work'. The massive gearing, and mixing of should-be-protected (depositors/FDIC) and should-not-be-protected (non-bank parts of C,BAC,WFC; IBs with minimal depository exposure; credit investors) - that has got to go.
Please explain why it shouldn't.
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"Once we start restricting the free market we descend the slippery slope to socialism." (non sequitur fallacy - see below)
The U.S. financial system was NEVER a free market to begin with. Treasury, Fed, OCC, OTS, SEC, FINRA - they all exist to regulate, which is to say, restrict how people act. Capitalism depends on a WELL-REGULATED free market, of the kind that doesn't allow banks to borrow the savings of citizens in order to lever up and chase hot-money yields around the globe.
Is limiting leverage for gov't-chartered banks socialism? Is requiring an exchange settlement process for CDS and similar derivatives 'restricting the free market'? Is not allowing fully-hedged creditors to submarine a bankruptcy workout 'restricting the free market'?
Conspiracy theorists and the Republican Party aside, no one is suggesting that the U.S. permanently move to state-ownership of capital. The only argument is: within a fairly tight range, how much regulation should there be? That is not quite socialism, in my view.
(and BTW - please define 'free market' and socialism' as you are using those terms - I don't agree with that statement. One term has to do with who owns the means of capital, the other has to do with how you require markets participants to interact with each other. Related, perhaps, but certainly not on a single-axis continuum.)
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On May 12 11:14 AM Cetin Hakimoglu wrote:
> Keep in mind that enforcing regulation of leverage, lending,
> derivatives will have unintended negative consequences for
> the US economy, and stock market. Once we start restricting
> the free market we descend the slippery slope to socialism.
What were those bondholders thinking when they bought the Chrysler bonds, Chrysler has bee essentially bankrupt for ten years.
It appear you do not know Chrysler well. Those bonds were senior debts which were legally secured by hard assets of Chrysler (ie factory, equipment etc, similar to your mortage is secured by your home). In the event that Chrysler fails to make interest payments, these bond holders are legally entitled to take posession of the assets. Of course, selling these assets may only pay back pennies on the dollar (hence the bonds were bought at discount).
Obama overrode that and said "your right to seize assets of Chrysler in the event of a bankruptcy is now null and void, instead those assets will now be given to UAW."
Obama is saying employees deserve 75 cents, senior debt holders get 25 cents.
On May 12 09:09 PM nuclear stocks wrote:
> The unions did not steal Chrysler from the bondholders. The bondholders
> purchased bad bonds. Have you ever heard of a bankruptcy hearing
> where the very first motion was to protect the employees? If the
> employees walk, the bondholders get nothing because the company is
> worth nothing. Obama did the same thing that the bankruptcy court
> would have done at the bondholder’s insistence. This guy is clueless
> about the corporate bankruptcy process.
>
> What were those bondholders thinking when they bought the Chrysler
> bonds, Chrysler has bee essentially bankrupt for ten years.
--rq
On May 12 09:09 PM nuclear stocks wrote:
> The unions did not steal Chrysler from the bondholders. The bondholders
> purchased bad bonds. Have you ever heard of a bankruptcy hearing
> where the very first motion was to protect the employees? If the
> employees walk, the bondholders get nothing because the company is
> worth nothing. Obama did the same thing that the bankruptcy court
> would have done at the bondholder’s insistence. This guy is clueless
> about the corporate bankruptcy process.
>
> What were those bondholders thinking when they bought the Chrysler
> bonds, Chrysler has bee essentially bankrupt for ten years.
On May 13 12:58 PM reluctantQuant wrote:
> So what country are all you guys moving to?
>
> --rq