Why Are Banks Paying Back Loans They Can't Afford? 17 comments
an article to
-
Font Size:
-
Print
- TweetThis
The initial stress tests came at a time when the government kept pouring money into banks but had no way of testing whether this money was actually making a difference.
When the results of the first bank stress test were announced, the market did gain a small boost of confidence when they learned that banks would have to raise less capital than previously anticipated.
But, this confidence soon evaporated as the public learned that it would be near impossible to duplicate the test again. The banks themselves were calling the test unfair and confusing, and too many questions were left unanswered that the government was unwilling to answer or simply was unable to.
Now, as the Treasury announced that certain banks are going to be allowed to pay back $68 billion of TARP fund, the Congressional Oversight Panel is calling for more stress tests. They believe these stress tests should be conducted periodically because circumstances change and they can become strenuous on banks.
If this is the case, then why is the government allowing these banks to repay the loans when there is nothing more than circumstantial evidence that shows that they are in a “decent” shape?
Banks still hold large amounts of toxic debt in their books, and the fact that they’ve raised capital and are willing to repay their loans hasn’t changed this. The jobless rate in the U.S, at the current moment, is 9.4%.
This rate isn’t expected to go down anytime soon, if anything it’s expected to go up in the near future. President Obama’s promise to create 600,000 jobs over the next 100 days may just very well not become a reality in such a short span of time. With so many Americans out of jobs, it’s no surprise that credit problems are high and that credit card delinquencies have increased.
This spells trouble for the very same banks that are in a hurry to repay their TARP loans. Many of these banks issue cards, such as JP Morgan Chase & Co. (JPM), American Express Co. (AXP), Citigroup Inc. (C), and Bank of America Corp. (BAC), to name a few. Their profits are already expected to fall as recent credit card legislation bars credit card companies from charging certain excessive fees.
With so many problems against them, it’s a shock the government is actually permitting them to repay the loans at this moment. The banks actually believe that by repaying the funds the government will no longer meddle in their business, which is the real reason they’re in such a hurry to repay the loans.
They're wrong, so very wrong. Banks are going to be under government scrutiny for a very long time, so it doesn’t matter whether they pay the loans now or later. They may still have to undergo more bank stress tests and by returning money they can’t afford to give back, they are only putting themselves in a precarious situation.
So banks out there, it doesn’t matter if you return the money now or later, Uncle Sam is still watching you. Just keep the money and return it when you’re 110% confident that you actually can afford to. If not, you’re just going to dig yourself in a hole that the government just might not save you from again.
Related Articles
|





















If the financial institutions do not have T.A.R.P. funds on their books,it would be discriminatory to interfere with their bank's operations and leave other Non-T.A.R.P. recipients alone.
An analogy would be to loan money from a credit company,pay them back and have them tell you that you are loaning too much from other loan companies
> jack
Commercial banks have already significantly increased loan loss reserves and they don’t do so on a whim. Good commercial banks (and there are many more that are good than are not), large and small, employ rigorous analysis and modeling so that they can effectively weather any storm. They will be fine. This is the market at work and the market CAN learn. The best way for it to do so efficiently is to have the government keep it’s fingers out of it.
How about "difficult, if not impossible to value/and or in danger of becoming non-performing" for a definition of a "toxic asset"?
On Jun 10 09:17 AM greedcanbgood wrote:
> So what do you define as a “toxic” asset? I find this just the most
> recent in a sea of buzz words that people like to use to make a point.
> Is it defaults on commercial loans? Consumer loans? Credit default
> swaps? Something else? In addition, nobody ever makes a distinction
> between commercial banks and investment banks – they simply get factored
> in together.
>
> Commercial banks have already significantly increased loan loss reserves
> and they don’t do so on a whim. Good commercial banks (and there
> are many more that are good than are not), large and small, employ
> rigorous analysis and modeling so that they can effectively weather
> any storm. They will be fine. This is the market at work and the
> market CAN learn. The best way for it to do so efficiently is to
> have the government keep it’s fingers out of it.
"How about "difficult, if not impossible to value/and or in danger of becoming non-performing" for a definition of a "toxic asset"?"
Again, you have to define these factors. In it's purest form, "value" could be defined as that which someone is willing to pay for a given asset at a given point in time. By this definition, an asset worth $1 today could be worth $1000 tomorrow. You might as well get into penny stocks. It doesn't work.
What about "danger of becoming non-performing"? How does one define this attribute? Admittedly, a simplified example could be a mortgage. Presume that a consumer has a $750k mortgage on a home that has now plumetted in value to $400k. They are underwater by $350k yet they have a job with good income, good credit and solid assets, even some that are liquid. What is their propensity to become "non-performing" on their mortgage? Most people would say that assuming all of those factors remain, the probability is quite low. That said, commercial banks are seeing these loans move immediately into default/voluntary reposession without warning. Why? Because the individual decides to go buy another home at $400k (start over at or near the bottom) and sacrifices the hit on their credit bureau for 7 years or so because they don't believe that their existing home will recover in value as much as their new home will appreciate. How can this be predicted?
My point here is that people need to be more responsible and define their interpretation of these latest "buzz words" (i.e. credit markets, toxic assets, etc.) if they choose to use them to make an argument.
Greenspan testified that his error was to think the bank CEO's would not put their company's at risk chasing a quick and easy profit, and therefore took their word that their complicated trading rooms were adequately hedged. All sorts of nasty stuff was hidden from us. That Greenspan and his regulators couldn't find it makes me feel better that I couldn't either... but not much.
However, I think a certain magazine has already copyrighted the name, The Economist.
I find it interesting that you say that there is a "Difference" between Investment and Commercial banks, yet the Repeal Of Sarbanes/Oxley Muted The Distinction. Things Have Become Much More Blurred.
Your angling for a better definition of "Toxic Asset" shows that you have not done much research on the subject. I would suggest these for help with your education:
Shadow Banking, Off Accounting Book Assets, Derivatives (Collateralized Debt Obligations - CDO, Comercial Morgage Backed Securities - CMBS, Mortgage Backed Securities - MBS, Interest Rate Derivatives, Credit Default Swaps - CDS), Financial Engineering.
There are others search terms, but this list will give you a head start on your research. The creation and transfer method is what has created the "Unassailable Complexity" and as a result their inability to be "Valued".
There Is More To Know Than Can Ever Be Known.
Good Luck
On Jun 10 02:13 PM greedcanbgood wrote:
> You are WAY off-base TBill. Investment banks are different than
> commercial banks. Do you have a 401(k) plan with your employer?
> I bet you've got some bank stocks in that portfolio. At the end
> of the day, the corporation exists for the benefit of its shareholders.
However, I'm not declaring "The Economist" to be a named owned by name. It's just the user name that I've chosen. I don't pretend to own The Economist or any rights that it may own.
Thank you for the comment though.
On Jun 10 03:23 PM Genesis wrote:
> I don't have a comment on the article.
>
> However, I think a certain magazine has already copyrighted the name,
> The Economist.
I'm quite familiar with off balance sheet instruments and yet not ALL credit default swap contracts or any of the other instruments you cited are, by defintion, "toxic." The problem here is that "toxic assets" is the latest and greatest buzz word that exists without definition. I do agree with you however in that the more these instruments are "pyramided" with one another the more difficult it is to asses their realitive value - and risk. Yet, that alone does not make them "toxic". If you are as familiar with these as you seem to be, you would know that they also exist as simple transactions.
In Theory - None Of The Structures I Mentioned, nor the ones I did not, Are "Toxic". However, the current rate of Default and Bankruptcy coupled with the Complexity Issue makes ALL OF THEM Suspect.
In the end (maturity), not all will be worthless. It Is Roulette At This Point.
Based upon my exposure to distressed real estate I conclude that there was a greater amount of "Fraudulent Valuation" than not; further adding to the fire.
Cyanide as a chemical is not toxic, until one is "exposed".
On Jun 11 10:51 AM greedcanbgood wrote:
> Painfully aware - I concur that the difference between investment
> and commercial banks has become more blurred. That said, while most
> of the investment banks are now running under commercial charters
> it does not change (in the immediate term) their current business
> model and thus they remain starkly "different" from thier legacy
> commercial bank peers.
>
> I'm quite familiar with off balance sheet instruments and yet not
> ALL credit default swap contracts or any of the other instruments
> you cited are, by defintion, "toxic." The problem here is that "toxic
> assets" is the latest and greatest buzz word that exists without
> definition. I do agree with you however in that the more these instruments
> are "pyramided" with one another the more difficult it is to asses
> their realitive value - and risk. Yet, that alone does not make
> them "toxic". If you are as familiar with these as you seem to be,
> you would know that they also exist as simple transactions.