A-Power Energy Generation Systems: Headwind or Tailwind? 17 comments
-
Font Size:
-
Print
- TweetThis
A-Power Energy Generation Systems (APWR) is a provider of distributed power generation systems (DG) in China and is in the process of launching a wind power business. Its stock price has more than tripled this year as investors considered the company a proxy for the fast-growing alternative energy sector in China, especially the wind power market.
Additionally, most of the major Chinese wind power players are listed either in mainland China or Hong Kong. APWR enjoyed an extra tailwind due to its perceived scarcity value.
However, a reality check of the wind power market in China suggested that APWR might be facing significant headwinds as it tries to jump-start its wind turbine business. Its current stock price has simply priced in too much of a blue sky scenario and significantly underestimates a wind chill factor of the execution risk in the current market environment.
Reality Check Supply deficit of wind turbine market in China has given way to manufacturing overcapacity in 2009. Since 2005, the wind power installed capacity in China has experienced a triple digit growth rate. However, this explosive growth has quickly been surpassed by the manufacturing capacity as more and more companies jumped on the wind power bandwagon. Going forward, the demand growth is expected to gradually slow down. According to the Global Wind 2008 Report prepared by the Global Wind Energy Council, “demand in the decade between 2011-2020 is forecasted to be 80 GW, or about 8 GW per year”. This will be more than met by the existing manufacturing capacity in China – according to Chinese Wind Energy Association, the top four Chinese turbine manufacturers (Sinovel, Goldwind, Dongfang and Shanghai Electric) already have a combined capacity of 12GW now. APWR stated that it has the largest wind turbine production facility in China with 1125 MW capacity (according to its press release on January 11, 2009), however, in an industry with growing overcapacity, the utilization rate matters more than size. Wind turbine market in China is highly concentrated with limited incremental market share for new entrants. There are currently 70 wind turbine manufacturers in China, but the top 10 accounted for a staggering 90% market share by the end of 2008. There is little market share left for new entrants such as APWR unless the demand grows significantly more than expected or the new entrants focus on the international market. APWR may be able to mitigate some of this risk by selling 2.7 MW turbines as most of its competitors are selling 0.75MW, 1.5 MW and 2.0MW models. However, Sinovel, the largest wind turbine in China, has just started to manufacture 3.0MW (for offshore wind farm) in 2009 and other top manufacturers are also eyeing the high capacity turbine market. Direct exports may not be a solution for APWR as its technologies are all licensed from European companies which may have rigid geographic limits on the licensed products. Wind turbine manufacturing is not the sweet spot in the wind power value chain. A typical wind power value chain in China includes wind farm operators (usually the government owned utilities), wind turbine manufacturers, wind turbine components providers, and raw material providers. Wind turbine manufacturers have the least bargaining power along the chain and are potentially squeezed from both upstream and downstream participants. The overcapacity has led to increased competition and price wars among turbine manufacturers, which has eroded their bargaining power against wind farm operators and weighed on the top line. On the other hand, there is a significant supply deficit for key turbine components as the explosive growth of manufacturing capacity has not been matched by the similar growth of qualified component providers in China. Consequently the pricing and delivery terms are more dictated by the component suppliers, which will eventually weigh on the cost structure of turbine manufacturers. APWR will have to face similar challenges, though its joint venture with GE will mitigate these pressures with respect to one component: gearboxes. Wind power business is very capital intensive. To build a wind power turbine business from scratch, it takes significant upfront capital outlays to acquire land, equipment, technology licenses and other necessary manufacturing facilities. For example, Beijing-based wind turbine new entrant Shengguo Tongyuan recently invested RMB 460 million ($65million) in the first phase of a wind turbine project with annual output of 1,000 units of 1.5MW wind turbines. The second phase will cost an additional $90 million. After the business is up and running, the ongoing working capital need is also high as there is a natural funding gap between current assets and current liabilities. For example, Goldwind Technology, the 2nd largest wind turbine manufacturer in China, has accounts receivable days of 96 and inventory days of 116 while the accounts payable days are 58. For some small players with less bargaining leverage, the accounts payable days could be as low as 30. APWR’s existing DG business has relatively low working capital requirements: both receivables and inventory requirements are minimal - its A/R days are 20 and inventory days are only 7. With the ramping up of its wind power business, its working capital needs will have to increase significantly to be more in line with the industry norm and its cash balance is likely to go down significantly. Valuation Buying APWR now is essentially buying its DG business and a call option on its new wind turbine business and its JV with GE. It will make a great investment if its DG business is traded at a discount and the call option is free. Current valuation does not present a good entry point, however. Near Term Catalysts Disclaimer: the author has no exposure to APWR.
Related Articles
|






















This article has 17 comments:
The article is disingenuous by damning this well run and sweet spotted company with very faint praise.
trespass
The salient issues to me are the conservatism of estimates that are based entirely on booked contracts making no allowance for new business generated during the months ahead. Estimates have been raised after yesterday's conference call and seem likely to be raised again as new business is booked. I see the proven growth of APWR as being worth at least 50% more than the p/e the author deems appropriate, and the "call option" on the wind-power business as having considerable value as well. I would not be surprised to see this impressive stock priced at 20 or higher by year-end.
I have my share of misses, but my gains in APWR average more than 100% and my portfolio is up 70% year-to-date, largely through Chinese stocks like APWR.
The whole basis of your argument falls on that point alone.
That was painful, but it's hard to argue that the current valuation <$10 is not a good entry point.
scott
www.solarfeeds.com
sweitzman at gmail
U have NO expsosure to APWR , I own a boatload and will PREDICT we see $19 by years end. One Thailand PR and this puppy turns into a PIT BULL eating folks short along the way as it did past two days going down chewing up longs and spitting them out as roadkill
MORE DUE DILIGENCE and less talk about WIND which you sort of kind of forgot to mention that CHINA makes 70% be spend on CHINESE COMPANIES
HELLO GE SUGAR DADDY?????/
A Fuel Cell stock heading into Europe, making losses, which it will for another year or two, cash per share of $AUD 0.15 at most, capital expenditure requirements, and market cap of $AUD340m ($270m).
BWEN, AMSC.
And Mr utu, if your hash was a website marketing ploy, I will treat it as the opposite - aversion.
"The second phase will cost an additional $90 million."
I'm a little confused by the above paragraph. How is $155 million dollars expensive for 1.5 GW generating capacity? A nuclear plant of same size would be about 50 times that much, at maybe $6.5 billion to build.
Or am I just misreading what is being said here?