Big Banks in Trouble: Huge Mortgage Write-Downs Seem Inevitable 91 comments
an article to
-
Font Size:
-
Print
- TweetThis
Are The Banks Paying Back TARP Money Too Soon?
Since the beginning of the year, major banks have raised over $200 billion in capital, far in excess of the $75 billion of new capital that the government stress tests had called for. The market prices of major bank stocks have recovered dramatically since March, indicating that Wall Street investors see a recovery in the banking industry.
In addition, the banking industry is enjoying one of the largest net interest margins in history due to a very low cost of funds. Wells Fargo (WFC), for example, in the fourth quarter saw its average cost of funds decline to 1.5% while its net interest margin exceeded 4%. With banks able to access cheap funding thanks to the super low rate money policy of the Federal Reserve, banks almost have a license to print money.
The big question is will the banks be able to earn enough to offset the huge amount of future write downs that will be needed on their troubled loans? Earlier this year, Bloomberg reported that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated U.S. banking losses through 2010 at $1.06 trillion. To date, the banking industry has taken write-downs of only half that amount, indicating further write-downs of an additional $500 billion will be necessary.
In addition, delinquency rates on $1 trillion of commercial real estate loans held by banks have been increasing at a higher rate than anticipated. Credit card losses for the banks have also been rapidly mounting from previous estimates.
Mortgage Default Surge Could Wipe Out Banking Capital

Total Estimated Losses
Courtesy: T2 Partners LLC
The banking industry’s mortgage portfolio is the real wild card and may result in the need for huge additional write-downs to cover the cost of mounting defaults. The banking industry is facing a potential nightmare surge in mortgage loan defaults, even if real estate prices stabilize at current levels due to the large negative equity positions of many homeowners. (The above chart shows the total estimated banking losses of which only a fraction has been realized to date.)
There is no historical model to predict the correlation of mortgage defaults to equity position, but one would expect that being deeply underwater on the mortgage will result in a strong economic motive to stop paying or simply walk away. How many homeowners, for example, will continue to make a mortgage payment on a $200,000 mortgage when the home is valued at $100,000? The greater the negative equity, the greater the odds of a mortgage default, especially if the homeowner is under financial stress.
Unfortunately, the problem of negative equity is not theoretical. In the latest overview of housing and the credit crisis, T2 Partners LLC assembled an in depth, excellently documented case on why the pain in housing is not about to end quickly. One eye opener in the report is the estimate, by type of mortgage borrower, of negative equity. T2 shows the following stats: 73% of OptionARMs, 50% of subprime, 45% of Alt A and 25% of prime mortgage loans are underwater. Combine this with a weak economy, job losses and negative income growth and the potential for additional huge write-downs on residential mortgages seems inevitable.
The impact of a poor economy and huge negative equity is already being reflected in default rates never experienced in modern economic history. Almost 10% of all mortgages are in some stage of delinquency or default. The delinquency rate on prime mortgages, never expected to exceed historical delinquency rates of approximately 1%, are now over 4.5%. Note that prime mortgage loans are the loans that were never expected to have more than a minimal default rate based on the borrower’s credit and income characteristics.
The banking industry is likely to need every dollar of newly raised capital and then some to cover future loan losses. If future banking industry profits are overwhelmed by additional loan losses, it will be years before banks can be solidly classified as well capitalized. A capital-constrained banking industry will survive in some form, but it may not be able to provide the new lending necessary to foster future economic growth.
Related Articles
|





















I sufferered through the oil patch bust in the 80's. Out of school I bought a cheap condo and watched its value plummet to 30% of what I paid for it. I couldn't afford a credit hit. I lived in it for 11 years and rented and paid on it for another ten...taking a loss every month... until the value came up to what I owed.
I think a lot of people will do this. I think the major implications will be a diminished move up market.
A smaller home but at least the fridge isn t empty like it was a couple months ago. You can t eat a house and with a family of 5 one must do what s best for his family. I bet you Milkweed lives a free stress life.
Maybe not... while they're current. But they take a KEEN interest in how much they owe once they do fall behind on payments. Don't think for a minute that people aren't doing the math to see if the LTV is within their tolerance level.
Many borrowers were stupid enough to take the loan they were given. But they're not stupid enough to keep it.
I agree with the gentleman that mentioned once someone gets to the point where they are considering defaulting on their loan they start looking into the "current" value of their house but I don't agree that "current" value of the house is what is causing people to consider defaulting at this point in the game. A couple of years ago when housing first started crashing the speculators and flippers were bailing based on market value however common sense tells you anyone who has been current on their loan this late in the game is looking to keep the house and only defaulting due to personal finances.
You can give me all the anecdotal evidence you want I'm sticking with common sense.
Have to disagree. Most people are stupid.
I told my friend 5 months ago he was stupid to keep the condo when he way over $100,000 under and he still has it.
Americans are not very smart. It is a wonder where we are today.
Disclosure: Lost my ass in the market over the last year, (i.e. Washington Mutual, 401K and IRA). Bought a second property one year ago that is worth significantly less than I paid for it, I can't raise the rent on the other one because the market won't stand for it and my damn property taxes are up again this year.
People are coming to Houston and doing exactly that.
I don't think that this will be most people. Most people will want to stay in their home and will want to maintain their credit. I also think that the "this late in the game comment" is accurate. I know someone who is interest only on his mtg...and he has lost his job, but if he can find a job he is going to hang on to the house. He has a back up plan to move in his girlfriend to help out. (I know..bad plan)
The point is that he is 40 years old now and doesn't want his credit destroyed if he can help it and he doesn't want to leave his home.
1) It would be helpful if the author could provide some stats from the T2 report which segment "how far" under water each of the product segments is. For example, if X% of the estimated 25% of prime mortgages were !0% under water, the liklihood of a foreclosure is far less(probably quite small) than the segment which might be 40% underwater.
I tried the T2 website for its report, but was undable to access the report without a paid subscription. Perhaps the author can answer my question, but I'd be very surprised if there's any segmentation.
2. Given the IMF, T2, Roubini, and GS(Which I consider most accurate) projections, what is the relationship between the estimated "losses to come" and the bank's loan loss reserve accounts which are targeted to the various product segments. To assume that estimated losses are competely uncovered by reserves---and that seems to be what the author is assuming----is highly misleading.
3. IMF financial institution estimates have been notoriously off the mark in the past. GS projections have been historically.....conse...
4. Mr. or Ms. Milweed has an excellent and realistic point: When time passes and the real estate market even starts to improve, most of the borrowers who were going to turn in their keys have already done so. The obvious question, then, becomes "Where are we in this cycle?". If real estate were to continue to decline markedly, the author's assertions could become partly true. I say partly because their are a few questions to be cleared up first, namesly Nos. 1 and 2.
By the way, I don't work for any financial institution---or Wall Street, or consultancy outfit: I'm just a retired dope who's trying to get a few simple answers so I can objectively analyze risks to my portfolio. Easier said than done.
The housing market will bottom when people stop losing their jobs which should be coming in the not too distant future.