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If one were to parse the bullshit that the government has allowed the banks to proffer in the name of earngings, one would find the banks probably flailing this quarter from bad loans and mortgages. Beware of the FASB authorized accounting games and peer beneath the hood.

I have included a portion of the professional level Wells Fargo analysis (click this link to subscribe) to help drive my point home, but before you peruse it as a non-subscriber, be sure to remember how this research subject twisted and manipulted their numbers to produce a bank profit out of a bank loss (Tricky Dick Bank Reporting Schemes - what record earnings are you referring to?) then take a look at the hard data released by the FDIC and the NY Fed: Revised SCAP Assumptions Public Open Source Version 1.1 2009-05-18 15:15:47 1.21 Mb) as well as an explanation as to how I tabulated it.

Wells Fargo

Wells Fargo (WFC) acquired home equity loans from Wachovia, which carries the highest default risk as its portfolio largely comprises second lien mortgages. The value of the home equity portfolio is US$128.9 billion.

Home equity portfolio
US$ mn
Core portfolio
California
31,784
Florida
12,067
New Jersey
8,086
Virginia
5,653
Pennsylvania
5,129
Other
56,342
Total core portfolio
119,061
Liquidating Portfolio
California
3,835
Florida
492
Arizona
233
Texas
179
Minnesota
122
Other
5,001
Total liquidating portfolio
9,862
Total core and liquidating portfolios
128,923

The value of Wells Fargo’s pick-a-pay portfolio (home loans) is US$93.2 billion, of which US$39.7 billion or 42.6% is impaired loans. The principal balance of the impaired loans is US$61.6 billion. This loan has the highest probability of risk and could result in a complete writedown. Currently, the LTV in the majority of the states is above 100%, with California and Arizona having the highest – 161% and 152%, respectively. Despite writing down US$21.9 billion, the carrying value at these two states hovered around 100%, implying high risk.

Pick-a-pay-portfolio
Impaired loans
Unpaid principal balance
Current LTV %
Carrying value
Carrying value to current value
California
42,216
152.0%
26,907
98.0%
Florida
6,260
129.0%
3,779
79.0%
New Jersey
1,750
101.0%
1,271
74.0%
Texas
475
76.0%
336
54.0%
Arizona
1,642
161.0%
987
99.0%
Other states
9,306
110.0%
6,397
77.0%
Total
61,649
39,677

Methodology to compute loan loss rate: Real estate 1−4 family junior lien mortgage

Real estate 1−4 family junior lien mortgage comprises home equity line of credit (HELOC) and second/junior lien mortgages. Home equity carries a very high risk of default due to high LTV and being a second lien mortgage. We segregated the loans into owner occupied and non-owner occupied based on the state-wise proportion published by FDIC. Thereafter, applying the respective default rate of each category, we arrived at the weighted average default rate.

To determine net charge-offs, we have considered the recovery rate based on historical recovery rates applied in conjunction with the current LTV. The table below gives the recovery rates used to determine net charge-offs.

Current LTV
Recovery rate
Basis
Greater than
120%
12.0%
(recovery rates during 1990-1991, lowest since 1976)
Greater than
110%
16.7%
Greater than
100%
21.4%
(average recovery rate since 1976)
Greater than
90%
28.2%
Less than
<90%
35.0%
(highest recovery rate since 1976)

Source: FDIC and Boombustblog.com Analysis

We estimated the current LTV for home equity loans based on the housing price decline calculated using the Case-Shiller Index of each state and LTV at origination to determine the current LTV. Impaired loans have a two-year loss rate of 67.5%, while other loans have a loss rate of 56.4%. We have assumed impaired loans to have a 0% recovery rate in each of the states. The non-impaired home equity loans would have a loss rate of 56.4% for 2009 and 2010, while the Federal Reserve’s estimated loss rate is 21–28% for the same period.

Real estate 1−4 family junior lien mortgage
High Risk Subprime ARM Loans (Low FICO and high LTV)
Current LTV
Owner Occupied
Non- Owner Occupied
Default rate
Recovery Rate
Loss Rate
Impaired Loans
65.0%
95.0%
California
128%
93.7%
6.3%
66.9%
0%
66.9%
Florida
124%
88.7%
11.3%
68.4%
0%
68.4%
New Jersey
108%
91.5%
8.5%
67.6%
0%
67.6%
Arizona
146%
91.9%
8.1%
67.4%
0%
67.4%
Other
112%
91.0%
9.0%
67.7%
0%
67.7%
Total Impaired Loans
67.5%
All other loans:
California
128%
93.7%
6.3%
66.9%
12%
58.9%
Florida
124%
88.7%
11.3%
68.4%
12%
60.2%
New Jersey
108%
91.5%
8.5%
67.6%
21%
53.1%
Virginia
111%
91.1%
8.9%
67.7%
17%
56.4%
New York
90%
92.0%
8.0%
67.4%
28%
48.4%
Pennsylvania
111%
90.0%
10.0%
68.0%
17%
56.6%
North Carolina
86%
88.3%
11.7%
68.5%
35%
44.5%
Texas
89%
91.6%
8.4%
67.5%
35%
43.9%
Georgia
105%
88.5%
11.5%
68.5%
21%
53.8%
Arizona
146%
91.9%
8.1%
67.4%
12%
59.3%
Other
112%
91.0%
9.0%
67.7%
17%
56.4%
Home equity portfolio
56.4%

As a reminder...

  • America, You have been outright lied to! Bamboozled! Swindled! Hoodwinked! The Worst Case Scenario
  • Warning: "What you don't report in your balance sheet can screw the average investor".

Disclosure: I own bearish positions on WFC and all companies that I am bearish on, obviously.

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