Was Paulson Right? 9 comments
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By James Kwak
The New York Times has a story about how the government is making a profit on its TARP investments: “The profits, collected from eight of the biggest banks that have fully repaid their obligations to the government, come to about $4 billion, or the equivalent of about 15 percent annually.” The article has plenty of appropriate caveats – the total bailout went well beyond TARP, the Citigroup (C) and Bank of America (BAC) investments and asset guarantees are still out there, we still have a ton of money sunk into AIG (AIG) – but the fact remains that some of the investments are getting paid back, with interest and with a modest bonus from the warrants issued to Treasury.
There is also an ongoing debate about whether Treasury is getting full value for its warrants, which we’ve covered previously, but let’s leave that aside for now. The bigger question, I think, is this: Did Treasury get a fair deal for its investments at the peak of the crisis?
At the time I said no, and I still think the answer is no. The most important principle to bear in mind is that how a decision turns out has no effect on whether it was a good decision to begin with. In honor of the changing seasons, imagine it’s the first quarter of a football game and you have fourth-and-one at the other team’s 40-yard line. Anyone who studies football statistics will say you should go for it; it’s not even close. (Some people have run the numbers and said that a football team should never – that’s right, never – kick a punt.) If the offense fails to make it, the announcer, and the commentators the next day, will all say that it was a bad decision. That’s completely wrong. It was a good decision; it just didn’t work out.
The same holds true for investing. In this case, Treasury bought some securities from the banks and underpaid significantly, according to both the Congressional Oversight Panel and the Congressional Budget Office. The difference between the amount paid for the securities and their fair value at the time was a subsidy to the banks. What happened here was that Treasury made what was in strictly financial terms a bad investment and then got bailed out by later events. Or, you might say, it bailed itself out by undertaking a series of bank-friendly policies that had the effect of bolstering banks’ share prices and making it easier for them to raise capital. Which raises a whole other question: whether Treasury was counting on their ability to themselves out, and thereby avoid any eventual criticism for losing money on the deal – but which, at the same time, gave them the incentive to do what was best for bank shareholders.
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Hey, if I had the money and the guts I could manipulate things like that too!
Lastly, for all the hue and outcry over how Paulson contributed to the credit crisis by letting Lehman fail, I don't think he has taken even half the heat he deserves. He wanted to actively punish stock investors because the companies took too much risk and he wanted the investors to suffer because of it, the moral hazard argument. But his focus on moral hazard came at a huge price, the near death experience of the entire financial system of the U.S. Paulson's message was don't expect the government to bail you out if your company can't survive in the marketplace and he contributed to that fear of failure. His handling of Bear Stearns clearly sent that message. And then he reinforced it by destroying the preferred shares of Fannie and Freddie, not just the common share investors. And who owned the preferreds? Banks. So he undermined capital in the banking sector at the very time banks were having difficulty raising capital. And he also contributed to the collapse of the entire preferred market, precluding any financial firm from being able to raise capital via preferred share issuance. Letting Lehman fail was just the icing on the cake of a string of policy decisions that greatly worsened the credit crisis. Despite the many billions in profits that I expect to come from the government's lending activity, Paulson's decisions made a bad situation much worse and allowed the financial system to approach collapse when it was all avoidable. Bernanke and Geithner have both distanced themselves from some of these decisions and for good reason. Paulson may have been one of the worst Treasury Secretaries ever.
That takes some masterful book cookin'
Fire up the corporate jets!
Let's celebrate!