Recession Is Over; Depression Has Just Begun

For the last few months I have been casting around looking for bullish data points as counterfactuals to my more bearish long-term outlook. I have found some, but not enough. If you recall, early this year, I stated that we are in depression, making the case for the ongoing downturn as a depression with a small ‘d.’ Nevertheless, I was quite optimistic about the ability of policymakers to engineer a fake recovery predicated on stimulus and asset price reflation and I certainly saw this as bullish for financial shares if not the broader stock market. But, I saw these events as temporary salves for a deeper structural problem.

As a result, I have been on a quest to find data which disproves my original thesis – signs that the green shoots that everyone keeps talking about (and a term I had banned from my site) are part of a sustainable economic recovery. Unfortunately, I have concluded that they are not. This post will discuss why we are in a depression, not a recession and what this means about likely future economic and investing paths. I will try to pull together a number of threads from previous posts, add some context via Wikipedia links and draw in some good discussion via recent posts by Prieur du Plessis on balance sheet recessions and Marshall Auerback on the sector financial balances model of economics which completed the picture for me.

This post is very long and I have had to shorten it in order to pull all of the ideas into one post. Please do read the linked posts for background as I left out some of the detail in order to create this narrative.

Let’s start here then with the crux of the issue: debt.

Deep recession rooted in structural issues

Back in my very first post in March of 2008, I said that the U.S. was already in a recession, the only question being how deep and how long – a question I answered in the next post saying “we are definitely in recession. And according to Gary Shilling, this recession is going to be a big one. Worse than 2001, 1990-91 or the double dip recession of 1980-82.” This has certainly turned out to be true. The issue was and still is overconsumption i.e. levels of consumption supported only by increase in debt levels and not by future earnings. This is the core of our problem – debt.

I see the debt problem as an outgrowth of pro-growth, anti-recession macroeconomic policy which developed as a reaction to the trauma of the lost decade in the U.S. and the U.K.. This was a period of low growth, high inflation and poor market returns, in which the U.K. became the sick man of Europe and labor strife brought that economy to its knees. It is a period that saw the resignation of an American President and the humiliation of the Iran Hostage Crisis.

In essence, after the inflationary outcome that many saw as an outgrowth of the Samuelson-Keynesianism of the 1960s and 1970s, the Reagan-Thatcher era of the 1990s ushered in a more ‘free-market’ orientation in macroeconomic policy. The key issue was government intervention. Policy makers following Samuelson (more so than Keynes himself) have stressed the positive effect of government intervention, pointing to the Great Depression as animus, and the New Deal, and World War II as proof. Other economists (notably Milton Friedman, and later Robert Lucas) have stressed the primacy of markets, pointing to the end of Bretton Woods, the Nixon Shock and stagflation as counterfactuals. They point to the Great Moderation and secular bull market of 1982-2000 as proof. This is a divisive and extremely political issue, in which the two sides have been labelled Freshwater and Saltwater economists (see my post “Freshwater versus saltwater circa 1988”).

However, just as the policy of the 1950s to the 1970s was not really Keynesian (read Keynes’ General Theory as Richard Posner did and you will see why), the 1980s-2000 was not really an era of true ‘free markets.’ I call it deregulation as crony capitalism. What this has meant in practice is that the well-connected, particularly in the financial services industry, have won out over the middle classes (a view I take up in “A populist interpretation of the latest boom-bust cycle”). In fact, hourly earnings peaked over 35 years ago in the United States when adjusting for inflation.

Remember, the 1970s was a difficult period in which the U.K. and the U.S. saw jobs vanish in key industrial sectors. To stop the rot and effectively mask the lack of income growth by average workers, a new engine of growth had to be found. Enter the financial sector. The financialization of the American and British economies began in the 1980s, greatly increasing the size and impact of the financial sector (see Kevin Phillips’ book “Bad Money”). The result was an enormous increase in debt, especially in the financial sector.

This debt problem was made manifest repeatedly during financial crises of the era. Not all of these crises were American – most were abroad and merely facilitated by an increase in credit, liquidity, and international capital movement. In March 2008, I wrote in my third post on the US economy in 2008:

From the very beginning, the excess liquidity created by the U.S. Federal Reserve created an excess supply of money, which repeatedly found its way through hot money flows to a mis-allocation of investment capital and an asset bubble somewhere in the global economy. In my opinion, the global economy continued to grow above trend through to the new millennium because these hot money flows created bubbles only in less central parts of the global economy (Mexico in 1994-95, Thailand and southeast Asia in 1997, Russia and Brazil in 1998, and Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil in 2001-03). But, this growth was unsustainable as the global imbalances mounted.

Eventually, the debt burdens became too large and resulted in the housing meltdown and the concomitant collapse of the financial sector, a looming problem that our policymakers should have seen. This is why my blog is named Credit Writedowns. But, make no mistake, the housing and writedown problems are only symptoms. The real problem is the debt – specifically an overly indebted private sector (note the phrase ‘private sector’ as I will return to this topic).

This is a depression, not a recession

When debt is the real issue underlying an economic downturn, the result is a period of stagnation and short business cycles as we have seen in Japan over the last two decades. This is what a modern-day depression looks like – a series of W’s where uneven economic growth is punctuated by fits of recession. A recession is merely a period of recalibration after businesses get ahead of themselves by overestimating consumption demand and are then forced to cut back by making staff redundant, paring back inventories and cutting capacity. Recessions can be overcome with the help of automatic stabilzers like unemployment insurance to cushion the blow. Depression is another event entirely. Back in February, I highlighted a blurb from David Rosenberg which summed up the differences between recession and depression quite well.

Depressions marked by balance sheet compression
Recessions are typically characterized by inventory cycles – 80% of the decline in GDP is typically due to the de-stocking in the manufacturing sector. Traditional policy stimulus almost always works to absorb the excess by stimulating domestic demand. Depressions often are marked by balance sheet compression and deleveraging: debt elimination, asset liquidation and rising savings rates. When the credit expansion reaches bubble proportions, the distance to the mean is longer and deeper. Unfortunately, as our former investment strategist Bob Farrell’s Rule #3 points out, excesses in one direction lead to excesses in the opposite direction.

The next day, I highlighted Ray Dalio’s version of this story because it takes a historical view and rightly emphasizes the debtor instead of the lender as the crux of the problem. Notice the part about printing money and devaluing the currency if the debt is in your own currency.

… economies go through a long-term debt cycle — a dynamic that is self-reinforcing, in which people finance their spending by borrowing and debts rise relative to incomes and, more accurately, debt-service payments rise relative to incomes. At cycle peaks, assets are bought on leverage at high-enough prices that the cash flows they produce aren’t adequate to service the debt. The incomes aren’t adequate to service the debt. Then begins the reversal process, and that becomes self-reinforcing, too. In the simplest sense, the country reaches the point when it needs a debt restructuring…

This has happened in Latin America regularly. Emerging countries default, and then restructure. It is an essential process to get them economically healthy.

We will go through a giant debt-restructuring, because we either have to bring debt-service payments down so they are low relative to incomes — the cash flows that are being produced to service them — or we are going to have to raise incomes by printing a lot of money.

Commence the fake recovery

So where are we, then? We have left the fake recovery and are entering a new era of growth that could last as long as three or four years or could peter out very quickly in a double dip recession. By now, you have seen my post on the fake recovery, so I won’t cover that ground here. However, I do want to highlight how I came to believe in the fake recovery and how asset prices have played into this period (the S&L crisis played out nearly the same way). I see writedowns as core to the transmission mechanism of debt and credit problems to the real economy via reduced supply and demand for credit. Again, this is why my site is called Credit Writedowns.

In March, at the depths of the downturn I wrote:

The problem is the writedowns. You see, if you get $30 billion in capital from the government, but lose another $40 billion because of credit writedowns and loan losses, you aren’t going to be lending any money. To me, that says the downturn will only end when the massive writedowns end, not before.

The U.S. government has finally realized this and is now moving to stem the tide. Their efforts point in four directions:

Increase asset prices. If the assets on the balance sheets of banks are falling, then why not buy them at higher prices and stop the bloodletting? This is the purpose of the TALF, Obama’s mortgage relief program and the original purpose of the TARP.

Increase asset prices. If assets on the balance sheet are falling, why not eliminate the accounting rules that are making them fall? Get rid of marking-to-market. This is the purpose of the newly proposed FASB accounting rule change.

Increase asset prices. If asset prices on the balance sheet are falling, why not reduce interest rates so that the debt payments which are crushing debtors ability to finance those assets are reduced? This is why short-term interest rates are near zero.

Increase asset prices. If asset prices on the balance sheet are falling, why not create Public-Private partnerships to buy up those assets at prices which reflect their longer-term value? This is what Geithner’s Capital Assistance Program is designed to do.

So I lied, there is only one direction the government is headed: increase asset prices (or, at least keep them from falling). Read White House Economic Advisor Larry Summers’ recent prepared remarks to see what I mean. (Summers on How to Deal With a ‘Rarer Kind of Recession’ – WSJ)

I was more on target in my thinking here than I could have known. Within two weeks, the mark-to-market model was dead and mark-to-make believe had begun. It was then that I knew a recovery was likely to take hold. And it was going to be bullish for bank stocks and the broader market. What you should realize is that, despite the remaining problems in credit cards, commercial real estate or high yield loans, limiting credit growth, the changes instituted by government definitely have meant 1. that banks will earn a shed load of money and 2. that house price declines have stalled, underpinning the asset base of lenders. This necessarily means an end to massive writedowns, a firming of banks’ capital base, and a reduction in private sector deleveraging.

As an aside, I should mention that this dynamic called the asset-based economy, where economic well-being is dependent on asset prices, is far more pronounced in Anglo-Saxon countries like the U.S. and the U.K. (and Australia, Ireland, and Canada to a degree). While the free market ideal has gained sway globally, it is viewed with much more skepticism elsewhere. In Germany, for example, the term Anglo-Saxon is often bandied about as an epithet for political demagoguery to represent free market ideology. These cultural differences are something I explored in my post “Cultural attitudes on work, leisure and wealth in Europe and America.”

As for the recent asset-based economic reflation, be under no illusion that these measures ‘solve’ the problem. The toxic assets are still impaired and banks are still under-capitalized. But the increased asset value and the end of huge writedowns has underpinned the banks and led to a rise in the broader market in a feedback loop that has been far greater than I could have imagined at this stage in the economic cycle.

The double dip or the economic boom?

So what’s next? A lot of the economic cycle is self-reinforcing (the change in inventories is one example). So it is not completely out of the question that we see a multi-year economic boom. Higher asset prices, lower inventories, fewer writedowns all lead to higher lending capacity, higher cyclical output, more employment opportunities and greater business and consumer confidence. If employment turns up appreciably before these cyclical agents lose steam, you have the makings of a multi-year recovery. This is how every economic cycle develops. This one is no different in this regard.

However, longer-term things depend entirely on government because we are in a balance sheet recession. Ray Dalio and David Rosenberg make this case well in the previous quotes I supplied, but it was a recent post about Richard Koo from Prieur du Plessis which got me to write this post. His post, “Koo: Government fulfilling necessary function” reads as follows:

According to Koo, American consumers are suffering from a balance sheet problem and will not increase consumption until their personal finances are back in order. The banks are not lending mainly because nobody wants to borrow and, furthermore, the banks want to build their own balance sheets (raise cash) and get rid of toxic garbage…

Again, when asked what would happen if the government cuts back on its fiscal stimulus, Koo replies: “Until the private sector is finished repairing its balance sheets, if the government tries to cut its spending, we’re going to fall into the same trap Franklin Roosevelt fell into in 1937 (a crushing bear market) and Prime Minister Hashimoto fell into in 1997, exactly 70 years later.

“The economy will collapse again and the second collapse is usually far worse than the first. And the reason is that, after the first collapse, people tend to blame themselves. They say, ‘I shouldn’t have played the bubble. I shouldn’t have borrowed money to invest – to speculate on these things.’

This view of a second, more serious downturn mirrors the one I wrote of when I wrote about high structural unemployment last week. And, again, it is predicated on what government does. I wrote last November that if government stops the support, recession is going to happen.

The U.S. economy cannot possibly work itself out of the greatest financial crisis in some 70-odd years in a mere 4 years and then expect to raise taxes on the middle class without a major recessionary relapse.

So, when you hear policy makers talking about reducing the deficit as soon as possible, what you should think is 1938 and continued depression.

Right now, if you listen to what President Obama is likely to do when we see more economic growth, you know that the government prop for the economy is going to be taken away. Koo again:

So the fact that Larry Summers was talking about ‘temporary’ fiscal stimulus had me very, very worried. That whole Larry Summers idea that one big injection of fiscal stimulus will get the US out of the recession, and everything will be fine thereafter, probably led to President Obama’s saying he’s going to cut his budget deficit in half in four years."

Get ready because the second dip will occur. It will be nasty: unemployment will be higher and stocks will go lower than in 2009. I am convinced that it is politically unacceptable to have the government propping up the economy as Koo suggests it should. The question now is one of timing: when will the government stop propping up the economy? The more robust the recovery, the quicker the prop ends and the sooner we get a second leg down.

So to recap:

1. A depression was borne out of high levels of private sector debt, the unsustainability of which became apparent after a financial crisis.
2. The effects of this depression have been lessened by economic stimulus and government support.
3. Government intervention led to a reduction in asset price declines, which led to stock market increases, which led to asset price stabilization and more stock market increases and eventually to asset price increases. This has led to a false sense that green shoots are leading to a sustainable recovery.
4. In reality, the problems of high debt levels in the private sector and an undercapitalized financial system are still lurking, waiting for the government to withdraw its economic support to become realized
5. Because large scale government deficit spending is politically impossible, expect a second economic dip within three to four years at the latest.

Why is government spending necessary?

The government plays a crucial role here because of the huge private sector indebtedness. In the U.S. and the U.K., the public sector is not nearly as indebted. So while, the private sector rebuilds its savings and reduces debt, the public sector must pick up the slack. Why do I say must? It’s because of an accounting identity which comes from the financial sector balances model. Marshall Auerback says it best in a recent post:

We’ve said it before and we’ll say it again. As a matter of national accounting, the domestic private sector cannot increase savings unless and until foreign or government sectors increase deficits. Call this the tyranny of double entry bookkeeping: the government’s deficit equals by identity the non-government’s surplus.

So, if the US private sector is to rebuild its balance sheet by spending less than its income, the government will have to spend more than its tax revenue. The only other possibility is that the rest of the world stops saving on a massive scale — letting the US run a current account surplus. But that is highly implausible and socially undesirable, since it means we export our economic output, rather than consume it domestically. And if the government deficit does not grow fast enough to meet the saving needs of the private domestic sector, national income will decline, which, given the size of the private sector’s debt problem, will generate a huge debt deflation.

This is the foundation of modern monetary theory. Would that the IMF and the G20 understood these basic facts.

If the private sector is a net saver, the public sector must, I repeat must, run a deficit. That’s the law of double entry book-keeping. The only other way to prevent the government from running a deficit when the private sector is net saving is to run huge current account surpluses by exporting your way out of recession – what Germany and Japan tried in the 1990s and in this decade. But, of course, the G20 and the IMF are all talking about global re-balancing. This cult of zero imbalances is something Marshall first brought forward back in April. And it ignores the accounting identity inherent in the financial sector balances model. I highlighted this model in my post, “Minsky: Turning neoclassical economics on its head.” However, I must admit to having a preternatural disaffection for large deficits and big government which is what Koo and Minsky advise respectively – a recent cartoon shows why. It is this knee-jerk aversion to what is viewed as fiscal profligacy which is at the core of the cult of zero imbalances.

So, what does this mean for the American and global economy?

1. The private sector (particularly households) is overly indebted. The level of debt households now carry cannot be supported by income at the present levels of consumption. The natural tendency, therefore, is toward more saving and less spending in the private sector (although asset price appreciation can attenuate this through the Wealth Effect). That necessarily means the public sector must run a deficit or the import-export sector must run a surplus.
2. Most countries are in a state of economic weakness. That means consumption demand is constrained globally. There is no chance that the U.S. can export its way out of recession without a collapse in the value of the U.S. dollar. That leaves the government as the sole way to pick up the slack.
3. Since state and local governments are constrained by falling tax revenue (see WSJ article) and the inability to print money, only the Federal Government can run large deficits.
4. Deficit spending on this scale is politically unacceptable and will come to an end as soon as the economy shows any signs of life (say 2 to 3% growth for one year). Therefore, at the first sign of economic strength, the Federal Government will raise taxes and/or cut spending. The result will be a deep recession with higher unemployment and lower stock prices.
5. Meanwhile, all countries which issue the vast majority of debt in their own currency (U.S, Eurozone, U.K., Switzerland, Japan) will inflate. They will print as much money as they can reasonably get away with. While the economy is in an upswing, this will create a false boom, predicated on asset price increases. This will be a huge bonus for hard assets like gold, platinum or silver. However, when the prop of government spending is taken away, the global economy will relapse into recession.
6. As a result there will be a Scylla and Charybdis of inflationary and deflationary forces, which will force the hands of central bankers in adding and withdrawing liquidity. Add in the likely volatility in government spending and taxation and you have the makings of a depression shaped like a series of W’s consisting of short and uneven business cycles. The secular force is the D-process and the deleveraging, so I expect deflation to be the resulting secular trend more than inflation.
7. Needless to say, this kind of volatility will induce a wave of populist sentiment, leading to an unpredictable and violent geopolitical climate and the likelihood of more muscular forms of government.
8. From an investing standpoint, consider this a secular bear market for stocks then. Play the rallies, but be cognizant that the secular trend for the time being is down. The Japanese example which we are now tracking is a best case scenario.

Not particularly uplifting, but hopefully well-documented. Your comments are very greatly appreciated.

Comments

[aussiereader4]

This is an extremely accurate analysis of what has happened. Rather than face the issues of restructuring in the early 1980's, avoidance of the problem resulted. It has taken 30 yrs to unwind.

The answer is to print money and lots of it. There is going to be a realignment in world wealth that has only started.

2009 Oct 02 04:37 AM

[Roger Knights]

"Deficit spending on this scale is politically unacceptable and will come to an end as soon as the economy shows any signs of life (say 2 to 3% growth for one year)."

But won't QE end sooner, in six months? And what if China and/or Japan stop buying our Treasuries before our economy grows for a year, because they don't like our deficit spending, or because they are no longer able to afford to do so? Julian Robertson said a few days ago that the effect of their doing that would be instant double-digit inflation. (Something's got to give somewhere, because it's all connected. If stress is relieved at one point in the system, it is transfered to another.)

So we may not have the ability to to prop up asset prices for more than more three months--or six at the most. After that, le déluge. Someone's got to take the "hit" for all the debt and absorb the losses. Going forward, I think it will be stockholders, then bondholders, then land-owners.

Speaking of le déluge, the first raindrops are falling already. I think they'll fall even harder today (Friday).

2009 Oct 02 04:46 AM

[Steven Hansen]

Edward, you have put a lot of accurate thought into this.

if you put me in charge of steering the US economy out of this mess, i would concentrate on jobs and job creation. this is a real problem which structurally destroys any solution to fire up the economy.

as long as economists believe their report card is a rise in GDP, we will remain in a failure mode. a country is not defined by GDP but by the life of its citizens.

the metrics are: employment, earnings, wealth, health, and infrastructure, living conditions.

2009 Oct 02 04:57 AM

[Moon Kil Woong]

Edward Harrison: Thanks for the complete historic diarama.

At best what we can hope for is a good 20 years of patient austerity and recovery. Most likely, the government will opt for a series of extreme measures which will pull us in and out of tighter and tighter business cycles which are actually carefully orchestrated monetary ploys.

2009 Oct 02 05:07 AM

[Ricard]

Excellent and exceptionally condensed summary of the current situation. It amazes me at times how complicated it can be to answer a simple question: will markets go up or down?

2009 Oct 02 05:20 AM

[Tom Armistead]

Very carefully thought out article: I appreciate your willingness to draw investment implications - play the rallies but be careful.

The point about double entry book-keeping, that the private sector surplus must be offset by a government deficit, is a good one. But it is possible to think of a private sector, a government sector, and a financial sector. The system contains excessive debt, which has been migrating from the private and financial sectors onto the government balance sheet, somewhat obfuscated by the use of guarantees rather than actual purchase transactions.

Econoimists interpret the experience of other countries as suggesting a law that when debt in the system becomes excessive, financial institutions come under speculative attack, leaving the government no alternative but to support financial institutions until the currency collapses. Because the US dollar is the world reserve currency that event is unlikely. But discussion of alternative reserve currencies sets the stage for a reckoning.

US financial institutions came under speculative attack during the course of the meltdown, demonstrating that this country is not immune to these facts of life.

Solutions are not easy, I would agree with Steven Hansen, we need jobs to create value.

And finally there is the issue of financialization or financialism, no need to define it, the US and UK have it bad, something has to be done.

2009 Oct 02 06:30 AM

[Pat C]

Excellent Article - Thanks

2009 Oct 02 07:33 AM

[chap08]

Good article Edward. In something so wide ranging, everyone will find things to agree and disagree with.

My main point of agreement is your diagnosis of repeated W's as the economy struggles and policy reversals are executed.

My main disagreement is when you say that we are tracking Japan and that this remains a model. I disagree with this because, while the initial conditions are similar, the policy response to date, and likely future response, are totally different. The main difference is the monetary approach.

Japan's problems started at the end of the 80s, but it wasn't until 2001 that they started a policy of QE. Up until that point, what efforts they had made had focused on fiscal stimulus. This just resulted in plenty of mal-investment and deflation took an increasingly strong grip on the country. When they started on QE, things changed. You can argue how much it had to do with QE, but the introduction of the QE policy (2001 - 2006) coincided with the longest expansion in Japan’s post world war two history (2002-2007).

These points are not lost on the Fed. They know about Japan. They know about the mistakes we made in 1937. The one thing that they will not do is repeat these mistakes. It is far more likely that they will err on the other side, with too much accommodation. They will not tolerate deflation in the same way that Japan did. They will want a combination of positive CPI and near negative real interest rates. They'll need to stay active and responsive, but they'll keep stepping in to make sure that's the outcome. As a result, we won't look like Japan. Things won't be easy for us either, but Japan is not the model.

2009 Oct 02 07:36 AM

[CautiousInvestor]

Nice job across the board and I found the following most pertinent:


Depressions marked by balance sheet compression
Recessions are typically characterized by inventory cycles – 80% of the decline in GDP is typically due to the de-stocking in the manufacturing sector. Traditional policy stimulus almost always works to absorb the excess by stimulating domestic demand. Depressions often are marked by balance sheet compression and deleveraging: debt elimination, asset liquidation and rising savings rates. When the credit expansion reaches bubble proportions, the distance to the mean is longer and deeper. Unfortunately, as our former investment strategist Bob Farrell’s Rule #3 points out, excesses in one direction lead to excesses in the opposite direction.

2009 Oct 02 07:36 AM

[Fanatical Yankee]

I've been calling this a Depression since last October. To any such extent as a Recession becomes a Depression ~ as opposed to BackDating the Depression ~ then THAT is when it began.

And of course they'll retroactively say that the Depression started way back in December of 2007, which of course it did, as those of us on the front lines realized in Real Time...and which pundits, 99% of them, realized only about a year or so later.

That divergence notwithstanding, an excellent article, sir.

As usual.

2009 Oct 02 08:23 AM

[markfl]

Agreed. I wanted to hold off on macroeconomic comments until the BLS report came out. Avg. weekly hours fell again, which means we may have not reached a cyclical bottom. This is awful. While I don't think the situation is severe enough to suggest the economy will contract again (yet), the evidence for disappointing Q4 growth is rising, and there is so much labor force slack (the weekly hours number) that we are easily facing the worst labor market prospects since the Big D. In terms of duration of elevated unemployment we may rival the early 80s. We may not top the peak U3 number, but we may also not have the benefit of a steep decline in the rate in the way that happened in 1983; that year unemployment declined at a brisk 2%. I don't see it this time.

On Oct 02 04:57 AM Steven Hansen wrote:

> Edward, you have put a lot of accurate thought into this.
>
> if you put me in charge of steering the US economy out of this mess,
> i would concentrate on jobs and job creation. this is a real problem
> which structurally destroys any solution to fire up the economy.
>
>
> as long as economists believe their report card is a rise in GDP,
> we will remain in a failure mode. a country is not defined by GDP
> but by the life of its citizens.
>
> the metrics are: employment, earnings, wealth, health, and infrastructure,
> living conditions.

2009 Oct 02 09:07 AM

[Fanatical Yankee]

Addendum.

I might as well say for public consumption, though I've been saying it elsewhere: I believe that the Deluge to come will DWARF The Great Depression.

2009 Oct 02 09:12 AM

[E Nuff Sed]

You cite the Thatcher-Reagan era in positive terms and yearn to go back. I on the contrary see it as era where controls over the private sector put in place in response to the great depression were lifted. This led to a philosophy of market fundamentalism and leverage which peaked under the Ayn Rand disciple Greenspan. Sure we had the roaring 90's and lot of chest thumping of the status of America as a hyper power and "end of history" where capitalism was supposed to reign supreme.

Well the moment to pay the piper has arrived. We are now in a classic Minsky moment surrounded by ponzi borrowers who threaten the very survival of our system and way of life.

2009 Oct 02 10:05 AM

[Leftfield]

I would like to point out a greater need to compare apples to apples. Government spending does not equal sustainable, wealth-increasing private-sector jobs. The double-entry accounting (identity) you explain as necessary; that private saving must be balanced by public debt, deserves a deeper look.
We have been developing a crippled Main St. whose jobs pay less for two earners than for one 40 years ago vs. cost of living. This has been masked by excessive debt and asset inflation. So has the rise of government, which is an inefficiency and cost overall to an economy. The total is grossly unsupportable and in need of more than "balance" from one side to another. It is unsustainable in size now, and in the foreseeable future.
If we don't make better choices than we have, towards productive rather than crony uses of money. we can expect failure to continue with ever-more outlandish "solutions" causing greater Main St. pauperization and bondage.

2009 Oct 02 10:36 AM

[bob adamson]

Thank you for the excellent article Mr. Harrison. You put the role of debt in its proper perspective; the real culprit being the massive debt bubble created in the consumer and financial markets prior to 2008 and not the subsequent growth of national government debt associated with stimulus measures. For too many years prior to 2008, the stagnation in the creation of productive capacity in the traditional ‘First World’ economies was masked by overstimulation of the consumer debt and the focus of finance away from capital formation and into secularized debt and derivative pyramid creation and manipulation. Now that the resulting debt bubble threatens to implode, government stimulus is needed to stabilize the financial system and the larger economy to give national governments the time and capacity to begin to address the underlying structural problems in the economy. Addressing these underlying problems will be an extended, many staged and difficult process and not the simple return to growth through pump priming, on the one hand, or a short and sharp bout of creative destruction and recovery, on the other, as envisaged by too many otherwise perceptive observers on the centre left and centre right respectively.

Your description of the usual recession as being a temporary imbalance of an essentially sound economy – an imbalance that the recession itself will correct or that can be corrected by short term adjustments by central banks and governments – properly focuses our attention on the fact that the current crisis is deeper and will require more profound restructuring over an extended period. You are also right to trace the root causes of the crisis to the 1970s.

2009 Oct 02 11:06 AM

[Howard_T]

Thank you, Mr. Harrison, for this excellent analysis. Until I read it, I would have been one screaming for an end to profligate federal spending that would only lead us on the road to rapid inflation. I am now convinced that government must spend in order to temporarily provide the means to get the economy moving forward once again.

More government spending comes with one huge stipulation: the spending must be targeted, intelligently planned, and diligently regulated. Any unnecessary spending must be curtailed. As a start, forget any ideas of health care reform or energy cap-and-trade taxes. These can be left for later, although immediate action to begin work toward reducing the cost of health care (that is, how much it costs to see the doctor, not how much you pay for insurance) can start immediately.

Targeting of spending means putting the money directly into the hands of those who can use it to develop the economy and create jobs. Propping up state and local governments, while not an entirely bad idea, does little to create jobs and can be left for later. In the meantime, the states should be allowed to operate at a deficit, issuing bonds to keep them going, and make up the debt with increased income and fiscal austerity once tax revenues have come back. The money needs to be placed in the hands of small and medium-size businesses, in the form of grants or low-interest loans, to allow these businesses to expand, innovate, develop new products, and put people to work. Bailing out an already sick industry is not the answer. We see now that Chrysler will not be able to introduce new models based on Fiat products for several years. We also see that GM has not been successful in selling the Saturn brand, and will now abandon it. Despite the bailouts, the ship continues to the bottom. Spending does not have to be in the form of cash or credit. One of the most effective things that could be done is to revise the federal tax code to ease the burden on business, stop penalizing the re-investment of profits, and make it more attractive to keep one's manufacturing operations in the US.

Regulation simply means forcing those who benefit from federal spending to give an honest and accurate accounting of where it goes. Here I'm looking directly at the financial industry. It's too late to stop the creation of the mega-banks that has happened over the last few decades, and was accelerated by the government-assisted mergers of the last 2 years. What can be done is to force these large institutions, and indeed all financial institutions, to separate their banking, financial services, and brokerage operations. Ownership of such operations can continue under the existing corporate heads, but tall and stout firewalls would need to be put in place to prevent abuses such as the the banking operation placing depositors money into questionable financial products sold by the brokerage arm. Restoration of Glass-Steagle, perhaps with some updates to account for technology, would be the obvious start.

I am not an economist, nor am I involved with the financial industry in any way other than as a customer. I am a retired engineer living on my wife's small income, a pension, social security, and savings. In the meantime, I'm putting a kid through college. My debt load is low; if I were forced into it, I could pay it off tomorrow without real hardship. What little I know about finance I learned from my father, who worked for many years at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. I write the above as one who thinks that common sense has been abandoned in the corridors of government, greed and insensitivity have become the watchwords of the financial elites, and despair is increasing among those of us who are at their mercy. So please, Mr. Harrison, keep your ideas flowing, but please temper them with common sense.

2009 Oct 02 11:28 AM

[totheabovejerkface]

to have something you just mentioned would take some catastrophic event to pull the trigger. A nuke somewhere, 'the big one' hitting cali, kayne west putting george soros in a bad mood..

there is going to be some serious debt relief to balance this out. It it doesn't come sooner, then it comes later where assets are so low people can buy back in and screw the holders twice


On Oct 02 09:12 AM Fanatical Yankee wrote:

> Addendum.
>
> I might as well say for public consumption, though I've been saying
> it elsewhere: I believe that the Deluge to come will DWARF The Great
> Depression.

2009 Oct 02 12:33 PM

[Edward Harrison]

I think you confuse my neutral tone with an endorsement of the Reagan-Thatcher era. I am not a fan. However, I have tried to take the politics out of this post. Apparently, I succeeded!


On Oct 02 10:05 AM E Nuff Sed wrote:

> You cite the Thatcher-Reagan era in positive terms and yearn to go
> back. I on the contrary see it as era where controls over the private
> sector put in place in response to the great depression were lifted.
> This led to a philosophy of market fundamentalism and leverage which
> peaked under the Ayn Rand disciple Greenspan. Sure we had the roaring
> 90's and lot of chest thumping of the status of America as a hyper
> power and "end of history" where capitalism was supposed to reign
> supreme.
>
> Well the moment to pay the piper has arrived. We are now in a classic
> Minsky moment surrounded by ponzi borrowers who threaten the very
> survival of our system and way of life.

2009 Oct 02 12:36 PM

[Donald Ingram]

Agree. This economic global beast has just barely begun to rampage. This period in history will be described as the start of the Great Re-ordering. I pray this may be accomplished without geopolitical military conflict, however I do not hold out any hope.
Edward - Very good post. One point I would make is that there is NO WAY that government spending can replace the amount of credit destruction that has taken place by non-spending/deleveraging by the consumer citizens. Although the government is trying hard, all they are accomplishing is the destruction of the dollar.


On Oct 02 09:12 AM Fanatical Yankee wrote:

> Addendum.
>
> I might as well say for public consumption, though I've been saying
> it elsewhere: I believe that the Deluge to come will DWARF The Great
> Depression.

2009 Oct 02 01:05 PM

[Michael Clark]

Great article, Edward. I think history will decide that the Great Depression of this era began in 2001. If you look at the NDX chart your will see very clearly that this is where the Bear Market began.

Greenspan's battle with the depression (his bubble sequences) were an attempt to re-inflate a dying credit expansion cycle. We had credit expansion of the high variety from 1983-2001, 18 years. 2001 is when we should have begun raising rates slowly, chocking the inflation out of the system (inflation which has been horrific in fact, EXCEPT in salaries....this is the gimmick that allowed the government to proclaim a lack of inflation).

We now face 18 years of deflation, 2001-2019, during which time we will attempt to unwind our debt and should also make an attempt to stabilize our currency.

The idea that we can fight deflation by back-handed currency devaluation is irresponsible and immoral. The middle class, the working poor, and the poor in America CANNOT afford an ever-inflationary model because high prices bankrupt them over and over again.

Discipline is needed. 18 years of expanded credit (yes, I supported Reagan's expansion of credit in 1983); followed by 18 years of credit contraction. Painful? Yes. Pain is involved. Discipline brings stability. Currency re-valuation has to follow currency de-valuation. Expansion is NOT an eternal condition. The fact that Bernanke does not get this shows that his philosophy of life is incomplete. He is terrified of the shadow side of life. Understandably. But we cannot endure as a nation pretending that life is made of only days and no nights, of only wealth and no poverty, of only victories and no defeats, of only hubris and no punishment for hubris.

The higher your mountain of debt expansion, the lower your valley of debt deflation. It is a law as explicit as the laws of physics.

2009 Oct 02 01:37 PM