Is Another October Surprise in the Works? 27 comments
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I have been asked countless times in the past month why it is that share markets seem to have a difficult time navigating the autumn months. Obviously, there is a healthy amount of fear regarding the next 29 days, as the memories of last year are still firmly intact. Yesterday’s 203-point drop in the Dow Jones Industrials Average has done nothing more than rekindle those sour memories. While the question ‘Why October?’ is largely rhetorical in nature, we can certainly take a look at history for some potential causes for the blowups.
Not helping our prospects for avoiding another October surprise is the fact that almost nothing has been done to rectify the underlying problems facing the U.S. economy. Plenty has been spent to bailout various enterprises, but until a healthy, unsubsidized demand for goods and services exists at the consumer level, we will continue to spin our wheels. A fantastic example is the cash for clunkers program. The massive infusion of subsidies did manage to increase auto sales, but now that the program has ended, we’re heading right back to where we were before. This is evidenced by Ford’s U.S. auto sales immediately dropping 5.1% after the program was terminated.
The Panic of 1819
The panic of 1819 was the first stoic example of the boom-bust cycle in the nascent United States. Oddly enough, this panic, and the crisis in which we are currently embroiled, have striking similarities even though they occurred nearly 200 years apart. For starters, the panic of 1819 was a direct result of internal factors rather than external ones. Occasionally, a crisis in a nation can happen because of someone else’s doing. This one was mainly due to the rampant spread of private bank notes of varying quality and value thanks to runaway inflation caused by borrowing for the War of 1812. Oddly enough, the panic of 1819 resulted in many of the same things we are seeing today: foreclosures, unemployment, bank failures and significant slowdowns in both agriculture and manufacturing activity. This crisis is important because it is the country’s first example of a homegrown crisis and really determined the anatomy of many subsequent events. Essentially what happened was a boom of sorts, which resulted in malinvestment, financial and economic dislocations, and the decay of underlying fundamentals followed by a severe correction of the imbalances to restore economic and financial order.
However, there was another interesting twist in many of these early panics, and it had to do with our money itself. One of the characteristics of early banks in the U.S. was to offer paper bills that were redeemable for specie (metallic) money. Redeemability was a huge factor in the confidence in the paper bills.
Unfortunately, analogous to today’s Fed, these early banks had the propensity to print and circulate bills far in excess of the amount of specie they had on deposit, making them susceptible to bank runs. Many of the early panics in the new United States were caused because banks got greedy and overstepped their boundaries. Sound familiar? The more things change, the more they stay the same.
Unfortunately, when these bank runs occurred, the banks would merely run to the government who made the rather foolish decision to suspend specie payments on bank notes, effectively ripping off the holders of the bank notes. Incidentally, as a result of the panic of 1819, unemployment in Philadelphia, for example, reached near 90% and almost 2000 workers were put into debtors prisons. In addition, displaced and unemployed workers lived in tents outside the city. I am sure this irony is not lost on anyone who has seen some of the tent cities around America as a result of runaway foreclosures.
The important point underlying many of the panics of the 19th century was the fact that they were rooted in the monetary system and/or the economy in general. This paradigm shifted with the advent of share markets and the panics oftentimes transitioned from monetary and economic panics to stock market crashes and then to a hybrid situation from 1929 through the start of World War II.
The Crash of 1929 – October 24-29, 1929
I am not going to rewrite the chronology and factors surrounding the Great Depression. For anyone who is interested, there is an article here from last fall. This crash was the first well-defined example of a stock market crash and a significant economic contraction happening simultaneously.
Not surprisingly, this is where the history books usually get it wrong. They oftentimes assert that the market crash caused the Great Depression. Nothing could be further from the truth. The economic boom of the roaring 1920’s had run its course leaving (as in prior examples) financial and economic dislocations, overleveraged consumers and a general feeling the boom would last forever. The mountain started shaking in the summer of 1929 and by autumn panic gripped the markets, resulting in a 2-day, 23% sell-off in the DJIA. By the middle of November 1929, the DJIA had lost 40% of its value.
What happened next is crucial to understanding what is happening right now. The market then made a valiant attempt to rally, bringing back many investors from the sidelines as the Dow mounted a furious charge into 1930. However, the rally didn’t stick, conditions worsened and by the time 1932 rolled around the venerable index had lost 89% of its value. It would take 25 years for the Dow to recover that lost value in nominal terms.
If you think this cannot happen again, then you are incredibly naïve.
The Crash of 1987 – October 14th - 19th, 1987
In financial folklore, the crash of 1987 is one of those events that cannot generally be explained since there were no obvious dislocations. P/E ratios were high, but not extreme, investors were not grossly overleveraged and the economy was comparatively healthy. There have been many theories about financial raiders cashing in on the sudden decline, and given what we’ve seen recently the idea of someone triggering a crash for their own benefit doesn’t seem too far out of the realm of possibility. The interesting thing about the 1987 event was the recovery time. On a percentage basis, the loss was massive – 31% in five days for the DJIA. Yet it took just a tad under two years for the index to fully recover in nominal terms.
What was rather poignant about the ’87 crash was the response. This was the event that gave rise to the shadowy President’s Group on Working Markets, often lovingly referred to as the Plunge Protection Team. In addition, various circuit breakers were placed in the markets to halt trading if certain conditions were met.
After the invocation of trading curbs and the President’s Working Group, investors seemed to be lulled into a sense that the markets could never again drop significantly. That has certainly not been the case, and in case anyone is counting, the events are becoming larger and closer together. In 1997 and 1998 we had the Asian crisis and the Russian default, followed by Long Term Capital Management. The new century was ushered in by a vicious bear market thanks largely to overvalued Internet stocks. That bear market ended in 2003 and was followed by a steep nominal recovery in share prices only to see markets fall apart once again after the late 2007 top.
In summation, given everything we know about the underlying economic fundamentals and the nature of bear market rallies, it certainly won’t be much of a surprise if we have another horrendous October. And if the first day is any indication, it could be a long month.
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This article has 27 comments:
But alas, in this life justice will not happen for the banksters.
Too big to jail.
I am sure some technician somewhere has trading rules around that.
1) Summer seasonality especially in the housing market is over (people usualy buy houses during summer break). 2) People worry about the holiday season ramp. 3) Companies liquidate investments to get money to stock up inventory for the holidays. 4) And some say October crases are somewhat in response to fear of November selloffs. Thus maybe September falloffs are people trying to get a headstart on October declines. The last explaination is one of the weaker arguments yet is persistently mentioned as the primary reason by "financial news" coverage such as CNBC.
Yeah, well, as long as the financial lobbyists paralyze the Senate, little can be expected there. OTOH, Obama's executive branch did a pretty good job keeping us from falling into a catastrophic Great Depression, but it's bad form around here to say "thank you."
I'd say about 31 days
Gold, recall, is central bankers "currency of last resort". A rise in the price of gold is an effortless way to inject a lot of new money into the system.
> 1) Summer seasonality especially in the housing market is over (people
> usualy buy houses during summer break).
I'm very reticent to correct one of my favorite writers but as a former real estate analyst (amateur) I'd like to fine tune this concept a little bit without ruining your reasoning. The seasonality of the residential real estate sector is stunning in its regularity (normally). The summer months themselves are the deadest time for residential real estate sales throughout the USA and Canada... every single year. There are many reasons as to why sales kick off so strongly in April but to sum it up quickly... it has mostly to do with parents reluctance to disrupt their children's school year, so they buy in spring and then make the actual relocation in the summer.
Then there is almost always a strong resurgence in real estate sales starting in October and lasting through to Christmas... then deadsville once again until the spring. I'm wondering if the regular flow of capital into real estate every October (during regular times when the world isn't on the brink) would result in a drawdown of funds from the stock markets? I'm not suggesting that to be fact... just proposing a possibility.
>The last explaination is one of the weaker arguments yet is persistently mentioned as the primary reason by "financial news" coverage such as CNBC.<
I think your last explanation is actually one of the stronger arguments... the main stream median itself, being nothing more than an arm of the power brokers and a puppet that dances to the tug of the strings made of dollars. IOW, I think the idea of October crashes is blown totally out of proportion by the MSM for the benefit of their masters and rulers. The fact is that Octobers are no worse than any other month, except for the fact that 3 notable crashes have started in Oct. Indeed, Oct. is often a springboard into the "best 6 months of the year" trading strategy.
As we all know, the markets have fallen for the past two weeks (the last two of those days being in October). It's still possible this is only a correction, but if it doesn't turn around almost immediately, it could certainly be one of those nasty Octobers to be remembered. Having said that, and with what could be a two week correction behind us, and with the incredible number of stick saves we've seen out of the banksters all the way through the rally off the March lows... this could also end up being a barn burner of a good month for the markets.
In my personal view... this market is so overbought it's a case of irrationality on steroids. The internals are breaking down and the mood isn't good. I'm of the opinion that the "dumb money" retail investor isn't even in this market yet... and he's not coming back until he sees a meaningful correction. I don't think the "dumb money" is anywhere near as dumb as Wall Street and its pump jockeys think.
I realize probably everybody who participates here on SA are in the markets in one form or another... I don't consider any of you as the "dumb money".
It'll be early next year before people wake up and realize that "Change You Can Believe In" means high taxes, high gas, high unemployment, high utility bills, high inflation, a screwed up health care system, riots, just enough money to get essentials at Wal-Mart or Family Dollar, and so on.
2010 will be a bad year. Count on it. That's change you can believe in.
Another interesting thing about 1987 is that it was an up year. The DJIA finished 1986 at 1896.00 and finished 1987 at 1938.80 a 2.26% increase. Same for the S&P 500.
On Oct 03 04:35 AM jeandit75 wrote:
> "it certainly won’t be much of a surprise if we have another horrendous
> October. And if the first day is any indication, it could be a long
> month"
>
> I'd say about 31 days
On Oct 03 10:33 AM Albertarocks wrote:
> On Oct 03 02:59 AM Moon Kil Woong wrote:
To add another comment, then I am "off the stump", as soon as market sentiment turns the market turrns. One precedes the other. Is not that an interesting example of measureable relationship that many have grabbed onto and it is interpreted in an intuitive sense viz., the market declined and therefor sentiment has fallen as a result. NO, it is the other way around but who would agree ! It is too "counter intuitive" to imagine. To do so would tag one as "some kinda nut case!". So be it.
Kind Regards,Chuckols
On Oct 03 01:43 AM Kimball Corson wrote:
> Why are the autumn months more difficult for the market? I think
> that as the weather turns colder, leaves on trees die, grass goes
> brown, we get less sun, and as we head toward winter people are affected
> and become less optimistic. Many people in the pacific northwest,
> for example, have tanning lamps or tables to give themselves more
> "sun" exposure as a means of combating depression in that often dreary
> and overcast part of the country. Keynesian "animal spirits" wane
> and we tend to look inward more. All of this is not good for a buoyant
> market.
People also make decisions (resolutions) on New Year's Day. Fund managers would like statements and balances to show good things at this psychological benchmark. Besides, with the holidays much decision making and activity slows and is left for the New Year. In other words, October is a good time to sell and hunker down for the Winter.
On Oct 03 12:07 AM sethmcs wrote:
> I really wish the author could give more theories as to why market
> corrections tend to occur in October.
This is not a "Proof"s to why prices decline in October, but it is one factor.
The support levels below that were mentioned as 9300-9350 are now at 9650 level. A solid break below that level should bring the markets close to 6-8% lower. Today it seems as if they are trying to test those suppor levels. For all trend followers now may be a good time to enter long, or add to your position.
On Oct 03 12:41 AM AlphaKing wrote:
> Here we are now 3% lower than where I gave a warning signal up at
> 9850. As suggested in my initial warning comment I believe we still
> have at least another 1-2% move lower in the short-term, and then
> there is some strong support. If we get a break below 9300-9350 level
> it should confirm an even stronger move lower, which is moderately
> likely due to the bearish pattern formation with which a solid break
> below 9300 would confirm. Confirmation of a trend line break should
> then bring at least another 5% drop, but I believe closer to 12-15%
> fall technically from there in the medium term.