Bob Cantwell - Executive Vice President, Finance and CFO
Andrew Lazar - Barclays Capital
B&G Foods Inc. (BGS) Barclays Back-to-School Consumer Conference Transcript September 4, 2013 3:00 PM ET
Andrew Lazar - Barclays Capital
Our final presentation of the day. You can do it. You can do it. Okay. Our final presenter today will be B&G Foods. The phrase limitation is the sincerest form of flattery comes to mind when thinking about B&G. One of the first North American food company to position its investment case less around topline growth for growth sake and more around margins and use of free cash for M&A and returns to shareholders. This model has of course since become a successful framework for others as well.
Well recent deals have established B&G has a presence when in stacking, which could with it bring a growth to the element such deals are also very consistent with the company’s ongoing consolidation strategy. We delighted to have Executive Vice President, Finance, CFO, Bob Cantwell with us today to discuss B&G in more detail.
So with that I turn it over to Bob. Thanks for being here.
Thank you, Andrew, and good afternoon, everyone. I’ll pass through the forward-looking statements and non-GAAP financial matter disclosure and get right into it. B&G has had a consistent track record of growth and profitability.
First in class in this industry going back to 2004, but this charts kind of showing from 2006 forward, B&G has grown a sales from $411 million to we finished last year to $634 million and our LTM number is about $660. We are up 7.5%.
We’ve done that through focusing on profitable sales growth of our Tier 1 and our top of our Tier 2 brands, a lot of implementing cost savings that has approved EBITDA and improving productivity and accretive acquisitions along the way.
Adjusted EBITDA has grown very quickly also from $69 million back in 2006 to an LTM number of almost $175 million. EBITDA as a percentage of sales have grown into the 26% range. Small mistake on the last bar, we are actually on the LTM basis 26.5% EBITDA margin to sales. So, continued growth in EBITDA up over 15% on a compounded annual growth rate.
As Andrew mentioned, we have been about returning cash to shareholders along the way. We have paid quarterly dividends since us going public in October of 2004. 2009 our dividend as of -- was $0.68 a share. Today with our increase in dividend that we did again in July were $1.28 a share, current total dividends that we payout on an annual basis is $67.7 million and we’ve grown that dividend at the rate of 14% over the last five years.
And we do that with accretive acquisitions. Our goal on accretive -- on acquisition is fundamental, we return about 50% to 60% of our free cash flow to shareholders and acquisitions are always accretive to us out of the box they generated over 50% of free cash flow as percentage of EBITDA. Most of our acquisitions since 2007 have been closer to 70% and we are returning 50% to 60% of that 70% back to shareholders and immediately increasing the dividend in the following quarter.
Since 2004 as a small company we still have returned $332 million back to shareholders in the form of dividends of $323 million and some minus share repurchases back in the kind of 2008, 2009 period when the market was a little below valuation and we bought some shares back at very reasonable prices. But our goal again is to continue to take a substantial piece of our cash flow and return it to shareholders.
When you look at us compared to what we consider our mid-cap peers, our EBITDA margin on LTM basis is 26.5%. You can read who our peers across the chart but their average is 14.4%, but the closest one being over 5 percentage below us of 21.1% and it continues to drop off.
And our EBITDA turns into free cash flow. And I’ll show you on a chart later how much that turns into free cash flow. But our EBITDA 26.5% of sales equates to 25% free cash flow after CapEx as a percentage of sales. So again substantially higher than the peer average, peer average are little lower 11% with the next closest being post at little over 18% compared to our 25%.
Also, again, we are committed to returning cash to shareholders in the form of dividends. Our dividend now, we just increased it in July to $0.32 a quarter per share or $1.28 annualized, which is again about $67.7 million in total dividend payout on our annual basis.
Dividend rate has been ranging returning 3.5% and 4% depending where our share price is. Again, the peer group is much lower, little over 1% and our closest peers in the mid tiers, so we are percentage point above most of the players in the mid-cap space. And we will continue to look at increasing that dividend as we had accretive acquisitions and accretive acquisitions are all about accretive cash flow to us.
And we have really returned a substantial amount of shareholder return back to shareholders over the last number of years. In the last five years, our total shareholder return has been 465%. You can see on the chart substantially had everybody else on that chart.
And we’ve taken that EBITDA during that time from $69 million to $175 million. Again, this without the Pirate’s Booty acquisition that adds kind of another $20 million on top of that, that’s been a compound annual growth rate of 15.5%.
We have done that through aggressively innovated new product offerings, reducing costs throughout our organization. And during that time we have added a little over 25 brands into this portfolio.
Again as you saw in the prior charts, our LTM adjusted EBITDA 20 -- almost 27% substantially higher than the average of 14%. Even this year our stock price has grown close to 20% since the beginning of the year. So we continue that return to shareholders and we expect to continue to do that.
I mentioned before we are all about free cash flow. When we look at our LTM EBITDA of almost $175 million when you add the Pirate Brands acquisition kind of pro forma for Pirate Brands were about $194 million of EBITDA.
We got some non-cash share based comp of $4 million. So our cash EBITDA is about $198 million. Very modest CapEx expenditures, we are spending about 1.6% of sales, so very low. With Pirate’s acquisition a little more than 40% of the products we make now are co-packed Pirate is also co-packed.
Our CapEx in total is about $12 million, $13 million a year. Cash taxes now about $10 million. We have $63 -- little over $63 million tax yield amortized each year, which goes out. It starts declining but goes out 15 years from now. So substantial tax yield, total tax yield is about $700 million in total that’s being amortized over the next 15 years.
And with everything we’ve down, we recapitalized this company back in early June. We took our debt -- we refinanced most of our debt and took it out in an eight year bond at four and five age, so we have substantially fixed lower cost interest.
We have some small bank debt still outstanding, that’s floating around 3% today. But our total net cash interest is only $37 million on that $194. So before dividends our $194 turns into almost $140 million of excess cash before dividends and again we are paying a little then $68 million today.
So about half is going out to shareholders in the form dividends and half is going on our balance sheet either cash in the bank and to be used to pay down our Term A and our revolver.
Today as we look at our capital structure. Right now, we used most of this cash to buy Pirate’s Booty in the beginning of July, so the cash was drawn. We do have Term A bank debt outstanding of about $135 million. Again we did that $700 million of 4 5/8% notes that are sitting out there for eight years. We no longer have the 7 5/8% notes that was paid off in July and we have a revolver outstanding today of about $40 million.
Our net leverage today after the Pirate Brands acquisition is about 4.3 times and our market value of our equity is somewhere around a $1 million, $1.8 -- almost $1.8 billion. Total cap is about $2.7 billion and total and kind of our pro forma adjusted EBITDA we are looking at it is $194 million.
This team at B&G has been doing this for over 15 years. We really started this process in early 1997 and it’s truly the same team, Dave Wenner has been with organization over 20 years. I have been there, he is 22 or 23 years now, I have been there 30 years since the early 80s.
We look for acquisitions that are immediately accretive and with the cash flow. So we are looking at businesses that are going to generate more than 50% of the EBITDA back to us in free cash flow day one. And as I said, our typical acquisition really since 2007 that EBITDA generation has been really about 7 -- cash flow has been about 70% of that EBITDA generation.
We aggressively look for brands in the dry grocery category that have been around a long time. That have been kind of ignored big three companies that we can take on. They are either flat to a little bit of the declining business. Businesses that wouldn’t go away even in the big companies but businesses that they just want to pay an attention to and they might have had six cues on the shelf and now they are down to three or four.
That was the example of The Cream of Wheat. Cream of Wheat if you look at ShopRite in New Jersey, couple of years prior to us buying that business, there was anywhere -- depending on the store 7 to 9 different SKUs on the shelf. When we bought the business, it was down to four. Those four SKUs will probably never going away. Cream of Wheat has the right to be in ShopRite and would have been there for another 100 years.
Today, it has over nine SKUs back. So what we are very good at is getting the distribution back, creating new products, creating new line extension for those products, helping to halt the sales decline and move the needle go in the right way. We’ve also created the three tiers which I’ll show you in a little bit.
Our tier one brands are the brands which we really trying to spend the most money behind. We think they have the most opportunity. Tier 2 is more of the stable brands, some of those are higher margin than tier 1 brands. Harder to grow but very flat to up a little bit but huge cash flow metrics.
And tier 3 is kind of where we don’t spend a lot of money, typically our lower margin brands, all of our brands are profitable in EBITDA. All of our brands generate EBITDA margins and excess of 10%. Tier 3 brands tend to be in that low double digit multiple on EBITDA basis.
Again, we have superior margin structure in this industry. Our EBITDA margin has 26.5% far above every body. In our peer group and we have a very strong commitment to continue to return meaningful portion of our cash flow back to shareholder in form of dividends and hopefully growth in the stock.
Then just looking at where we’ve come from, back in 96, we were really just a pickle company doing -- and a couple of other small things, doing about $82 million in sales. Our LTM sales number through June is $660 million. When you add pro forma for the acquisitions to Pirate’s Booty acquisition and kind of rolling in a few of the other acquisitions on a few year basis.
We’re a little less than $800 million in sales today. And during that time, we did 26 acquisitions for 26 brands during that time. Again our goal is to really look at those brands, take cost out of the structure, invest in the high margin brands where we see opportunities and we’ve now moved in, which we’ll talk about in a little bit into the snack category.
We see a lot of opportunities there. All of these acquisitions need to be day one cash flow and EPS accretive. Cash flow need to be more than 50% of the EBITDA. If there are cost synergies, we’re aggressive. We’re typically buying brands. So we’re buying a brand from Kraft. We’re buying their product contribution.
So we think we can do certain things better but it’s not like buying a whole business where we’re getting a rid of huge amount of people. That’s not what we’re really buying. We’re really buying a brand, a stripped out brand from a large company. And we’re really set today at leverage of 4.3x in equity position in the market places that’s doing very well to be well positioned to continue to do accretive acquisitions.
Very diverse portfolio, we sell in all of the U.S., everywhere in Canada and Puerto Rico and a little bit elsewhere internationally but really we are just really that our U.S., Canada business more than anything else typically what we’re buying a number one and number two brands.
We have a lot of number one and number two brands in smaller categories nationally. A lot of regional brands and a lot of these regional brands are driven in the North East B&M B&G (inaudible) those are all in accents. These are all north, the [Sason] Accent piece. This is also north east driven. [Sugar Point] is a Canadian business.
It’s the number one brand of sugar sweetener in Canada. We kind of call regional and has every elements in niche products. We don’t really think we compete in -- with anybody. Accent is very unique. Over 60% EBITDA margins and it’s MSG and (inaudible). There is really nobody who competes with that. There is nobody who wants to tell people that they are selling MSG.
So people buy Accent. So it’s a very unique product. The same is Static Guard very unique. It says what it is and is really, you don’t have any real competition because it is what is. And Static Guard is very small brand, small brand to us about $10 million but it makes over $5 million in EBITDA, very profitable business, very stable business.
What we look for from a shelf-stable side is products with defensible market positions, products that can go through -- we have a national sales and distribution structure. We sell every customer in the U.S. and Canada some of our products. So anywhere you go in this country, whether it’s a supermarket to club any of these alternatives channels of both (inaudible) New York city, there is some of B&G products somewhere.
So we cover the four gamut across this country and now we cover the four gamut into Canada also. And really with that provides us on our smaller acquisitions is we tend on smaller acquisitions to go up against private equity buyers. And they really can’t repeat this. We can drop these acquisitions into our system and go.
They have fundamentally more lines on our invoice and more SKUs on our warehouses. And they are all going on same employer, same trucks and so by the same sales team. We really look at businesses under 100 million in sales and (inaudible) we have found historically and this is 15 plus years that the competition for those businesses are lower and we can keep the multiples down to a more reasonable number for us.
In this market, multiples have jumped up because financing is so cheap. But we tried to stay disciplined because we are in this for the long term. We just think the right answer is what we’ve been following on a multiple basis. And we’re looking today only for businesses that have very strong margins. Margins close to where we are today if not better and certainly those margins dropping to significant excess cash flow.
And as I said, this financing environment has really moved the multiples. We moved with it but we’re also very careful how far that should go because we are doing this a long time and we kind of have a really good feeling. Ultimately as financing changes, some of these brand will be worth long term.
Now, just a quick look at our kind of our tiers and what we’re doing. When we talk our tier one brands, those are brands like Ortega and Mrs. Dash and certainly all are new snack brands. We spend most of our consumer support money or marketing money behind those brands. We market our existing products and we are also actively looking at launching and launched -- have launched a number of new products.
We’ve recently launched and it’s been well accepted a product call Fiesta Flat. It’s kind of like a Taco boat. It’s very unique. Nobody else has it. We’ve launched Ortega fish taco seasoning mixes. We’ve taken the line of Ortega seasoning packets and typically these Mexican seasonings have been sold in packets and launched the line in Canisters also which have been well accepted and doing extremely well.
We’ve got some other taco shells and we’ve jus launched the line of these skillet sauces. You’ll see more and more in supermarkets. Skillet sauces seem to becoming a bigger category. A lot of the big guys have launched skillet sauces. And we just think this is a Mexican skillet sauce theme and we just think we need to be there under the Ortega label.
Mrs. Dash has been another one of those product lines, we’ve been very aggressive at. Mrs. Dash is a salt-free seasoning. It had various flavor profiles in salt free and number of SKUs. We are now launching really more of a meal solution packet which McCormick has done very successfully. A lot more of mix of spices that’s kind of one use you put it in, you making your beef stew, you are making your meat well. It’s all the seasoning you need. You just need the vegetables in the meal.
That’s been accepted well. We’ve also launched a lot more packets in the Mexican side under Mrs. Dash. We’re really trying to get no salt seasoning where we’ve had other products. So we have all this, most of these products under (inaudible). We’ve now mand them salt free and put them on the Mrs. Dash. We have a product called Bakers Joy, which is a baking powder spray which is somewhat unique. Bakers Joy is the biggest baking powder spray out there. We’ve now kind of created a line off to the Bakers Joy line called Chef’s Joy, basically (inaudible) which really competes with Pam and all the other baking sprays.
And we’ve had some very good success over the years on an emerald spray that we launched. We’re getting good feedback on this. Wal-Mart has accepted a few of these items. And most of this does sell during certain times of the season but we’re seeing that.
And then we have a product called Static Guard. We launched a product called Shed Guard recently over the last few months and it’s really to for cleaning pet here, same product as Static Guard but it is what Static Guard is able to do, and we are just looking for, additional incremental sales that’s in a different place in the store.
We are trying to also get it into pet stores through pet distributors. But we have found at least initially we had really good success in supermarkets in the pet side of the supermarkets.
And as we go into our Tier 2 and Tier 3 we get very tactical. The Maple Grove business has grown consistently for us. It’s a Tier 2 brand. We continually have to update. It’s a maple syrup business. It’s a pancake syrup business. It does a decent business and specialty salad dressings along with a number of others things.
We are continuing updating the flavors of salad dressing, pushing new products out. Emeril Legacy has developed a nice little space in pasta sauces. It didn’t have a white sauce.
White sauce is actually very large as you get into the middle of the country. You go to Wal-Mart in the middle of country, its more white sauce than red sauce. We just didn’t have it. We actually have a very good white sauce line now under the Emeril Legacy level.
We are also willing to look at license agreements. We entered into a license agreement with Crock-Pot and where we use this kind of license agreement for is immediate marking, people get when you put Crock-Pot on the label what it might be. They kind of understand Crock-Pot means seasoning for Crock-Pots. So we launched a line of seasonings in the Crock-Pot, that continues to grow for us and it is growing very nicely.
It’s not going to be huge business it’s a nice to go add-on business. It was very easy to do. It was very easy to take a lot of recipes we had and from the co-packed we don’t make that ourselves, somebody else makes it and use the Croc-Pot named to get in distribution.
So we are always looking for licensing arrangements like this. It’s kind of how we launched the Emeril Legacy lines, really used that name to sell it in and Crock-Pot is different version of that but it is working in a very nice way.
Now B&G, yeah, cost structure and you will see from the next slide, which is our commodity. It is very unique. Early on 2008 and everybody in this industry have large cost increases, which lead to large price increases and that kind of all work for people once they got pricing above cost.
We continue to see cost increases in 2011, 2012, but easily covered by our pricing and our other cost savings. 2013 we have seen a reduction in costs. This is pretty locked in now, it’s almost a $1.5 million of cost reductions and as we look at it 2014 we are actually seeing some bigger savings going forward. So we should achieve this $1.5 million incrementally on top of that this $1.5 million plus more in 2014.
And we are not commodity intensive at all. We’ve got could be the largest guy in Maple syrup, maple syrup usually is more mom and pop people sound, but we have happen to be the largest maple syrup seller in the United States.
We actually, our largest piece of purchases coming from the commodity side of maple syrup and that all comes out of Canada basically 90% of this comes out of Quebec and all comes out from trees in April and May, and so we bought our maple syrup to Texas through next June, July.
No real cost increase and actually a small cost decrease over the next 12 months here. But this is our biggest purchase about $34 million a year. Next biggest purchase drops down dramatically. It’s not quite 11 million in annual dollar spent and then it really drops off. Fruit concentrates $3.5 million, sugar $3.5, hyper calcium almost $3 million, molasses a little less than $3 million.
So not big commodity exposure, that’s why we haven’t had when cost rose on a lot of guy. They didn’t -- we didn’t have those huge cost increases. And again a cost decrease dramatically across the board we are not going to have those huge cost decreases.
I want to talk a little about where we are heading as a company. And the one thing is we still like the dry grocery acquisitions and we still wanted to be opportunistic and look at what those -- look for those acquisitions and when those acquisitions come into market be very aggressive. If they fit our model to buy those, because we still think we have a lot more room to continue to fill out dry grocery.
But we have -- in addition to that, we started down a different track which has opened up a lot more opportunities for us. In October 2012 we made our first snack acquisition, the New York Style Old London acquisitions and New York Style is a bagel chip, Peter chip business that’s solved in daily and we actually own that business in the late 90s.
As we were building up a dry grocery business it was really and we were still very small, it was very much an outlier for us and it is the only business we sold. But as we proved the first and only business we sold we ended up buying back.
This is a business that the prior owners who bought it in 2008, ‘09 consolidated plans and really built what we would call a super plant in North Carolina. They spent over $100 million on machinery in this plant. They had huge expectations for this brand. This brand was twice the size it was today when they bought it. They really just hurt this brand dramatically.
They just didn’t have a manager brand in the United States. We were able to buy those brands for $62 million. So, less than the value of this plant. We have this underutilized really state-of-the-art plant that is a first class baking and packaging operation that we can put a lot of snacks into as we build the snack business. And we think there is a lot of upside on the sales which I will talk about in a minute.
The TrueNorth acquisition was a small acquisition, enough cluster business that was originally started out by Pepsi in 2005 or 2006. They built it through a small level of sales and then actually reached out to us a few years ago to see -- we wanted the snack business at that point and ended up selling it through a small PE shop who put it in one of their candy businesses.
And they managed it. They didn’t do anything with it, but they kept it flat. Again, we think there is a lot of real opportunity on this as we built a snack organization to really try to sell this.
And then our last acquisition here, the Pirate Brands acquisition, all kinds of opportunities with us. We think the Pirate’s Booty name is a great name. It has been growing at over 20% a year. There is a lot more growth to it and a lot more ability to take that Pirate’s Booty name outside of its existing product line.
So when we look at kind of where we were today and where we are with snacks, our Tier 1 brands without snacks are about 40% of our total sales. And that had grown through the first half of the year, up 1.6%. Our Tier 2 is about 31% that grew about 1% of sales.
Our Tier 3 which is 20% of sales is really what heard us as a first of the year and basically kept ourselves flat. That was down 4% a lot of those Tier 3 brands are Northeast regional brands and we have struggled in the Northeast on volumes. Northeast has been very problematic in the last almost two years now in the Northeast.
As we go forward, the snacks in our portfolio, the snacks business, the three businesses combined are about $150 million in sales. Snacks become 19% of our business and everything else gets reduced because snacks fall into that.
So, there is less stress on the system and a lot more opportunity on growing that. We look at our base businesses. Our dry grocery brands, as they went would always look at it, we are trying to strive to 2% to 3% growth on those businesses and really very happy with 2% growth. We think the snacks have a lot more upside to us.
When we talk about the three pieces of the business, the New York Style business is truly half the size that it was not more than five years ago and it’s declined until we got it. That decline has stopped. There is a full re-launch going on now that really started in September. There is a brand new packaging on all the products. This active displays gaining set in stores. This is a product line that sold in the daily departmental stores. So this is a -- this is a daily snack business like Stacy’s and (inaudible).
And really (inaudible) and Stacy’s grew as this thing, they expanded sales in the daily substantially but really took away from this brand because nobody was watching the store.
So there is brand new packaging. Consumers are very loyal, consumers and buyers are very loyal to this product and it just has an imperative attention to it. And there was a lot of issues when we bought the business and really took us nine months to kind of stop the decline and really make this plan for this push starting now. So we see good things in the fourth quarter.
Just a lot of what these displays, various displays that have been launched into the market place, a much more aggressive into the market place where daily and supermarkets are very important.
We have hired temporary street -- what they call street sales force who goes into these daily departments, talk to the store manager, will do demos in the stores, really make sure these racks are always old ones are there. So a very aggressive kind of gorilla tactic at store level to try to get this brand moving in the right direction.
And then we are launching new products at the beginning of 2014. We are going to take this product line in addition to really firming the bagel chip business and trying to get the repeat piece of the business and a few of the other pieces of the business moving. We are going to go into a sweet side of this business.
So we have licensed the Cinnabon name that has been very good for us in premium wheat to kind of begin that launch and using Cinnabon to help this launch of the sweet products. So right now we have got a chocolate and a Cinnabon product that will be launched in the early part of 2014, and we have a line up of other new products that we are going to launch against this brand and let people know we are truly paying attention as we go forward.
One of the -- kind of the little diamonds in a rough year is this TrueNorth brand is a very small brand. It’s a very good nut cluster product. It’s all natural. It’s gluten free. It’s what people would want to eat once they had this. It doesn’t sell in a lot of places today. It’s a huge club business.
It has ended up in a lot of where candy has sold because it’s been sold by a candy distributor. Huge opportunity on this brand and the Pirate Brands acquisition has allowed us to -- we have added 15 people from Pirate Brands all in sales and marketing. They are top notch people. We now have sales -- a real sales snack organization to go after these snack brands and really move the needle. So there is a huge upside to this brand as go forward.
And then the other gem and we are very happy we were able to get this brand back in July. We paid a $195 million for Pirate’s Booty, little over ten times EBITDA multiple and kind of at the mid point of our guidance and we gave our guidance of $18 million to $20 million, and when you look at the tax adjusted basis, because this is all stepped up. So we get amortized at $195 for tax purposes. It’s about 8.3 times, so kind of a present value of the tax benefits of $37 million.
It’s all natural. It’s truly sold. The consumer who eats this is typically kids 13 and under and young women 18 to 40ish and it’s kind of young moms who eat this product, every 25-year-old daughter who called me when we bought this product, they may have said Dad you finally bought something that’s good.
So this is a very young women’s product. It’s a better for you snack. It’s still salty snack but it’s better for you. It’s fairly low calories per one ounce bag. It has been growing at a double-digit close to 20% rate. The business today is heavily distributed on the east coast, pretty good distribution on the west coast, not very good on the center of this country, it’s spotty.
So it has all the grocery stores on the east coast. It sells [Cascos], it’s in target. Target is growing substantially for this brand. You are finding in CBS’s, you don’t usually find them in 7/11 jet. It should be there and the biggest customer doesn’t sell them today which we need to get it in this Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart is a huge -- the first huge opportunity for this brand. It just hasn’t sold in Wal-Mart for various issues but it’s too big of a brand and it needs to be in Wal-Mart.
Wal-Mart struggles with the whole natural category too. So it’s problematic within their store but it needs to there. It is not that high price, it should be in Wal-Mart and it needs to get their own -- and then while this is all co-pack, so there is no CapEx with this. So, huge cash flow. This kind of 18, 20 -- $20 million EBITDA for us turns into free cash flow of over $16 million on this business.
So very positive free cash flow. And we think this Pirates Booty brand has the ability to expand outside. Right now 90% of what’s sold in this line in various sizes is in 8 wide (inaudible) product. Because again it’s SKU to young children and so the young children are not looking for salad (inaudible) and other flavors.
It has other flavors but it is not aggressively in the lot of distribution. So this is an item that we think we can take outside. Pirates Booty can mean a lot of things to a lot of people. You know it could be kid’s krackers and shapes of Pirates, it could be a lots of things. I mean we could be in Mac and Cheese, we could be in fruit roll, there is a lot of things that this brand could we think can translate to.
There is a lot of brand loyalty here. It’s known as all natural better for you product and we think that we have a lot of possibilities. With that I will open it up for questions.
Andrew Lazar - Barclays Capital
Thanks very much Bob. Why don’t we do this, I want to be respectful. It’s 3:40 so why don’t you respect people’s time and those need to skid out for the hall and such, maybe if you have a couple of minutes, maybe what we’ll do is those that need to leave can do that. And others maybe come on up. Chat with Bob, he will be here and let’s go from there. Please join me in thanking Bob for being here.