The Dollar as a Reserve Currency 13 comments
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Much hand-wringing is taking place over the reduction or possible loss of the dollar’s reserve currency status. That’s a bit ironic since the whole concept of a reserve currency is no longer valid in a system of floating exchange rates.
Under the dollar-exchange system established at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire after World War II, countries committed to keep their own currencies in a narrow band around a par value expressed in U.S. dollars. No reserves were needed to offset upward pressure on the domestic currency since the monetary authority could sell their own currencies for dollars in theoretically unlimited amounts. But to offset downward pressure on the domestic currency, a reserve currency was needed to purchase and support the domestic currency. A country’s ability to defend its currency from downward pressure was thus limited by the amount of the currency held in reserve. Since the parity was expressed in dollars, it was convenient to use dollars as the reserve currency.
The U.S. commitment was to peg the dollar to gold at a rate of $35 per troy ounce by standing ready to buy or sell gold at that rate with foreign central banks or Treasuries. (That official rate was later changed to $42.22 when we devalued the dollar.) Other currencies were pegged to the dollar by exchange-market intervention while the dollar was pegged to gold the same way. Therefore, all currencies were indirectly tied to gold.
Under the “rules of the game,” a country’s policymakers were supposed to follow policies similar to what would happen automatically under a pure gold standard. If their currencies came under upward pressure, they should permit domestic economic expansion and/or inflation to correct the imbalance. Downward pressure on the domestic currency should prompt a policy tightening to correct the underlying imbalance while dollar reserves were used in the meantime to defend the peg.
Theoretically, the Bretton Woods arrangement was supposed to simulate a real gold standard where inflows or outflows of gold were allowed to raise or contract the domestic money supply. That was easier to do when domestic expansion was called for. Expansion is fun. It was less easy when contraction was called for. It was common for countries to “sterilize” the gold outflows and counteract their impact on the domestic economy.
In the early postwar period, and the early years of the Bretton Woods system, the world was starved for dollars and most countries gladly accumulated dollars in their reserves. This was a sweet deal for the United States because it meant we could buy real goods and services on world markets and pay with money unlikely to be redeemed in gold.
Over the years, however, the world accumulated as many dollar reserves as it needed and increasingly wanted to exchange some of them for gold, which they had the right to do. The United States, however, was not eager to lose gold; so it pressured its trading partners to continue holding dollars without demanding gold. “You don’t really want gold, do you?”
The dollars had been supplied to the world through deficits in the U.S. balance of payments and comparable surpluses by our trading partners. From our viewpoint, having the dollar used as the reserve currency was like playing poker with IOUs that the other players were willing to accept during the game and did not present for “redemption” after the game was over. (“There’s time enough for counting with the dealing’s done.” Kenny Rogers)
Eventually, the accumulated U.S. deficits had supplied more dollars than our trading partners wanted to hold. At the same time, U.S. policymakers did not want to follow the rules of the gold standard game and tighten policy to improve the balance of payments. So, President Nixon broke the last link between the dollar and gold in 1971 and we went on a system of floating exchange rates.
Under floating exchange rates, the exchange rate itself is supposed to trigger the internal economic adjustments necessary to restore and maintain equilibrium rather than changes in domestic policy. The rule of floating exchange rates is to let the market determine the exchange rate without policy interference. Let the float be clean. Policies to influence the exchange rate would dirty the float and would be considered inappropriate.
With no pegged exchange rate to defend, and with sporadic intervention considered inappropriate, there is no need for a reserve currency. Reserve currencies are a feature of fixed exchange rates, not floating rates.
Part of the angst over the potential loss of the reserve currency status of the dollar is really over the use of the dollar as a transactions currency in much of the world and in certain markets, particularly the oil market. There is now a long-standing tradition of pricing oil in dollars even if the United States is not a party to the trade. That means that a decline in the exchange value of the dollar makes oil effectively cheaper—good for buyers, bad for sellers. Of course, what has been happening is that oil sellers raise the nominal price of oil to offset the decline in the value cause by dollar depreciation. This peculiar relationship does not apply to most other commodities.
Pricing goods in dollars is a separate issue from the use of the dollar as a reserve currency.
Our reserve-currency equivalent is gold, which to my knowledge is setting in Ft Knox, on the books at $42.22 per ounce, the last official pegged price before the link was cut. And you thought all the gold was in a bank in the middle of Beverly Hills in somebody else’s name!
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The key point is that as the current system, one way or another, reaches exhaustion point, the demand for the dollar to fill these roles will fall. That means only one thing for the price.
The gold thing is a canard. At current market it is equal to 1% of the debt. It does not matter.
bk
Over the past 13 years I have imported Jack Daniel's, Absolut, Moet & Chandon, Macallan, Famous Grouse and various other premium spirit Brands from around the world. I spend a disproportionate amount of my time and focus managing the currency swings (the Rand is an "exotic" currency and therefore subject to fairly high short term fluctuations). In addition placing the hedges is very expensive - - a 12 month hedge historical costs between an 8-12% premium). The frustrating part of this is that given the relative liquidity of the Rand, a 23 year old Forex Trader sitting in London can significantly impact the currency - with swings at times of as much as 5-10% in a month. This makes managing the wholesale price extremely difficult unless you hedge everything. Unfortunately hedging everything works as long as the currency keeps depreciating - if it does not you get caught on the wrong side of a hedge which scrambles your price point relativity to locally produced "alternatives"(unaffor... is a big factor in a market such as South Africa where disposable income levels are relatively low), your Brand's price points become irregular which frustrates consumer loyalty and you lose depletions which impacts on your overhead structures etc. A fixed rate would simplify the business and allow Executive Management time to be more focused on the real business issues.
I do not fully appreciate all the wider implications, of which I am sure there are many BUT from a business perspective it would make managing price for imported goods significantly easier. I am sure the same applies to exports - our family are also involved in the exports of grapes and the European Retailers demand rebates when the Rand strengthens, BUT NEVER release the margin back to you when the Rand weakens - Farmers don't understand this!
Perhaps a new global economic system will emerge from the current "cross-road" (the gravel junction!) that will better serve the needs for a more equality structured and sustainable cross global trade flow - I hope so!
"Over the years, however, the world accumulated as many dollar reserves as it needed and increasingly wanted to exchange some of them for gold, which they had the right to do. "
I think it is fair to say that the USD is still the primary international currency of settlement and account. As such, it serves a vital function for multi-national corporations and multi-national transactions. If it ever ceased to serve this function there would be a major loss of use for the USD internationally with resulting selloff and devaluation.
One great advantage for the US in having the USD as the global reserve currency (an advantage that remains substantially but not fully intact now that that role has atrophied to becoming the primary international currency of settlement and account) is that the other major mature and emerging economies have a major interest in the US economy regaining and remaining healthy. The world could look on with relative disinterest when other nations experienced currency crises (even the UK currency crisis of the 1980s) since WW II but they know that if the USD goes into crisis it affects them negatively as well. It follows that if the US is prepared to take plausible measures of a reasonable nature to improve its economic wellbeing in an orderly fashion it will have international cooperation. Other nations in crisis have suffered the need to resort to the harsh IMF solutions or the need to take painful measures quickly to forestall attacks by currency speculators etc. The US will be much better able to retain control and set the terms and pace of its recovery provided it is seen to be serious in that endeavor.
The dollar's downfall will come as the US share of world GDP and world trade shrink to the point where US weakness does not kill the world economy, out creates a cold that they can recover from.