Seeking Alpha
, Hussman Funds (492 clicks)
Profile| Send Message|
( followers)  

Excerpt from the Hussman Funds' Weekly Market Comment (5/5/14):

“Cahm viss me eef you vahn to live.”

Arnold Schwarzenegger, Terminator 2: Judgment Day

We’ve recently emphasized that our estimates for probable S&P 500 nominal total returns have now declined below zero on every horizon of 7 years and shorter. At longer horizons, the 6.3% growth rate that we’ve assumed for nominal GDP over the coming years will begin to bail investors out given enough time, and as a result, our projection for 10-year S&P 500 nominal total returns peeks its head up above zero, at about 2.4% annually from current levels. Looking out 15 years, the expected 15-year total return approaches 4.4% annually, and at that horizon, investors are unlikely to lose money even if actual returns are a standard deviation below our expectations. To the extent that 6.3% growth in nominal GDP seems too high (and there are certainly reasons to think so), just reduce those annual return projections accordingly.

The key point is this – everything that investors can expect to obtain from selling stocks 7 years from now is already on the table today. Valuations might move higher over the very short run, but at present valuations, investors would require a positive surprise more than one standard deviation above expectations just to pull the likely 2-year return out of negative territory. The chart below provides a quick summary of our return expectations for the S&P 500 – from current price levels – over a variety of investment horizons. I emphasize the phrase “from current price levels,” as a significant retreat in valuations is likely to dramatically shift this profile, as it has over the completion of every market cycle in history.

I was grateful last week for some very kind words from Jeremy Grantham at GMO, who is certainly one of my mentors despite having never actually met. Back in the late-1990’s, one of the ways that Grantham operationalized the word “bubble” was to ask if valuations were at least two standard deviations above their norm. On a bell-curve, about 95% of your observations will be within two standard deviations one way or another, so only about 2.5% of your observations will be beyond “two sigma” on the upside.

Grantham observes that Robert Shiller’s “cyclically adjusted P/E” or CAPE is presently less than two sigmas above its historical norm, allowing for the potential for a bubble – under that definition – to carry the S&P 500 to 2250 if we allow an ugly CAPE to turn really ugly. Not that Grantham is actually bullish about this prospect, noting instead that it can be useful for prudent investors to imagine future pain “so that they can more easily process it and be less likely to do something foolish.” Still, for reasons noted below, we believe that stocks are already more overpriced than meets the eye.

...

While there’s no question that our own discipline has been subject to the most reckless bout of Fed-induced speculation in history, we also have reason to believe that valuations are much closer to a two-sigma event than may be apparent. The main reason is profit margins. Perhaps Grantham taught me too well, but I have always taken these words of his very seriously: “Profit margins are probably the most mean-reverting series in finance, and if profit margins do not mean-revert, then something has gone badly wrong with capitalism.” It turns out that he is still right, and the effect of being right is that equities are far more overvalued than may be evident even on measures like the Shiller CAPE (see An Open Letter to the FOMC: Recognizing the Valuation Bubble in Equities).

The way to identify mean reversion is not simply to ask whether a variable has recently returned to its mean. The key is to ask whether elevated levels are associated with weak subsequent changes, and depressed levels are associated with strong subsequent changes (at least in evidence up to the present date). I don’t see anything in this dynamic that has changed – at all. All we observe is a half-cycle that is not yet complete.

...

Now there’s no doubt that something has, indeed, gone badly wrong with capitalism in the recent economic cycle, but we hasten to add that stocks are not only a claim on one year or one cycle of cash flows, but are claims on a stream of future deliverable cash flows with an effective duration of about 50 years. Our concern about profit margins is not that earnings will retreat over the short-run and pull stock prices lower. While both may happen, the fact is that there is actually very little correlation between cyclical movements in earnings and cyclical movements in stock prices.

Rather, our concern is that investors are pricing stocks on the assumption that current record profits can be used as a “sufficient statistic” for cash flows that will emerge decades and decades from today. That’s exactly what it means to value stocks as a multiple of say, forward operating earnings. It means that you’re taking current earnings as representative of the entire stream.

...

These Fed-induced speculative valuations are now evident across the board, as the median price/revenue multiple on S&P 500 components (as well as S&P 1500 components) is now the highest in history, easily exceeding the 2000 peak. The average price/revenue multiples of S&P 500 components are nearly the same as in 2000. It’s true that the largest of the large-cap stocks are less overvalued today than in 2000, but even on a capitalization-weighted basis, the difference is far smaller than one might think once profit margins are taken into account. Investors and even the Fed seem oblivious to the risks because they assume that recent earnings can be taken as a sufficient statistic for decades and decades and decades of future cash flows. Unfortunately, one does not obtain reliable measurements using a yo-yo.

Taking the broad stock market as a whole, and considering all stocks – not simply the largest of the large caps – investors are now making the broadest and most leveraged bet on overvalued equities in U.S. history. Conditions somehow do not feel so dangerous because profit margins are cyclically extreme, but I suspect that this only means that investors will be surprised by the depth of the markets losses, as they were in 2000-2002 and 2007-2009. The lessons on this really are freely available all the way back to the South Sea Bubble. Meanwhile, with Bernanke out, the Federal Reserve no longer appears inclined to pursue his wildly experimental and financially distorting policies. That’s not a good mix for speculators, and there may not be much time left until Judgment Day.

Source: John Hussman: Cahm Viss Me Eef You Vahn To Live