As a result of the ever more evident failure of his money printing exercise to produce anything beside overvalued stock prices and soaring commodity prices, Ben Bernanke is now forced to fight a rhetorical rearguard action. The speech he gave Tuesday was basically a slightly extended and embroidered version of the past 20 or so FOMC statements. A summary of the salient points has been provided by Marketwatch.
As a slightly more expansive report on the speech notes in its preamble:
In short, Bernanke is either as dense as a fence post, or he's pulling a JC Juncker on us. As we have previously noted, the Fed's quantitative easing program has done far more than just 'increase excess bank reserves at the Fed' as many defenders of the exercise would have it. The most commonly heard argument is that since these bank reserves remain for now sequestered on the Fed's balance sheet and it doesn't seem likely that private sector credit growth will spur the 'money multiplier' into action, the Fed's activities have been neutral with regard to money supply inflation. This is belied by the fact that the true money supply TMS-2 is currently up almost 43% since the beginning of 2008.
The broad US 'true money supply' TMS-2, as per Michael Pollaro (for a definition and detailed explanation see here). This measure stood at $5.3 trillion as at January 1 2008. Today it stands at $7.574 trillion, an increase of 42.9%. Since January of 2000, the true money supply has increased by 151%. It has been the biggest monetary inflation of the entire post WW2 era in such a short time period.Evidently then, the Fed has done precisely what Ben Bernanke said it would do when he was first interviewed on the topic of 'QE' on '60 minutes'. It has printed plenty of money. If you wonder how this feat was accomplished in the face of private sector credit deleveraging, consider that the Fed buys securities not only from banks, but also from non-banks, which increases both deposit money (i.e., perfect money substitutes) and bank reserves concurrently. In addition, the banks are not as idle as is generally supposed. They are reinvesting the proceeds from 'QE' by buying more government securities. Thus, although the debt monetization by the Fed bypasses the treasury (it is not allowed to buy treasury debt directly from the government), it finances the government's spending excesses indirectly, via the detour of the commercial banking system and other market participants that receive checks from the Fed in the course of QE (for details on the mechanics of QE, we refer you to an earlier article). We mention all this mainly to make one point perfectly clear: there has been inflation, and lots of it. When Ben Bernanke references 'inflation', he talks about the rise in consumer prices, but that is not what inflation is. Inflation is the increase in the supply of money. Rising consumer prices are just one possible effect of inflation, and not the most important one.
The defenders of inflation as a viable method of combating recessions should therefore explain how it was possible that the decade that has brought us the worst economic performance since the Great Depression coincided with the biggest monetary inflation since WW2. If inflation worked as a panacea that 'fixes' the economy as they assert, then why has the exact opposite happened? Evidently their theory has a major flaw – and the same obviously goes for the defenders of deficit spending (more on those further below).
Hence the rhetorical 'rearguard battle' Ben Bernanke is forced to fight these days. He has inflated the money supply massively and has nothing to show for it. Hence his assertion that the current slide back into recession is of course only 'temporary'. As Marketwatch reports further:
Home prices have just slipped to a new low, employment is weakening again, the ISM diffusion indexes are plunging – but don't worry. Bernanke just knows that all his money printing must have worked somehow. Indeed, it has. It has distorted the economy's productive structure further and thus weakened the economy structurally, while creating an all too brief illusion of 'recovery'. How Bernanke knows that 'growth will pick up in the second half' he didn't say. Given his forecasting track record, we can take this assertion almost as a guarantee that a recession is all but imminent.
The report continues:
Translation: there is no recovery.
As we have noted previously, the Frank-Dodd regulatory monstrosity is an attempt to close the barn door long after the horse has escaped. It will have far more unintended than intended consequences, as is always the case with such interventions. So they have imposed endless new regulations on top of the existing regulatory jungle without 'conducting a study on their economic consequences'? Instead the new rules will be 'tweaked' later (every time an intervention predictably fails, new interventions are heaped on top of it to 'repair' the failings of the previous ones, and so forth, ad infinitum).
This is too funny. The mainstream experts all assured us sotto voce back in March that the 'broken window' in Japan would have no adverse economic effects – see 'Japan disaster will have limited impact on global economy' as a pertinent example. Now all of a sudden it is to blame for the US slowdown? And of course the somewhat 'higher' gasoline prices that preceded the prospect of 'lower gasoline prices' in coming months had absolutely nothing to do with the Fed's policies. That goes without saying.
The markets know of course that without a further acceleration in monetary pumping, the bubble activities that have held the prices of titles for capital aloft will come under pressure. We can start speculating now on how many SPX points will need to be lost before 'QE3' comes down the pike.
The pace of monetary inflation should indeed 'moderate' once QE2 ends, but that is of course not what Bernanke is talking about. As regards commodity prices, it is clear the Fed is not the only central bank responsible for their sharp rise, as other CB's have been inflating copiously as well (especially the PBoC). However, when the money supply is pumped up, some prices, somewhere in the economy will always rise. That Bernanke is trying to take credit for pumping up stock prices while refusing to acknowledge the Fed's role in increasing commodity prices only shows how disingenuous he is. The central bank has absolutely no control over where the money it creates goes. It didn't go into houses, that much is clear. But it sure did go into financial assets and commodities.
The part we have highlighted above is testament to the bureaucracy's hubris. Listening to these guys one always gets the impression that without our vaunted 'policy makers' we would have been in a permanent financial and economic crisis since at least anno domini 1374, when the Venetian banking system crashed after an economic boom turned to bust (this particular bust was the result of the banks creating a boom by practicing fractional reserve banking, in the main to finance the extravagant expenditures of the government – sound familiar?).
Whether or not rising prices are a 'transitory' phenomenon depends not only on the increase in the supply of money, but also on the demand for money. The fact that inflationary effects on final goods prices have so far remained subdued owes much to the public's much greater demand for money (i.e. cash balances) in the wake of the bust. Should people alter their assessment of the likely future purchasing power of the money unit, the bureaucrats could be in for a surprise, given how much additional money they have already created since 2008. Meanwhile, as the recent example of the BoE shows (which keeps its administered short term interest rate at 0.50% in spite of 'CPI inflation' increasing to nine times as much, at the current level of 4.50%), the promise that the monetary bureaucracy will 'respond as necessary' is a hollow one. Similar to the BoE, we expect the Fed to eventually come up with all sorts of excuses as to why the 'necessary response' must be delayed.