See What Over A Million Live 2015 Price Forecast Results Produced - You May Want To Rethink Your Strategy

Includes: SPY
by: Peter F. Way, CFA


We took ~2500 widely-held, actively-traded stocks and ETFs and every day for over a year ending in December 2015, determined what coming prices market-making investment professionals expected.

Their in-advance, monitored forecasts, used in a simple, rigid investing discipline determined years ago, produced price gains of over +50% CAGRs, when applied to ALL 2500, month after month.

The point here is that significant investing opportunities are present widely not just in carefully selected securities, but in nearly all securities, present across time, not just at “lucky” periods.

Average gain opportunity for buys varied from month to month in 2015, with two months showing losses, but practical usage of time discipline forces gains to compound rapidly, losses slowly.

Locking capital into Buy & Hold strategies denies the ability to capture these pervasive opportunities. An active investment dictum frees them, providing huge differences in returns, net of risk.

Crippling Misconceptions Can Stifle Your Investment Progress

Investment forecasts out beyond a year now are a fantasy.

Long-term forecasts are futile in today's globally-competitive, high-tech world of instant communications, mergers & acquisitions, developing energy alternatives, better understanding of the physical world around us and within our bodies, and the increasing aspirations of billions of people seeking improvement in their lives.

Value-determining circumstances change too quickly in this 22nd century to allow 21st century notions of how to build wealth to be genuinely productive. Look at this past year's level of the S&P 500 index, at start, interim, or finish, in comparison with its price at the start of the century.

Moving from an index price of 1500 back when Y2K was a concern, to an index of 2000 in 16 years is a CAGR of +1.8%, measured in US Dollars. The rate of US inflation in that period has been 2.25% according to US Government statistics. The S&P 500 at that rate should be 2145, not 1900+.

That's just to break even, not to have any real capital gain. Dividends? The SPDR S&P 500 ETF (NYSEARCA:SPY) pays a magnificent 2% yield. If you're an income investor, most likely you spend all of that, and more, just keeping even. Don't kid yourself about mentally moving it out of your bank account into the brokerage account by "not spending the dividend."

The point of this report...

... is to provide a clear comparison of what disciplined, practical, active investing can provide for wealth-building investors, evaluating the prospects across the board for thousands of equity issues, in periods throughout the year 2015. A comparison to passive investing in market averages is provided by means of a Buy & Hold strategy over the same period.

Regular readers of our approach may conserve their reading time by skipping to FIGURE 4. Those less familiar or desiring a detailed exploration of the rationale and the necessary comparisons and computations will find it between here and there.

Could this be you?

Suppose an investor at age 25 starts a family in 1975, frugally building college education funds for his kids. They have graduated by the time he & she reach age 50 at the end of year 1999, consuming all of those committed funds. Now it's time to build for retirement.

Conventional (at the time) reasoning was that market appreciation in stocks would be +10% a year. In 15 years, at age 65, any 1999 stock nest egg should be 4+ times as large, and accumulated contributions maybe twice their original commitment size.

Guess again. "The best-laid plans of mice and men..."

So here we are in 2016 at age 66, with the egg in its original shell, unhatched and not grown, and subsequent accumulations back to about where they were when originally sequestered, in a medium that has failed to match inflation. At a cost of 16 years. Ready to retire?

Perhaps not.

But you're far from broke, where you could be in a few years, despite the 401(k) and Social Security, unless another source of income can be found. This is retirement?

Maybe a part-time job, just to slow the decline of the 401(k) balance. But still, even Wal-Mart (NYSE:WMT) isn't hiring as many greeters as they once did.

Maybe as a consultant, you could use your accumulated expertise over a 40+ year career. You still have industry contacts. Perhaps not as many as you used to. A lot have been laid off since 2008-9. And the business seems full of others who have come to the same idea; it's not panning out. Things in the old game aren't what they used to be - #%@& advancing technology!

There may well be an overlooked answer

One answer may be like the relief of shipwrecked lifeboat occupants, miles off the mouth of the Amazon, thirsting for fresh water - which was all around them. An answer can be: Work your 401(k) harder.

The investment misconception of "conservative, low-risk, long-term strategy" has put you where you are, since the turn of the century. Please go back and re-read the first few paragraphs of this report.

It's a different world now. Even in the earlier one, the old Roman saying "pecunia in arboribus non cresit" held true. Unless your name is Weyerhauser. Easily available money is always scarce.

Everything has a cost, despite what marketing mavens try to make us believe by touting "free" offers. In investing, the cost of Reward is Risk. But risk is not what academics and investment professionals have been teaching the public and each other for the last 50+ years. The fostering of that misconception has caused unknowing current-day investors to be almost perpetually surrounded by the fresh-water of shorter-term investments.

What is investment risk?

Mark Twain attempted (and succeeded) being humorous by describing August as a particularly risky month for investing in stocks. "Other risky months are..." and he randomly lists the remaining eleven. Besides being entertaining, he was accurate and, hopefully, thought-provoking, because risk in any investment, particularly equities, is not a static dimension. It is constantly changing in each security.

Current price and future prospects continually shape the risks provided by every investment.

Is a stock with a "beta" of 3.0 risky when its price is $20, down from $60, and knowledgeable market professionals constantly in touch with the trading desks of $-billion-fund clients see its downside at $19 and an upside of $30. A forecast of -5% to +50% in the next 3 months. When they had the same outlook proportions on this stock three dozen prior times across the past 5 years, they had been right 35 of the 36.

Is that a risky investment? Not what my common sense tells me.

Unless - this time "it's really different!"

Hah, sure.

Uncertainty of return is not risk. It contains risk, the potential of having capital injured, but it also contains opportunity, or potential reward. The statistical sophistry device for measuring uncertainty is standard deviation.

Standard deviation unfortunately measures distances from an average of things being observed or experienced. Both "good" distances and "bad" ones. But not separately, just as an average of all of the deviations. For our purposes, presuming that there are as many bad ones as good ones, and that their averages are equal on opposite sides of the typical, or average, thing being measured, just doesn't stack up with historical stock price evidence. Not now, nor at the time the "risk" misrepresentation was promulgated some 50+ years ago.

Plus, the loss of capital can be far less damaging to the achievement of financial goals than the loss of time. Capital can be rebuilt, time can't. Once time is lost, used, or squandered, it's gone. And time is always invested alongside capital, with a leverage of its own on rate of return, a leverage far more powerful than simple growth.

Until downside prospects can be separated from upside ones, no true risk can be measured. And in that statement, the key word is 'PROSPECTS', because risk lives only in the present and in the future. Once a risk has been realized, it instantly is replaced by a new prospect. That one's clock starts ticking afresh.

That is why investment forecasts are essential. Libraries are full of studies showing that the pure history of past stock prices is a lousy guide to future ones.

Unfortunately, for "technical analysts" of stock prices, all they can do to bolster their forecasts is cite one or two instances of what they think may happen now in this case, or did happen at one or a few selected times in the past. When put to the discipline of what happened all of the times the proposed result was forecast, the subject usually gets quickly shifted to another stock, another measure, or another topic.

We all need to look to the past to verify the chances for what we think is likely to occur in the future. But the first of a multi-stage forecast rocket, one more likely to reach its objective, might be the history of what others were thinking before the fact, at the time of their forecasts. If we have the results of those forecasts, we can emphasize the ones where that second-stage history was successful, in hopes that our third-stage objective may most likely be met.

An investing discipline that can help

This is the perspective that we take at all times. It is what now is presented in this 2015-year daily analysis, with the help of the Portfolio Management Strategy of TERMD. The acronym stands for Time-Efficient Risk-Management Discipline. By using TERMD, we can put a standardized, practical measure on all stocks and ETFs (excluding those with low prices - below $5). This standardization is essential for purposes of comparing price range forecasts for securities of widely varying underlying circumstances.

The discipline limits forecasts to 3 months, a horizon that many investors and professionals have demonstrated to be within their capacity to project successfully. By success, we mean a high percentage (2/3rds or more) of producing profits in ongoing daily instances over several years.

The source of the forecasts is the professional investment community that keeps markets functioning for all issues at all times, despite the recurring irregular periodic adjustments that $-billion funds (and a few $-Trillion ones) want to make to their portfolio holdings.

The "regular-way" transactions that were once telephoned, paper & pencil-handled, by humans now nearly all are electronically submitted, accomplished, and recorded, in small $ increments. That system chokes on multimillion $ transaction orders. Those have to be negotiated in order for the market to balance buyers with sellers.

The balancing is done by market-making firms putting their own capital at risk, taking temporary positions as needed. That gets done only if other professional speculators, for what they consider an appropriate fee, will take on the price-change risk, relieving the market-maker. Everyone in this game wears big-boy pants, as bulletproof as they can make them. If the risk-transfer fee is too large for the order-originator to accept, the desired trade gets "killed" rather than "filled" and must wait for a more tenable market condition.

The pricing and structure of the risk-transfer hedging deal tells what these pros think are likely to happen to an issue's price in the time period covered by the derivative securities being used to accomplish the hedge. The equally-knowledgeable buyers and sellers in this risk marketplace define the potential likely price extremes, both up and down.

As we have done daily since Y2K, we compare their implied forecasts with what actually takes place, issue by issue, in subsequent market periods. We use a sliding-window of the past 5 years to accommodate the changing nature of everything involved, while emphasizing the most recent, most relevant outcomes.

Since the forecasts are of the extremes of price ranges likely to occur, they usually surround the present market quote, dividing the range into potential upside and downside proportions. Those proportions have proven to be useful means of categorizing the forecasts. Our metric for the proportions is the Range Index [RI] which tells what proportion of the forecast range lies below the current market quote.

Measuring the impact of TERMD

Each day, we generate price range forecasts for ~2500 stocks and ETFs out of ~3600 equity issues. Quality control of information input disqualifies the other ~1100 (not always the same ones). In the year 2015, the 252 market days produced more than 625,000 pairs of forecasts, an upside and a downside for each issue, each day, or over 1 million total forecasts.

To do a complete one-year daily analysis takes many resources of a small organization, even if most of the workers are computers. Every IT pro knows the dietary demands of the machines, given the plug-pulling capabilities of decision-makers because of toxic ingestions. GIGO-prevention is essential, but expensive in both man and machine hours.

We're no different, so our approach is to start with a sample of over 30,000 forecast pairs, ~2500 from one day in each of 12 month-ends across the span of a year. Next, we will increase our sample size from 12 monthly aggregates to 52 weekly ones, and finally expand to the ultimate 252 daily aggregates of all covered issues.

The advantage of this approach is that some perhaps less precise information is available sooner, with improvements progressing until a complete review is achieved.

Since we sense that the general perspective of individual investors regarding available rates of return and risk costs are far from what is really present, this first step for the public in attuning its reality will probably be the biggest one. Credibility and acceptance also may have much larger adjustments than will be the changes in scale of the typical reward and risk results, as the frequency of measurement increases.

Having dealt with the process for decades, during which market circumstances have varied widely, we know in general what the end results of presenting the report are likely to be.

But that is a forecast based on personal prejudice rather than scientific sampling, so we will have to see what presents itself as we proceed.

Details of measurement

Now, let's explore how TERMD works, so that it is understood how differences in holding periods from the same start-date can come about.

For each stock or ETF, on the day a forecast is generated, a hypothetical position is created with a cost of the closing price of the following day. Publicly, we have always discussed actions and results from the posture of a "long" position bought. In this analysis, we also examine the inverse of the longs, a separate "short" position, with an initial "sale" identical to the long's next-day closing price "cost."

The forecast provides an upper price extreme, which is taken as a sell-target for the long position, and a lower price extreme, acting as a cover-buy-target for the short position.

As each day of the 3 months (63 market days) following the forecast date evolves, the positions are examined against the targets and when the day's close price exceeds or equals the targets, the position is closed and the gain is recorded, along with the length of the holding period. At the 63rd day, all still-open positions are closed at the end of day prices and the gains or losses recorded, accompanied by their holding periods.

Figure 1 illustrates how the process works on a handful of specific issues starting alphabetically with ticker symbols on the end of month date, 12/31/2014, starting the year 2015.

Figure 1

The prospective gains and losses are recorded as simple price relatives, the forecast price divided by the market price on the forecast day (not shown, but usually quite close to the next-day price). The overall uncertainty directly divides the forecast high by the forecast low. The up and down average percentage changes do not sum to the uncertainty average, reflecting the need to properly measure such changes with geometric mean averages, rather than arithmetic ones. A $100 investment losing -50% and immediately gaining +50% only winds up at $75, not back to $100. The differences are multiplicative in combination, not additive. Hence the requirement for using price relatives, rather than positive and negative numbers.

The prospective shorts price relatives divide the market price by the forecast-low price. Both high and low price relative opportunity measures of 1+ the price change allow the proper geometric averaging. They also provide direct comparisons between the differing prospects for individual stock issues.

This ability to compare stocks' prospects and their past performances on a comparable basis is at the heart of active investing, which benefits from identifying and choosing investments on a timely basis in response to advantageous potential price change opportunities.

I know, you've been told it can't be done, so just buy and hold - things like Kodak (NYSE:KODK) and GM (NYSE:GM) (before it was bankrupted, wiping out former shareholders, and in 2010 became Government Motors, the present GM).

The purpose of this report is to show that what it takes to perform productive active management is broadly available every day, and when used, it is far more productive in building investment wealth than Buy & Hold as a strategy ever can be.

Let's go on with the illustration of how it is done.

Figure 1 shows how widely different are the expectations of knowledgeable, at-risk, investment professionals for various stocks. Just in these 8 issues, the overall uncertainty levels vary from 11% to 28%. Conventional investment thinking would have us avoid frightening uncertainties like 28%. That's more than a quarter of the investment. Who could stand to lose that?

What cripples that kind of thinking is an inability to separate the uncertainty into its two opposite parts. In Applied Optoelectronics, Inc. (NASDAQ:AAOI), the 28% uncertainty issue, there is more than twice as much upside in prospect than downside. Wouldn't you at this point in time rather be invested in AAOI, with a gain potential of over +18% than in Aaron's Inc. (NYSE:AAN) which only has an uncertainty of 11% - but an upside prospect of not quite +8%?

The balance between upside and downside, is shown by the Range Index [RI]. It ranges from stock A's 83% of its forecast range to the upside and 17% to the downside (a 6 to 1 ratio) to American Airlines Group (NASDAQ:AAL), where there is more downside (55%) than upside (45%).

In the AAOI vs. AAN choice just posed, both stocks have the same prospective ratio of reward to risk, evidenced by their RIs, both at 28 (percent of the forecast range down from the current market price to the low of the forecast, as a percent of the whole forecast range). The big difference is in the size of the uncertainty, given the "good to bad" balance - and the investor's personal ability to deal with the situation.

If the choices of raising cash from a portfolio were between AAL and another stock with the same kind of more downside than upside, also with a RI of 55, but an uncertainty like AAN (11%, not AAL's 24%), the smaller actual downside would be a better choice to retain. It would make sense to diminish the more uncertain holding, since the portfolio's overall downside prospect would be reduced by the holdings change.

So while the Range Index is a quick indicator between stocks of nearby (3-month) price change prospects, it often is better to further examine the actual payoff prospects, as indicated by the price relatives.

That is done in Figure 2, where we look at the same stock forecasts in light of what opportunities actually were presented by subsequent market price changes.

Figure 2

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Everything in Figure 1 is based on forecasts. Here in Figure 2, TERMD disciplines are imposed to define time periods, either by reaching forecast targets or by 63 market day holding period limits. Using those bounds on the "long" side, extreme price changes are listed in the highest price and lowest price columns.

The highest prices are cut off at the sale targets when reached, but depending on specific sequences of price gains and upside targets, lowest prices may exceed forecast downside targets. It is important to know these lower prices because they are one of the best measures of long position risks.

The reasoning for that notion is that long positions are taken in the hope and expectation that higher prices will occur, within the holding period limit. Usually during the time limit, or before the sell target is reached, market prices will decline, perhaps below the day after forecast "cost" price.

This is when emotion raises the risk of a premature sale to avoid further price decline. A strong discipline will hold the long position under TERMD, expecting by the end of the holding time patience limit a recovery, either to the sell target, or at least above cost. The larger a price drawdown that occurs, the harder it usually is to maintain that discipline, hence the higher the risk of taking a loss when a gain might be achieved.

In Figure 2, the presumption is that the discipline as to closeout actions is rigid, both in long and short positions. We recognize that neither we nor many readers might have that fortitude, but for sake of the illustration, please stay with the explanation.

The Market Days Held columns reveal that in only 3 of the 8 stocks are long positions that were able at this time to reach their sell targets. Of the shorts, only two fail to have prices fall as far as the low forecasts. This is just a condition of the time period and the sample, and is not intended to be taken as any average, extreme, or "normal" situation, just an illustration.

In one case, AAON, neither upper nor lower forecasts were reached, and in two others, AAN and AAOI both extremes were encountered. All situations happen.

Likewise, the highest and lowest actual subsequent price change averages come out to be at equal 11% moves. Again, this is entirely coincidental. But the scale of changes and their differences between issues is instructive. They range from +3% to +30%, -5% to -20%.

Over the course of the year 2015, SPY ranged from a high of $213 to a low of $187, or "only" -12.3%. B&Hers regard this as risk protection from the likes of our illustration's -20% instances. We regard it as a deterrent to achieving +21% to +30% gains. Gains in far shorter time periods than a year.

The most important part of the explanation...

... has to do with the most powerful element of investing, TIME.

We continue our illustration of the 8-stock forecasts at the beginning of the ticker symbol alphabet of our population's list of 2553 equities on this first investing day of 2015. Figure 3 incorporates the time dimension into the previously pictured outcomes of applying the TERMD discipline to those stocks.

The purpose of this elaborate explanation is to make clear how to compare widely different conditions among investment alternatives, both among themselves and across different periods of elapsed time and in different calendar periods. When it comes to keeping score on investing performance, it gets complicated. That can't be helped, or simplified, and still be kept truthful.

Figure 3

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The dates of actions dictated by TERMD to forecasts indicated in Figure 1 are repeated from Figure 2, accompanied by the price relatives so produced. Figure 2's market days held are converted to calendar periods, to make them consistent with the way investment return scores are kept.

The basic measure of an investment return (from price change) is:

Click to enlarge

Compound Annual Growth Rate [CAGR] provides comparability of measurement of subjects of varied size of commitment and or of holding periods.

The preliminary calculation, between the { } brackets is known as Return on Capital Employed [R.O.C.E.]. It is produced by taking the Nth root of the price relative to get a per day rate of gain or loss. Then the CAGR is determined by re-compounding the ROCE's change per day result by a power of 365, converted to percentage terms by subtracting 1.

For example: In our illustration, a buy of Apple (NASDAQ:AAPL) at a cost on 1/2/15 of $109.33 and a sell on 2/12/15 for $126.42 when first exceeding a sell target of $125.89 produces a price relative of 1.15632 after a 43 calendar-day holding period. The ROCE of about 1/3rd of 1% per day compounds in a year to an annual CAGR of +243%.

It's a lot more fun to talk about a winner like AAPL than Alcoa (NYSE:AA) which even after being held the full 3 months still declined in price more than 18%, or just about the opposite of AAPL, a loss of some 1/3rd of 1% per day. But if your portfolio resembled our illustration, you would need to account for both of them, even when one has a CAGR of -55%.

It is necessary to go through what seems like an unnecessary, pickey-pickey process because we want to have a valid sense of the flow, daily, of many alternatives, each having disciplined outcomes covering varied holding periods. When they are reduced to a per-day rate, then a common basis for comparison, or averaging, is at hand.

This is not like measuring the performance of a portfolio, where most of the holdings are present over the entirety of a common period of measurement. Where that is not the case in a portfolio (perhaps a recent addition) the process for inclusion of exceptions is similar to the measurement process above, but with each exception's capital commitment weighted in relation to the common bulk of the portfolio. These complications and many others are dealt with in portfolio performance measurement under the CFA GIPS standard that is orders of magnitude more complex, but necessary.

Here we are not attempting bragging rights to win capital to be put under our management. Instead, we are simply interested in getting the public to recognize what kinds of shorter-term investment opportunities are readily available on a reasonably continuous daily basis.

Back to the purpose of this report

But to take advantage of that opportunity requires investors to cast off the misperception that Buy & Hold is a low-risk strategy with superior reward-risk outcomes. Instead, a far better reward~risk tradeoff is typically available on an active "blind selection" basis from all the ~2,500 widely-held alternatives daily, using a standardized discipline of opportunity measurement.

To prove that assertion, we have throughout the year 2015 produced daily forecasts of the market-making community implied by their self-protective behaviors. In Figure 4, we display 12 daily aggregations, each a month apart, which use their 30,000+ forecasts on over 2,000 stocks and ETFs to show both what really was going on in the market, and what market professionals anticipated could occur.

Figure 4

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The solid columns of blue and magenta are the averages of actual largest up and down price changes from the prices of each stock in the population at the start date, during the following 3 months. Repeated monthly, there are 2-month overlaps in each measure, but when decisions must be made in advance this is the way the real world works.

The dashed green and red lines are similar averages from the population of the forecasts implied, stock by stock, by market-maker hedging behaviors.

It becomes evident that the market sometimes does not reach the pros' enthusiasm, but they rarely (at least in this year) are far from being wide of reality on the upside. On the other hand, concerns over price drawdowns are regularly over-hedged. Those downside targets get triggered month after month.

When markets are of a declining disposition, the professional market-making community makes sure that is not they that are hurting. Woe to the investing public.

To help visualize how the market was trending over this period we have added an overlay of the price path of SPDR S&P 500 ETF to figure 4. The SPY price scale is on the right of Figure 4A.

Figure 4A

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So market-maker-implied forecasts relate fairly well to market behavior, particularly on the upside. Can they be used to select and manage equity investments?

Figure 3 shows a tiny piece of how that can work. If we follow that approach for all of the stocks and ETFs where MM hedging actions in each of the dozen months pictured in Figure 4, we have a sample of how TERMD worked across a year, mostly in 2015. That is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5

Whoa! How can this be? If TERMD buy closeouts have an aggregate average of a net loss, how can their return on capital employed be turned into a positive?

It happens because losses only occur because positions are forced to close out by the 91 calendar day holding period time limit. That limit exists as a risk-control measure. Experience shows that price drawdowns persisting 3 months tend to get worse before getting better. And often getting better does not bring them back to a gain over cost.

Further, the longer holding periods of losers reduces their rate of loss, or negative return, reducing their ROCE in that average. While the loss is still there, its potency in the time period use of capital is lessened.

On the other hand, winning buy positions usually score their returns earlier in the 3-month period. That lets their liberated capital commitments (now expanded) to go on in new opportunity compoundings. Those multipliers may well be found in other parts of these overlapping periods, since TERMD advocates full investment by recommitting capital immediately once a position is liquefied. Plus, the shorter times of capital employment on a profitable basis significantly boost the average ROCE number.

There are similar opportunities (not explored here) on the "short" side, with potentials in "bad" years, like 2015, that can be far superior to "long" investments. They will be dealt with after the present report offering can be digested. After that, the productivity of "selection" will be examined.

What's this all about, Alfie?

The point of this exploration is that there is a continuous flow of opportunity in the form of positive rates of price change among a massive population of equity investment vehicles that have the capacity to support investment returns that are many multiples of what is normally expected from such investments. The "normal expectation" of market-index performance is a misconception.

That misconception comes about because investors have been trained to think of investing as committing capital to an investment to be held for periods of time beyond when the investments ceased being competitive with investment alternatives. The notion of changing investment horses "midstream" is an anathema in conventional investment thinking.

The notion that there is any well-defined "stream" to be "mid" of, is a seriously flawed conception.

Calendars are for remembering birthdays and holidays, not for excusing the failure to take wealth-building equity investment actions.

The point of examining this huge number of outcomes is not to advocate holding them all, but to make clear that the experiences cited are common ones, not ones cherry-picked after the fact. Any investments selected may approximate the "average." There are ways to improve on that average, but that is for a later report.

The results of just using "blind selection" exhaustively from this torrent of varied levels of return opportunities on capital employed produces a staggering average CAGR in excess of +50%. That, in a year where market indexes produced total return, including dividends, of far less than +10%.


  • Risk is about getting hurt, not about just getting surprised, particularly when the uncertain surprise outcome is a favorable one.
  • Investment uncertainty must be separated into risk and return elements to be useful.
  • Investment risk is not a static or constant dimension. It depends on the price for a proposition, expectations for the future of the subject proposition, and prices and expectations for alternatives, all of which are likely to be in motion, needing continuing periodic reappraisals.
  • Forecasts of risk and return out in time beyond reasonable limits of projection have large prospects for disappointment and damage to investment capital.
  • Current-day transaction costs should be no inhibition to frequency of opportunity capture. More realistic limitations are personal time, energy, and perspective.

Yet to come

  • Treatment of the "short" side of the opportunity picture, both as a stand-alone strategy and in conjunction with the "long" side.
  • Presentation of how significantly security "selection" adds to the overall, unstructured opportunity set.
  • Fuller verification of the stock-by-stock price-change opportunity scene by 52 weekly population results in the style presented here monthly.

Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours.

I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.