CEFL Still Attractive With 20.1% Dividend Yield Even After Price Rebound

| About: UBS ETRACS (CEFL)

Summary

My projection for the May 2016 CEFL monthly dividend is $0.2574.

The higher dividend as compared to the first two months of 2016 is due solely to the price rebound since the January 2016 lows.

It is the world wide oversupply of loanable funds relative to opportunities to deploy those funds which is the cause of low interest rates.

This imbalance between the supply and demand for loanable funds should keep interest rates lower for long.

I am still bullish on the UBS ETRACS Monthly Pay 2xLeveraged Closed-End Fund ETN (NYSEARCA: CEFL) despite the recent rebound in the price from the January 2016 lows. The annualized yield on a monthly compounded basis is 20.1%, based on calculations including my projected May 2016 CEFL dividend. The weighted average discount to book value for the 30 high dividend closed-end funds that comprise the index upon which CEFL and its unleveraged version, the YieldShares High Income ETF (NYSEARCA: YYY), is based, was 9.24% on April 18, 2016. This is less than the 12.43% on February 24, 2016. However, this discount to book value is still somewhat larger than historical norms. A year ago the weighted average discount to book value was 8.6%.

The two concerns that have depressed high dividend closed-end fund prices over the last year, are fear of higher interest rates and credit concerns. Some of the high dividend closed-end funds hold junk bonds. High yield bonds have been under severe pressure, especially those involved in oil and other natural resources. The rebound in the price of CEFL and some of its' components since January 2016 is due mainly to the improvement in the credit outlook for high yield bonds in the energy and natural resource sector. GAMCO Global Gold Natural Resources & Income Trust (NYSEMKT:GGN) is the largest component of CEFL with a weight of 5.2%. GGN exemplifies the rebound in that sector since the January 2016 lows. It closed at $6.33 on April 18, 2016. On January 19, 2016 GGN closed at $3.75.

Not all of the CEFL components will have ex-dividend dates in April 2016. Thus, they will not all contribute to the May 2016 dividend. Even though 28 of the 30 high dividend closed-end funds that comprise the index upon which the UBS ETRACS Monthly Pay and YYY is based pay monthly dividends, there is a small seasonal factor involved with the CEFL dividend. Only the Morgan Stanley Emerging Markets Domestic Debt Fund (NYSE: EDD) and the Royce Value Trust (NYSE: RVT) now pay quarterly dividends in January, April, October, and July. Thus, EDD and RVT will not be included in the May 2016 CEFL dividend but were in the April 2016 dividend.

My projection is that the May 2016 CEFL dividend will be $0.2574. This is more than the February 2016 dividend of $0.2109 and the $0.2174 March 2016 CEFL dividend. The April 2016 CEFL dividend of $0.2731 was larger than February 2016 and March 2016 since the two components that pay quarterly were included.

There was also an increase in the net asset or indicative value of CEFL from $13.8794 at the end of February 2016 to $16.2107 on April 18, 2016. As the value of the closed-end funds in the portfolio increase, portfolio assets must be increased to maintain the leverage level. This increases the dividend, separate from any changes in the dividends paid by the closed-end funds in the portfolio. The relationship between the net asset value of a 2X leveraged ETN and the dividend is explained more fully in MORL's Net Asset Value Rises - Implications For The Dividends.

The outlook for CEFL depends on the level of interest rates and the equity markets. The equity markets themselves seem to be very dependent on the level of interest rates. Many of the closed-end funds in CEFL hold bonds and borrow money and thus do better when interest rates are lower. Short-term rates in particular, will influence the returns on CEFL since the imputed cost of borrowing on the leveraged aspect of CEFL is based on LIBOR.

Everyone knows that short-term interest rates are controlled by central banks. In many industrialized countries the rates set by the central banks are negative. In Japan the 10-year government bond rate is now negative. The USA is an exception in the industrialized world in that the Federal Reserve has increased the rate it pays banks on their excess reserves deposited at the Federal Reserve to 50 basis points. In most other industrialized countries the deposit rate, which is their equivalent of the rate paid to banks on excess reserves deposited at the Federal Reserve, is negative. What does not get much attention is the question of what risk-free interest rates would be if there were no central bank intervention.

The rates paid to savers in risk-free money market accounts are determined in a free-market, in that each financial institution is free to pay whatever it wants. Politicians in the USA who argue that the rates paid to savers in risk-free money market accounts are too low generally blame the Federal Reserve for the interest rates being too low. That assumes that absent intervention by the Federal Reserve interest rates would be higher. That assumption may not be correct.

The payment of interest on reserves is a direct transfer of billions of dollars from the American taxpayers to the banks. From its inception in 1913 until a few years ago the Federal Reserve never paid any interest on reserves, even in the 1980s when short-term risk-free rates exceeded 20%. In her testimony a number of congress members were very concerned about the transfer of billions of dollars from the American taxpayers to the banks that paying 50 basis points on reserves entailed, Janet Yellen explicitly said that if the Federal Reserve had just raised the target rate on Fed Funds but not began paying 50 basis points on reserves, the market rates in the financial markets on loans and certificates of deposit would not have risen enough to accomplish the goals that the Federal Reserve wanted to accomplish by raising interest rates.

It is not as easy to quantify what a free-market rate on risk-free securities would be absent government intervention. Similarly it would be difficult to say what the rate on the US 10-year treasuries would be if the Federal Reserve was not asserting that they plan to raise short-term interest rates many times over the next few years. Might the rate on the US 10-year treasuries be closer to those in Europe or even Japan? The rates on 10-year Italian government bonds which were over 7% in 2012 are now 1.25%.

Without government intervention prices are determined by supply and demand. Interest rates are the price of loanable funds. At any given time and interest rate there is a supply of loanable funds from those who went to lend money. There is a demand loanable funds from those who went to borrow. Bond issuers are borrowers and bond buyers are lenders.

One complicating factor is that the supply and demand for loanable funds is also a function of credit conditions. At the height of the housing boom Alberto Ramirez whose occupation was strawberry picker and whose income was $14,000 per year was able to get a $720,000 mortgage to buy a house in Hollister California with no money down. There may be many strawberry pickers today who would like to get a $720,000 mortgage to buy a house with no money down. However, today there are probably no lenders who will issue a no money down mortgage that had a $5,200 monthly payment to someone who income is $14,000, while there were such lenders in 2006.

The supply and demand for assets that are risk-free in terms of credit is much narrower than the total supply and demand of loanable funds. Only governments can generally issue or guarantee bonds or deposits that are without credit-risk. Highly rated private corporations and financial institutions can issue debt that is considered close to credit risk free. It is the risk-free or close to risk free credit markets where most central banks intervene. That many lenders and investor are accepting negative interest rates give us a pretty good indication regarding the supply and demand for loanable funds in the risk-free sector.

While much attention is paid to how markets and institutions are dealing with negative interest rates, little attention has been focused on why there is such an imbalance between the supply and demand for loanable funds in the risk-free sector. My view is that the enormous shift in the tax burden away from the rich and onto the middle class world-wide has put much more loanable funds into the hands of the wealthy who have a relative low marginal propensity to consume and a corresponding high marginal propensity to save. As I said in an earlier Seeking Alpha article:

In an interview about the proposed "Buffett Rule", T.J. Rogers the CEO of Cypress Semiconductor Corporation (NASDAQ: CY) inadvertently illustrated the potential perils of overinvestment for an economy. Warren Buffett the CEO of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (NYSE: BRK.B) had proposed the "Buffett Rule" which would impose a minimum tax of 30% on incomes above one million dollars. Rogers explained to Larry Kudlow on CNBC's Kudlow Report on May 16, 2012 why he opposed the Buffett Rule. Rogers said that he spends less than 1% of his income on his living expenses and invests the other 99% in creating new businesses and increasing the productive capacity of the businesses he already owns. If he had to pay taxes pursuant to the Buffett Rule he would not be able to invest as much. Clearly, someone who invests 99% of their income will see his wealth grow exponentially as long as his investments are at all productive. It would not take too many members of the top 1% investing 99% of their income before they would be unable to deploy their capital productively. This would be a classic example of capital accumulating faster than consumers' incomes. Consumers would be able to buy all the goods and services produced by the over investment…

Warren Buffett also famously said: "There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're winning." Professor of Economics Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts and Producer of the Economic Update podcast, Richard D Wolff. puts it even more harshly and says "America is now a place where, to be a credible political candidate, you have to satisfy 500 people who sit at the top of the economic ladder of this society. And if you manage to displease any significant portion of them, your political career is either over or capped at a point of incapacity to do anything, no matter what the mass of opinion is in the country."

Buffett and Wolf are correct in terms of tax policy but not so much as to government spending. Across the political spectrum in the USA and to a greater or lesser extent the rest of in developed world there is a rough consensus on the magnitude of government spending should be. The Republicans want somewhat more defense spending and the Democrats want somewhat more nondefense spending, but both seem to agree on about how much total government spending should be relative to the size of the economy. Thus, there is very little effort to restrain government spending.

The laws of supply and demand apply differently to the market for loanable funds as compared to commodities. With commodities, equilibrium reached when the quantity supplied is equal to the quantity demanded. The debt or loanable funds market is more complex. A simple example illustrates this. An increase in government deficits accompanied by a commensurate increase in the issuance of government debt would normally be thought of as causing an increase in interest rates. However, the cause and/or purpose of the government deficits have a tremendous impact in terms of how interest rates are affected.

A government deficit for the purpose of funding a tax cut for those with high propensity to save has a much different impact on interest rates than the a deficit of similar magnitude who purpose is to fund an increase in social or defense spending. When the Federal government sells bonds and uses the proceeds to cut taxes on the wealthy, who in turn now have more money to lend, the net effect is to push down interest rates. This is especially true when the central banks are the buyers of much of the government debt.

As long as there is a much greater supply of loanable funds than the demand for them in the risk-free credit market, risk-free and near risk-free interest rates should remain low. Attempts by the Federal Reserve to push risk-free rates higher than what supply and demand would otherwise indicate, will only result in weaker economic activity. Lower rates are by far the best environment for leveraged ETNs such as CEFL.

Some readers have asked to see the details of my dividend calculations. I have changed my procedure, and now use the contribution by component method. It should give the exact same result as my previous method that could be called the total imputed dividends divided by the number of shares outstanding method. An example of that methodology using actual numbers can be seen in the article " MORL Yielding 24.7% Based On Projected June Dividend." In the total imputed dividends divided by the number of shares outstanding methodology, the number of shares outstanding appears both as a numerator and a denominator. Thus, the same result can be obtained by using the contribution by component method.

Closed-end funds typically trade at either discounts or premiums to book value. On balance, there is a slight bias towards discounts. Because of significant changes in the composition of the index, comparisons of aggregate discounts to book value from previous years are not very meaningful.

In attempting to find an explanation for the discount to book values that the closed-end funds that comprise CEFL and YYY are trading at, I considered two possible factors. One concern with many closed-end funds is that their dividends include a significant amount of return of capital. I ran a regression analysis to determine if there was any correlation between the proportion of the dividend paid by a closed-end fund that represents a return of capital and the discount to book value that the closed-end fund is trading at. For the 30 closed-end funds that comprise the index CEFL is based on, there was no statistically significant relationship.

For many securities other than closed-end funds, such as common stocks, discounts or premiums to book values are logically based on the business prospects for companies. Thus, Alphabet (NASDAQ: GOOG) (NASDAQ: GOOGL) trades at significant premium to book value, while Peabody Energy (NYSE: BTU) trades at a significant discount to book value, reflecting differing market perceptions of the future prospects for those companies. Alphabet trades at approximately 5X book value while BTU trades at about one-fifth of book value. In my article, mREITs Impacted By Enormous Price To Book Swing - MORL Yielding 27.6%, I discussed the large discounts to book value that mREITs such as American Capital Agency Corp. (NASDAQ: AGNC) are trading at. The logic behind mREITs such as AGNC trading at significant discounts to book value is primarily based on the possible impacts of higher future interest rates.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with the magnitudes of the discounts or premiums to book for securities such as Alphabet, Peabody and AGNC, there are facts and logic related to each company's business prospects that could possibly explain or justify changes in the premiums or discounts that have occurred in those stocks. There are no such facts or changes in market forecasts of business prospects that can possibly explain or justify changes in the premiums or discounts that have occurred in the closed-end funds that comprise CEFL.

For closed-end funds, changes in the premiums or discounts to book value should be solely based on the value that investors place on the relative advantages and disadvantages of the closed-end fund structure, rather than the differing market perceptions of the future prospects for the securities in the closed-end funds' portfolios. Investors in closed-end funds could purchase the securities held by a closed-end fund themselves. In most cases, there are also open-end funds available to investors that have risk, return and expense characteristics similar to any given closed-end fund.

Changes in market perceptions of the prospects of the securities that comprise the portfolios of closed-end funds cannot logically explain or justify any change in the magnitudes of the discounts or premiums to book for the closed-end funds. Any such changes in market perceptions of the prospects of the securities in the portfolio should be reflected in the prices of the portfolio securities themselves. Thus, the ratio of the price of the closed-end fund to its book value should not be related to the expectations of the prospects for the portfolio securities held by the closed-end fund.

If investors value the advantages of diversification, management and possibly lower transaction costs associated with owning a closed-end fund rather than owning the individual securities that comprise the closed-end fund's portfolio more than the fees and expenses, which are the primary negative aspect of closed-end funds, then the closed-end fund will trade at a premium to book value. Conversely, if investors feel that the fees and expenses of the closed-end fund outweigh the advantages of diversification, management and possibly lower transaction cost associated with owning a closed-end fund, it will trade at a discount to book value.

The trade-offs between the advantages and disadvantages associated with closed-end funds relative to the securities that comprise the portfolios of the closed-end funds are rational reasons for the closed-end funds to trade at discounts or premiums to book value. However, it is not rational for the discount or premium to be influenced by expectations of future returns on the securities that comprise the portfolios of the closed-end funds. If the market thinks that the securities in a closed-end fund's portfolio will decline, and thus the net asset or book value of the closed-end fund will decline, there is no reason why the premium or discount that the closed-end fund is trading at should change.

Some closed-end funds employ limited amounts of leverage. As investment companies, closed-end funds cannot have more than 33% leverage and most employ less, if any. That a closed-end fund does or does not employ a relatively small amount of leverage should not impact the premium or discount that the closed-end fund is trading at. Leverage is the easiest characteristic of a security to offset. Thus, if an investor was interested in a security but did not like the fact that the security employed 20% leverage, the investor could offset that leverage by combing that security with a risk-free asset. For example, if you had $10,000 to invest and you liked a closed-end fund but were unhappy with the 20% leverage, investing $8,000 in the closed-end fund and $2,000 in a risk-free asset will result in the same risk/return profile as investing $10,000 in the same closed-end fund, if that fund did not employ any leverage.

Likewise, if you liked a closed-end fund but would rather that fund employed more leverage, you can buy that fund on margin and get in the same risk/return profile as investing in the fund if it had more leverage. Thus, leverage or lack of leverage should not influence the premium or discount that the closed-end fund is trading at since any leverage in a closed-end fund can be offset by an investor.

There should be some limits as to how far away from book value a closed-end fund should trade. If a closed-end fund is trading at a sufficiently high premium to book value, an arbitrage opportunity could exist. Buying the securities in the closed-end fund's portfolio and simultaneously selling the closed-end fund should generate a profitable arbitrage. Likewise if a closed-end fund is trading at a large enough discount, buying the closed-end fund and selling the securities that comprise the portfolio could generate arbitrage profits. These types of arbitrage would be risk arbitrage as opposed to riskless arbitrage. In riskless arbitrage, one buys a security or commodity and simultaneously sells something that is the equivalent of what you sold. An example of riskless arbitrage would be after a merger had been approved in which the acquirer is issuing one share of its stock for two shares of the company being acquired; you simultaneously buy two shares of the company being acquired for a total cost less than a share of the acquirer. This would essentially lock in a profit that would be realized when the merger closed and the values converged.

Attempting to take advantage of the discount to book value being irrationally wide for a closed-end fund would be an example of risk arbitrage since there is no terminal event that will make the value of what you buy converge with what you sell. It may be irrational for a closed-end fund to trade at a 10% discount to book value. However, there is always the possibility that it could go to a 15% discount. As Keynes famously said, "The market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent."

Closed-end funds do not usually provide convenient opportunities for explicit risk arbitrage transactions where one security is bought and the other security is shorted. Retail investors usually cannot use the proceeds from selling some securities short to buy other securities. Hedge funds and institutions that may be able to use the proceeds from selling some securities short to buy others might find closed-end funds, and especially some of the securities that comprise the portfolios of the closed-end funds, not liquid enough to trade in.

Even market participants who are able to use the proceeds from selling some securities short to buy others might be dissuaded from buying closed-end funds and shorting the securities in the closed-end funds' portfolio because of the fees and expenses charged by the closed-end funds. However, if the discount to book value is large enough, the fees and expenses charged by the closed-end funds could be offset by the discount to book value and thus generate a positive carry for a long closed-end fund - short the fund's portfolio position. This would be especially true for closed-end funds that specialize in securities that generate higher income, such as those in the index upon which CEFL and its unleveraged counterpart YYY are based.

An example of the discount to book value more than offsetting the fees and expenses would be a hypothetical closed-end fund whose portfolio securities yielded 10% before expenses. Most income-oriented closed-end funds have expense ratios lower than 1%. Shorting $100 worth of the securities that comprise the fund would require payments of $10 representing 10% annually to those who the securities were borrowed from. The $100 proceeds from the short sale could be used to acquire $100 of the closed-end fund. If the closed-end fund was trading at a 14% discount, $100 of the fund would represent 100/.86 = $116.28 worth of the securities in the fund. These securities yield 10%, so the gross income from the fund position would be $11.63. The net income, assuming a 1% expense ratio, would be $10.63. Thus, even after expenses and fees, an account long the closed-end fund would generate higher income than the portfolio securities while it waited for the discount to narrow to realize the risk arbitrage profit.

While explicit risk arbitrage where the portfolio securities are shorted and the proceeds are employed to buy the closed-end fund might not occur in significant quantities to narrow the discount to book value, implicit arbitrage should eventually have an impact. Implicit risk arbitrage would occur as investors holding or wanting to hold securities with similar risk/return characteristics as a closed-end fund or the portfolios held by the closed-end fund shift from other securities to the closed-end fund.

Institutional investors who had portfolios that contained securities similar to or identical to those held in a close-end fund could improve their risk/return profile by shifting out of securities in the closed-end fund to the closed-end fund, if the discount to book value for the closed-end fund was large enough. Retail investors could switch from securities held in portfolios of close-end fund to the closed-end fund and improve their risk/return profile if the discount to book value for the closed-end fund was large enough. More important, investors could shift out open-end mutual funds into closed-end mutual funds with similar objectives and portfolios.

Open-end mutual funds are sold and redeemed at net asset value. Thus, there is never any discount or premium to book value for an open-end mutual fund. Advantages for investors in no-load mutual funds are that there are no transactions costs and the funds can always be redeemed at net asset or book value. Closed-end funds usually require some brokerage commission to buy and sell them, and there is risk that the closed-end fund will fluctuate due to changes in the premium or discount to net asset value in addition to fluctuation in the portfolio securities. The advantages of no-load open-end mutual funds are somewhat offset by the lower fees and expenses that closed-end funds usually have.

When closed-end funds are trading at large discounts to book value, investors can significantly increase their returns by switching from open-end funds to closed-end funds that have similar assets but are selling at discounts to net asset value and typically have lower fees and expenses. When an investor redeems an open-end fund at net asset value, the open-end fund sells portfolio securities to fund the redemption. That would tend to lower the market prices of those portfolio securities. If the investor uses the proceeds from the redemption of the open-end fund to buy shares in a closed-end fund that holds similar portfolio securities, the net effect would be to put downward pressure on the market prices of the portfolio securities and upward pressure of the market prices of the closed-end funds. Thus, the discount to book value for the closed-end funds will tend to decline.

This discount to net asset value alone is still a good reason to be constructive on CEFL. It should be noted that saying many CEFL components are trading at a discount to the net asset value of the closed-end funds that comprise the index does not mean that CEFL does not always trade at a level close to its own net asset value. Since CEFL is exchangeable at the holders' option at indicative or net asset value, its market price will not deviate significantly from net asset value. The net asset value or indicative value of CEFL is determined by the market prices of the closed-end funds that comprise the index upon which CEFL is based.

My constructive view on CEFL stems not only from the discount to book value of the closed-end funds, but also from the very large dividends paid by CEFL. One troubling aspect of CEFL is the significant amount of the dividends paid by the closed-end funds that comprise CEFL that consists of return of capital. My calculation using available data indicates that 28.4% of the CEFL dividend consists of return of capital. However, there does not seem to be any statistically significant relationship between return of capital and the discounts to book value that the individual closed-end funds trade at.

My calculation projects a May 2016 dividend of $0.2574. For the three months ending May 2016, the total projected dividends are $0.7479. The annualized dividends would be $2.992. This is a 18.4% simple annualized yield with CEFL priced at $16.22. On a monthly compounded basis, the effective annualized yield is 20.1%.

Aside from the fact that with a yield about 20%, even without reinvesting or compounding, you get back your initial investment in only five years and still have your original investment shares intact. If someone thought that over the next five years markets and interest rates would remain relatively stable, and thus CEFL would continue to yield 20.1% on a compounded basis, the return on a strategy of reinvesting all dividends would be enormous. An investment of $100,000 would be worth $249,722 in five years. More interestingly, for those investing for future income, the income from the initial $100,000 would increase from the $20,100 initial annual rate to $49,966 annually.

Holdings of CEFL and YYY as of April 18, 2016

Name

Ticker

Weight

Price

NAV

price/NAV

ex-div

dividend

frequency

contribution

GAMCO Global Gold Natural Resources & Income Trust

GGN

5.2

6.33

6.09

1.0394

4/13/2016

0.07

m

0.0186

Morgan Stanley Emerging Markets Domestic Debt Fund

EDD

4.64

7.7

9.03

0.8527

3/29/2016

0.2

q

 

Aberdeen Aisa-Pacific Income Fund

FAX

4.5

5.01

5.74

0.8728

4/18/2016

0.035

m

0.0102

Western Asset Emerging Markets Debt Fund

ESD

4.38

14.67

17

0.8609

4/20/2016

0.105

m

0.0102

Doubleline Income Solutions

DSL

4.29

17.21

18.6

0.9268

4/13/2016

0.15

m

0.0121

Prudential Global Short Duration High Yield Fundd

GHY

4.28

14.79

16.3

0.9068

4/13/2016

0.11

m

0.0103

Eaton Vance Limited Duration Income Fund

EVV

4.27

13.13

14.6

0.8993

4/7/2016

0.1017

m

0.0107

Royce Value Trust

RVT

4.24

11.76

14

0.8394

3/10/2016

0.26

q

 

Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Global Diversified Equity Income Fund

EXG

4.22

8.9

9.42

0.9448

3/22/2016

0.0813

m

0.0125

ING Global Equity Dividend & Premium Opportunity Fund

IGD

4.18

7.01

7.94

0.8829

4/1/2016

0.076

m

0.0147

Alpine Global Premier Properties Fund

AWP

4.07

5.62

6.83

0.8228

4/20/2016

0.05

m

0.0117

Calamos Global Dynamic Income Fund

CHW

4.06

7.06

8.26

0.8547

4/8/2016

0.07

m

0.0131

Alpine Total Dynamic Dividend

AOD

4.05

7.57

9.08

0.8337

4/20/2016

0.0575

m

0.0100

Allianzgi Convertible & Income Fund

NCV

4.02

5.64

6.04

0.9338

4/7/2016

0.065

m

0.0150

PIMCO Dynamic Credit Income Fund

PCI

4

17.6

19.7

0.8952

4/7/2016

0.1641

m

0.0121

PIMCO Corporate & Income Opportunity Fund

PTY

3.58

13.63

12.7

1.0741

4/7/2016

0.13

m

0.0111

Western Asset High Income Fund II

HIX

3.54

6.79

6.97

0.9742

4/20/2016

0.0665

m

0.0112

Clough Global Opportunities Fund

GLO

3.52

9.43

11.4

0.8294

4/13/2016

0.1

m

0.0121

Wells Fargo Advantage Income Opportunities Fund

EAD

3.21

7.59

8.37

0.9068

4/11/2016

0.068

m

0.0093

Prudential Short Duration High Yield Fd

ISD

3.12

15.58

16.7

0.9352

4/13/2016

0.11

m

0.0071

Backstone /GSO Strategic Credit Fund

BGB

2.79

13.7

15.5

0.8850

4/20/2016

0.105

m

0.0069

Wells Fargo Advantage Multi Sector Income Fund

ERC

2.67

12.19

13.6

0.8990

4/11/2016

0.0967

m

0.0069

BlackRock International Growth and Income Trust

BGY

2.31

5.92

6.61

0.8956

4/13/2016

0.049

m

0.0062

Blackrock Corporate High Yield Fund

HYT

2.21

10.14

11.1

0.9168

4/13/2016

0.07

m

0.0049

Blackrock Multi-Sector Income

BIT

1.93

15.82

17.9

0.8828

4/13/2016

0.1167

m

0.0046

First Trust Intermediate Duration Prf.& Income Fd

FPF

1.81

22.44

22.7

0.9877

4/1/2016

0.1625

m

0.0042

Alliancebernstein Global High Income Fund Inc

AWF

1.59

11.72

12.8

0.9178

4/6/2016

0.081

m

0.0036

Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Diversified Equity Income Fund

ETY

1.3

10.77

11.4

0.9431

3/22/2016

0.0843

m

0.0033

Invesco Dynamic Credit Opportunities Fund

VTA

1.1

10.65

12.2

0.8758

3/10/2016

0.075

m

0.0025

Nuveen Preferred Income Opportunities Fund

JPC

0.93

9.78

10

0.9741

4/13/2016

0.067

m

0.0021

Click to enlarge

Disclosure: I am/we are long CEFL, AGNC.

I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.