On 5/10/2016, Prospect Capital Corp. (NASDAQ:PSEC) reported net investment income ("NII") of $0.246 per share, earnings per share ("EPS") (also known as "net assets resulting from operations") of $0.212 per share, net investment company taxable income ("ICTI") of $0.243 per share and a net asset value ("NAV") as of 3/31/2016 of $9.609 per share. In my prior PSEC fiscal Q3 2016 NII and NAV projection article, I projected the company would report quarterly NII of $0.246 per share, EPS of $0.106 per share, net ICTI of $0.243 per share and a NAV as of 3/31/2016 of $9.503 per share.
As such, PSEC's NII and net ICTI were an "exact match" when compared to my projections while the company's EPS and NAV figures were a minor "outperformance." It should be noted some market participants were expecting a more severe decrease to PSEC's EPS and NAV. When calculated, my NII, EPS, net ICTI and NAV projections had a variance of $0.00, $0.106, $0.00 and $0.106 per share, respectively. With that being said, PSEC's EPS and NAV per share figures were within my stated range.
I will now summarize my prior article's account projections and compare each account to PSEC's actual results. I will discuss PSEC's accounts in the same order as provided in my NII and NAV projection article (link provided above).
Projected Versus Actual Results (Overview):
To begin this discussion, Table 1 is provided below. Table 1 shows my prior account projections, which were referenced in the linked article above, and compares these figures to the company's actual results for the fiscal third quarter of 2016.
Table 1 - PSEC NII and EPS for the Fiscal Third Quarter of 2016 (Projected Versus Actual Results)
(Source: Table created entirely by myself, partially using PSEC data obtained from the SEC's EDGAR Database)
Income and Expense Accounts:
In my prior PSEC NII and NAV projection article (link provided above), I projected PSEC would report an extremely low quarterly loan originations/add-on investments figure for the fiscal third quarter of 2016. This was due to the fact loan originations across financial markets were either at or near multi-year lows at the beginning of calendar year 2016 mainly due to heightened volatility in U.S. and global credit markets. This assumption/projection came to fruition as PSEC reported loan originations/add-on investments of only $23 million during the quarter while having portfolio sales/repayments/restructurings of ($164) million (prior to all quarterly "fair market value" ("FMV") fluctuations and scheduled principle payments).
Using Table 1 above as a reference, I projected PSEC would report "total interest income" of $179.5 million for the fiscal third quarter of 2016. In comparison, PSEC reported total interest income of $179.0 million which was basically an exact match ($0.5 million variance). I correctly anticipated a minor decrease in PSEC's control, non-control/non-affiliate and "collateralized loan obligation" ("CLO") interest income for the fiscal third quarter of 2016 when compared to the prior quarter. An explanation for PSEC's decrease in quarterly interest income within these three classifications was provided in the linked projection article above.
Moving down Table 1, PSEC's combined dividend and structuring/fee income was also as expected; "depressed" when compared to the prior quarter. The main reason for the exceptionally low structuring/fee income figure was due to the historically low loan originations/add-on investments reported for the quarter. I projected PSEC would report a combined dividend and structuring/fee income of $11.0 million. In comparison, PSEC reported dividend and structuring/fee income of $8.3 and $2.2 million, respectively. When both figures are combined, this was a variance of only $0.5 million which was well within my stated range. PSEC recognized a fairly large "one-time" dividend payment of $7.3 million in regards to the company's equity investment in Echelon Aviation LLC (Echelon). As stated in my PSEC projection article (link provided above), I anticipated strong quarterly performance from the company's aerospace investments. Since Echelon was able to distribute a sizable dividend to PSEC during the quarter, I believe this projection proved to be a correct assumption. Regarding PSEC's structuring/fee income, this figure comprised of several amounts in relation to PSEC's consumer finance, online lending and real estate investment trust ("REIT") portfolio companies.
When PSEC's total interest, dividend and structuring/fee income are combined, I projected the company would report "total investment income" of $190.5 million for the fiscal third quarter of 2016. In comparison, PSEC reported total investment income of $189.5 million which calculated to a $1.0 million variance which was well within my stated range.
Still using Table 1 above as a reference, I projected PSEC would report "total operating expenses" of $103.2 million for the fiscal third quarter of 2016. In comparison, PSEC reported total operating expenses of $101.9 million. When calculated, this comes out to be a variance of $1.3 million. Consistent with the other figures discussed above, this was well within my stated range. When taking a look at all the accounts that make up this figure, since PSEC reported slightly lower total investment income for the fiscal third quarter of 2016, the company also reported slightly less "investment advisory fees" when compared to my projection. In addition, PSEC's "legal fees" and "other general and administrative expenses" were lower when compared to my projections which should be seen as a positive trend. However, this positive trend was partially offset by higher than projected "audit, compliance, and tax related fees" and a minor "excise tax" for the quarter. Even though PSEC reported net ICTI of $0.243 per share while distributing dividends totaling $0.25 per share for the fiscal third quarter of 2016, the company recorded a minor excise tax accrual due to the fact management recorded a prior-period net ICTI "true-up" adjustment during the quarter. This adjustment will be further discussed/explained in a future PSEC dividend sustainability article.
Continuing to move down Table 1, when all the amounts above are combined, I projected NII of $87.3 million for the fiscal third quarter of 2016. In comparison, PSEC reported NII of $87.6 million. Simply put, PSEC's reported NII was basically an exact match to my projected NII ($0.3 million variance). Let us now discuss PSEC's three valuation accounts.
I believe PSEC's investment portfolio, as a whole, slightly outperformed my expectations which ultimately led to the company reporting EPS of $0.212 per share when compared to my projected EPS of $0.106 per share. This directly led to PSEC reporting a NAV as of 3/31/2016 of $9.609 per share versus my projection of $9.503 per share. Still, this variance was within my projected range. As stated in my PSEC projection article (link provided above), I correctly anticipated net depreciation within PSEC's CLO portfolio, continued stress on certain oil & gas investments, and net appreciation within several control investments (in particular several consumer finance and REIT portfolio companies). However, the level of net appreciation PSEC recorded within the company's REIT portfolio companies was notably larger than I projected for the fiscal third quarter of 2016. These three sectors will be further discussed within PSEC's "unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on investments" account later in the article.
First, continuing to move down Table 1, I projected PSEC would report a "gain (loss) on the extinguishment of debt" of $10,000 for the fiscal third quarter of 2016 while the company reported a loss of ($23,000). Most would agree this was basically an exact match/immaterial so further discussion of this account is unwarranted.
Next, I projected PSEC would report a "net realized gain (loss) on investments" of $3.0 million during the fiscal third quarter of 2016. As stated within my prior PSEC NII and NAV projection article (link provided above), I projected a large portion of this amount was due to the sale of "CIFC Funding 2011-I, Ltd." (CIFC 2011-I). However, PSEC reported a net realized loss of ($10.8) million within this account. This ($13.8) million variance was due to several reasons. First, management "cleaned up" PSEC's balance sheet during the quarter by "writing-off" the company's investments in "New Century Transportation, Inc." (New Century) and "Wind River Resources Corp." (Wind River). Second, PSEC recorded a notable realized loss upon the restructuring of a troubled portfolio company, "Targus Group International Inc." (Targus). Third, PSEC recorded a minor realized loss when it sold "ICON Health & Fitness, Inc" ("ICON"). These "unrealized to realized" activities were not disclosed in prior SEC filings and therefore could not be anticipated. For the most part, these events were merely a "reclassification" issue.
This leads us to one last projection with PSEC's income statement, the company's unrealized appreciation (depreciation) on investments account. I projected PSEC would report net unrealized depreciation of ($52.5) million in regards to the company's entire investment portfolio for the fiscal third quarter of 2016. Since we now know PSEC recorded a ($13.8) million more severe realized loss when compared to my projection (due to the unrealized to realized reclassifications discussed above), my projected unrealized depreciation on investments figure would theoretically decrease to ($38.7) million. In comparison, PSEC reported net unrealized depreciation of ($1.3) million for the fiscal third quarter of 2016. Due to the sheer size of PSEC's investment portfolio (FMV of $6.0 billion as of 3/31/2016), I believe the company's extremely small net depreciation amount was a minor outperformance when compared to my projection. With that being said, let us discuss three main sectors of PSEC's investment portfolio which I believe should be examined to compare actual versus projected results.
First, during PSEC's fiscal third quarter of 2016, U.S. and global credit markets continued to experience heightened volatility. In part, towards the end of last year, markets anticipated the "Federal Open Market Committee" ("FOMC") would finally increase the Federal ("Fed") Funds Rate for the first time in roughly a decade which directly impacts most short-term funding rates, including the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). This heightened volatility caused varying levels of underperformance within residential/commercial mortgages, corporate bonds and the high yield debt market. As such, spreads materially widened during PSEC's fiscal second quarter of 2016. Directly due to the increase in short-term rates in December 2015, most market participants were expecting U.S. interest rates to net increase during 2016, either at a steady or rapid pace. However, U.S. and global markets experienced a rapid, material "reversal" of rates back to or near multi-year lows (in some cases historical lows) amid fears of a global recession. This panic was apparent during January 2016 through the first half of February 2016. While guaranteed fixed-income prices (for instance agency mortgage-backed securities ["MBS"] and certain AAA government bonds and institutional debt) were positively impacted by this event (general "rush to safety"), many other types of investments/fixed-income sectors saw spreads/yields materially widen/increase which, in turn, drove down prices. The high-yield debt market was no exception. However, it should also be noted this bearish trend "reversed course" during the second half of February 2016, March 2016, and more recently April 2016 as spreads/yields tightened/decreased which, in turn, drove prices back up. I believe the intra-quarter"price swing" within the "middle market" ("MM") and "upper middle market" ("UMM") should, at the very least, be mentioned as this has a direct impact on sector valuations.
When compared to the MM, UMM and syndicated loan market, CLO pricing remained under pressure throughout PSEC's fiscal third quarter of 2016. However, consistent with the trend discussed above regarding the high yield debt market, CLO pricing by the end of the quarter "rebounded" from lows seen during February 2016 (just to a lesser extent). As such, while I certainly did not expect PSEC's CLO portfolio to record the same amount of investment depreciation that occurred during the prior quarter, I still correctly anticipated net depreciation occurred within this portfolio during the company's fiscal third quarter of 2016 (especially newer vintages). I projected PSEC's CLO portfolio would record net investment depreciation of ($50) million for the fiscal third quarter of 2016. In comparison, PSEC recorded net investment depreciation of approximately ($35) million. Due to the size of PSEC's CLO portfolio (FMV of $1.0 billion as of 3/31/2016), I believe this ($15) million variance was a minor outperformance when compared to my projection. Now let us discuss a couple reasons why PSEC's net depreciation within the company's CLO portfolio was not as severe as some market participants' more bearish expectations.
In prior public/private correspondence with readers, I stated it would be interesting to see how PSEC valued the company's CLO portfolio as of 3/31/2016 knowing that the forward LIBOR curve rapidly "reversed course" and began to materially flatten during the fiscal third quarter of 2016. A flattening of the forward LIBOR curve typically benefits projected future discounted cash flows, even in instances when current pricing remains "under pressure." Again, I anticipated PSEC would still record net investment depreciation within the company's CLO portfolio. However, my projected net investment depreciation was not as severe as what other contributors/analysts were projecting. Since most of PSEC's CLO investments have leveraged "floating-rate" liabilities, a deferment/drop to the forward LIBOR curve positively impacts projected future discounted cash flows under most scenarios. Simply put, an increase to the CLO's "cost of funds" rate is delayed. Also, in some cases, refinancing can occur which leads to more attractive term sheets.
I would also point out that, as a whole, PSEC's CLO portfolio continues to experience a default rate under the syndicated loan market average (a positive). The following quote by PSEC's President and Chief Operating Officer ("COO") M. Grier Eliasek during the company's earnings conference call for the fiscal third quarter of 2016 supports this notion:
"… As of March 2016, our structured credit portfolio experienced a trailing 12-month default rate of 1.16% or 59 basis points less than the broadly syndicated market default rate of 1.75%.…"
With that being said, PSEC did, in fact, witness another "uptick" in defaults during the fiscal third quarter of 2016 when compared to the prior quarter (a negative) which needs to be carefully monitored. This was one of the reasons why projected future discounted cash flows were "trued-down" (plays a part in which discount rate/margin to use; can cause an increase to this particular factor/variable). Simply put, this factor impacts valuations.
As of 6/30/2015, PSEC's "residual interest" (equity) CLO portfolio was valued at a "FMV versus cost" ratio of 1.0376. As of 9/30/2015, this portfolio had a FMV versus cost ratio of 1.0236 which I believed, at the time, was a minor - modest overvaluation (as stated in prior articles/comments). When calculated, this was a quarterly percentage decrease of only (1.40%). However, as of 12/31/2015, this portfolio had a FMV versus cost ratio of only 0.9303. When calculated, this was a quarterly percentage decrease of (9.33%) within just one quarter. I correctly anticipated this ratio further declined during PSEC's fiscal third quarter of 2016. As of 3/31/2016, PSEC's CLO portfolio had a FMV versus cost ratio of only 0.9010, a decrease of (2.93%) when compared to the end of the prior quarter.
This quarter, PSEC's CLO portfolio had a slight decrease in quarterly accrued interest income (current cash flows per se; shown within the income statement) and the actual valuation of the portfolio itself net decreased as well (projected future discounted cash flows per se; shown within the balance sheet). It should also be noted the recent increase in LIBOR and uptick in defaults (as discussed earlier) played a minor part in the amount of accrued interest income recorded during the fiscal third quarter of 2016 (negatively impacted GAAP yields). I believe this is an important notion for readers/analysts to understand.
In addition, it should also be noted PSEC's CLO residual interests are in the "lowest tranche/bottom basket" when it comes to income distributions. If, in the future, there is a noticeable uptick in underperforming/non-performing loans (defaults), the residual interest (equity) tranche of a CLO bears first risk loss of this income. This methodology is also known as a CLO's "waterfall" calculation which I have discussed at length in prior PSEC/BDC articles. This is why this particular tranche of the CLO can have highly attractive yields under certain positive scenarios (say north of 25%) yet also have very poor yields under certain negative scenarios (say single-digit or even negative yields). This all gets back to an investment's "risk versus reward" metric. Within a CLO's residual interest/equity tranche, there's heightened risk for investment depreciation but also a heightened reward if the security is performing above expectations.
Culminating this data with trends that have occurred during the first half of PSEC's fiscal fourth quarter of 2016 (through the week ending 5/13/2016), the probability of notable investment depreciation within PSEC's CLO portfolio has slightly decreased. However, heightened risk still persists within specified securitizations. This is important for readers to understand. Simply put, the positive impacts of the sharp reversal of the forward LIBOR curve are, in some instances, offset by continued pricing pressure and adjustments to discount rates/margins. Even though there has been a recent decrease in credit market volatility, this positive trend can once again quickly deteriorate in the future.
Still, I continue to not be as "bearish" as some market participants' valuations. I believe projected valuations need to take multiple models into consideration to come up with a "blended"/weighted average mean. Right now, I believe some valuations that have been calculated by market participants are more towards the "worst-case" scenario. While that type of specific scenario can certainly come to fruition, I believe a more normalized valuation is typically appropriate. Of course, this is an analysis that constantly needs to be "tweaked." As is the case with all my mortgage real estate investment trust (mREIT) and business develop company ("BDC") research, I constantly evaluate all applicable factors/variables that go in a modeled projection. In this instance, this includes a non-simulated future discounted cash flow projection, various modeled forecasts through a privately-accessed intranet valuation software (includes "Monte Carlo" modeling), and comparable research tools/models from outside resources (including Intex).
With that being said, I continue to stress to readers this is not an "exact science." This is dealing with various imputed factors/variables and providing certain "judgments." That is why these types of investments are classified as "level 3" assets per Accounting Standards Codification 820 (ASC 820) which I have continued to reiterate since I began covering PSEC several years ago. In the end, if a company were to engage three independent valuation firms, I believe each firm will likely derive three different valuation ranges for a particular portfolio (partial "overlap" of these three ranges would likely occur). Currently, that's just the "grim reality" that investors/market participants have to deal with regarding these types of more illiquid investments/securitizations. Let us now move on to the next sector.
Second, I correctly anticipated PSEC would record net investment depreciation within the company's oil and gas portfolio companies. In particular, notable investment depreciation occurred within the following oil and gas portfolio companies during the fiscal third quarter of 2016: 1) Arctic Energy Services, LLC (Arctic Energy); 2) Ark-La-Tex Wireline Services, LLC (Ark-La-Tex); and 3) Spartan Energy Services, Inc. (Spartan). When combined, I projected PSEC's oil and gas portfolio companies would record net investment depreciation of ($40) million for the fiscal third quarter of 2016. In comparison, PSEC recorded net investment depreciation of approximately ($35) million. I believe this ($5) million variance was a minor outperformance when compared to my projection and was well within my stated range for this sector.
Third, I was somewhat surprised by the amount of net appreciation recorded within PSEC's REIT portfolio companies. While I projected notable net appreciation in regards to this portfolio, PSEC actually recorded an even higher FMV increase. In particular, notable investment appreciation occurred within the following REIT portfolio companies: 1) American Property REIT Corp. ("APH"); 2) National Property REIT Corp. ("NPH"), and 3) United Property REIT Corp. ("UPH"). When combined, I projected PSEC's REIT portfolio companies would record net investment appreciation of $40 million for the fiscal third quarter of 2016. In comparison, PSEC recorded net investment appreciation of approximately $70 million. I believe this ($30) million variance was a notable outperformance when compared to my projection. Simply put, I believe PSEC's valuations for the company's REIT portfolio companies (in particular NPH) were "very bullish." While I agree net investment appreciation was certainly appropriate knowing the factors impacting valuations for these portfolio companies, I do not completely agree with the amount of FMV appreciation actually recorded within one quarter. Unless markets witness a material change of events between now and 6/30/2016 (quarter end), I would expect some "reining in" of REIT valuations for the fiscal fourth quarter of 2016 (audited financial statements). This is merely my professional opinion as I try to remain as "non-bias" as possible when researching/analyzing any company.
Side Note: Regarding PSEC's online lending investments, this portfolio actually held up fairly well (valuation wise) during the fiscal third quarter of 2016. This was in contrast to the negative trends occurring with online lending companies such as LendingClub Corp. (NYSE:LC) and OnDeck Capital Inc. (NYSE:ONDK). Simply put, both of these companies have been hurt by recent rising default rates, the loss of investor trust partially due to heightened market volatility to begin the year (lack of demand for each company's products; companies act as a "middle-man"), and the recent notion that the "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau" ("CFPB") is looking to provide oversight for this sector within the foreseeable future. Regarding LC, the company's Chief Executing Officer ("CEO") Renaud Laplanche was dismissed by the Board of Directors ("BoD") after the board found out he failed to disclose certain personal investments with Cirrix Capital L.P., one of LC's recurring clients. In addition, it came to the BoD's attention management violated certain lending practices by, amongst several other examples, packaging $22 million of online loans to Jefferies Group LLC (JEF) that were outside client specifications. These recent negative events have hurt LC's stock price which was already materially lower when compared to the start of the year. LC's stock price has now decreased 68% during 2016 (through 5/13/2016). ONDK's stock price has also materially decreased during 2016; just not as severe a percentage decrease when compared to LC. Simply put, both stocks have performed poorly over the past six months. Since PSEC purchases online loans from ONDK, I believe at least referencing these recent negative trends/events is beneficial for readers.
One exception to PSEC's outperformance in this sector was the company's subordinated notes in "MarketPlace Loan Trust, Series 2015-OD2." In fact, as of 3/31/2016, this specific securitization had a yield of (4.01%) and a FMV versus cost ratio of just 54%. With that being said, this specific investment only had a cost basis of $0.7 million as of 3/31/2016. It should also be noted this securitization was originally created, in part, when PSEC sold 780 small business loans (which were originally purchased from ONDK) to Jefferies Asset Funding LLC, an investment division of JEF.
Therefore, when analyzing PSEC's entire investment portfolio, I had the following overvaluations (undervaluations) when compared to the company's reported FMV fluctuations during the fiscal third quarter of 2016: 1) net undervaluation of CLO portfolio by approximately ($15) million; 2) net undervaluation of oil and gas portfolio companies by approximately ($5) million; 3) net undervaluation of REIT portfolio companies by approximately ($30) million; and 4) net overvaluation of the remainder of the company's investment portfolio by approximately $10 million.
Readers have continued to request that I provide these types of "update"/"follow-up" articles showing how my quarterly projections "stacked-up" to PSEC's actual results. I believe the analysis above accomplishes this request. Since a company's operating performance (quarterly earnings) is one of the key drivers to stock price valuations, I believe these types of projection/assessment articles are appreciated by most readers. In addition, this article provides my overall thoughts on the quarter which I believe most readers see as beneficial when assessing certain investing strategies.
PSEC's results for the fiscal third quarter of 2016 had two components - First, PSEC reported NII and net ICTI that matched my expectations; second, PSEC reported EPS and a NAV that was slightly above my expectations which is a positive trend. As discussed above, this was due to less severe net depreciation within PSEC's investment portfolio when compared to my projections. As I researched the cause of this variance (by calculating PSEC's quarterly unrealized appreciation (depreciation) fluctuations within each portfolio company), I discovered several notable events that occurred during the quarter. These events were discussed (in detail) above.
In my opinion, the following positive trends should be highlighted for existing and potential PSEC shareholders: 1) quarterly economic returns being generated in most quarters; 2) eventual separation of CLO, online lending and real estate investments through spin-offs; 3) continued attractive cumulative undistributed taxable income ("UTI") balance; 4) continued strong cumulative performance regarding several control investments; 5) continued "modest" exposure to the oil and gas sector when compared to its peers; 6) continued high percentage of floating-rate debt investments; and 7) notable insider purchases of common stock by the company's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") John Barry (since 12/9/2015 has purchased 14.7 million outstanding shares of common stock [excludes all reinvestments] for a total purchase price of $98.0 million).
However, the following cautionary/negative trends should cause heightened awareness for existing and potential PSEC shareholders: 1) continued suppressed dividend and structuring/fee income; 2) recent low loan originations when compared to historical averages (negatively impacts NII); 3) continued modest - material depreciation within several control/non-control investments (including most oil and gas portfolio companies); 4) "non-amendment" of the company's Investment Advisory Agreement with Prospect Capital Management L.P. (regarding the "2%/20%" fee structure); 5) recent net unrealized depreciation within the company's CLO portfolio (has to be continually monitored going forward); 6) continued delays regarding the company's three proposed spin-offs (first spin-off is now "pushed back" to the second half of 2016 at the earliest); 7) fairly high weighted average cash LIBOR floor and cost of funds rate when compared to sector peers; and 8) lack of share repurchases initiated by PSEC (the company itself; not insider purchases which do not affect the amount of dividend distributions accrued for/paid).
My BUY, SELL or HOLD Recommendation:
PSEC recently closed at $7.57 per share as of 5/13/2016. This was a ($2.04) per share discount to PSEC's NAV as of 3/31/2016 of $9.61 per share. This calculates to a price to NAV ratio of 0.7876 or a discount of (21.24%).
When combining the analysis above with various other factors/analytical metrics not discussed within this specific article, I currently rate PSEC as a SELL when the company's stock price is trading at less than a (18%) discount to NAV as of 3/31/2016, a HOLD when trading at or greater than an (18%) but less than a (25%) discount to NAV as of 3/31/2016, and a BUY when trading at or greater than a (25%) discount to NAV as of 3/31/2016. These ranges are unchanged when compared to my last PSEC article.
As such, I currently rate PSEC as a HOLD. My current price target for PSEC is approximately $7.90 per share. This is currently the price where my HOLD recommendation would change to a SELL. This price target is a $0.10 per share increase when compared to my last PSEC article. My current re-entry price for PSEC is approximately $7.20 per share. This is currently the price where my HOLD recommendation would change to a BUY.
Final Note: On 8/27/2015, I once again initiated a position in PSEC at a weighted average purchase price of $7.325 per share. I made a subsequent purchase in PSEC on 2/8/2016 at a weighted average price of $5.445 per share. My second purchase was approximately double the monetary amount of my initial purchase. When calculated, the weighted average purchase price on my PSEC position was $6.072 per share. This weighted average per share price excluded all dividends received/reinvested. I sold my entire PSEC position on 3/2/2016 at a weighted average sales price of $7.495 per share as my price target, at the time, was met. All trades were disclosed to readers, in "real time," via the "StockTalks" feature of Seeking Alpha (and in prior PSEC articles). All proceeds from the sale of PSEC stock were "redeployed" into several other equity investments which currently have a positive total return.
Each investor's BUY, SELL, or HOLD decision is based on one's risk tolerance, time horizon, and dividend income goals. My personal recommendation will not fit each reader's current investing strategy.
Disclosure: I/we have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours.
I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it (other than from Seeking Alpha). I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.