Today’s news: 28 Spanish Banks were downgraded by Moody’s Investors Service. Included in this list were Banco Santander SA (SAN) and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA (BBVA). Moody’s had cut the ratings of 16 Spanish banks on May 17. Again, the argument can be made that this move was "too little, too late."
Yet perhaps the most important thing to realize is that especially if the move by Moody’s is “too little, too late,” the situation in the banking system has not improved even though a substantial amount of time has passed since the banks entered into this “dark” region.
That is, maybe the banks should have been downgraded six months ago ... or nine months ago ... or twelve months ago. What we should reflect upon is that the banks have not improved their financial condition over this six months, or nine months, or twelve months, so that the ratings would not have had to be dropped.
The banks did not respond to the conditions because everyone in Europe seemed to believe that the problems faced by the banks were “liquidity” problems and not “solvency” problems, and that eurozone governments also did not face “solvency” problems.
The conditions cited by Moody’s for the downgrade included the weakness of Spain’s sovereign debt and the increasingly larger losses being recognized by the banks on commercial real estate loans.
Today, Spain requested funds for a banking bailout from members of the eurozone. The lingering question still remains about when Spain, itself, is going to ask for a formal bailout. Spain’s bonds are now trading near peak level spreads over German bonds of the same maturity. The concern here is that these high yields cannot lead to a sustainable financing of the national government.
The situation of Italy is not unlike that of Spain, so there is concern over when the financial markets are going to turn more strongly on the government of Italy. But no one seems to have the will to act. Still no leaders have arisen. The general belief that the solution must ultimately rest with Germany receives cries of strong protest from German officials. Short-term plugging of the dike is about all anyone can do.
It is becoming more and more obvious that the only way the European situation will be corrected will be when the European governments “bite the bullet” and actually accept the fact that there is a massive need for structural reforms in most countries. However, these government officials, in the past, postponed actions over and over again, arguing that the problems were just ones of “liquidity.” Now they have moved to claiming short-run cash injections will solve the “solvency” problems.
The possibility that European government officials will really consider structural reforms for their societies still seems a distant fantasy.
There has been talk of a banking union with the eurozone. Yet no one really seems serious about giving up their national interests when it comes to forming a banking union. And no one seems to want to create a system of deposit insurance like we have in the United States. And no one seems to want to bear the burden of forming some central regulation agency. Without some give, somewhere along the line, nothing will happen!
The deeper problem is that banks are not seemingly resolving their balance sheet problems within the time given them by their respective central banks. Liquidity has been pumped into both the United States financial system and the European financial system. But few banks seem to be lending, indicating they are in a holding pattern until things get better.
Still, things have not gotten appreciably better. If they had, Moody’s would not have had to downgrade all the banks they have downgraded, at this late date. This applies equally to the United States banking system, where commercial real estate loans also plague many banks.
Furthermore, in Europe and in the United States, economic recovery is not going to take place as long as their respective banking institutions are not lending.
To me, moving to a QE3 will do no more to right the banking system in the United States, nor will a QE3 do anything more to help the economy start growing faster. Just as in 1937, having more excess reserves in the banking system does not mean that the banks are solvent or will start lending. Other things must happen for the banks to start lending, and one of these things is to honestly recognize the serious weaknesses that exist within the banking system and continue to re-structure the banking system as smoothly as possible so as to bring solvency back to the industry.
This is also true of Europe. Further provision of liquidity to European banks is not going to help them. European officials, as well as the banks themselves, must accept the reality of the situation and move on. The banking system needs bailing out. Several governments in Europe need bailing out. Solvency is the issue. Recognizing this and re-structuring their societies is necessary to move forward into the future.
Any bright future for Europe will only face further delay by postponing the re-structuring that ultimately needs to take place.