The assets were reviewed by the Federal Reserve and its advisor, BlackRock Financial Management. The assets were not individually selected by JPMorgan Chase or Bear Stearns.
In other words, this is not $30 billion of nuclear waste that JP Morgan specifically did not want on its balance sheet. Instead, it was simply a question of there being too much in the way of Bear Stearns assets for JP Morgan to comfortably absorb them all over the course of a single weekend. Here's Geithner's Congressional testimony:
On Sunday morning, executives at JPMorgan Chase informed us that they had become significantly more concerned about the scale of the risk that Bear and its many affiliates had assumed. They were also concerned about the ability of JPMorgan Chase to absorb some of Bear's trading portfolio, particularly given the uncertainty ahead about the ultimate scale of losses facing the financial system.
The key phrase here is "the scale of the risk" - we're talking quantity of assets, more than level of impairment.
In general, I'm impressed by Geithner's testimony: while he necessarily elides quite a lot of the nitty-gritty, he makes the big themes clear and reasonably compelling. If this was a bailout, it was a bailout of the entire financial system more than it was of Bear Stearns in particular. And that is precisely what the Federal Reserve in general, and the New York Fed in particular, was designed to do.



























This article has 7 comments:
I'm sure the airlines' (Delta, UAL, et al) shareholders would have appreciated $10 per share from the government after 9/11 related bankruptcies. Heck, even the $2 would have been nice...but they got nothing.
As will in the future any shareholders of non-banking (Big Banks) companies that may go bankrupt.
However, after the emergency, you look back and make things more fair.
For example, all the money the Federal Reserve Board is making available to depository institutions comes with no haircut for the securities accepted by FRB. Why is that?
FRB should adopt a new rule, as soon as the emergency is over, to provide funds at a discount relative to the face value of the securities. In fact, this rule should be applied retroactively.
The Fed is pumping too much liquidity too fast into a system that is not working because of uncertainity. This uncertainity will not be relieved until the extent of non-payment of mortgages becomes clear. That will take years.
Allow asset values to contract. Look to the future rather than to the next week.