More on the Subprime Market and Derivatives 4 comments
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A correspondent makes three points:
First, Moody's response to requests to rate highly complex structured mortgage derivatives should have been: We don't have enough historical data on securities like this in a housing price environment where rent-versus-buy ratios are this low. We cannot rate them to our usual standards.Second, if you are collecting a fee for rating things, and if your fee is based on your past reputation for, providing good ratings based on long-term historical data, and if you use the same classification scheme to make ratings that are not based on sufficient historical data - then you do have a problem. Third, the fact that there was an ABX index and therefore, provided an easy way for people to bet that the mortgage-backed securities market would crash probably cut short the bubble, because the true hedge funds were stabilizing speculators. The destabilizing speculators were (i) the funds that were long CDOs and, (ii) the banks and other issuers who retained the CDOs because their portfolio managers believed their marketers. A world without derivatives but with mortgage-backed securities would probably be a world in which we have a bigger problem than we have now.
This third point is very much the point that Sandy Grossman made about the 1987 crash. This was that the problem with "portfolio insurance" was that it was a trading strategy rather than a derivative security traded by a market. Therefore, nobody knew how large the demand for it was, and so those planning to implement the trading strategy in a market downturn had no way of assessing how expensive implementing it was going to be. However, on Black Monday, everybody found out.
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This article has 4 comments:
Also, many of these "products" should be made illegal.
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