MBIA and Ambac: Edge of the Cliff, Ratings-Wise 12 comments
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From my RealMoney Columnist conversations yesterday:
So yesterday Moody’s places MBIA and Ambac on Negative Watch. S&P grabs the ball and downgrades them, leaving them on negative outlook. I pointed out a while ago that the dike had been breached, and it was only a matter of time until the downgrades came.
And, as I pointed out yesterday, there will be new entrants to the market. Not only will Berky be there, with Assured Guaranty and Dexia, but Macquarie Group joins the party as well.
Even if Ambac and MBIA (the holding companies) survive, the business that used to be profitable for them will be occupied by others. I’ll throw this out as my next prediction in this space: they both go into conservation, and in runoff, claimants get paid off, senior debtholders get nicked, subordinated debtholders lose a lot, and the equity is a zonk.
Position: none
and
One last note: the stocks rally after the downgrade. Probably short covering and other derivative-related activity, but you have to admit it is amazing for the stock to go up when the franchise gets destroyed.
Okay, after yesterday’s piece, there was a fast, opportunistic reaction by S&P. Moody’s action gave them cover to downgrade, and S&P took the ball and ran with it. Now that action gives Moody’s the cover to downgrade freely. There is no longer any reason for them to stay at Aaa. There is no money in it, and their reputation can only take further his from here. Rating agencies are like wolf packs — there is safety in the pack. Don’t be an outsider.
From one of my old RealMoney pieces (12/1/2004):
Many of the conflict-of-interest problems still exist today. One more example: Could the ratings agencies downgrade MBIA (MBI:NYSE) or Ambac (ABK:NYSE) even if they wanted to? MBIA and Ambac rely on their Aaa/AAA ratings to the degree that they would have a difficult time operating without the rating. Much of the bond market relies on enhancement from MBIA and Ambac. The loss of a Aaa/AAA rating would be a jolt to the guaranteed bonds.
In addition, MBIA and Ambac structure their risks according to models provided by the ratings agencies. It is the models of the ratings agencies that tell the guarantors how much equity must stand in front of the debt that is being guaranteed. The ratings agencies are an inherent part of the business model of the financial guarantors. MBIA and Ambac can’t get along without them.
The ratings agencies derive so much income from these major financial guarantors that their own financial well-being would be affected by a downgrade. I’m not saying that either should be rated less than Aaa/AAA, but there is a cliff here, and I am wary of investing near cliffs.
Well, we came to the cliff, and S&P shoved MBIA I(MBI) and Ambac (ABK) to the edge. Now Moody’s can push them over the edge. It should come soon. As with the rating agencies actions on the other financial guarantors, once a guarantor is pushed below AAA, the rating no longer matters as much. There are dedicated “AAA only” investors that care about this, and they will be forced sellers now, or, they will modify their investment guidelines. ![]()
Now, as I have mentioned before, stable value funds will have their difficulties here. Some have positioned themselves as “AAA only” funds, and that led to large holdings of MBIA- and Ambac-guaranteed debt. What they do now is beyond me. I suspect they try to modify their investment guidelines. ![]()
At this point, we have to contemplate life without the old guarantors. They will shrink and disappear, while new guarantors, who are all currently skeptical of doing much more than Municipal bond insurance, will grow, and make it impossible for the old guarantors to return, because they are much better capitalized. Once you lose your AAA as a guarantor, you will rarely get it back.
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With regard to my last point, I'd like to point out that MBI was the 3rd largest originator of bond insurance this year. But if you listen to the headlines, and follow the rating agency dictum, they're not writing any new business, at least not now...not that they're now downgraded.
I liken MBI and ABK to boxers; they're in the ring, fighting the fight, because that's what they do. This is tough fight, and they're taking some blows, but if left to fight a fair fight, they'll finish the bout a winner. Unfortunately, there are forces at work to ensure that they don't finish the fight. So ask yourself, who would want that, and why?
Policyholders are going to be paid; they were never in danger, and MBI and ABK's reputations were fine, that is, until they were trashed in the headlines. So why downgrade them? Why effectively take them out of the fight?
Did someone say there are new entries to the market? How interesting.
California, New York, New Jersey, New York City and now Florida have all decided not to use monoline insurance anymore. That trend is growing rapidly. Those are huge clients.
Soon all 50 states will simply issue bonds on their own full faith and credit just like the US government does.
It's far cheaper that way.
Monolines will default long before states do.
Why does MBI refuse to give an open accounting of what's actually going on in their offshore subsidiaries? What are they trying to hide?
I also agree that many states aren't, at the moment, utilizing the monolines to credit enhance new debt issues, but I suspect you and I disagree as to why. It's not that the states don't want insurance per se, but it's simply too expensive at the moment. The lack of muni defaults has provided for a stable underlying/spur rating, but bond insurance premiums charged by the few players exploiting mkt conditions are exorbitant. As such, the minimal rate differential of AAA vs AA isn't enought to substantiate today's high premiums for credit ehancement. It's easy math and an easy decision, so the states are foregoing bond ins for now. But make no mistake, bond insurance is here to stay, and once the dust settles, and competitions returns to the mkt, premiums will drop, the economics of the deals will work and states will get insurance.
On the topic of muni defaults, I'd offer that you may see a increase in muni defaults. Over the past five yrs, many municipalities obligated themselves to many new projects, and the inherent funding obligations, based on tax revenue...revenue that is now falling. Keep watching the radar. If this happens, it'll reinforce the need/desire for monoline insurance.
Again, bond insurance is here to stay. After all, if it's such a flawed business model, why is everyone rushing to start their own bond insurer?
I'm not sure what you mean by "default" in terms of the monolines, but if you're opining as to their future insolvency, then I would disagee on that count as well, as their financial fundamentals (not media headlines) don't support this popular perception. In fact, based on the numbers, insolvency is highly unlikely.
I'm also not sure what you mean by "offshore". MBI has a number of subsidiaries domiciled outside of the US for the purpose of writing international coverage, which seems logical given the nature of the business. If by "offshore" you're referring to their one Bermuda subsidiary, CapMAC Asia Ltd., then I would offer that it's "accounting", as well as that of the other "offshore" subs, is incorporated and disclosed in the company's financials/10-K. With that said, Channel Re, a Bermuda-based reinsurer, has garnered some headlines where MBI is concerned. MBI is a 17% owner in Channel Re, but it is not a "subsidiary" of MBI, technically speaking, hence the reason MBI can't provide details of it. Unfortunately, that's not what you read in the headlines, let alone hear it in Bill Ackman's rhetoric. If Channel Re is a subsidiary of MBI, then Moody's is a subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway (a 20% owner).
If you look at the ownership of the stock, you will also find interesting things. The insiders and institutional investors holds 113% of the outstanding stocks. It is over 100%!! Most of them just bought the stock in last 6 months and lots of them is for long term investment. As the short sell ratio is 16%, there is only 3% of the outstanding stock in normal investors hands. So, either the insiders and institutional investors are crazy (NOTE: Insiders bought over 20 million shares in last 3 months and a lot of institutional investors are top-tier mutual funds) OR there will be lots of blood from the short-sellers (Just think about how can they come up the 16% short from 3% normal investors' hands)
Will the muni-bond insurance business stay in the future? No one knows. However the fact is: In normal economic environment, the cost of using muni-bond insurer is much lower than issue the muni-bond with low credit rating. As long as the premium is reasonable and the muni-bond insurance can enhence the credit rating, there is no reason for muni-bond insurance disappearing.
There is a better chance of seeing zero than seeing 4 or 5
I mean victim in the literal sense. Wall Street invented the garbage and the ratings agencies were negligent in rating them. Wall Street, as usual, is now trying to profit by buying the garbage they created at pennies on the dollar to re-sell it at a handsome profit.
It has been that way forever. What is different this time is systemic fraud and glaring spotlights.
Vittello is 100% correct -- the rating agencies, who have already proven their competence -- are trying to execute ABK using a firing squad formed in a circle. At minimum, they have again proved they don't have a clue -- just a couple months ago they demanded that ABK and others raise capital, which they promptly did.
So, were the raters incompetent when, A, they first issued the ratings; B, when they demanded more capital; C, or now; or, D, all of the above.
It is the rating agencies whose business will be destroyed in the end. If they were not culpable, they should be joining ABK in attacking (and seeking compensation from) those that misrepresented what was being rated / insured.
btw, if the banks face $300B in losses -- and extending the financial system turmoil -- you would think the smarter banks would contribute capital to ABK to meet the latest rating agency rant.
Don't get me wrong... these are risky shares and I having been building a position only recently writing cash covered puts and trading calls on the few shares I own. I treat them like an unexpiring option.
Also, with regard to recent weakness: on the 10th ABK was pulled from the SP500 index.
The market will take care of itself after the election. Things will then be normal again. Three A ratings will be reestablished, and then you'll know.