Downey's Aversion to Home Equity, Construction Lending: Key to Its Survival 10 comments
June 11, 2008
| about: DWNFQ.PK
Submit
an article to
an article to
-
Font Size:
-
Print
- TweetThis
This article has been deleted at the author's request.
Related Articles
|



















Using fundamental analysis which looks only at book value while ignoring the necessity of due diligence on the booked assets which gets investors into DEEP trouble. It is also this line of thinking combined with a reliance on a chain of third parties, each of which absolves themselves of due diligence responsibility (brokers, rating agencies, etc.) which allowed companies like DSL to underwrite and sell garbage sub-prime, ALT-A and other low quality debt which helped create the current financial crisis. While I empathize with the author on the losses incurred by their long DSL position I also advise him and anyone else to cut the losses here and walk away as DSL will follow IMB, BKUNA, IMH, AHM, NFI, NEW and numerous others to a share price of somewhere between $0 and $2.
Just a few comments on DSL. NPAs are over 13%. LTVs listed are at orgination, so the portfolio would have a much higher current LTV ratio if the V portion was marked to market. Therefore loss severity is poised to increase. Run some scenarios at different severity ratios and determine if the current provision for loan loss is adequate. If not, which I don't think it is, you need to make a reduction in book value. Provision probably needs to more than double to just to cover current NPAs, then make some provision for future deliquencies. There goes some more book value. Then there is the farce of negative amortization. Subtract that accumlated neg. am. interest of $375 million from book value (not to double count with the general provision for loan loss) put this in the specific loan provision bucket rather than the general provision. As soon as these loans recast to fully amortizing, the borrower who couldn't pay even the interest only portion certainly won't be able to cover interest plus amortization of principle. The company is never going to collect that inerest which has been added to book value through earnings. These two adjustments alone get you to a current mid twenties book value. Properly reserved then the book value is is the mid to high teens. Then apply a discount and maybe the stock looks cheap at $4. The problem is pretty soon you run out of regulatory capital and there goes the only "asset" the company has (the deposit base) as the FDIC gets another bank to take over the deposit liability. Finally if you really think this company could survive, look at the on going business, no bank is going to be able to originate exotic products for the foreseeable future so normalized origination volumes will never recover (forget about trough origination volumes). As the performing loans run off so will interest income decline so even if the company could survive a significant discount to book value would be warranted. Cramer missed the complete change in the business model of these formerly conservative lenders, which is why he hasn't said a word about them.