MBIA: Moody's Twists the Knife 15 comments
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Ouch! This news is really bad for MBIA: Moody's has slashed its ratings by even more than it cut the ratings on Ambac. It's a deep cut, with real financial consequences:
The main rating, of MBIA Insurance Corporation, the insurance subsidiary, has fallen all the way to A2 from Aaa. That's a five-notch downgrade, which I think I'm safe in saying is more severe than anybody expected.This ratings action will give certain holders of guaranteed investment contracts the right to terminate the contracts or to require that additional collateral be posted
And there's more:
Yes, those are Bs. Investment-grade Bs, to be sure, but Bs all the same. Both of these constitute six-notch downgrades: obviously keeping newly-raised equity at the holding company level didn't help its ratings at all.Moody's also downgraded the surplus note rating of MBIA Insurance Corporation to Baa1, from Aa2, and the senior debt rating of the holding company, MBIA, Inc. (NYSE: MBI) to Baa2, from Aa3.
These downgrades severely impair MBIA's ability to continue as a going concern. Until now, I've been focused on MBIA's solvency: most crudely, whether or not its assets exceed its liabilities. (They do.) But CEO Jay Brown doesn't just want a solvent company: he wants a company with a future. And it's hard to see where that future lies if the holdco is barely holding on to an investment-grade credit rating. The whole point of insurance companies is that they're ultrasafe: as soon as that safety is called into question, no one wants to do business with them any more.
Until this morning, I thought MBIA's plan to create a new triple-A subsidiary had some hope to it. But now that seems pretty improbable. As Moody's says, in something of a self-fulfilling prophecy, "today's rating action... reflects MBIA's... impaired franchise".
So, MBIA still has money. As Moody's also says:
In numbers:the group remains strongly capitalized, estimated to be consistent with a Aa level rating, and benefits from substantial embedded earnings in its existing insurance portfolio.
But money alone might not be enough. Especially since Moody's is leaving the door open to further downgrades:Moody's has re-estimated expected and stress loss projections on MBIA's insured portfolio, focusing on the company's mortgage-related exposures as well as other sectors of the portfolio potentially vulnerable to deterioration in the current environment. Based on Moody's revised assessment of the risks in MBIA's portfolio, estimated stress-case losses would approximate $13.6 billion at the Aaa threshold and $9.4 billion at the A2 threshold. This compares to Moody's estimate of MBIA's claims paying resources of approximately $15.1 billion... Relative to Moody's 1.3x "target" level for capital adequacy, MBIA is currently $2.6 billion below the Aaa target level and is $2.8 billion above the A2 target level.
At this point, the best-case scenario for MBIA is that credit markets calm down enough for the company to be acquired by someone with credibly deep pockets. (Sounds a bit like Lehman Brothers.) Absent that scenario, which admittedly is pretty improbable, things are likely to be pretty precarious at MBIA for the foreseeable future.The outlook for the ratings is negative, reflecting the material uncertainty about the firm's strategy and the non-negligible likelihood of further adverse developments in its insurance portfolios or operations.
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This article has 15 comments:
They are already doing these, so it will take some time to deleverage their books from uncertainties and rewrite new business again.
It all began when activist hedge fund managers, like Ackman, shorted the monolines. They then intentionally launched highly visible, well-executed propaganda campaigns to trash the companies. Like the rats led by the Pied Piper of Hamlin, the market soon began to buy into the propoganda. Ackman and other were successful in creating a "perception" (albeit a false one) that began to manifest itself into a "reality". The stock price dropped, and Ackman (and fellow manipulators) made a bundle on their short positions. As expected, the companies' reputations fell under fire, and they soon found it hard (although not impossible) to write new business. Yes, they were still writing business, but much less than before. The rating agencies, which had maintained the companies' AAA-ratings, soon fell under scrutiny from the market place. The mkt couldn't understand why its "reality" wasn't that of the rating agencies, as such it deduced the rating agencies were inept. Feeling the pressure, the rating agencies downgraded the monolines, but lacked substantive supporting evidence, so they quoted such things as "financial flexibility" and "franchise value" as reasons for their actions. In other words, they questioned the monolines ability to write new biz. But remember, they were, in fact, still writing business...albeit much less. Given enough time, the Pied Piper-induced "reality" would have, in time, dissipated like an oceanic fog on a sunny day, and the monolines could have henceforth resumed business-as-usual. However, by downgrading the monolines, the rating agencies effectively shut the monolines' doors; they can't write biz without the "AAA". Ironic, isn't it? And so now you find MBI and ABK trying to open new entities via pre-existing subsidiaries. The subsidiaries can be rated "AAA"; they don't need the holding co's rating.
Sure, you'll hear a lot of rhetoric about how monolines are toast. But ask yourself this, if that were the case; if the whole industry was doomed, why did Buffett just enter the market via his newly created monoline, Berkshire Hathaway Assurance (who, by the way, owns 20% of Moodys rating service -- interesting huh?).
Meanwhile, Ackman and is others activist hedgies keep blowing away on their magical flutes, and the market rats follow mindlessly. Ackman is now "out" of his positions on MBI and ABK, so he's trained his sight on FSA, a AAA-rated (for now!) monoline.
I truly hope MBI and ABK survive this. Sure, they made mistakes, and should take their blows accordingly. But their mistakes are not (and should not be) dibilitating. They're good companies, with sound fundamentals and strong leadership, that should be allowed to survive on their own merits and not be destroyed by the selfless, self-centered antics of activist hedge funds.
mythoughts - yes, I collect antique fishing tackle. And I must admit, at this juncture, it has proven to be a better investment than my various holdings in the financial sector.
library.corporate-ir.n...
Thats $129 billion of CDO exposure. $129 billion. No one has booked this stuff to its true value so its difficult to tell what this stuff is really worth (and what these guys will have to pay out in insurance claims). Well, actually, JP Morgan put a $2 price tag on this stuff when they bought Bear Sterns ($150/sh company a few months earlier)? So if JP Morgan says $150 is now worth $2, wouldnt you have to say that $129 billion is now worth, 1.7 billion? Yikes.
Also, be careful not to compare total CDO value, or lack thereof, with the exposure to loss by MBI and/or ABK. Neither company is exposed to the entire CDO, only the senior and super-senior tranches of CDOs. And should those senior or super-senior tranches be breached, MBI and ABK are only obligated to make semi-annual pmts of P&I on the debt, not a lump sum. Of course, all you hear about is the lump sum book-adjustments for market-to-market valuation discounts, which is a non-cash GAAP entry (i.e. in the real world, it means nothing.)
I'm not trying insinuate that neither company will take a hit on their CDO exposure; they will, but I don't believe it will come anywhere close to the dire predictions expounding by (or extrapolated from) the headlines of many "short" writers.
Just my two cents. And admittedly, that's about all it's worth.