Auction Rate Securities: Who's To Blame? 15 comments
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The Wall Street Journal's “UBS to Pay $19 Billion As Auction Mess Hits Wall Street” reports on state attorneys general entering into settlements with banks on auction rate securities [ARS]. UBS (UBS), Merrill Lynch (MER) and Citigroup (C) have agreed to buy back more than $36B,as well as pay fines. The process will start with individuals and charities in October and institutional clients in mid 2010. Over 100,000 individuals were included in the more than $330B sold.
The basis of the complaint is that investors were misled about the safety and liquidity of ARS. While the market was drying up, the banks temporarily stepped in to support the auctions. This gave the illusion of liquidity as the bank tried to unload their inventory through their retail channels. Commissions for the product were increased at many firms, and a Merrill Lynch analyst’s dire warning was enhanced to say only ARS offered “higher returns in exchange for less liquidity.” Apparently, even this subtle warning was buried so deep in Frances Constable’s report that no one found it. Merrill Lynch even categorized ARS as “other cash” on clients’ brokerage statements.
In "Auction Rate Bonds are not Cash Equivalents" and "Retail Investors stuck with Auction Rate Securities", I wrote about how investors should have known that they actually purchased long term bonds. And in "Mechanics of Auction Rate Securities", I explained the convoluted market for ARS almost guarantees liquidity crunches from time to time. So how were so many smart people lolled into complacency? I think the answers are greed and laziness.
Sure, the banks consciously tried to hide the liquidity risks, and the reduced monoline ratings accentuated the problems. But investors should have understood the maturity of the bonds they purchased, and the market for trading them. Retail investors, charities, and small and medium sized business are very lucky to be bailed out. It is difficult to know how large businesses will fare. Those being helped should keep in mind that the only reason they are being helped is the desecration the ARS caused public finance. The attorneys general had little sympathy for investors.
This scandal reminds me of the analysts’ scandal emanating from the dot-com crash. In both cases the investors knew they were being taken for a ride, but greed and laziness prevailed. The only sympathy I have for ARS investors is that the Alan Greenspan era made many desperate for yield. Many people pushed further out on the risk scale then they might have been comfortable with. The banks soothed their fears and they say took advantage of them.
Why did the banks lose and have to buyback the ARS, while they came off relatively unscathed in the dot-com bust? The difference here is that ARS trade in a captive market. When I bought municipal bond unit trusts in the 1980’s, I knew that was also a captive market. But no one told me it was just like cash. Captive markets present disclosure risks to their sponsors.
Disclosures: Author is long C and UBS
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This article has 15 comments:
> jack
If the Chase wants to be a bank it shouldn’t have sales people from Case Securities sit right next to my regular relationship manager and have that person have access to my Chase bank accounts to see how he can help me take money out of my case MM account and put it into AUS. I know of other Chase customers who were put into AUS as interchangeable vehicle for Chase MM or CD accounts. There was no disclosure, just the opposite. Sounds like somebody was making more money on the AUS, so that was being pushed.
I wonder why the others are forced to buy back the AUS and not Chase so far. As soon as the liquidity evaporated in AUS, the Chase thieves circled the wagons, it was almost comical, announced they couldn’t communicate about AUS by email only phone – it was pretty sad. As much as I don't like lawyers and AG Cuomo (or his father) I find that Chase’s behavior throughout the AUS saga was and still is very shabby and if it takes Cuomo to slap them around, unfortunately, so be it. I hope Chase is somehow not protected by the Fed for being the “good guys” on Bear. Nothing would surprise me anymore.
DougM – what that a bank, can you tell me please which institution it was?
hooboy – you know, life’s busy and here’s a Chase employee… I was told the credit was insured munis, as to the liquidity he assured me that it was fine. In hindsight of course I’d act differently. Still this does not excuse their nondisclosure and as I wrote above their intermingling of Chase Bank and Chase Securities.
How could investor know that investor was buying the long term bond when no prospectuses were offered and the only information investor could rely upon were:
words of their brokers
published materials by brokerage companies telling them that the investment was "Cash Alternative"?
I appreciate your Monday Quarterbacking, but I see no substance in your post whatsoever.
There is a poll going on if you are incompetent or just enjoy your pontifications, stay tuned, we'll know by the end of the day from investors.
nothingcontroversial.c...
Have a nice day and do me a favor, do some due diligence before you write your next "well informed" opinion.
P.S. when you get the proof about the alleged positions of AG's we, the investors, are in the constant contacts with - please feel free to post them here for all to see how right you were.
All - this will be a very long wait, bring your pop corn and folding chairs.
After the auctions started failing and I asked for a prospectus, my local office didn't have one and it took two weeks for the main office to get me a copy. And a copy it was - 200 pages off a copy machine. Not even a normal prospectus.
Part of the blame for this needs to be placed on the SEC, IMO. In 2006 when they examined ARS auction fraud and fined a number of brokerages, they knew of the "auction" problems and the risks but still chose to allow the brokerages to sell these without providing any written disclaimers, prospectus etc. However, this doesn't excuse the fraud perpetrated by the brokerages in selling these as "money market equivalents", "totally liquid", etc. when they knew this wasn't true.
Edwards/Wachovia still hasn't announced any redemption and I'm still waiting for liquidity in my "totally liquid" SLARs.
Willi
this is cash equiv and totally secure from a FA I have known for years.
What you wrote sounds like you have only heard about one side.
Your side! Please research more and write it over.
invites more bankers to settle with investors he has no sympathy for, according to your fairy tale.
For your reading pleasure:
www.bloomberg.com/apps...
I hope you don't have anything against real journalists who do their due diligence.
His office represents the PEOPLE (us)
As far as penalty rates are concerned,
Michael, some of the current penalty rates are LOWER than they were prior to Feb 13th. Andrew Cuomo returns confidence into the market place and billions of dollars as well. When I get my money back, I'll buy real estate FOR CASH and us, the redeemed investors, will stop the slide of the housing market.
All well what ends well and I glad you taking this lesson in ARS in stride.
Pimco is not qualified to handle the nation’s financial assets….they continue to hold their own customers prisoner in Auction Rate Preferred Securities – and have not been subjected to regulator scrutiny of these fraudulent instruments Pimco created, packaged and sold. If Pimco cannot deal honestly and openly with its existing customers on ARPS they cannot be entrusted with the national bailout.