Okay. Let's leave no room for ambiguity here. The Treasury's draft plan for saving the world is breathtakingly awful. It would give the Secretary of the Treasury entirely unchecked discretion over up to 700B dollars. Even that "limit" has a loophole big enough that you could drive a truck through it, so the Secretary could in effect spend up to 1.8T dollars, right up to the newly raised Federal debt ceiling, without further Congressional action. This act would be such a wholesale delegation of the power of the purse that I wonder whether it is even constitutional. Of course, the act explicitly puts the Secretary's actions beyond any judicial review, so perhaps questions of legality or constitutionality are merely academic. (Paul Campos shares these concerns.)
As Paul Krugman has pointed out, for the plan to help insolvent institutions, the Treasury would have to overpay for these assets. Yves Smith unearths an account that Secretary Paulson has acknowledged this fact in private, although he won't cop to it on the Sunday talk shows. It is almost old-fashioned to raise questions about whether or not the former Wall Street banker will offer sweetheart deals to his industry (an industry that has harmed the American economy more deeply than most people realize). Just as big lies boldly asserted can trump plausible untruths nervously defended, overt corruption on a massive scale (but "in the public interest") might leave a lot of naysayers dumbstruck. It becomes the way we do business. Of course, none of Dean Baker's progressive conditions, none of Brad DeLong's dealbreakers, not even my plea for a little transparency are incorporated into the proposal.
The oldest technique for the usurpation of power by the executive from the legislative is the manufacture of a state of emergency. That is not to say the present financial crisis is not actually an emergency. But the how the crisis is understood by legislators and the range of options by which it might be addressed have been set by Messrs Paulson and Bernanke. They have presented a single option, one more radical than seemed reasonable even at the height of the depression. (ht Brad DeLong)
It is worth noting that Paulson and Bernanke have thus far proven themselves to be capable technocrats. (Although, as Dean Baker points out, they've been awful prognosticators.) There's a lot to disagree with in how the dynamic duo have handled the torrent of crises that began last August. But they have acted aggressively and creatively, and in their ad hoc interventions so far, they've gone to some lengths to create upside for taxpayers and to squeeze miscreants at least a bit. Until reading the text of the Treasury's proposal and stewing on it overnight, I was inclined not to fight too hard. I saw things as I'm sure legislators see things: Something must be done, a megabailout is disagreeable and imperfect, but it's something that we can do quickly, and it's what our experts, whom we trust, recommend. Let's fiddle at the margins to get it done as best we can.
But the proposed text flipped a switch in my brain. This is not, as Senator Schumer put it, "a good foundation of a plan that can stabilize markets quickly”. It is a raw arrogation of power. My trust, my willingness to extend the benefit of the doubt, has evaporated.
This is overreach. This is bad.
For a contrary view, check out the always thoughtful knzn. I disagree pretty strongly, but he's always worth reading.
FD: I am short broad stock indices, which seem to like the prospect of a bailout, so opposing the plan might seem self-interested. But I am longer precious metals and I'm short long-maturity Treasuries. My guess (and of course it is only a guess) is that those positions would do well under the plan.