According to a September 25, 2008 press release from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC Seeks More Transparent Disclosure for Investors"), pundits will gather in Washington, D.C. on October 8 to wax poetic about transparency. Two panels will convene to address "data, technology, and processes that companies and other filers use in satisfying their SEC disclosure obligations" as well as "how the SEC could better organize and operate its disclosure system so that companies enjoy efficiencies and investors have better access to high-quality information."
While I am in favor of "sufficient" disclosure to inform shareholders, plan participants and other interested parties, a critical question remains. What exact type of disclosure can really make a difference? I vote for information about process and accountability. Otherwise, financial statement users end up with snapshot assessments of mandated metrics. While these numbers could be potentially helpful, they are made less so without an understanding as to how they are derived, why they change and the extent to which an organization is exposed to economic danger. A few of the countless questions on the minds of inquiring individuals are shown below. (This is by no means an exhaustive list.)
- Who has the authority to effect change for all things financial management?
- Who oversees authorized persons and the latitude they enjoy to make decisions?
- How are risk drivers identified, measured and managed on an ongoing basis?
- What creates "stop loss" threshholds?
- How are functional risk managers compensated?
As reported by CNN.com, JP Morgan Chase (JPM) has just purchased $307 billion in assets from Washington Mutual (WM) in what is described as "the biggest bank failure in history." Serious stuff indeed, but would more detailed financials have helped? We know that the large thrift ushered in a new chief risk officer ("WaMu replaces its chief risk officer," April 29, 2008) to "help steer the nation's largest savings and loan through the fallout of the mortgage and credit crises."
The 2007 Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for Washington Mutual, Inc. is rich with information about risk management, credit risk management, liquidity risk and capital management, market risk management, operational risk management and "Factors That May Affect Future Results." Page 5 of said document states that an evaluation of the Company's disclosure controls and procedures allows the "Company's Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer" to conclude that, "as of the end of such period, the Company's disclosure controls and procedures are effective in recording, processing, summarizing and reporting, on a timely basis, information required to be disclosed by the Company..."
A company press release dated July 22, 2008 informs the public of actions taken by the Company to build up its reserves and mitigate risk. See "WaMu Reports Significant Build-Up of Reserves Contributing to Second Quarter Net Loss of $3.3 Billion." The bank's website provides a slide presentation about credit risk management also dated July 22, 2008. It details all sorts of information about the loan portfolio, including allowances for loan losses.
According to Wall Street Journal reporters Robin Sidel, David Enrich and Dan Fitzpatrick, a flood of deposit withdrawals forced the demise of this Seattle based financial house. (See "WaMu is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan In Largest Failure in U.S. Banking History," September 26, 2008).
Question of the Day: What disclosures could have helped shareholders (including pension plans) to know how bad it could get and in what time?