6 Emergency Measures to Prevent a Banking Meltdown

“We’re going to see five hedge funds fail for every bank, maybe more,”

A moment of reckoning for many hedge funds may come at the end of this month, when their exposure to credit default swaps must be “marked to market” to reflect the increased obligations at the end of the third quarter.

Olivant, the investment group run by former Abbey boss Luqman Arnold, revealed last week that its 2.8% stake in UBS was held through an account at Lehman (LEH) in London which the firm’s administrators are refusing to release.

Oct. 3 (Bloomberg) — Maverick Capital Ltd., Greenlight Capital LLC and The Children’s Investment Fund Management LLP fell more than 12 percent in September as stock hedge funds posted record monthly losses and braced for client defections. Lee Ainslie’s Maverick Capital declined 19.5 percent and Greenlight Capital, run by David Einhorn, was down 12.8 percent, according to investors in the New York-based funds. Children’s Investment, overseen by Chris Hohn in London, fell 15 percent, based on a preliminary estimate.

Stock hedge funds fell an average of 8.6 percent in September, the biggest one-month loss since Hedge Fund Research Inc. began collecting data in 1990. While that was better than the 12 percent decline by the MSCI World Index, a benchmark for global stocks, industry analysts expect investors to increase their requests to pull money from funds. The poor performance of certain hedge funds will have repercussions in the allocation processes, and it may lead to substantial shifts between hedge-funds strategies and between hedge funds.”

Other managers with above-average losses for the month included Stephen Mandel, whose main Lone Cypress fund in
Greenwich, Connecticut, fell 14.7 percent. New York-based Third Point LLC, run by Daniel Loeb, dropped 11 percent. Officials for the hedge funds declined to comment or didn’t return calls.

Defensive Doesn’t Work

Funds in all investment categories fell 6.9 percent in September, according to Hedge Fund Research’s Global Hedge Fund Index. That’s the worst month for the $1.9 trillion industry since August 1998, when the Russian debt default triggered the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management LP.

Key Problems:

• LIBOR bid only, no offer.
• Commercial paper market shut down, little trading and no issuance.
• Corporations have no access to long or short term credit markets — hence they face massive rollover problems.
• Brokers are increasingly not dealing with each other.
• Even the inter-bank market is ceasing up

The Treasury Tarp plan is an irrelevance if we are at a major funding crisis.

We are indeed at the cardiac arrest stage and at risk of the mother of all bank and non-bank runs as:

-The run on the shadow banking system is accelerating as: even the surviving major broker dealers (Morgan Stanley (MS) and Goldman Sachs (GS)) are under severe pressure Morgan losing over a third of its hedge funds clients); the run on hedge funds is accelerating via massive redemptions and a roll-off of their overnight repo lines; the money market funds are experiencing further withdrawals in spite of government blanket guarantee.

-A silent run on the commercial banks is underway. In Q2 of 2008 the FDIC reported $4462bn insured domestic deposits out of $7036bn total domestic deposits; thus, only 63% of domestic deposits are insured. Thus $ 2574bn of deposits were not insured. Given the risk that many banks – small, regional and national – may go bust (as even large ones such as WaMu (WM) and Wachovia (WB) went recently bust) there is now a silent run on parts of the banking system. Deposit insurance formally covers only deposits up to $100000. Thus any individual, small or large business and/or foreign investor or financial institution with more than $100000 in a FDIC insured bank is now legitimately concerned about the safety of its deposits. Even if as likely the deposit insurance limit will be temporarily raised to $250000 by Congress there will still be a whopping $1.9 trillion of uninsured deposits (or 73% of total deposits); thus, a huge mass of uninsured deposits will remain at risk as even small businesses have usually more than $250K of cash while medium sized and large firms as well as any domestic and foreign financial institution or investor with exposure to US banks has average exposure in the millions of dollars. Particularly at risk are the cross border mostly short term interbank lines of US banks with their foreign counterparties that are estimated to be close to $800 billion.

-A run on the short term liabilities of the corporate sector is also underway as the commercial paper market has effectively shut down with little trading and no issuance or rollover of such debt while corporations have no access to long or short term credit markets and they are therefore facing massive rollover problems (over $500 billion of rollover of maturing debts in the next 12 months). Indeed, the market for commercial paper plummeted $94.9 billion to $1.6 trillion for the week ended Oct. 1 (and down over $200 billion in the last three weeks). Especially banks and insurers were unable to find buyers for the short-term debt: financial paper accounted for most of the decline, plunging $64.9 billion, or 8.7 percent in the last week; but now even non-financial corporations are also experiencing a severe roll-off in the CP market. Discount rates for investment-grade non-financial commercial paper spiked to 599bp for 60 day maturities. More companies are borrowing against or tapping their revolving credit lines. This is largely due to the dislocation caused in the money markets by the failure of Lehman and the subsequent withdrawals from money market funds, which are some of the biggest providers of liquidity in the short term funding/commercial paper. Even the largest corporations are at severe stress: AT&T (T) last week was forced to rely on overnight funding for its treasury operations, as lenders were unwilling to provide more long term financing due to fears in money market funds over investor redemption. The CEO said “It’s loosened up a bit, but it’s day-to-day right now. I mean literally it’s day-to-day in terms of what our access to the capital markets looks like,’’ Things are much worse for non-investment grade corporations and for small and medium sized businesses. As reported today by Bloomberg: Almost 100 U.S. corporate treasurers gathered for an emergency conference call yesterday to warn each other that banks are using any excuse to charge
more to renew lines of credit.

-The money markets and interbank markets have shut down as - despite the Senate passing the bail-out bill - yesterday USD Overnight Libor was still at 268bp after reaching an all-time high of 6.88%; the USD 3m Libor-OIS spread widened to record 270 basis points; EUR 3m LIBOR-OIS spread is at record 130bp; the TED spread is at record 360bps (TED was 11bps one month ago); Money and credit markets are dysfunctional also in emerging markets ; and agency bond spreads are also at highs again.

So we are now facing:

- a silent run on the huge mass of uninsured deposits of the banking system and even a run on some insured deposits are small depositors are scared;

- a run on most of the shadow banking system: over 300 non bank mortgage lenders are now bust; the SIVs and conduits are now all bust; the five major brokers dealers are now bust (Bear and Lehman) or still under severe stress even after they have been converted into banks (Merrill, Morgan, Goldman); a run on money market funds restrained only by a blanket government guarantee; a serious run on hedge funds; a looming refinancing crisis for private equity firms and LBOs);

- a run on the short term liabilities of the corporate sector as the commercial paper market has totally frozen (and experiencing a roll-off) while access to medium terms and long term financings for corporations is frozen at a time when hundreds of billions of dollars of maturing debts need to be rolled over;

- a total seizure of the interbank and money markets.

This is indeed a cardiac arrest for the shadow and non-shadow banking system and for the system of financing of the corporate sector. The shutdown of financing for the corporate system is particularly scary: solvent but illiquid corporations that cannot roll over their maturing debt may now face massive defaults due to this illiquidity. And if the financing of the corporate sectors shuts down and remains
shut down the risk of an economic collapse similar to the Great Depression becomes highly likely.

So what needs to be done?

Even several hundreds of billion dollars in emergency liquidity support to the financial system by the Fed and other central banks in the last week alone have not been enough to stop the seizure of liquidity in interbank markets and the shut down of financing for the corporate sector as counter-party risk is now extreme (no one trusts any more in this crisis of confidence even the most reputable and trustworthy financial and corporate counter-parties).

Thus, emergency times where we are at risk of a systemic meltdown require emergency measures. These include the following six ideas, which are also the key points to be listening for as potential catalysts for sudden market surges to the upside:

-A temporary six-month blanket guarantee on all US deposits (not just those below $250k) combined with a rapid triage between insolvent banks that should be quickly closed and distressed but solvent – conditional on liquidity and capital injections – banks that should be rescued. To stop the silent run on the banking system you need now such a blanket guarantee on all (insured and uninsured) deposit regardless of their size. To minimize lender moral hazard from such action the blanket guarantee needs to be followed by a very rapid triage and shut-down of insolvent institutions to prevent such institutions from gambling for redemption, i.e. acquiring more deposits and making even more risky loans. To limit such moral hazard distortions one can also limit the extended guarantee only to current deposits: i.e. any new deposit above a $100k limit will not be insured.

- Extension of the emergency liquidity support of the Fed (both TSLF and PDCF) to a broader range of institutions in the shadow banking system, especially those directly providing credit to the corporate sector. The TSLF and PDCF are already available to some non banks (the broker dealers that are primary dealers of the Fed). But two of such broker dealers are gone (Bear and Lehman) and the other three are under stress. Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, the other primary dealers and the banks that have access to the TSLF and PDCF (and discount window) have massively used these facilities in the last few weeks; but they are hoarding such liquidity and not re-lending it to other banks, to the thousands of the other members of the shadow banking system and to the corporate sector as they need such liquidity and don’t trust any counter-party. Thus the transmission mechanism of credit policy (the non-traditional Fed liquidity lines) is completely shut down now.

- Some members of the shadow banking system will not receive such liquidity support of the Fed (hedge funds and private equity funds) as – fairly or unfairly - there is no political sympathy for such institutions. This means that the demise of hundreds – and possibly thousands – of hedge funds will occur as redemptions and roll off of overnight repo financing for leveraged investments will cause a massive liquidity – and thus solvency – crisis for such institutions. If hundreds of smaller hedge funds collapse the systemic consequences would be limited (even if in the aggregate hedge funds provide significant financing to the corporate sector). If larger and systemically important hedge funds were at risk of failing the Fed will have to engineer a massive private sector bail-in of such hedge funds (a larger scale rescue a la LTCM) where the prime brokers of such funds are forced to maintain repo exposure to such funds rather than be allowed to shut off such exposure. This is a radical suggestion but the alternative of a Fed liquidity bailout of systemically important hedge fund is not politically feasible given the little sympathy that such funds enjoy in Congress. The refinancing crisis of private equity firms and their LBOs is a longer fuse run as covenant-lite clause and PIK toggles will postpone such financing crisis but make the harder the fall as zombie corporations that postpone restructuring will have a bigger collapse once the financing crisis eventually occurs. But since many of these LBOs should have never occurred in the first place any financing crisis for such buy-outs should be dealt with in bankruptcy court; no public funds should be used to rescue such LBOs and the reckless private equity firms that designed such schemes.

- Direct lending to the business sector from the Fed via extension of the PDCF and TSLF to the non financial corporate sector. This could include Fed purchases of commercial paper from corporations and other forms of financing of the short term liabilities of the Administration to small businesses secured in appropriate ways. Given the collapse of the corporate CP market and the banking system reluctance to provide loans to the corporate sector (credits lines are being shut down) the only alternative to the Fed becoming directly the biggest emergency bank for the corporate sector would be to force the banking system to maintain its exposure to the corporate sector, possibly in exchange for further Fed provision of liquidity to the banking system. The former option may be better than the latter to deal with the looming illiquidity of the corporate sector.

- Have a coordinated 100bps reduction in policy rates by all major advanced economies central bank and, possibly, even some emerging market economies central banks. While this policy rates may not directly resolve the insolvency issues in financial markets and in the corporate sector it may ease liquidity pressures and it would signal that global policy makers are serious about addressing together this most extreme liquidity and financial crisis. Also, some of the radical policy actions that have been suggested here for the US will most likely need to be undertaken also by European policy makers as the liquidity and credit crisis is now becoming global.
- Radically redesign the Treasury TARP rescue plan – possibly after its necessary approval Monday - to make it effective, efficient and fair. This implies that in addition to a more limited government purchase of toxic assets, you need: a) an emergency triage between insolvent and illiquid and under-capitalized but solvent banks should be made; b) a sharp reduction of the mortgage debt burden of the insolvent household sector; c) and a recapitalization of solvent banks to be done via public injection of preferred shares and matching contributions by current shareholders of the banks. Financial markets have already voted no to this plan (that is flawed in its current form) yesterday when after its passage in the Senate US and global equity markets plunged another 4% while money markets and credit markets seized up even further.

Bottom Line Conclusion:
This credit crisis is both a crisis of confidence and illiquidity and a crisis of credit and solvency. But while the insolvent institutions should go bust we have now reached a point where many financial institutions and now non financial firms may become insolvent because of pure illiquidity; and this would lead to an extremely severe economic contraction similar to an economic depression rather than a mild recession. At this point the US, the advanced economies (and now likely even some emerging market economies) will experience an ugly recession and an ugly financial and banking crisis regardless of what we do from now on. What radical policy action can only do is preventing what will now be an ugly and nasty two-year recession and financial crisis from turning into a systemic meltdown and a decade long economic depression.

Comments

[JasonC:]

On the hedge funds losing their liquidity, cry me a river and let them all fail. They tried to smash the entire financial system of the modern world with their reckless end of the world trading, let them end instead.

The banks are another matter. The Fed should simply direct the open market desk to wade in as a capitalist and buy all the financial name paper yielding over 10%, currently being dumped on the secondary market. Pay for it all with newly created dollars, and keep doing it until spreads narrow. If no private capital is willing to take the risk of standing ahead of bank depositers, let the Fed take that risk and make it good at the same time.

2008 Oct 06 08:06 PM