Alfred Little

Long/short equity, hedge fund manager
Alfred Little
Long/short equity, hedge fund manager
Contributor since: 2010
Company: A*L
Incredible work. I am a happy subscriber!
Can you address the failure of VB-111 in Mullerian cancer discussed by another author, especially the safety concerns:
http://bit.ly/1R0brBd
For what its worth, my researchers visited each Jinpan factory last year and found them all to be active with satisfied workers who attested to the growth and stability of the business. I'm long a small amount of JST.
Wonderful report. I am long JST too
This article includes multiple reasons why JRJC should be delisted and banned from ever trading in the U.S. again. I imagine JRJC insiders are secretly dumping as much stock as they can and using the proceeds to buy safe houses in Cali they can abscond to.
Hainan would certainly be a great place to have a lot of EVs available for tourists. They'd need some significant range improvement or charging stations to let you wander this 33k sq km island that's a little larger than the state of Massachusetts. Huge potential
Thanks Art. The incentives are certainly good. I think if you read between the lines, the provincial and municipal official visit to the Hainan Wanning site is the kind way of warning that KNDI had better get the factory built soon or risk losing the incentives.
Hi Art. To clear this up, KNDI really needs to explain the $50M of equipment purchased last year for the Hainan factory that is stalled in construction. The equipment purchase raised eyebrows at the time and consumed a huge amount of cash that could have been deployed to grow sales which have lagged guidance. Today, the equipment purchases seem like a big mistake. What can KNDI do about this?
My own research has found little progress on the Hainan Wanning new factory construction site other than basic concrete footers built in 2014. Few workers were present in January. None in March. The site looked unchanged over first 3 months of 2015 and a local claimed that the construction had been halted.
Based on these observations, the large advance purchases of equipment begin to look questionable. This is something KNDI shareholders should press management to address. Disclosure: I have no position
HK comps' market caps are in HK Dollars, so divide by 7.75 to get USD. Otherwise great report.
Older, care to comment on the arrest of the Chairman and the suspension of FAB's Chinese business?
Good question for IR - Jinong appears to running at capacity, so how will it fulfill those orders?
Piggy - Can you tell more about your search for stores?
Short sellers decrease their holdings for lots of reasons, including high borrowing costs and buy-ins by their brokers.
Hey Ferdinando, could you provide any actual analysis of any of Geo's evidence and allegations?
CGA cut to Sell by Crystal Equity Research, the only analyst covering the stock

http://bit.ly/1yaOG43

CGA – Change in rating. Our rating of China Green Agriculture is changed to Sell from Buy. Since the collapse of valuations for small-cap, China-based companies, CGA has traded generally downward from a peak stock price in early 2010. Since taking profits during that period, we have been following a strategy of trading the stock on technical indicators in order to accumulate gains that would improve total return on our remaining shares. Our view has changed in recent weeks as we have become concerned the management team has been less than forthcoming regarding the Company’s fundamental performance.

The Company recently announced investor events in Xian and Beijing. While the announcement provided only a two-week preparation time, we made arrangements for a representative to attend the Beijing event. Indeed, this is the first investor event ever held by a company in our coverage universe where we did not have at least a three-month notice of the date. Our attempts to register for the event were not acknowledged. We are aware of others that attempted to attend the event, but were also unable to register. Indeed, prior to the investor event announcement, we had made numerous attempts to contact the Company by e-mail and telephone. None of our messages were answered. We asked a senior executive of another public China company to contact China Green Agriculture with a reference for Crystal Equity Research and we presented the Company’s legal representation in the U.S. with details of our questions. None of these overtures were acknowledged, despite the U.S. attorney’s assurances that our questions would be answered.

When we were unable to register for the investor event, we had again contact the Company’s attorney by e-mail and by phone. We received a receipt for the e-mail and our call was answered by the attorney, who then claimed she could not understand the conversation as soon as we identified Crystal Equity Research. Finally, after both investor events were over, we received an e-mail message from China Green Agriculture’s investor relations representative, indicating that it was too late to register for the events. The message provided evidence that all of our messages were more than likely received and that no technical problem existed to prevent China Green Agriculture personnel from answering our questions or giving our agent access to the investor event.

The sequence of messages as well as the conduct of the U.S. attorney and investor relations representative, have given rise to suspicion that the investor events were staged. We suspect that China Green Agriculture management has deliberately not responded to questions and that they did not intend to allow legitimate analysts to attend the events.

The appearance of misconduct casts a different light on other corporate actions, namely the significant investment in a marketing program that has required over $100 million dollars in cash investment over the past three years. Granted the number of participating retail store has increased dramatically to over 26,000 at the end of the last fiscal year. Yet the expenditure is significant on a per store basis given costs of signage and displays in China. If the investment leads to higher sales in the long term, then it is easily justified. However, the lack of transparency around the program and the change in accounting treatment now look deceptive. The marketing program is organized in such a way that it could be easily compromised by fraudulent retailers or unethical employees.

Given that it appears the Company’s legal representation may be complicit in management’s efforts to avoid investor scrutiny, we also have less confidence in the Company’s financial reports. The reclassification of the marketing program assets from PP&E to deferred revenue was overlooked previously as an understandable mistake. Now we have concerns that the auditor could be more a conspirator as well. That casts new doubt on the integrity of the financial reports

While we had been managing our position in CGA using technical analysis and paid only tangential attention to fundamental developments over the past couple of years, we find unacceptable the apparent lack of respect for legitimate investor inquiry. In our view, it is preferable to exit CGA with a loss than continue to hold a potentially toxic asset in the portfolio. We recommend divesting of this position as after the dividend record date of October 31st has passed. We note that the stock could appreciate in value if the broader market turns more favorably toward small-capitalization companies. Periods of trading strength would be preferable timing for position liquidation.
Only analyst following CGA cuts rating to Sell, says management wouldn't answer her questions or allow her to attend investor days, which she thinks may have been staged:
http://bit.ly/1yaOG43
CGA – Change in rating. Our rating of China Green Agriculture is changed to Sell from Buy. Since the collapse of valuations for small-cap, China-based companies, CGA has traded generally downward from a peak stock price in early 2010. Since taking profits during that period, we have been following a strategy of trading the stock on technical indicators in order to accumulate gains that would improve total return on our remaining shares. Our view has changed in recent weeks as we have become concerned the management team has been less than forthcoming regarding the Company’s fundamental performance.
The Company recently announced investor events in Xian and Beijing. While the announcement provided only a two-week preparation time, we made arrangements for a representative to attend the Beijing event. Indeed, this is the first investor event ever held by a company in our coverage universe where we did not have at least a three-month notice of the date. Our attempts to register for the event were not acknowledged. We are aware of others that attempted to attend the event, but were also unable to register. Indeed, prior to the investor event announcement, we had made numerous attempts to contact the Company by e-mail and telephone. None of our messages were answered. We asked a senior executive of another public China company to contact China Green Agriculture with a reference for Crystal Equity Research and we presented the Company’s legal representation in the U.S. with details of our questions. None of these overtures were acknowledged, despite the U.S. attorney’s assurances that our questions would be answered.
When we were unable to register for the investor event, we had again contact the Company’s attorney by e-mail and by phone. We received a receipt for the e-mail and our call was answered by the attorney, who then claimed she could not understand the conversation as soon as we identified Crystal Equity Research. Finally, after both investor events were over, we received an e-mail message from China Green Agriculture’s investor relations representative, indicating that it was too late to register for the events. The message provided evidence that all of our messages were more than likely received and that no technical problem existed to prevent China Green Agriculture personnel from answering our questions or giving our agent access to the investor event.
The sequence of messages as well as the conduct of the U.S. attorney and investor relations representative, have given rise to suspicion that the investor events were staged. We suspect that China Green Agriculture management has deliberately not responded to questions and that they did not intend to allow legitimate analysts to attend the events.
The appearance of misconduct casts a different light on other corporate actions, namely the significant investment in a marketing program that has required over $100 million dollars in cash investment over the past three years. Granted the number of participating retail store has increased dramatically to over 26,000 at the end of the last fiscal year. Yet the expenditure is significant on a per store basis given costs of signage and displays in China. If the investment leads to higher sales in the long term, then it is easily justified. However, the lack of transparency around the program and the change in accounting treatment now look deceptive. The marketing program is organized in such a way that it could be easily compromised by fraudulent retailers or unethical employees.
Given that it appears the Company’s legal representation may be complicit in management’s efforts to avoid investor scrutiny, we also have less confidence in the Company’s financial reports. The reclassification of the marketing program assets from PP&E to deferred revenue was overlooked previously as an understandable mistake. Now we have concerns that the auditor could be more a conspirator as well. That casts new doubt on the integrity of the financial reports
While we had been managing our position in CGA using technical analysis and paid only tangential attention to fundamental developments over the past couple of years, we find unacceptable the apparent lack of respect for legitimate investor inquiry. In our view, it is preferable to exit CGA with a loss than continue to hold a potentially toxic asset in the portfolio. We recommend divesting of this position as after the dividend record date of October 31st has passed. We note that the stock could appreciate in value if the broader market turns more favorably toward small-capitalization companies. Periods of trading strength would be preferable timing for position liquidation.
Piggy - the link Geo provided works just fine, as anyone can see:
http://bit.ly/1rITckt;query=
齐红莉:来自商洛的美术设计师

(人物小档案:齐红莉,籍贯陕西商洛,毕业于西...
问:你出生在商洛,小学、初中、高中都是在老家...
齐红莉:对,我从小就在丹江边长大,对那里的一...

问:现在的城市生活是你小时候想要的吗,哪些是...
齐红莉:总的来说,还好吧。
高中的时候语文老师经常跟我们说,山上的草比山...

问:你从小就喜欢美术,喜欢画画,继而高中毕业...
齐红莉:哈哈。其实不是那样的原因。我高中的时...

问:毕业11年,回顾自己走过的路,你有什么感触?
齐红莉:说实话,我现在经常还在想:如果我当时...
问:作为一名资深的平面设计人员,你是如何理解...
齐红莉:资深真的不敢当,我觉得自己离资深平面...

问:到鼎天集团工作后,那些设计工作让你曾经赶...
齐红莉:我觉得有难度的工作其实还挺多的。记得...
2009年3月份,我调到济农这边做平面设计工...
在自己比较满意的工作里,有当时自己做为美工设...
Transparency? Debra Fiakas, the only analyst who covers the stock, says CGA excluded her from attending the investor days: http://bit.ly/1rfs5h5
Piggy - According to CGA's SEC filings, Tianjuyuan is owned by Gufeng and together they have 8 facilities all located in the same complex (you can see all the facilities in the satellite view of Gufeng in Geo's report.) Similarly Jinong has 2 facilities located in the same complex in Xi'an, also visible in the satellite view in Geo's report.
CGA reports in SEC filings it has factories at Jinong (2 facilities in one complex) and Gufeng (8 facilities in one complex). The transcript shows that the guard said that the Jinong factory is the only one in Shanxi province. CGA has never disclosed any other Jinong or Gufeng factories. So I conclude that the investigators filmed the right place.
Good point Waldo - the 8-K shows the Chairman signed an SPA that sets an unspecified future closing date to be determined by both parties. Until a form 4 is filed, assume the Chairman hasn't paid. Even if a form 4 is filed, who knows if he really paid.
KGJI is a decent company. CGA has and always has been a joke.
Older - Any guess as to how many Media kiosks there really are? 400,000 Beijing membership cardholders, using how many Media kiosks?
Until I exposed that FAB had not deployed 3,954 media kiosks in Beijing (which has now been confirmed by FTI), I am certain that nearly every FAB investor was under the impression that "5c" and "5c Intelligent Media Kiosk" and "media kiosk" all meant the same thing. It is pretty clear to anyone who reviews FAB's historical filings. So just how few "media kiosks" are there in Beijing? FAB won't say.
I think Ms. Wang could use the recorded interviews of herself in FAB's office, doing FAB's work as director of franchisee sales, to defend the claim that she was never an employee of FAB. She'd make a great whistleblower!
First of all, if you have a mandarin/english speaking friend, I would welcome them to check the translation. My team and I go to great lengths to get them right. Yes, my translator has a habit of manually saving his work ever 5 minutes or so, inflating the number of revisions. Earlier this year I hired a translator with a masters degree but his work still requires a true native english speaker to proof and consult to get the proper english sense/meaning of some of the Chinese colloquial or idiomatic phrases. I welcome anyone to challenge my translations. To date, no one has found any material errors in them.
To answer your concerns regarding the quality of the interviews, the most important point I stress to my investigators is to try to avoid posing leading questions to the "witness." I want these interviews to stand up in court. I want the interviewee's answers to be clear. Of course interviewees cannot be trusted to be honest, hence I like to conduct multiple interviews of different people, with potentially different points of view. Often the results will vary (the number of Beijing media kiosks reported by the couple dozen people interviewed varied from just 30-40 to as many as 1400. But no one said 4,000!) My investigators are also trained to ask the same question, repeatedly, in different ways, during the course of the interview and follow up interview (when possible) to see if the answers match.
Thank you for your interest in the quality of these reports.
I will soon publish my interviews of her, which she can use to defend herself against FAB's unscrupulous charges. I'd be happy to assist her to file a whistleblower complaint to the SEC against her employer.
Obviously you have a lot of technical skill analyzing the metadata of the documents. Beyond providing my assurances that all my documents are legitimate and translated as accurately as possible, I can say that:
1) Translators are non-native English speakers.
2) They frequently start/stop/save their work as they translate, generative dozens of revisions.
3) Following translation the document is further reviewed by others, including myself, to further improve the translation for native english speakers to comprehend.
4) The final versions are then formatted to match each other (font, layout), since they were sometimes prepared by different translators.
5) They were shared and sometime re-shared with different regulators and with FAB's counsel
6) The most recent versions were then reassembled together to publish this week.
The versions the public has today are the most accurate available at this time. If anyone knows a good Chinese translator they are welcome to check them. I'd be more than happy to correct any errors.
Older is right about the website. But Fabgou.com looks like another fraud. Scroll to the very bottom and try to click the 4 buttons, which supposedly should link to FAB's various ecommerce business license/registrations. The buttons don't work. Compare the function of the same buttons on the JD.com website, that FABgou.com appears to be a clone of: http://www.jd.com
A real company with a wildly profitable kiosk business, free of pirated content, 1) would have published the kiosk locations on its website, years ago, 2) would not suddenly stop selling wildly profitable kiosks after a short seller challenged their existence, 3) would not secretly issue high interest bonds when the company is awash with cash, 4) would conduct an independent investigation, not an internal investigation, and would have launched it immediately, not waiting several months later 5) would NEVER delay a year-end bank balance verification of $100M and then downgrade from a low-tier auditor to a bottom tier in the middle of a trading halt to finish the audit prior to the belated investigation
Very good point, the short term loans and secret bond issued by FAB's Chinese subsidiaries are nonsensical for a company supposedly flush with cash.