What is critical to recognize is that both California and the U.S., as well as numerous global lookalikes such as the U.K., Spain, and Eastern European invalids, are in a poor position to compete in a global economy where capitalism is morphing from its decades-long emphasis on finance and levered risk taking to a more conservative, regulated, production-oriented system advantaged by countries focusing on thrift and deferred gratification. The term “capitalism” itself speaks to “capital” – the accumulation of it and the eventual efficient employment of it – for growth in profits and real wages alike.

A photograph of Bernard Baruch looms ominously on the far corner of my PIMCO office wall. ...This well-known financier of the early 20^th century...almost schizophrenically cautioned investors during the stock market’s speculative blow-off in the late 20s that “two plus two equals four and no one has ever invented a way of getting something for nothing.” Three years later during the depths of economic and financial gloom he opined just the opposite: “Two plus two still equals four,” he said, “and you can’t keep mankind down for long.” ...

Aside from cyclical contractions and a brief bout of deflationary monetary policy in the Volkerian 80s, credit has always been available and at a relatively cheap price. Credit and debt finance is, in fact, the mother’s milk of capitalism: without it, entrepreneurs may transact, but economic progress would be most difficult with seashells or gold bars for mediums of exchange...

While the Republicans will blame you for years and label you “Trillion Dollar Obama” in future campaigns, there is in fact not much that you or any other President can do. You’ve inherited an asset-based economy whose well has been pumped nearly dry with lower and lower interest rates and lender of last resort liquidity provisions that have managed to support Ponzi-style prosperity in recent years. Foreign lenders have cooperated by purchasing Treasuries at yields which when combined with dollar depreciation have resulted in negative returns on their money. Even if these charades continue (and they may not), their stimulative effects – their magical powers to transform a 110-pound weakling into a Charles Atlas/Arnold Schwarzenegger mensch of an economy – are gone. What you need now is fiscal spending and lots of it. No ordinary Starbucks will do, Mr. President, you need to step up for a six-pack of Red Bull.

Credit Markets, Reregulation, and Home Prices
In my opinion, the private credit markets have forfeited their privileged right to operate relatively autonomously because of incompetence, excessive greed, and in minor instances, fraudulent activities. As a result, the deflating private market’s balance sheet is being re-nationalized in some cases with increased regulation, in others with outright guarantees and agency lending. Ultimately government programs which support private credit market assets may be required in order to prevent an asset deflation of significant proportions. Authorities must act quickly, with a shot of adrenalin straight to the heart of the problem: home prices. Since homes are the most highly levered and monetarily significant asset that American consumers own, if they decline much further they will drag the rest of the economy with them. Supporting home prices goes counter to the thinking of Republican orthodoxy. President Bush and Treasury Secretary Paulson argue that markets must "clear" in order to avoid similar mistakes made by Japanese authorities in the 1990s. Yet we may have passed the point of no return for "clearing" markets. Home price declines of 20% are in fact much more of a shock to the American economy than the popping of the Internet bubble and NASDAQ 5000, because the amount of homeowner leverage is so much greater. A 20% negative adjustment not only wipes out all ownership equity for millions of Americans, it turns their homes "upside down" – incentivizing them to let their gardens grow weeds instead of lettuce. The decline needs to be stopped quickly in order to avert additional crises.

It seems obvious that ... a prolonged period of risk aversion and deleveraging of our global shadow banking system lies ahead. Tighter lending standards, reduced risk budgets, and increased regulatory scrutiny all promise to produce a reduction in the growth rate of lending. Mortgage credit, for instance, grew at 10%, then 11%, then 13%+ annualized rates during the shadow’s heyday just a few years past. Now, despite the obvious rescue efforts of the Federal bureaucracy (much of which is aimed at preventing a contraction of mortgage credit), it promises to grow at tiny single-digit rates due to diminished housing starts and a buyer’s strike of significant proportions. Similar trends lie ahead for consumer credit, and importantly, commercial lending which heretofore has held up the investment side of the GDP ledger.

The $150 billion "return to sender" deficit plan advanced by Bush and the Congress, for instance, amounts to just 1% of GDP and is labeled temporary. It will be of marginal benefit to long-term prosperity. To understand why, consider that the productivity of our economy ultimately depends on its ability to 1) innovate, and 2) save and invest, and that there is little of either in this stimulus package. Some have even suggested – and with my somewhat grudging concession – that this package will help the Chinese economy more than ours... To provide a stable recovery path, government spending needs to fill the gap – not consumption. Public works programs, badly needed infrastructure repairs, as well as spending on research and development projects should form the heart of our path to recovery. Assistance for homeowners? That too...

Our modern shadow banking system craftily dodges the reserve requirements of traditional institutions and promotes a chain letter, pyramid scheme of leverage, based in many cases on no reserve cushion whatsoever. Financial derivatives of all descriptions are involved but credit default swaps [CDS] are perhaps the most egregious offenders. While margin does flow periodically to balance both party’s accounts, the conduits that hold CDS contracts are in effect non-regulated banks, much like their hedge fund brethren, with no requirements to hold reserves against a significant "black swan" run that might break them. Jimmy Stewart—they hardly knew ye!...

The ultimate destination of Fed Funds is dependent on the state of the domestic economy which, in turn, will be influenced by the direction and level of U.S. housing prices. Chairman Bernanke and his divided band of governors will have to feel their way along this treacherous path with canes in hand—not totally blind, but significantly hampered by a lack of historical context which might point the way to the ideal rate via precedent as opposed to feel. Nonetheless, there are theoretical guidelines which may help to validate or invalidate current assumptions reflected in Fed Funds futures contracts which currently forecast an ultimate floor of 3¼% sometime late in 2008. Traditionalists would point to the "Taylor Rule" which formulaically computes a neutral Fed Funds yield based on divergences of real GDP and inflation from "potential" and "target" levels. Since these levels are somewhat variable and subjective, there is no one number that a computer can spit out, but nonetheless, using reasonable assumptions, neutral Fed Funds levels somewhere in the 4% "+ or –" range are produced. Assuming the Fed would have to drop below neutral to stimulate a faltering economy, the 3¼% Fed Funds futures forecast does not seem unreasonable...

[B]oth old-fashioned banks and their derivative, conduit-fed shadow counterparts will be growing their balance sheets a lot more slowly in future months and quarters. That rather immediately translates into a slower economy and the need for government assistance in the form of lower interest rates or liquidity pushes like Treasury Secretary Paulson’s “Super SIV.” Whether Paulson’s “Committee to Save the World – Part II” will succeed like Bob Rubin’s original during the Long Term Capital crisis is debatable. The idea, first of all, is counterproductive because it continues to hide subprime asset prices in the “shadows.” Secondly, Rubin confronted no regulatory headwinds back in 1998, nor did he have to deal with today’s behemoth shadow banking system in the process of losing its brave face. Rubin in fact, along with his all-star committee featuring Alan Greenspan and Larry Summers, had a near hurricane force tailwind with 24 months more of dotcom IPOs yet to come. No wonder that Chairman Greenspan needed to cut short rates by only 75 basis points before stabilizing the economy nearly a decade ago.

Remember those old economics textbooks that told you how a $1 deposit at your neighborhood bank could be multiplied by five or six times in a magical act of reserve banking? It still can, but financial innovation has done an end run around the banks. Derivatives and structures with three- and four-letter abbreviations – CDOs, CLOs, ABCP, CPDOs, SIVs (the world awaits investment banking’s next creation; perhaps IOU?) – can now take a “depositor’s” dollar and multiply it ten or 20 times. Reserve banking, and the Federal Reserve that regulates the system, appear anemic in comparison...

Alan Greenspan admits in his newly published book that he didn’t appreciate until recently the impact adjustable-rate mortgages and their subprime character, accompanied in some cases by outright fraud, would have on the housing market. If the Fed was so slow to grasp the role that subprime mortgages played in the housing boom and bust, do the Fed and the Treasury of today totally comprehend what happens when the nonbanking private system suddenly stops flooding the market with credit? Do they recognize that such a shutdown puts spending for housing and business investment at risk, and job growth as well? The Fed will have to adapt its monetary policy, and the Bush Treasury will have to adjust its fiscal policy to this brazen new world dominated more and more by private rather than public policies and proclivities. To overcome private-market caution, the Fed may need to put on a bold face marked by even more decisive cuts in short-term rates. To prevent a housing-market slump from metastasizing into a cancerous self-feeding tumor, Treasury Secretary Paulson will have to coordinate policies that lend a helping hand to homeowners in distress...

Room to Run by Lauren R. Rublin

Summary: Barron's 2007 mid-year roundtable survey of influential fund managers. Their picks:

Long ago and far away there used to be an old “20% down” reality that morphed somehow into a subprime/Alt A cyberspace free-for-all (literally “free for all”). Talk about a second life! U.S. homeownership has expanded from 65% to 69% of households since the turn of the century, in part because it became so easy, and so cheap to finance a home. No avatars in that bunch – they were living, breathing U.S. citizens who yes, might knowingly or unknowingly have taken advantage of “low doc” or “no doc” applications, who might have taken out a “liar loan” in the face of “full disclosure” documentation required of their mortgage lenders, or who simply might just have jumped on board the 1% Fed Funds financing train of 2003. No matter. They bought a house, began living the American dream by making money with someone else’s money, and expected to live happily ever after. Well, not so fast, at least for some of them, it seems. Home prices, as measured by the National Association of Realtors, have gone down by 2% nationally over the past 15 months and there’s fear in the air that it could get worse. It most assuredly will.

Mixing It Up -- Part II by Lauren R. Rublin

I've posted about a previous investment outlook newsletter of his, and his latest is about as grim. But grim as he may be, his writing is seldom dull and never useless. In this month's installment he shows us how the ability to leverage for extra return is much more limited than it used to be. The lesson I take form this as an income investor, is to be wary of closed end funds that are leveraged to the maximum, taking on a lot of risk for very little extra yield.

You need to realize that before this most recent series of rate hikes we have had only three others in recent history that were distinguishable enough to use. We had the bubble burster that ended in 2000, a modest rate hike cycle that ended in 1995, and one that ended in 1989. Two precluded recessions and one came before the most massive bull market the world has ever seen. Before that we just a jumble of ups and downs mostly at an elevated rate all through the 70s and early 80s then it took up into the mid 80s for things to smooth out. And everything that happened before that I don’t consider to be relevant because too much has changed such as the influence of an increasingly global economy on bond yields.

Why then should the Fed be stopping [raising interest rates] and the bond market have bottomed in early July? The overarching reason is that 425 basis points of short-term hikes and the concomitant tightening of the yield curve in the past several years has been more than enough to slow economic growth and contain inflation. That’s a bold statement to make in the face of an apparently still strong domestic economy, a booming global environment, and accelerating core CPI numbers, but PIMCO’s cyclical analysis would suggest that it is justified.