The recent Dubai debt crisis has spurred some investors to take some profits, protect their portfolios and contemplate both the acknowledged and hidden threats to the global economy.

From Wednesday’s close to Friday’s intraday low, the S&P 500 index (SPX) only fell 17 points, or 2.4%, hardly the type of selloff that typically strikes fear into the hearts of bulls. Fearing that further declines may be in the cards, however, investors snapped up puts aggressively, particularly on Monday, when the put buying pushed the CBOE equity put to call ratio (CPCE) to elevated levels.

In yesterday’s chart of the week, I looked at three ETFs with exposure to the Middle East:

• Market Vectors Gulf States ETF (MES)
• Wisdom Tree Middle East Dividend ETF (GULF)
• SPDR S&P Emerging Middle East and Africa ETF (GAF)

It is a little known fact that Middle Eastern ETFs are actually a subset of a relatively new class of ETFs called frontier ETFs. Many of these frontier ETFs are single country ETFs, but two in particular stand out as diversified frontier plays:

With all the hoopla over the Dubai debt situation, I am surprised that there has been so little talk about Middle Eastern ETFs in general and ETFs with exposure to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular.

Part of the reason for the lack of mentions is surely that there is little to choose from, though the other problem is a lack of liquidity and investor interest to date. Only two ETFs with strong Middle Eastern exposure warrant mentioning: the Market Vectors Gulf States ETF (MES) and the Wisdom Tree Middle East Dividend ETF (GULF). Neither of these ETFs is particularly liquid (neither traded over 30,000 shares on Friday) and both have managed to avoid detection by all but the most adventuresome ETF investors.

I think the best way to look at crises (both big and small) is to think of them as learning opportunities. In the last year or so, many investors whose investing universe was narrowly bound by stocks have now become conversant in credit default swaps, the TED spread, the dollar, the carry trade, bank capital ratios and a whole host of concepts and statistics that they didn’t know existed in 2007.

So should the Dubai situation also be a learning trigger. Not familiar with the political structure of the United Arab Emirates? the history of sovereign default? the principles of Islamic banking? Now is an excellent time to learn – and perhaps profit – from becoming better informed about these issues.

With the S&P 500 and NASDAQ futures both down approximately 3% as I type this on concerns about the ability of Dubai World to repay some $59 billion in debt, today’s half day session is likely to be ugly and volatile. In a vacuum, this type of event would be concerning, but not likely to cause panic. With the emotional scars of the financial crisis still looming large in the memories of investors (i.e., Availability Bias and Disaster Imprinting), I would not be surprised to see an overreaction in the markets today.

On average, a 3% drop in the SPX yields a spike of about 12.6% in the VIX. On Wednesday, the Dow Jones STOXX 50 index of European companies fell 3.36%, yet the VSTOXX, (the corresponding volatility index, which is similar to a pan-European VIX) spiked 28.16%.

When I first broached the idea of Strangle Pong (a strategy of selling a front month strangle in the SPX one leg at a time), I had every intention of periodically following up to offer comments on the strategy, how it was or was not working, and how a trader might manage a position like the one discussed in order to minimize risk while realizing a large amount of the profit potential.

In Strangle Pong Update, Mark Wolfinger (Options for Rookies) and I discussed the advisability of closing out the short put trade and taking some rather substantial profits. We agreed that keeping the position open in hopes of securing the final 3.65 in profit was not an attractive risk-reward play, particularly since the position had already earned 20.35 in profits. I concluded, however, that “for educational purposes I will opt to keep this an open item on the blog.”

While I still have at least one and a half feet placed firmly in the bull camp, I am increasingly concerned with a number of signs from some key technical indicators. Near the top of my list of concerns is market breadth, as measured by the McClellan Summation Index and other similar market breadth indicators. The bottom line is that if the indices continue to advance on the strength of a narrow base of rising stocks while the majority of issues move sideways or decline, then the rally will have trouble sustaining itself.

During the last few weeks, several key sectors have been underperforming the S&P 500 index, notably banks (KBE), homebuilders (XHB), retailers (XRT) and semiconductors (SMH). This week’s chart of the week shows the performance of the four sectors relative to the S&P 500 index over the course of the last six months. In all four instances, these critical sectors are below the 50-day average of their ratio to the SPX and in the case of the banks, the relative performance gap is increasing almost on a daily basis.

At the risk of beating to death last week’s theme of availability bias and disaster imprinting as part of the explanation for some of the “realized volatility gap, persistent VIX futures contango and off-center VIX:VXV ratio,” I thought it might be informative to present a simple piece of research which supports the idea that the 2009 volatility picture has been an extremely abnormal one.

In the 20 years of VIX historical data, the VIX has typically overestimated the realized volatility 21 trading days hence, which is reflected in the chart below by the dotted green RV (+21d) line. In fact, the gray area portion of the graphic, which represents the difference between the VIX and realized volatility 21 trading days later, was close to 30% in the first half of the 1990s; more recently it has been averaging closer to 20%. The VIX actually fell below realized volatility for 2008, which is not surprising, given the volatility extremes of October and November.

I am neither an alarmist nor a conspiracy theorist, but I have been extremely concerned about Peak Oil since long before I took on the VIX a pet project. Now that I occasionally find myself as an unofficial source of all things VIX and volatility, it seems I am also perpetually on the lookout for storm clouds on the horizon.

Where will the next big threat come from? Commercial real estate? Failed Treasury auctions? The dollar? Pakistan?

On October 30th I talked about the possibility of legging into an S&P 500 index strangle, starting with the sale of a November SPX 1040 put and looking to sell a November SPX 1100 call when the index rallied back over 1080.

Here we are, six trading days later, and the SPX November 1040 put, which was at about 24.00 at the time of my original post, has fallen back to just over 8.00 as I type this.

As far as I can tell, I have not yet posted about the use of Bollinger bands in conjunction with a rate of change (ROC) indicator to identify volatility breakouts.

In summarizing the action in the VIX over the course of the past two weeks, the chart below captures some of the drama in terms of 10% (solid green) and 20% (solid blue) moving average envelopes. In the 6-month time frame included in the chart, the moving average envelopes flag last week’s VIX spike as the most powerful since stocks turned up in March. The moving averages also indicate that the VIX low of 20.10 from three weeks ago is the second strongest in terms of penetration of the lower moving average envelopes.

While I have a bias in favor of using home grown charts for my chart of the week, this week one chart in particular stuck in my head, the chart below from EconomPic Data that compares recent changes in the relative level of unemployment to the overall unemployment rate.

It may take a moment for readers to get their bearings on this graph, but in essence it shows that one’s level of education has increasingly become a factor in the likelihood of being unemployed. A decade or so ago, the unemployment rate for someone with less than a high school degree (dark blue line) was about 2% higher than the average for the population, while the unemployment rate for those with a bachelor’s degree or higher was about 2% lower than the average for all workers. By 2009, the gap had tripled to the point that less than a high school degree translated into a 6% higher unemployment rate and at the same time a bachelor’s degree or higher now meant about a 6% lower unemployment rate.

Once a popular subject in this space, the VIX:VXV ratio appeared to be a casualty of the financial turmoil and record volatility spikes in October 2008, when the ratio spiked to record levels and generated a buy signal that turned out to be nothing short of a disaster.

I was not yet ready to give up on the VIX:VXV ratio, so I was pleased to see that from November to January it generated some helpful long and short signals. In a promising development, on March 2nd the ratio generated a buy signal just before the markets bottomed. When the VIX:VXV ratio urged caution in June, I had even more reason to be hopeful. Then, once again, the ratio had another big miss, issuing a sell signal in mid-July, just after the markets started rallying. To compound matters, instead of moving back toward the neutral zone (between 0.92 and 1.08), the ratio persisted with a bearish recommendation all the way to the October top.

After I dashed off The VIX Spike Conundrum Monday, it occurred to me that there might be some aspects of behavioral finance that have contributed to what is now a full year of continued overestimating of future volatility. I detailed this phenomenon in The Gap Between the VIX and Realized Volatility and it is also being reflected in a VIX:VXV ratio that has been stuck at unusually low levels from mid-July until last week.

In thinking about the various elements of behavioral finance that impair ‘rational’ decision-making and could contribute to excess implied volatility, one factor that immediately comes to mind is availability bias (nicely summarized in Wikipedia). The global financial crisis and VIX spikes into the 80s were so vivid and memorable – and so thoroughly discussed in the media – that they are all too easy to recall one year later, even though arguably most of the risks associated with a VIX of 80 have since passed.

I have been absolutely astonished by the number of comments I have seen in the past few days to the effect that right now is an excellent time to initiate new long positions on VIX options. I am still not sure what is behind most of this thinking, but it seems as if quite a few investors are excited about the VIX breakout, some have adopted a Roubiniesque pervasive pessimism and others clearly are still operating under the shadow of the 2008 volatility spikes.

For all those who think that a VIX spike of 50% is a good time to get long the VIX, my response is that your ship has already sailed.

This week’s chart of the week is a simple reminder that while many of us like to standardize on 20-, 50- and 200-day moving averages, these rarely align perfectly with historical data. In fact, it often makes sense to develop customized moving averages that circumscribe past price action in order to get a better understanding of how current forces acting on stock prices compare to past forces.

One such example is in the chart below. The ‘usual suspects’ of moving averages fail to identify support levels from the July SPX low of 869. When this happens, then a little trial and error can quickly produce exactly which moving average provided support to the underlying. In this case, an 85-day moving average did the trick. While I am not saying that an 85-day moving average is the answer to all charting problems, it is reasonable to expect that if the current market downturn penetrates the 85-day moving average, it will be a move that is comparable to or more powerful than the July pullback.

While this might not provide a great deal of comfort to longs, I have updated the VIX and More Pullback Table to reflect today’s selloff. The table shows that the peak to trough drop of 66.73 points (6.1%) in the SPX has exceeded the 2009 average of 5.8%.

As noted previously, a 5.8% pullback from the SPX 1101 established a target low of 1037. Today the SPX has been as low as 1034.63.

Since the beginning of last year, I have periodically discussed what I call “calendar reversion,” which is essentially a phenomenon caused by the fact that the VIX is priced according to the calendar, but only calculated during trading days. The long and the short of this chronological mismatch is that market makers tend to drop option prices (and implied volatility) on Fridays in anticipation of the coming weekend and raise them on Mondays.

Earlier today, Mark Sebastian of Option911 wrote the best article I have seen on this subject, How Option Time Premium Decays Over the Weekend, in which he detailed his experiences related to weekend time decay and how market makers account for this during the Friday trading day. If you want to understand options pricing dynamics and how to best synchronize a five day clock with a seven day clock, then Mark’s work is absolutely required reading.

It has been a while since I posted one of my VIX studies and, given the recent spike in the VIX, Wednesday’s action seemed like a good excuse to revisit the idea of VIX spikes as contrarian bullish mean reversion buying opportunities.

Wednesday the VIX closed at 27.91, which is up 34.9% in the four trading days since Thursday’s close of 20.69. Over the course of the 20-year history of the VIX, the volatility index has posted close-to-close four day gains of 35% on 42 occasions. If you strip out the consecutive instances of +35% days, this leaves 27 instances in which the VIX crossed above +35% in four days.

Sometimes I like to skate around some of the salient points of volatility rather than try to hit readers over the head with them. But with the VIX now 16% over its 10-day simple moving average, I hope I am not the only one going short volatility. Specifically, anyone who has been paying attention to my comments about VXX should be looking at opportunities to get short this VIX ETN.

At the moment, not only do short VXX positions have mean reversion going for them, but even with the spiking VIX the VIX futures are still in contango, meaning that they are upward sloping over time, with the second month more expensive than the front month. The chart below shows that while the difference between the second month VIX futures and the front month VIX futures has been declining, it is still substantial, which translates into a meaningful negative roll yield that continues to work in the favor of shorts.