definition was met, with a collapse of the Dow to less than 50% of its peak, triggering a recession, as in 1929. Under these circumstances, the rise and fall of corporate creditworthiness is at least as important in determining the value of stocks, which should therefore be analyzed much like bonds. Our updated and proprietary investment model for stock valuation, book value plus ten times dividends, is accordingly a BOND construct. Bill Gross, the bond guru at Pimco, would probably agree, having pointed out that the twentieth century investment return on blue chip U.S. stocks was inflation, plus dividends, plus 0.6% a year real (after inflation). Put another way, such stocks can be analyzed much like TIPs (Treasury Inflation Protected Securities). Only about 20% of U.S. stocks are true growth stocks, according to Tweedy Browne (a value house). If you divide the universe into the value (80%) and growth (20%) portions, both of them match the market: A statistical property called "regression to the mean" pulls down the P/E ratios of growth stocks (as a group) enough to compensate for their generally higher growth, after allowing for the higher dividend yields of value stocks. Within the value 80%, stocks are basically indistinguishable except by valuation. Therefore, the bottom half of this universe (the cheapest 40% of the whole) will outperform the top half (the intermediate 40% of the whole), as well as the overall market. In fact, it's the intermediate or "limbo" 40% where the real losers, the Enrons, Worldcoms, Tycos, and financials are found. That's because they are false growth stocks that generate the verisimilitude of growth through the use of leverage. In the bankruptcy chapter, the book does a case study of Worldcom by presenting the three main financial statements in reverse order, cash flow statement, then balance sheet, then income statement. This is to train the student to gloss over the income statement, and focus on a cash flow profile that showed the company in deep trouble. In this instance, the weakness of the balance sheet was underlined by noting that most of the equity was represented by goodwill. In fact, one might do well to read whole annual reports from back to front. It is in the back that management is "legally accurate but not volunteering information" with the facts, while the front provides glossies that give visceral impressions of a prosperity that may be false. Growth stock investors can also do very well by concentrating on the same kind of fundamental analysis as value investors, albeit with a somewhat greater emphasis on earnings momentum. The bane of the 1990s, however, was not the search for growth, but rather for "optionality," a one time "big bang" of corporate expansion that would allow the rising (Boom) generation to prosper, possibly at the expense of their heirs in generations X and Y.