Active Management Versus Passive Index MLP Selection [View article]
Thank you for detailed comparison.
Believe that there is another First Trust closed end fund managed by EIP that seems from prospectuses, available at F/T site [*], to be very similar to EMLP. That CEF is FIF, and FIF would seem to have similar limit on MLPs, but higher expenses, and use of leverage, than the EMLP ETF. Maybe you can work in an analysis of FIF as well.
PIMCO's CEFs Trading At High Premiums: Is There A PIMCO 'Put'? [View article]
One PIMCO CEF that trades at a significant discount, and which is NOT listed above is MTS: Montgomery Street Income Securities.
Current discount is about 10%, with a distribution yield (according to CEFConnect) of 3.77%, no leverage, and an expense ratio of 0.71%.
MTS invests in investment grade corporate debt.
PIMCO became the manager relatively recently (in spring of 2010), and discount has not changed much from level that prevailed when it was managed by another firm.
PIMCO's CEFs Trading At High Premiums: Is There A PIMCO 'Put'? [View article]
One hidden PIMCO CEF is MTS (Montgomery Street Income Securities), an un-levered PIMCO managed investment grade corporate debt closed-end fund that trades at about a 10% discount.
PIMCO only became the manager relatively recently, in spring of 2010. Since that time, however, the discount has not significantly changed from the level that prevailed when it was NOT managed by PIMCO.
Banks, Home Prices, Home Sales Are 'Just Fine' [View article]
Thanks all for comments. There are many problems, I think, with my analysis, just as I think that it is NOT a good idea to take comfort from claim that "majority of banks are well capitalized."
As I noted at open of piece - so what? That's not - and never was - the issue.
Believe that the "relationship" that I charted in piece, while remarkable, ignores the problem and concludes that things are fine, as noted.
Key problem - such as it is - with my analysis is use of the Freddie CMHPI, which is virtual clone of FHFA/OFHEO index, and both of these include prices ONLY of homes financed by conforming mortgages.
At peak, however, believe more than half of the mortgage originations were non-conforming. This began as a subprime crisis, and then became a jumbo and an AltA crisis. These borrowers (at one time half of the market) had no financing alternatives, and it is their removal from the market, and struggles to get them back, that has led to the mess.
All of which is missed if you use CMHPI or FHFA/OFHEO. Or, think things are fine if you take comfort in fact that majority of banks are well-capitalized.
>>"With respect to foreclosures, they won't hit 3% they will >>continue to trend between 1-1.5%"
Interesting conclusion.
If the banks had NOT responded to jawboning and held off on foreclosures in response to jawboning, foreclosure starts would already be at 1.65%, as noted above. And you say that they won't get higher than 1.5%? I hope you're correct.
Greed, Fear and Loathing: What’s Next for Home Prices? [View article]
Thank you all for reading and comments.
Quick comment responding to Charles Lieberman's note that my notion of affordability is suspect because it differs from that produced by the NAR - National Association of Realtors; i.e. people who sell homes for a living.
1. Sure, the NAR is objective - why wouldn't they be?
2. But more seriously - the notion of affordability used by the NAR uses median income (derived by NAR) and median home prices (also by NAR).
I'm using average income, per BLS Census, along with average home price from FHFB.
While NAR uses FHFB rate information as is, they assume 20% down, all the time. I'm using down payment per the FHFB.
Finally, I also make an adjustment to the FHFB reported rates, reflecting the fact the dislocation in non conforming markets (i.e., requirement that borrowers have relatively spotless credit, currently) has made mortgage credit somewhat scarce for those with imperfect credit histories.
Think that - IMHO - the NAR is a "best case" figure, for reasons that I snarkily suggested above, and that mine is more realistic. Think the NAR - by definition - assumes the problem away and then proudly reports that there are no problems.
the scale of current decline blows away past declines, so optimization/market timing must use history of much weaker corrections. Think that will make it tough. - Ira
A Bimodal, Metrocensual Model of Foreclosures [View article]
User 68420 - Thanks for reading, and sorry that you missed the definition which appears early on in the piece. I've reprinted it below (or see above), reformatted for emphasis. - Ira
"To build a simple and rough:
bimodal [two factors, home prices and unemployment]; and
metrocensual [metro area, determined by US Census Bureau]
2 CEF Yield 'Baskets' To Boost Income Streams [View article]
As noted on the FTPortfolio website for FIF (link below), the expense ratio is about 1.50%.
http://bit.ly/LaV80q
Also, FIF seems to be very similar to the new ETF that began trading the other day. The ETF symbol is EMLP, and early info on it is at links below.
FTPortfolio:
http://bit.ly/NrbCGG
etfdb:
http://bit.ly/Md6JiT
Active Management Versus Passive Index MLP Selection [View article]
Believe that there is another First Trust closed end fund managed by EIP that seems from prospectuses, available at F/T site [*], to be very similar to EMLP. That CEF is FIF, and FIF would seem to have similar limit on MLPs, but higher expenses, and use of leverage, than the EMLP ETF. Maybe you can work in an analysis of FIF as well.
First Trust site: http://bit.ly/Mygh6Y
Thanks again. - Ira
Note: Links as of 06-21-12:
a. http://bit.ly/KBmamO
b. http://bit.ly/MyfTWb cef/cefsummary.aspx?Ti...
ETFs Vs. Mutual Funds: A Case Study - Part III [View article]
Once you take into account the relative tax efficiencies of each, the case for ETFs gets even stronger.
For last 10 years (per Morningstar) the 10 yr tax costs of each are as follows:
OLVAX:http://bit.ly/HV195r
1.11% per year
IWD: http://bit.ly/JU3yZd
0.58% per year
For taxable investors, OLVAX was (more or less) twice as costly from a tax perspective than IWD.
PIMCO's CEFs Trading At High Premiums: Is There A PIMCO 'Put'? [View article]
You only change the name after you've had a chance to acquire a "full" position, no?
PIMCO's CEFs Trading At High Premiums: Is There A PIMCO 'Put'? [View article]
Current discount is about 10%, with a distribution yield (according to CEFConnect) of 3.77%, no leverage, and an expense ratio of 0.71%.
MTS invests in investment grade corporate debt.
PIMCO became the manager relatively recently (in spring of 2010), and discount has not changed much from level that prevailed when it was managed by another firm.
Links below have details.
CEFConnect.com Profile
http://bit.ly/HKF9Kz
MTS Website
http://bit.ly/HCfkbD
MTS PDF Factsheet
http://bit.ly/HKFa0R
Press Releases, With Info on Change in Management to PIMCO
http://bit.ly/J1HwUC
PIMCO's CEFs Trading At High Premiums: Is There A PIMCO 'Put'? [View article]
PIMCO only became the manager relatively recently, in spring of 2010. Since that time, however, the discount has not significantly changed from the level that prevailed when it was NOT managed by PIMCO.
See links below for details.
CEF Connect
http://bit.ly/HKF9Kz
Montgomery Street Income Website
http://bit.ly/HCfkbD
MTS PDF
http://bit.ly/HKFa0R
California and Florida Housing Outlook: More Hope for Recovery in 2010 [View article]
Thank you all ffor comments.
If you'd like to see what I proposed for the title of the above, please see my Instablog version, available here:
seekingalpha.com/insta...
A New Proposal: Bank Annual Optional Warrant Acquisition Operation [View article]
Note:
The SeekingAlpha "Instablog" version of this same article contains a slightly more evocative title, as well as a compelling opening graphic.
It may be found at the following link:
seekingalpha.com/insta...
The Long and Short of Bond and Equity Returns [View article]
The Long and Short of Bond and Equity Returns:
40 Weak Years And A Rule
Thanks for reading. - Ira
Home Sales and Foreclosures: Drawn and Quartered [View article]
MortgageNewsClips.com/... Slivers
mortgagenewsclips.com/.../
and
RiskCenter.com (free registration required)
www.riskcenter.com/sto...
Thanks for reading. - Ira
Banks, Home Prices, Home Sales Are 'Just Fine' [View article]
Thanks all for comments. There are many problems, I think, with my analysis, just as I think that it is NOT a good idea to take comfort from claim that "majority of banks are well capitalized."
As I noted at open of piece - so what? That's not - and never was - the issue.
Believe that the "relationship" that I charted in piece, while remarkable, ignores the problem and concludes that things are fine, as noted.
Key problem - such as it is - with my analysis is use of the Freddie CMHPI, which is virtual clone of FHFA/OFHEO index, and both of these include prices ONLY of homes financed by conforming mortgages.
At peak, however, believe more than half of the mortgage originations were non-conforming. This began as a subprime crisis, and then became a jumbo and an AltA crisis. These borrowers (at one time half of the market) had no financing alternatives, and it is their removal from the market, and struggles to get them back, that has led to the mess.
All of which is missed if you use CMHPI or FHFA/OFHEO. Or, think things are fine if you take comfort in fact that majority of banks are well-capitalized.
Jawbone: Whither Foreclosures? [View article]
Hardwood suggested:
>>"With respect to foreclosures, they won't hit 3% they will
>>continue to trend between 1-1.5%"
Interesting conclusion.
If the banks had NOT responded to jawboning and held off on foreclosures in response to jawboning, foreclosure starts would already be at 1.65%, as noted above. And you say that they won't get higher than 1.5%? I hope you're correct.
Greed, Fear and Loathing: What’s Next for Home Prices? [View article]
Quick comment responding to Charles Lieberman's note that my notion of affordability is suspect because it differs from that produced by the NAR - National Association of Realtors; i.e. people who sell homes for a living.
1. Sure, the NAR is objective - why wouldn't they be?
2. But more seriously - the notion of affordability used by the NAR uses median income (derived by NAR) and median home prices (also by NAR).
I'm using average income, per BLS Census, along with average home price from FHFB.
While NAR uses FHFB rate information as is, they assume 20% down, all the time. I'm using down payment per the FHFB.
Finally, I also make an adjustment to the FHFB reported rates, reflecting the fact the dislocation in non conforming markets (i.e., requirement that borrowers have relatively spotless credit, currently) has made mortgage credit somewhat scarce for those with imperfect credit histories.
Think that - IMHO - the NAR is a "best case" figure, for reasons that I snarkily suggested above, and that mine is more realistic. Think the NAR - by definition - assumes the problem away and then proudly reports that there are no problems.
Well, .... sure, but ...
A Bimodal, Metrocensual Model of Foreclosures [View article]
Thanks for reading.
Perhaps. But think - as noted by today's release of S&P Case Shiller, as wonderfully highlighted at SoldAtTheTops' Blog:
paper-money.blogspot.c...
the scale of current decline blows away past declines, so optimization/market timing must use history of much weaker corrections. Think that will make it tough. - Ira
A Bimodal, Metrocensual Model of Foreclosures [View article]
"To build a simple and rough:
bimodal
[two factors, home prices and unemployment]; and
metrocensual
[metro area, determined by US Census Bureau]
model of foreclosures."