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    <title>Ivan Kitov - Seeking Alpha</title>
    <description>'Ivan Kitov' Tag RSS Syndication from SeekingAlpha.com</description>
    <author>
      <name>SeekingAlpha.com</name>
    </author>
    <link>http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov</link>
    <item>
      <title>Predicting Gas Prices: August-December 2009</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/156327-predicting-gas-prices-august-december-2009?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">156327</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>Four months ago we made a prediction of the price of gas at the pump [1]. In essence, we drew a straight line, shown in Figure 1 as the future gas price for the period between March and December 2009. The line represents the difference between core CPI and the motor fuel index. The line says that the price for gas will be growing faster than the price of all goods and services less food and energy (the definition of core CPI).</p><p>A midterm review is a natural step in tracking the following prediction [1]:</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Sun, 16 Aug 2009 08:06:24 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p>Four months ago we made a prediction of the price of gas at the pump [1]. In essence, we drew a straight line, shown in Figure 1 as the future gas price for the period between March and December 2009. The line represents the difference between core CPI and the motor fuel index. The line says that the price for gas will be growing faster than the price of all goods and services less food and energy (the definition of core CPI).</p><p>A midterm review is a natural step in tracking the following prediction [1]:</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/156327-predicting-gas-prices-august-december-2009?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dbo">DBO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/oih">OIH</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/oil">OIL</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/uso">USO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/xle">XLE</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How Fast Will the Rate of Unemployment Decline? </title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/156316-how-fast-will-the-rate-of-unemployment-decline?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">156316</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p><span>Unemployment is one of the worst defined economic variables, which ignores the presence of a complete and closed (even if it is considered in many models as an open one) economic system. The rate of unemployment is defined as a share the labor force, i.e. as the percentage of the total <i>available</i> working force actively seeking jobs but remain unhired.  As an example, students are not available during scholastic terms and cannot be considered as unemployed  regardless of whether they might think about some job position. </span></p> <p><span>The inherent weakness of the definition of unemployment is rooted in the fact that the labor force is a <i>varying</i> portion of the total working age population, as defined by all people of 16 years of age and over.  (As mentioned above, this varying portion of the working age population is the denominator in the unemployment rate.) The portion is called labor force participation rate &#40;LFPR&#41;. The presence of the varying basis in the definition of the unemployment rate results in a strong bias in the interpretation of the unemployment rate estimates by an unprofessional audience and even many researchers. </span></p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Sun, 16 Aug 2009 07:14:18 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p><span>Unemployment is one of the worst defined economic variables, which ignores the presence of a complete and closed (even if it is considered in many models as an open one) economic system. The rate of unemployment is defined as a share the labor force, i.e. as the percentage of the total <i>available</i> working force actively seeking jobs but remain unhired.  As an example, students are not available during scholastic terms and cannot be considered as unemployed  regardless of whether they might think about some job position. </span></p> <p><span>The inherent weakness of the definition of unemployment is rooted in the fact that the labor force is a <i>varying</i> portion of the total working age population, as defined by all people of 16 years of age and over.  (As mentioned above, this varying portion of the working age population is the denominator in the unemployment rate.) The portion is called labor force participation rate &#40;LFPR&#41;. The presence of the varying basis in the definition of the unemployment rate results in a strong bias in the interpretation of the unemployment rate estimates by an unprofessional audience and even many researchers. </span></p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/156316-how-fast-will-the-rate-of-unemployment-decline?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dia">DIA</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/qqqq">QQQQ</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/spy">SPY</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Unemployment in Japan Still Rising</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/155048-unemployment-in-japan-still-rising?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">155048</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>Here we are following our previous <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/146310-unemployment-in-japan-will-be-above-6-by-august">article</a> on unemployment in Japan, where we predicted the rate to be at 6.0 in August. A new reading 5.4% for June 2009 was published on July 31. At the same time, a new estimate of labor force is also available for June and it is possible to quantitatively predict the unemployment rate using the empirical relationship introduced in the previous article:<br><br> <em><span>UE</span>(t)= -1.5*dLF(t)/LF(t) +0.045 (1)</em></p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 10 Aug 2009 07:06:32 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p>Here we are following our previous <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/146310-unemployment-in-japan-will-be-above-6-by-august">article</a> on unemployment in Japan, where we predicted the rate to be at 6.0 in August. A new reading 5.4% for June 2009 was published on July 31. At the same time, a new estimate of labor force is also available for June and it is possible to quantitatively predict the unemployment rate using the empirical relationship introduced in the previous article:<br><br> <em><span>UE</span>(t)= -1.5*dLF(t)/LF(t) +0.045 (1)</em></p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/155048-unemployment-in-japan-still-rising?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Unemployment Situation in Three Simple Graphs</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/154956-unemployment-situation-in-three-simple-graphs?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">154956</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>Three simple graphs illustrating the unemployment situation.</p> <p>Figure 1 presents monthly growth in the civilian (non-institutional) population (dCP) and in the labor force (dLF) between January 2007 and July 2009. All estimates are obtained in the monthly Current Population Surveys (household data) conducted by the US Census Bureau for the BLS and are seasonally adjusted ones. One can observe three benchmark revisions to the civilian population, which are carried out every January. The estimates of labor force are also affected by the CP revisions. Otherwise, the change in labor force is very volatile. The last three months demonstrate a decrease in the rate of labor force growth from +653 in April to -422 in July. One can expect that the labor force will start to grow again soon.</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Sun, 09 Aug 2009 08:05:23 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p>Three simple graphs illustrating the unemployment situation.</p> <p>Figure 1 presents monthly growth in the civilian (non-institutional) population (dCP) and in the labor force (dLF) between January 2007 and July 2009. All estimates are obtained in the monthly Current Population Surveys (household data) conducted by the US Census Bureau for the BLS and are seasonally adjusted ones. One can observe three benchmark revisions to the civilian population, which are carried out every January. The estimates of labor force are also affected by the CP revisions. Otherwise, the change in labor force is very volatile. The last three months demonstrate a decrease in the rate of labor force growth from +653 in April to -422 in July. One can expect that the labor force will start to grow again soon.</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/154956-unemployment-situation-in-three-simple-graphs?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PPI of Metals Revisited </title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/151344-ppi-of-metals-revisited?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">151344</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>We have demonstrated that the evolution of various components of CPI and PPI in the United States is not a random but rather a predetermined process with long-term sustainable trends [1-4]. Using these trends, we have predicted consumer and producer price indices for various goods, services and commodities [5-7].</p><p>In this post, we present the PPI of three commodities related to metals: steel iron, nonferrous metals, and metal containers. All these items have been already studied in our article [4]. Therefore, it is worth to revisit old predictions and to update them if necessary.</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2009 04:37:32 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p>We have demonstrated that the evolution of various components of CPI and PPI in the United States is not a random but rather a predetermined process with long-term sustainable trends [1-4]. Using these trends, we have predicted consumer and producer price indices for various goods, services and commodities [5-7].</p><p>In this post, we present the PPI of three commodities related to metals: steel iron, nonferrous metals, and metal containers. All these items have been already studied in our article [4]. Therefore, it is worth to revisit old predictions and to update them if necessary.</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/151344-ppi-of-metals-revisited?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Expect Gold Ore Price Index to Grow at Lower Rate than PPI</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/149455-expect-gold-ore-price-index-to-grow-at-lower-rate-than-ppi?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">149455</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>Previously, we have demonstrated that gold ores price can be predicted at a several year horizon [1]. The prediction was based on the observation that the difference between the overall producer price index, PPI, and the producer index for gold ores shows sustainable trends. A new trend has been emerging since 2008 and the difference can be foreseen at a five to ten-year horizon. As the PPI will be likely constant over the next decade, the difference provides a direct prediction of the price index for gold ores.  In this article, we update the forecast using a new reading of the PPI for June 2009.</p>  <p>Currently, the US economy is struggling through a period of high volatility in all macroeconomic variables including the difference between various PPI subcategories and commodities. Figure 1 illustrates the observation that this volatile period is related to the turn to a new trend in the difference after 2008. We have made a na&iuml;ve assumption about the new trend shown by green line - it should repeat the trend observed between 2001 and 2008 but with an opposite sign. Actual trend may be different but inevitably with a positive slope. The green line has a positive slope. Therefore the index for gold ores will be growing at a lower rate than the overall PPI. According to our assumption, the rate of the deviation from the PPI will be +11 units of index per year.</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 2009 07:36:51 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p>Previously, we have demonstrated that gold ores price can be predicted at a several year horizon [1]. The prediction was based on the observation that the difference between the overall producer price index, PPI, and the producer index for gold ores shows sustainable trends. A new trend has been emerging since 2008 and the difference can be foreseen at a five to ten-year horizon. As the PPI will be likely constant over the next decade, the difference provides a direct prediction of the price index for gold ores.  In this article, we update the forecast using a new reading of the PPI for June 2009.</p>  <p>Currently, the US economy is struggling through a period of high volatility in all macroeconomic variables including the difference between various PPI subcategories and commodities. Figure 1 illustrates the observation that this volatile period is related to the turn to a new trend in the difference after 2008. We have made a na&iuml;ve assumption about the new trend shown by green line - it should repeat the trend observed between 2001 and 2008 but with an opposite sign. Actual trend may be different but inevitably with a positive slope. The green line has a positive slope. Therefore the index for gold ores will be growing at a lower rate than the overall PPI. According to our assumption, the rate of the deviation from the PPI will be +11 units of index per year.</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/149455-expect-gold-ore-price-index-to-grow-at-lower-rate-than-ppi?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/gld">GLD</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/iau">IAU</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Why Crude Will Reach $100 / Barrel </title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/148953-why-crude-will-reach-100-barrel?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">148953</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>In June 2009, we presented a prediction of crude petroleum price for 2009 (<a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/145614-crude-will-reach-100-by-december-2009">Crude Will Reach $100 by December 2009</a>). Briefly, our analysis has shown that oil will overcome $100 per barrel before the end of 2009. As promised, we evaluate the prediction every month, after new readings of producer price index &#40;PPI&#41; with all its components become available. In this article, we report the results for June 2009.</p><div><p>The period between January 2008 and likely the end of 2010 is characterized by an elevated volatility in oil price, but the evolution of the price is not random. Moreover, even after the start of crisis in 2008, the price has been following a predetermined trajectory, as it has been demonstrating since 1980.</p></div>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2009 09:32:00 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p>In June 2009, we presented a prediction of crude petroleum price for 2009 (<a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/145614-crude-will-reach-100-by-december-2009">Crude Will Reach $100 by December 2009</a>). Briefly, our analysis has shown that oil will overcome $100 per barrel before the end of 2009. As promised, we evaluate the prediction every month, after new readings of producer price index &#40;PPI&#41; with all its components become available. In this article, we report the results for June 2009.</p><div><p>The period between January 2008 and likely the end of 2010 is characterized by an elevated volatility in oil price, but the evolution of the price is not random. Moreover, even after the start of crisis in 2008, the price has been following a predetermined trajectory, as it has been demonstrating since 1980.</p></div><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/148953-why-crude-will-reach-100-barrel?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dbo">DBO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/oih">OIH</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/oil">OIL</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/uso">USO</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/xle">XLE</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Predicting BofA's Share Price (An Advanced Model) </title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/147612-predicting-bofa-s-share-price-an-advanced-model?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">147612</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>We continue predicting share prices of S&amp;P 500 companies with Bank of America (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bac' title='More opinion and analysis of BAC'>BAC</a>). This time, we use an advanced model (see previous model <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/146649-modeling-bank-of-america-s-share-price">here</a>). The first company studied with this model was <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/434499-ivan-kitov/12224-predicting-boeing-s-share-price-advanced-model">Boeing</a> (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ba' title='More opinion and analysis of BA'>BA</a>). The advanced model includes four components of the CPI in the USA instead of two at the preliminary stage. For Boeing, the accuracy of prediction has been significantly increased.</p>  <div><p>There are 18 CPI components tested for each share price: the headline CPI ((<em>C</em>)), the core CPI, i.e. the headline CPI less food and energy (<em>(<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/cc' title='More opinion and analysis of CC'>CC</a>)</em>), food and beverages (<em>(F</em>)), housing ((<em>H</em>)), apparel ((<em>A)</em>), transportation ((<em>T)</em>), medical care ((<em>M</em>)), recreation ((<em>R</em>)), education ((<em>ED)</em>), communication ((<em>CO)</em>), services (<em>(<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/sr' title='More opinion and analysis of SR'>SR</a>)</em>), other (<em>(<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/o' title='More opinion and analysis of O'>O</a>)</em>), energy ((<em>E)</em>), shelter (<em>(<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/sh' title='More opinion and analysis of SH'>SH</a>)</em>), the CPI less food ((<em>FC)</em>), the CPI less energy ((<em>EC)</em>), the CPI less medical care (<em>(<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mc' title='More opinion and analysis of MC'>MC</a>)</em>), the CPI less shelter ((<em>SHC)</em>). All components are not seasonally adjusted ones and retrieved from the <a href="http://www.bls.gov/data">Bureau of Labor Statistics</a>.</p></div>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2009 07:41:54 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p>We continue predicting share prices of S&amp;P 500 companies with Bank of America (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bac' title='More opinion and analysis of BAC'>BAC</a>). This time, we use an advanced model (see previous model <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/146649-modeling-bank-of-america-s-share-price">here</a>). The first company studied with this model was <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/434499-ivan-kitov/12224-predicting-boeing-s-share-price-advanced-model">Boeing</a> (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ba' title='More opinion and analysis of BA'>BA</a>). The advanced model includes four components of the CPI in the USA instead of two at the preliminary stage. For Boeing, the accuracy of prediction has been significantly increased.</p>  <div><p>There are 18 CPI components tested for each share price: the headline CPI ((<em>C</em>)), the core CPI, i.e. the headline CPI less food and energy (<em>(<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/cc' title='More opinion and analysis of CC'>CC</a>)</em>), food and beverages (<em>(F</em>)), housing ((<em>H</em>)), apparel ((<em>A)</em>), transportation ((<em>T)</em>), medical care ((<em>M</em>)), recreation ((<em>R</em>)), education ((<em>ED)</em>), communication ((<em>CO)</em>), services (<em>(<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/sr' title='More opinion and analysis of SR'>SR</a>)</em>), other (<em>(<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/o' title='More opinion and analysis of O'>O</a>)</em>), energy ((<em>E)</em>), shelter (<em>(<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/sh' title='More opinion and analysis of SH'>SH</a>)</em>), the CPI less food ((<em>FC)</em>), the CPI less energy ((<em>EC)</em>), the CPI less medical care (<em>(<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mc' title='More opinion and analysis of MC'>MC</a>)</em>), the CPI less shelter ((<em>SHC)</em>). All components are not seasonally adjusted ones and retrieved from the <a href="http://www.bls.gov/data">Bureau of Labor Statistics</a>.</p></div><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/147612-predicting-bofa-s-share-price-an-advanced-model?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bac">BAC</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Core PCE Will Include Restaurant Prices</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/146979-core-pce-will-include-restaurant-prices?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">146979</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<div>The WSJ mentioned that &ldquo;<a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/06/11/restaurant-prices-to-flow-into-core-inflation-measure/"><font>Restaurant Prices to Flow Into &lsquo;Core&rsquo; Inflation Measure&rdquo;</font></a>. Effectively, the Bureau of Economic Analysis will include the index for &quot;restaurants&quot; into  the core PCE, the &quot;price index for personal consumption expenditures that excludes energy and all food products, whether bought at a grocery store or a restaurant.&quot;</div><div> </div><div>It is interesting to evaluate the influence of this new component of the core PCE through  the behavior of the CPI of  &ldquo;full service meals and drinks&rdquo; relative to the core CPI. Following our standard approach [see references below] to small components of the consumer price index, we calculate the difference between the core CPI and the index for &ldquo;full service&quot;.</div><div><p>Figure 1 displays the difference. As with many other components of the headline CPI, the difference is characterized by the presence of a linear trend between 1998 (start time of the index) and July 2008 with a slope +1.82. It means that the core CPI has been growing at a higher rate than the studied index during the past 10 years.</p><p><strong>Figure 1. The difference between the core CPI and the index for &quot;restaurants&quot;. </strong><br><a href="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/7/4/434499-12466932465694-Ivan-Kitov_origin.png" rel="lightbox"><img src="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/7/4/434499-12466932465694-Ivan-Kitov.png" hspace="6" vspace="6" /></a></p></div>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2009 07:09:43 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><div>The WSJ mentioned that &ldquo;<a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/06/11/restaurant-prices-to-flow-into-core-inflation-measure/"><font>Restaurant Prices to Flow Into &lsquo;Core&rsquo; Inflation Measure&rdquo;</font></a>. Effectively, the Bureau of Economic Analysis will include the index for &quot;restaurants&quot; into  the core PCE, the &quot;price index for personal consumption expenditures that excludes energy and all food products, whether bought at a grocery store or a restaurant.&quot;</div><div> </div><div>It is interesting to evaluate the influence of this new component of the core PCE through  the behavior of the CPI of  &ldquo;full service meals and drinks&rdquo; relative to the core CPI. Following our standard approach [see references below] to small components of the consumer price index, we calculate the difference between the core CPI and the index for &ldquo;full service&quot;.</div><div><p>Figure 1 displays the difference. As with many other components of the headline CPI, the difference is characterized by the presence of a linear trend between 1998 (start time of the index) and July 2008 with a slope +1.82. It means that the core CPI has been growing at a higher rate than the studied index during the past 10 years.</p><p><strong>Figure 1. The difference between the core CPI and the index for &quot;restaurants&quot;. </strong><br><a href="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/7/4/434499-12466932465694-Ivan-Kitov_origin.png" rel="lightbox"><img src="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/7/4/434499-12466932465694-Ivan-Kitov.png" hspace="6" vspace="6" /></a></p></div><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/146979-core-pce-will-include-restaurant-prices?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Modeling Bank of America's Share Price </title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/146649-modeling-bank-of-america-s-share-price?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">146649</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>One by one, we are modeling share prices of companies from the S&amp;P 500 list. We have already <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov/articles">presented</a> quantitative models for companies in various subcategories: information and technology, energy, industrials, consumer staples, materials, and financials (<a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/145811-wal-s-share-price-predicts-fast-growth-in-energy-and-food-prices">Western Alliance Bancorporation</a>). It is now Bank of America's (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bac' title='More opinion and analysis of BAC'>BAC</a>) turn.</p> <p>As before, our pricing model is based on the presence of a linear link between a share price and the difference between various components of CPI. (Share prices are retrieved from <a href="http://finance.yahoo.com/">YahooFinance</a> and CPI components are from <a href="http://www.bls.gov/data">BLS.gov</a>.) The intuition behind the model is simple; a higher pricing power for a given subcategory of goods and services, and thus related companies, is expressed in a faster increase in corresponding stock prices.</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2009 08:54:56 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p>One by one, we are modeling share prices of companies from the S&amp;P 500 list. We have already <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov/articles">presented</a> quantitative models for companies in various subcategories: information and technology, energy, industrials, consumer staples, materials, and financials (<a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/145811-wal-s-share-price-predicts-fast-growth-in-energy-and-food-prices">Western Alliance Bancorporation</a>). It is now Bank of America's (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bac' title='More opinion and analysis of BAC'>BAC</a>) turn.</p> <p>As before, our pricing model is based on the presence of a linear link between a share price and the difference between various components of CPI. (Share prices are retrieved from <a href="http://finance.yahoo.com/">YahooFinance</a> and CPI components are from <a href="http://www.bls.gov/data">BLS.gov</a>.) The intuition behind the model is simple; a higher pricing power for a given subcategory of goods and services, and thus related companies, is expressed in a faster increase in corresponding stock prices.</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/146649-modeling-bank-of-america-s-share-price?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bac">BAC</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Modeling Boeing's Share Price</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/146582-modeling-boeing-s-share-price?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">146582</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p><span>We continue modelling share prices of companies from the S&amp;P 500 list. At Seeking Alpha, we have already presented <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/145307-modeling-select-s-p-500-share-prices">models</a> for the following companies: <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ibm' title='More opinion and analysis of IBM'>IBM</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dov' title='More opinion and analysis of DOV'>DOV</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/pg' title='More opinion and analysis of PG'>PG</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dd' title='More opinion and analysis of DD'>DD</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/apd' title='More opinion and analysis of APD'>APD</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/cvx' title='More opinion and analysis of CVX'>CVX</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dvn' title='More opinion and analysis of DVN'>DVN</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/hal' title='More opinion and analysis of HAL'>HAL</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/msft' title='More opinion and analysis of MSFT'>MSFT</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/cop' title='More opinion and analysis of COP'>COP</a>, and <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/xom' title='More opinion and analysis of XOM'>XOM</a>. Here we model Boeing's (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ba' title='More opinion and analysis of BA'>BA</a>) share price. </span></p> <p><span>Our pricing model is simple. We assume the presence of a linear link between a share price and the difference between various components of CPI. The intuition behind the model is simple; a higher pricing power for a given subcategory of goods and services, and thus related companies, is expressed in a faster increase in corresponding stock prices. In the first approximation, the deviation between relevant price indices is proportional to the ratio of the pricing powers. The presence of sustainable (linear or nonlinear) trends in the differences, as found in (Kitov, Kitov, 2008; Kitov, Kitov, 2009ab) allows predicting the evolution of the differences, and thus the deviation between prices for corresponding goods and services. The share prices have to follow upwards. </span></p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2009 04:50:16 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p><span>We continue modelling share prices of companies from the S&amp;P 500 list. At Seeking Alpha, we have already presented <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/145307-modeling-select-s-p-500-share-prices">models</a> for the following companies: <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ibm' title='More opinion and analysis of IBM'>IBM</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dov' title='More opinion and analysis of DOV'>DOV</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/pg' title='More opinion and analysis of PG'>PG</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dd' title='More opinion and analysis of DD'>DD</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/apd' title='More opinion and analysis of APD'>APD</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/cvx' title='More opinion and analysis of CVX'>CVX</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dvn' title='More opinion and analysis of DVN'>DVN</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/hal' title='More opinion and analysis of HAL'>HAL</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/msft' title='More opinion and analysis of MSFT'>MSFT</a>, <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/cop' title='More opinion and analysis of COP'>COP</a>, and <a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/xom' title='More opinion and analysis of XOM'>XOM</a>. Here we model Boeing's (<a href='http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ba' title='More opinion and analysis of BA'>BA</a>) share price. </span></p> <p><span>Our pricing model is simple. We assume the presence of a linear link between a share price and the difference between various components of CPI. The intuition behind the model is simple; a higher pricing power for a given subcategory of goods and services, and thus related companies, is expressed in a faster increase in corresponding stock prices. In the first approximation, the deviation between relevant price indices is proportional to the ratio of the pricing powers. The presence of sustainable (linear or nonlinear) trends in the differences, as found in (Kitov, Kitov, 2008; Kitov, Kitov, 2009ab) allows predicting the evolution of the differences, and thus the deviation between prices for corresponding goods and services. The share prices have to follow upwards. </span></p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/146582-modeling-boeing-s-share-price?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ba">BA</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Relative Growth Rate of Consumer Price Indices</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/146473-the-relative-growth-rate-of-consumer-price-indices?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">146473</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p><em>Co-written by Oleg I. Kitov</em></p> <p><b><font size="2">Abstract </font></b></p> <p><font size="2">Headline CPI, core CPI, and indices for various small expenditure categories were analyzed. Sustainable long-term linear trends have been found in the difference between the headline CPI and these indices. Overall, the results completely support our previous findings for such principal categories as energy, food, housing, etc. One should return to the relative price of apples and oranges in order to explain these linear trends in terms of the mainstream economics. </font></p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2009 10:57:37 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p><em>Co-written by Oleg I. Kitov</em></p> <p><b><font size="2">Abstract </font></b></p> <p><font size="2">Headline CPI, core CPI, and indices for various small expenditure categories were analyzed. Sustainable long-term linear trends have been found in the difference between the headline CPI and these indices. Overall, the results completely support our previous findings for such principal categories as energy, food, housing, etc. One should return to the relative price of apples and oranges in order to explain these linear trends in terms of the mainstream economics. </font></p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/146473-the-relative-growth-rate-of-consumer-price-indices?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Predicting the U.K.'s Real GDP</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/146421-predicting-the-u-k-s-real-gdp?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">146421</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p><span>Finally, the United Kingdom presents an interesting case, where one can introduce a structural break in the model, i.e. in the predicted time series. Figure 5 displays original and smoothed curves for both observed and predicted GDP between 1972 and 2009. There is a distinct break around 1991 in both time series, which is described by a step in <i>A</i> from $400 to $500. The curve before 1991 is also shifted by 1 year relative to that after 1991. This implies the change in the specific age, which is nine years after 1991. </span></p> <p><span>Both segments of the predicted curve explain the 1991 recession. Because of the break, the 1991 reading can not be modelled. Since 1995, the observed growth rate has been hovering around 2% per year. It is a very difficult time series to model. The absence of changes with time means that any variable constant over the same period perfectly explains the observed pattern. Even the smallest difference of 0.5% is seen as a larger deviation, as the right panel of Figure 5 shows. In any case, the rate of GDP growth in the UK will likely remain above the zero line. </span></p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2009 07:08:27 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p><span>Finally, the United Kingdom presents an interesting case, where one can introduce a structural break in the model, i.e. in the predicted time series. Figure 5 displays original and smoothed curves for both observed and predicted GDP between 1972 and 2009. There is a distinct break around 1991 in both time series, which is described by a step in <i>A</i> from $400 to $500. The curve before 1991 is also shifted by 1 year relative to that after 1991. This implies the change in the specific age, which is nine years after 1991. </span></p> <p><span>Both segments of the predicted curve explain the 1991 recession. Because of the break, the 1991 reading can not be modelled. Since 1995, the observed growth rate has been hovering around 2% per year. It is a very difficult time series to model. The absence of changes with time means that any variable constant over the same period perfectly explains the observed pattern. Even the smallest difference of 0.5% is seen as a larger deviation, as the right panel of Figure 5 shows. In any case, the rate of GDP growth in the UK will likely remain above the zero line. </span></p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/146421-predicting-the-u-k-s-real-gdp?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ewu">EWU</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Predicting New Zealand's Real GDP</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/146420-predicting-new-zealand-s-real-gdp?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">146420</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>Following <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/146383-predicting-france-s-real-gdp">France </a>and <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/146419-predicting-germany-s-real-gdp">Germany </a>is New Zealand.</p> <p><span>The model for New Zealand is also obtained by trial-and-error method. Empirical constant <i>A</i> and the specific age have been varied in order to fit amplitude and major features of the observed curve. The best fit value is <i>A</i>=$220 (1990 US$), i.e. less than in France and Germany.  The specific age population in New Zealand is 14 years, which is different from that in the US, Japan, France, and Germany. The age pyramid enumerated by the 2006 census was extrapolated in the past and in the future in order to estimate the number of 14-year-olds in (4). </span></p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2009 07:06:14 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p>Following <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/146383-predicting-france-s-real-gdp">France </a>and <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/146419-predicting-germany-s-real-gdp">Germany </a>is New Zealand.</p> <p><span>The model for New Zealand is also obtained by trial-and-error method. Empirical constant <i>A</i> and the specific age have been varied in order to fit amplitude and major features of the observed curve. The best fit value is <i>A</i>=$220 (1990 US$), i.e. less than in France and Germany.  The specific age population in New Zealand is 14 years, which is different from that in the US, Japan, France, and Germany. The age pyramid enumerated by the 2006 census was extrapolated in the past and in the future in order to estimate the number of 14-year-olds in (4). </span></p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/146420-predicting-new-zealand-s-real-gdp?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/bnz">BNZ</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Predicting Germany's Real GDP</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/146419-predicting-germany-s-real-gdp?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">146419</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>This is a continuation of <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/434499-ivan-kitov/10697-predicting-real-gdp-in-france">the previous post</a>, where the model is presented.</p><p><span>In alphabetical order, the next country to predict the evolution of real GDP per capita is Germany. The best fit constant <i>A</i>=$260 and the defining age is eighteen years. The age distribution from 2002 allows a prediction at an 18-year horizon. From Figure 3, one can expect a slow-down in 2009 and likely a recession in 2011. Here, we would like to accentuate that the prediction of the 2009 slowdown could be obtained in 2002, i.e. seven years before it happened! The estimates of population age structure are slightly noisy, however. Otherwise, the agreement between the observed and predicted curves is excellent after some years of turbulence associated with the reunification. </span></p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2009 07:04:13 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p>This is a continuation of <a href="http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/434499-ivan-kitov/10697-predicting-real-gdp-in-france">the previous post</a>, where the model is presented.</p><p><span>In alphabetical order, the next country to predict the evolution of real GDP per capita is Germany. The best fit constant <i>A</i>=$260 and the defining age is eighteen years. The age distribution from 2002 allows a prediction at an 18-year horizon. From Figure 3, one can expect a slow-down in 2009 and likely a recession in 2011. Here, we would like to accentuate that the prediction of the 2009 slowdown could be obtained in 2002, i.e. seven years before it happened! The estimates of population age structure are slightly noisy, however. Otherwise, the agreement between the observed and predicted curves is excellent after some years of turbulence associated with the reunification. </span></p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/146419-predicting-germany-s-real-gdp?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ewg">EWG</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Predicting France's Real GDP</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/146383-predicting-france-s-real-gdp?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">146383</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p><span>In 2005, we introduced a new concept describing the evolution of real Gross Domestic Product &#40;GDP&#41; as driven by the change in specific age population and the attained level of real GDP per capita [3-6]. According to this model, the growth in real GDP per capita (for the sake of brevity, below we often omit &ldquo;per capita&rdquo;) in developed countries is characterized by an annual increment, as expressed in dollars per year, which is constant over time, and all fluctuations around the long-term trend defined by the increment can be explained by the change in the number of people of country-specific age population. Therefore, real GDP would be growing as a linear function of time, when no change in the population of relevant age is observed. As a rule, in Western Europe the cumulative growth in the specific age population during the last 60 years is negligible and thus the cumulative input of the population component is close to zero. In the USA, the overall increase in the specific age population is responsible for about 20% of the total growth in real GDP since 1960 [4]. The presence of constant increment implies that the rate of growth of real GDP is an inverse function of the attained level of real GDP itself. </span></p> <p><span>Our model of real economic growth was first derived from data for the United States [3] and Japan [7]. Since all GDP time series are intrinsically non-stationary ones we have conducted a comprehensive statistical analysis including tests for cointegration [6]. Both the Engle-Granger and Johansen approaches confirmed the presence of a cointegrating relation between real GDP and the specific age population, which is nine years in the USA and eighteen years in Japan. In this paper, we demonstrate the possibility to predict the evolution of real GDP in France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. </span><span>      Due to shorter time series for these countries, no econometric (statistical) techniques are used to validate the concept except obvious visual fit between dynamic and cumulative time series. </span></p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2009 07:02:04 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p><span>In 2005, we introduced a new concept describing the evolution of real Gross Domestic Product &#40;GDP&#41; as driven by the change in specific age population and the attained level of real GDP per capita [3-6]. According to this model, the growth in real GDP per capita (for the sake of brevity, below we often omit &ldquo;per capita&rdquo;) in developed countries is characterized by an annual increment, as expressed in dollars per year, which is constant over time, and all fluctuations around the long-term trend defined by the increment can be explained by the change in the number of people of country-specific age population. Therefore, real GDP would be growing as a linear function of time, when no change in the population of relevant age is observed. As a rule, in Western Europe the cumulative growth in the specific age population during the last 60 years is negligible and thus the cumulative input of the population component is close to zero. In the USA, the overall increase in the specific age population is responsible for about 20% of the total growth in real GDP since 1960 [4]. The presence of constant increment implies that the rate of growth of real GDP is an inverse function of the attained level of real GDP itself. </span></p> <p><span>Our model of real economic growth was first derived from data for the United States [3] and Japan [7]. Since all GDP time series are intrinsically non-stationary ones we have conducted a comprehensive statistical analysis including tests for cointegration [6]. Both the Engle-Granger and Johansen approaches confirmed the presence of a cointegrating relation between real GDP and the specific age population, which is nine years in the USA and eighteen years in Japan. In this paper, we demonstrate the possibility to predict the evolution of real GDP in France, Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. </span><span>      Due to shorter time series for these countries, no econometric (statistical) techniques are used to validate the concept except obvious visual fit between dynamic and cumulative time series. </span></p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/146383-predicting-france-s-real-gdp?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ewq">EWQ</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Unemployment in Japan Will Be Above 6% by August</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/146310-unemployment-in-japan-will-be-above-6-by-august?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">146310</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p>Since the beginning of 2009, the unemployment rate in Japan has been on rise. The Statistical Bureau of Japan has just announced a severe increase in the (seasonally adjusted) unemployment rate up <a href="http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/roudou/154.htm"><font>to 5.2%</font></a> in May. There was only 4.1%  unemployment in December 2008.</p> <div>We had predicted that effect in our early paper [1] and confirmed the prediction in the detailed study of <span>un</span>employment in Japan [2]. The most recent estimate of the linear link between the unemployment rate and the change in the labor force participation level gave the following relationship:<br> <em><span>UE</span>(t)= -1.5*dLF(t)/LF(t) +0.045 (1)</em></div><div>where <em><span>UE</span></em> is the unemployment rate at time <em>t,</em> <em><span>LF</span></em> is the level of labor force at the same time. Thus, there is no time delay between the change in the<em> L</em>F and <em><span>UE</span></em>, as it observed in many developed countries [3,4].</div>  <div>As with any quantitative prediction of future time series, one can check and validate the underlying relationship using new data. Figure 1 compares the measured unemployment rate in Japan to that predicted from (1). Relevant labor force estimates are <span>also</span> retrieved from the <a href="http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/roudou/154.htm"><font>Statistical Bureau's table</font></a>.</div> <div>Between 1999 and 2008, the prediction is excellent considering the accuracy of both unemployment and labor force measurements. The deviation between the curves observed in 2008 is the largest. However, it does not influence the accuracy of the 2009 prediction, which is definitely outstanding in terms of dynamic resolution. The dramatic increase in unemployment rate is well predicted by relevant fall in the level of labor force; the slope in (1) is negative. Because of the absence of time delay between these two variables, it is difficult to distinguish between action and reaction. Our previous investigations indicate that the change in labor force in the primary source of the change in <span>unemployment</span> and inflation [3,4].</div> <div>Figure 1 <span>demonstrates</span> that the rise in unemployment is not finished yet and it may reach 6% in August 2009. Since the labor force estimates are contemporary to the unemployment one, we can not stretch them into 2010. However, labor force projections for Japan show that the unemployment will approach 5% in the long run, as depicted in Figure 2 borrowed from [2].<br> <img src="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/6/30/434499-124635213225089-Ivan-Kitov.png" hspace="6" vspace="6" /></div> <p>Figure 1. Comparison of observed and <span>predicted</span> unemployment rate in Japan.</p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2009 17:21:00 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p>Since the beginning of 2009, the unemployment rate in Japan has been on rise. The Statistical Bureau of Japan has just announced a severe increase in the (seasonally adjusted) unemployment rate up <a href="http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/roudou/154.htm"><font>to 5.2%</font></a> in May. There was only 4.1%  unemployment in December 2008.</p> <div>We had predicted that effect in our early paper [1] and confirmed the prediction in the detailed study of <span>un</span>employment in Japan [2]. The most recent estimate of the linear link between the unemployment rate and the change in the labor force participation level gave the following relationship:<br> <em><span>UE</span>(t)= -1.5*dLF(t)/LF(t) +0.045 (1)</em></div><div>where <em><span>UE</span></em> is the unemployment rate at time <em>t,</em> <em><span>LF</span></em> is the level of labor force at the same time. Thus, there is no time delay between the change in the<em> L</em>F and <em><span>UE</span></em>, as it observed in many developed countries [3,4].</div>  <div>As with any quantitative prediction of future time series, one can check and validate the underlying relationship using new data. Figure 1 compares the measured unemployment rate in Japan to that predicted from (1). Relevant labor force estimates are <span>also</span> retrieved from the <a href="http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/roudou/154.htm"><font>Statistical Bureau's table</font></a>.</div> <div>Between 1999 and 2008, the prediction is excellent considering the accuracy of both unemployment and labor force measurements. The deviation between the curves observed in 2008 is the largest. However, it does not influence the accuracy of the 2009 prediction, which is definitely outstanding in terms of dynamic resolution. The dramatic increase in unemployment rate is well predicted by relevant fall in the level of labor force; the slope in (1) is negative. Because of the absence of time delay between these two variables, it is difficult to distinguish between action and reaction. Our previous investigations indicate that the change in labor force in the primary source of the change in <span>unemployment</span> and inflation [3,4].</div> <div>Figure 1 <span>demonstrates</span> that the rise in unemployment is not finished yet and it may reach 6% in August 2009. Since the labor force estimates are contemporary to the unemployment one, we can not stretch them into 2010. However, labor force projections for Japan show that the unemployment will approach 5% in the long run, as depicted in Figure 2 borrowed from [2].<br> <img src="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/6/30/434499-124635213225089-Ivan-Kitov.png" hspace="6" vspace="6" /></div> <p>Figure 1. Comparison of observed and <span>predicted</span> unemployment rate in Japan.</p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/146310-unemployment-in-japan-will-be-above-6-by-august?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ewj">EWJ</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Unemployment in Italy Will Reach 11% by 2012</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/146176-unemployment-in-italy-will-reach-11-by-2012?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">146176</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p><strong><span>The model</span></strong></p> <p><span>As originally defined by Kitov (2006a), inflation and unemployment are linear and potentially lagged functions of the change rate of labor force:</span></p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2009 07:57:42 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p><strong><span>The model</span></strong></p> <p><span>As originally defined by Kitov (2006a), inflation and unemployment are linear and potentially lagged functions of the change rate of labor force:</span></p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/146176-unemployment-in-italy-will-reach-11-by-2012?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ewi">EWI</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Predicting Inflation, Unemployment in Germany</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/145989-predicting-inflation-unemployment-in-germany?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">145989</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p><b><span>Abstract</span></b></p> <p><font size="2">Potential links between inflation, <i>p(t),</i> and unemployment, <i>UE(t),</i> in Germany have been examined. There exists a consistent (conventional) Phillips curve despite some changes in monetary policy. This Phillips curve is characterized by a negative relation between inflation and unemployment with the latter leading the former by one year: <i>UE(t-1) = -1.50</i><i>p(t) + 0.116</i>. Effectively, growing unemployment has resulted in decreasing inflation since 1971, i.e. for the period where GDP deflator observations are available. The relation between inflation and unemployment is statistically reliable with R<sup>2</sup>=0.86, where unemployment spans the range from 0.01 to 0.12 and inflation, as represented by GDP deflator, varies from -0.01 to 0.07.</font></p>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2009 13:26:42 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p><b><span>Abstract</span></b></p> <p><font size="2">Potential links between inflation, <i>p(t),</i> and unemployment, <i>UE(t),</i> in Germany have been examined. There exists a consistent (conventional) Phillips curve despite some changes in monetary policy. This Phillips curve is characterized by a negative relation between inflation and unemployment with the latter leading the former by one year: <i>UE(t-1) = -1.50</i><i>p(t) + 0.116</i>. Effectively, growing unemployment has resulted in decreasing inflation since 1971, i.e. for the period where GDP deflator observations are available. The relation between inflation and unemployment is statistically reliable with R<sup>2</sup>=0.86, where unemployment spans the range from 0.01 to 0.12 and inflation, as represented by GDP deflator, varies from -0.01 to 0.07.</font></p><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/145989-predicting-inflation-unemployment-in-germany?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/ewg">EWG</category>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The CPI of Food Revisited</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/article/145968-the-cpi-of-food-revisited?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">145968</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[<p><span>In 2007, we predicted the evolution of several consumer price indices relative to core CPI in the USA [1]. The past twenty months have revealed high turbulence in the behavior of such major expenditure subcategories as energy, food, housing, etc. We are going to compare our predictions with actual observations and revise the predictions where appropriate. Here we start with the index of food. </span></p><div><span>Below is an excerpt from the paper, as devoted to food:</span></div><div> </div><div><span>&ldquo;Figure 7 displays the difference between the core CPI and the index for food for the period after 1960. This curve differs from that in Figure 5. The first large change in the difference occurred in 1973 (not in 1979 as for energy) and lasted only 7 years. Around 1980, the difference started to grow from -7.0 to 13.0 in 1996. Between 1996 and 2003, the difference was effectively constant at the level of ~13.5 units of price index, i.e. a lengthy flat segment was observed. After 2003, the difference has been decreasing at a rate of 1.2 units per year, as Figure 8 demonstrates. </span></div><div><span>Overall, the difference between the core CPI and the food index was always lower than that between the energy index and the core CPI. The largest difference was only around 14 units.   Since 2003, the food price index has been slowly catching up the core CPI. Extrapolating the current linear trend one can estimate the intercept point when the food price index will reach the core CPI. According to Figure 8, this will happen in 2014. Such a behavior differs from that observed for the energy index in terms of timing and amplitude, but the overall behavior distinguishing periods of linear growth and bifurcation is very similar. Therefore, principal mechanisms behind the evolution of the food price index are similar to those behind the energy index. They are likely not related to the changes in supply pressure induced by good crops and draughts. These mechanisms have to be a part of economic system itself and should be related to relationships between economic agent not to production of goods and services. </span></div><div><em><span>click to enlarge</span></em><span></div><div><span><a href="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/6/28/434499-124618506354633-Ivan-Kitov_origin.png" rel="lightbox"><img src="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/6/28/434499-124618506354633-Ivan-Kitov.png" hspace="6" vspace="6" /></a></span></div><div><font size="2">Figure 7. The difference between the core CPI and the index for food between 1960 and 2007. There are three periods of linear trend and two turning periods. The most recent period of linear trend started in 2003. </font></div><div> </div><p><a href="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/6/28/434499-124618509887659-Ivan-Kitov_origin.png" rel="lightbox"><img src="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/6/28/434499-124618509887659-Ivan-Kitov.png" hspace="6" vspace="6" /></a></p></span>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2009 09:51:54 -0400</pubDate>
      <author>Ivan Kitov</author>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[<strong><a href='http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/'>Ivan Kitov</a> submits:</strong><p><span>In 2007, we predicted the evolution of several consumer price indices relative to core CPI in the USA [1]. The past twenty months have revealed high turbulence in the behavior of such major expenditure subcategories as energy, food, housing, etc. We are going to compare our predictions with actual observations and revise the predictions where appropriate. Here we start with the index of food. </span></p><div><span>Below is an excerpt from the paper, as devoted to food:</span></div><div> </div><div><span>&ldquo;Figure 7 displays the difference between the core CPI and the index for food for the period after 1960. This curve differs from that in Figure 5. The first large change in the difference occurred in 1973 (not in 1979 as for energy) and lasted only 7 years. Around 1980, the difference started to grow from -7.0 to 13.0 in 1996. Between 1996 and 2003, the difference was effectively constant at the level of ~13.5 units of price index, i.e. a lengthy flat segment was observed. After 2003, the difference has been decreasing at a rate of 1.2 units per year, as Figure 8 demonstrates. </span></div><div><span>Overall, the difference between the core CPI and the food index was always lower than that between the energy index and the core CPI. The largest difference was only around 14 units.   Since 2003, the food price index has been slowly catching up the core CPI. Extrapolating the current linear trend one can estimate the intercept point when the food price index will reach the core CPI. According to Figure 8, this will happen in 2014. Such a behavior differs from that observed for the energy index in terms of timing and amplitude, but the overall behavior distinguishing periods of linear growth and bifurcation is very similar. Therefore, principal mechanisms behind the evolution of the food price index are similar to those behind the energy index. They are likely not related to the changes in supply pressure induced by good crops and draughts. These mechanisms have to be a part of economic system itself and should be related to relationships between economic agent not to production of goods and services. </span></div><div><em><span>click to enlarge</span></em><span></div><div><span><a href="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/6/28/434499-124618506354633-Ivan-Kitov_origin.png" rel="lightbox"><img src="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/6/28/434499-124618506354633-Ivan-Kitov.png" hspace="6" vspace="6" /></a></span></div><div><font size="2">Figure 7. The difference between the core CPI and the index for food between 1960 and 2007. There are three periods of linear trend and two turning periods. The most recent period of linear trend started in 2003. </font></div><div> </div><p><a href="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/6/28/434499-124618509887659-Ivan-Kitov_origin.png" rel="lightbox"><img src="http://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2009/6/28/434499-124618509887659-Ivan-Kitov.png" hspace="6" vspace="6" /></a></p></span><br/><a href='http://seekingalpha.com/article/145968-the-cpi-of-food-revisited?source=feed'>Complete Story &raquo;</a>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="author" link="http://seekingalpha.com/author/ivan-kitov">Ivan Kitov</category>
    </item>
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