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Rare Earths: A China Price
I am predicting that this "China pricing" will indeed come into being, and that China will reciprocate by bringing into being a two-tiered pricing for metals within its control, in the production of which it dominates the world, the first of which could well be the rare earth metals. I predict that metals in which China dominates world production will be sold for la lower price within China that they are sold in the rest-of-the-world market.
A lower price charged to Chinese customers, producing products for the Chinese domestic market, for rare earth metals produced in China will mean that Chinese manufacturers of end use products critically dependent on the rare earth metals will be able to continue producing those products for the Chinese domestic market without a cost penalty. Any rare earth metals still exported from China or produced outside of China will be able to be sold for much higher prices in the non-Chinese market.
This dual pricing would mean that non-Chinese mining and refining of rare earth metals could be done profitably as it cannot be done now, because the current prices for rare earth concentrates at the mine face are too low for there to be any reasonable return on investment, by western standards, except for miners who now have high concentrations of the heavy rare earths and/or are vertically integrated, such as Canada's Great Western Minerals Group, GWG.V, and Avalon Rare Metals, AVL.TO.
It would be very beneficial to the Chinese domestic rare earth mining industry for a dual pricing situation to come into existence for their products. It would mean that Chinese domestic rare earth production could be dedicated to domestic production of end use items for the home market without pressure from export markets, because it would enable the immediate economic development of non-Chinese rare earth mines to satisfy non-Chinese demand.
I predict that the first production of heavy rare earths by a non-Chinese producer will be offered into the world market at a substantially higher price than is obtained today for such products.
This will drive Chinese domestic production higher as Chinese miners move to shield their domestic market from the necessity of paying higher prices, and this higher production will produce some surplus for export at higher prices thus making Chinese mining more profitable.
The Rare Earth Metals, Uranium, and Thorium: All Commonly Found Together; And All Desired By China
I'm certain that the above clip was edited out from an almost full hour show that ran on the ABC yesterday, Saturday, November 14, 2009, and was a good survey of the current issues in the market fundamentals (i.e., the current supply and demand situation) of the rare earth metals. The nearly hour long show is on the Internet at
The first clip cited above helped me to understand why the Chinese mining industry is interested in the Australian miner, ARAFURA, which I do not mention in my surveys, because, although it is one of the very few "listed" companies with a rare earths' deposit, known as the Nolan's Bore deposit, it is, to the best of my understanding not ready to go forward due to open issues with its "metallurgy." This is the term used in mining to describe the chemical engineering processes needed to economically extract the desired minerals from the mined ore concentrates and then to separate them into their constituent elements in a form in which they can be further processed to usable materials. The main issue is always economics.The metallurgy must finally result in products that will sell for more at that point than they cost to produce. It is very important to note that an environmental issue can have an economic impact on a project that makes the ultimate cost prohibitive even if the chemical processes involved do not on their own make the costs prohibitive.
This comes out strongly in both of the clips above as the Lynas Chairman, Mr. Nick Curtis, alludes to the problems caused for ARAFURA by the fact that their Nolan's Bore ore body contains both of the naturally radioactive elements, uranium and thorium.
An environmental commentator then uses inflammatory words such as "dirty" and "dangerous" to describe what he calls the historical mining of the rare earths (anywhere) through their extraction from formations known to geologists as monazite mineral sands, in which, as Mr. Curtis points out correctly, thorium is always found along with the rare earths.
The commentator goes on to tell us that the citizenry of Darwin, Australia is "concerned" with a plan by ARAFURA to "dump" rare earth processing residues from Nolan's Bore containing "yellowcake ( a common name for the yellow uranium oxide U3O8 ore known as carnotite when found alone) on an island in Darwin harbor. He doesn't mention, or if he does, I didn't note it, the final destination of the thorium from the Nolan's Bore operations.
I'd like to point out to my readers that I didn't know of the Darwin island scheme or that the radioactive residues were such an issue until I heard the ABC commentator and Mr. Curtis' comments during the last two days, but I must admit that I take a different view from theirs.
Perspective is the key to objectivity. So, what is the Chinese perspective on all of this?
China is very interested in uranium for current use and in thorium for future use in nuclear reactors to produce electricity for civilian use without the need to burn fossil fuels. In addition China seeks uranium for its military programs. China last year instructed its domestic rare earth processing plants to hold all thorium produced as a byproduct for government use. This has always been the requirement in China for any uranium produced anywhere.
I'm certain that the current Chinese minority shareholder in ARAFURA would be willing to buy and export to China all of the uranium or thorium produced in Australia by ARAFURA (or anyone else) at market price.
I am not confusing China and Chinese mining companies here; they are one and the same with regard to their primary focus on growing China's economy. I do not see any need to name individual Chinese entities at this point in the discussion.
Mr. Curtis and well known Australian rare earth expert, Dudley Kingsnorth, who once worked for Lynas, both point out that Australian monazite deposits were the source of 25% of the world's rare earths in the 1970s and 1980s and that the thorium (and uranium?) contained in them caused their then refiner, France's Rhodia, SA, to ultimately transfer their processing where possible to China where it was said on the program that environmental controls were less stringent.
What was not said was that until the LYNAS refinery being built in Malaysia is ready-in, perhaps 2-3 years-any ore concentrates produced in Australia by anyone will have to go to China also, even those produced by Lynas, should anyone want to refine them. Mr. Curtis indicated that LYNAS ore does not contain thorium. What he failed to note that even if it does contain thorium and uranium those elements will be recovered either in China or in Malaysia.
What also was not said by anyone on the show was that neither of the Australian deposits has significant amounts of the higher atomic numbered rare earths, dysprosium, terbium, or europium. Interestingly enough the show mentioned those rare earth elements frequently, but failed to mention that they are not present in Australian deposits in any significant amount. The "heavies" come only from China today, but I think they will soon be coming from Canada, the U.S., and the Republic of South Africa.
I'm going to discuss the topic of the relative importance and the relative value of rare earth deposits in a lengthy article to appear in "The Jack Lifton Report" next week after I discuss "who's going to win the race to be the first to produce the heavy rare earths outside of China?" next weekend, November 22 at the Hard Assets Conference in San Francisco at the downtown Marriott. Come by and talk to me at the expert round table there or, if you can't, be sure to read The Jack Lifton Report, www.jackliftonreport.com, next Monday, November 23.
The linkage of the rare earths, thorium, and uranium needs to be taken into account by those who are looking to produce rare earths or invest in their production.
Strategic & Critical Metals in Washington, DC.
The conference was organized and managed by Infocast, www.infocastinc.com, a Los Angeles based firm that produces some 60 conferences a year including many well attended ones on alternate energy (wind and solar, for example) and energy storage (batteries). I was asked several months ago by Infocast if I would work with them to create this conference and help plan its agenda and choose speakers. I agreed, because I wasn't then aware of any other conference themed on this topic, and I wanted to get this theme into the public's awareness. I believe that this was the first public conference open to non specialists on this specific topic.
The list of attendees included a large delegation from Canada's Northwest Territories, a still mostly unexplored treasure house of natural resources (rare earths [Avalon Rare Metals(AVL.TO), North American Tungsten, and the largest diamond mines in the world}, which included representatives of the Territorial government. Additionally. The US Government was also very much in attendance. Over the conference's three days I met individuals from the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Interior.
In addition to Avalon, Canada's Great Western Mining Group (GWG.V), Canada's Commerce Resources (tantalum) (CRZF.PK), America's Molycorp, and American located Canadian owned Rare Element Resources were present.
General Electric (GE.NYSE), Denmark's Vestas (the world's largest maker of wind turbines), and Intel were there, among other global 1000 manufacturing corporations.
Essentially all of America's designers and makers of permanent magnets, Thomas & Skinner, ElectronEnergy, Arnold Magnetics, and Dexter Magnetics were also present.
Trade associations attending included REITA, the Rare Earth Industries Technology Association, the USMMA, the United States Magnet Materials Association, and the MMTA (www.mmta.co.uk), the Minor Metals Trade Association, a UK based international group.
The speakers included officials from both the governments of the US and Canada, mining and metals experts and analysts, and procurement specialists.
The CEO of Infocast told me that Infocast plans to repeat this conference in Asia and to expand its, Infocast's, footprint in the rare metals information space as it pertains to alternate energy and cleantech.
I will be posting excerpts from the conference presentations and my commentaries on them here and on my new web site, "The Jack Lifton Report," www.jackliftonreport.com, in the near future.
In the meantime, for your edification, I am going to list below the URLs for some videos I made during the conference. There are two summary commentaries by me, and two interviews by me of prominent people, Dave Trueman (rare metals geologist) and John Kaiser (mining analyst and publisher of the Kaiser Bottom Fish, www.kaiserbottomfish.com )who attended and/or spoke at the conference.
Jack Lifton in Washington Part 1 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XKNpnWZkxl0
Jack Lifton in Washington Part 2 - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5mlJbnxsXHk
Jack Lifton with John Kaiser - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCUZbt1CgnM
Jack Lifton with Dr. Dave Truman - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pkVuYqLAoR4
A Note To Institutional Investors On The Creation Of a New Security For Investing In Rare Metals New Production By Mining And By Recycling Industrial Process Scrap
Sorry about the formatting and variance in font sizes; I am still an amateur at some of this.
Outlook for the strategic and critical rare metals for technology
Summary
A “strategic metal” can be defined, economically, as one that is necessary to or important in the start up, operation, or completion of a long term plan (i.e., a strategic plan) to mass produce or manufacture items, collectively or individually, which require large amounts of metal. For example the plan by a private business to construct an office building must consider the cost and availability of structural steel as a strategic necessity; this seems trivial at first glance, but it becomes very important when the strategic metals are or include even one rare “critical metal”, defined as one for which there is no substitute (in performance or economics) so that without it the project cannot be implemented or continued without guaranteeing the security of the supply of the particular specific metal. For example advanced jet engines that burn less fuel and are more efficient usually operate at higher temperatures than the ones they replace; such engines all require alloys that use the extremely rare metal rhenium and the very rare metal yttrium. If the engine cannot be produced or sold without meeting specifications that can only be assured by making some of its components from rhenium and yttrium alloys then without insuring the security of supply of these two metals beforehand the project may, in reality, be too risky to even start. Yet until now such considerations of insuring the security of supply have commonly been either overlooked or ignored.
This is because until the twenty-first century’s global explosion of demand for high technology goods procurement officials at private companies assumed that the market forces of demand and price would always combine to make supplies of all metals available competitively. It was commonly believed that these forces applied equally to all metals including the rare ones, which, like gold, it was assumed, would and could always be available, given enough time to accumulate them, in any desired quantity if one was willing to meet the market price. Thus all metals were viewed as commodity metals subject to and reacting in the same way to market forces.
Thus the rarity of a metal was assumed, if any thought was given to its procurement as a special project, to be caused by a production rate limitation; some metal ores were harder to find, but, given enough time and money, it was assumed, any metal could be obtained. This assumption is wrong; it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding by business and government economists of geology and mining and refining engineering.
In order to educate ourselves and understand the fundamental error we need to ask:
1. How are metals produced, which is to say where do the metals we can use actually come from?
2. What quantities of new metals are produced each year, and can the production rates of any or all of them now be increased beyond 2008 levels, or can or will the production rates for some of them actually decrease?, and
3. How does the location of the production sites for any and all metals factor into their availability, if at all?
How are metals produced?
This is not a trivial question. In fact there are two and only two possible sources for the production of any metal.
First of all, and primarily, the metal can be mined from an accessible and large enough ore deposit of high enough grade (percentage of desired material in the whole) so that currently available technology can economically
If any one of these steps is not possible or uneconomical then the metal will have no commercial use until such time as that step in the chain becomes economical.
Second, if a sufficient quantity of either the industrial scrap left over from the fabrication of the desired products or if the end products themselves have a high enough content of the desired metals or metals then the industrial process scrap or the worn out products may be inserted into the above enumerated processes at an appropriate place and then processed until the metal once again has been through step 5 above. At this point the metal is indistinguishable from the metal produced from ore and is said to have been “recycled.”
Logic applied to the above metric tells us that mining exploration is always the first step; this process is commonly known as exploration and is a meticulous operation characterized as much by luck and “experience” as by geological knowledge. Exploration is mostly the provenance of “junior” miners defined as those who mostly explore for valuable minerals in the hope that they will be able to find and characterize deposits the intrinsic value of which will lead to their sale to larger mining companies that will develop and mine the minerals, a very, very expensive and time-consuming process.
Junior mining companies frequently announce “discoveries” of desirable minerals and metals and those discoveries most often are of small amounts of material, which the junior miner hopes will be the precursor of an accessible, minable, large, high-grade ore body.
Institutional investors normally are very conservative with regard to committing to the large investments necessary to bring an ore discovery into final production, which we will define as the completion of step 3 above-this is usually as far as the “mine” goes. The main reasons for such reticence are the considerable sums necessary prior to any evaluation of the deposit just to see if the ore body is large enough and rich enough so that if it is accessible and the chemical processes exist or can be developed to recover the desired metals or minerals the mine’s final product can be sold at a profit at the end of step 3 above. The volatility of commodity metal prices over the last century and a half have made mining finance into a high risk game that is difficult to hedge against loss.
However a change has now occurred in the world of metals that is only now being perceived by institutional investors. The recent recession caused the commodity metals, which I call the structural metals, to drop precipitously in demand and price after nearly a decade of record increases in their production. Rare metals prices mimicked structural metals prices during most of the recession, but now the rare metals are described as “leading the recovery.” Actually this is not entirely correct. What is happening is that the rare metals are in fact qualitatively different in their uses from the structural metals; they are the “technology metals,” and the market for them is now standing on its own.
The main issue surrounding the supply of the rare metals that are the new strategic and critical metals of the age of technology is that both their availability in nature and their rates of production and recycling are limited.
Institutional investors have up until now confused the economics of widely available structural metals with those of the technology metals. An increased demand for structural metals can and will cause an increase in their supply. Also price can and will drive supplies of structural metals to the highest bidder. These simple rules do not apply to the procurement of the technology metals, because the most important factor for them is their availability in large enough and rich enough ore bodies (or, as we will discuss, as byproducts of structural metals) to be produced economically at all. Even where such ore bodies occur the rate of production (of any metal) is determined by its accessibility to logistics, water, and energy. Mines of any type also take a very long time to be brought into production.
The most common error made by institutional investors in assessing the net present value of a rare metal ore body is the misconception that the relative amount of a metal in the earth’s crust or in the ocean is a measure of the availability and accessibility of that metal for use. The distribution of a metal in the earth’s crust or ocean has absolutely nothing to do with its availability or accessibility. Both of these issues are measured only by the availability and accessibility of large high grade deposits of the ores of these metals in regions of the earth where the infrastructure of logistics, electricity, water, and labor are economically available, or when any or all of the elements of the infrastructure have to be created in order to mine the metal the cost of such infrastructure creation when amortized and placed as a liability of the mine still result in a selling price for the metal that is competitive. Of course for a critical metal for the military or for health is involved the calculation of price may become secondary to availability.
What quantities of new metals are produced each year, and can the production rates of any or all of them be increased or will the production rates for some of them actually decrease?
Global New Metal Production in All Time Record Year, 2008
Metal New Mine Production Metal New Mine Production
Metric Tons Metric Tons
Iron Ore 2,000,000,000 Uranium 41,279 (2007)
Raw Steel 1,360,000,000 Rare Metals
Pig Iron 958,000,000 Lithium 27,400 Aluminum 39,700,000 Silver 20,900
Copper 15,700,000 Cadmium 20,800
Chromium 20,000
Manganese 14,000,000 Yttrium 8,900
Zinc 11,300,000 Bismuth 5,800
Lead 3,800,000 Boron 4,100
Nickel 1,610,000 Gold 2,330
Magnesium 808,000 Selenium 1,590
Strontium 512,000 Zirconium 1,360
Tin 333,000 Tantalum 815
Molybdenum 212,000 Indium 568
Antimony 165,000 Platinum 200
Rare Earths (15 metals) 124,000 Palladium 200
Cobalt 71,800 Germanium 105
Vanadium 60,000 Gallium 95
Niobium 60,000 Rhenium 45
Tungsten 54,000 Rhodium 30
Hafnium 25
Tellurium UNKNOWN
Scandium UNKNOWN
Thorium UNKNOWN
There may be some quantitative errors in the list above; but there are no qualitative errors. The production ratios of the listed metals are accurate. As an example of an extreme, the production of raw steel in 2008 was equal to one million pounds of raw steel for each one pound of zirconium produced! For each nine hundred thousand pounds of aluminum produced in 2008 there was produced less than 15 ounces of the metal critical for the manufacturing of efficient and high temperature operation jet and rocket engines, rhenium.
The above list details the global production for 2008 of the most important metals of all types for our civilization; the totals represent the production rate achieved after a decade of the most available finance ever proffered to the global mining industry. Some of the resources and reserves of even the most common metals are now nearing the exhaustion of high grade (high percentage content of the desired metal) and new technologies for recovering them from lower grades must now be developed. Such recovery technology is time consuming, expensive, and frequently leads to dead-ends. Such “improved’ technological development therefore cannot be predicted to simply just happen even over a long time frame. Spaceship earth has finite recoverable resources, and so the questions become can we significantly increase the global production of new metal or are increases from now on going to be only marginal, if at all, and when, not if, will new metal production rates decline?
Just a note here about recycling: Our civilization has wasted many rare metals by either not simply recovering them when it would have been most economical and most practical or by using them in dissipative ways thus creating “grades’ of scrap too poor in rare metals content to be economically or even practically recoverable with current technology.
This waste cannot continue if there is to be widespread use of green technologies for producing and using energy without the burning of fossil fuels. There is no green path to the future without mining and using rare metals.
How does the location of the production sites for any and all metals factor into their availability, if at all?
For the US economy, currently the world’s largest economy, and the location, according to the National Mining Association of the most diversified natural resource base of any country in the world the reliance upon imports for 100% of strategic and critical natural resources , as calculated by the United States Geological Service, had grown by the end of 2008 to more than 25 metals. This figure has tripled in the first decade of the twenty-first century, but the incredible part of this growing reliance by the USA on imported metals is that in almost every case, for each metal, the USA has accessible and available domestic resources of the metals upon which it has become resource reliant. Unlike any other industrialized or industrializing country on earth the USA has stopped creating wealth producing its own strategic and critical resources even those required critically by its own military and non-fossil fuel energy producing and using industries!
China, Japan, Korea, and the European Union all have strategic stockpile programs in place to inventory a growing list of strategic and critical metals to safe guard their security of supply for both their civilian and military industries. The EU, for example, has identified 40 metals as being qualified to be considered strategic and critical for the economic preservation of its industrial base.
The USA has not amended its Defense Strategic Stockpile Act since 1979, and therefore the USA does not even consider any of the technology metals to be critical much less strategic.
It is only a matter of time before a general technology metals supply crisis erupts in the USA and the time during which the USA can become a participant in the global race to produce and stockpile strategic and critical metals both physically and through ownership and operation of their sources is running out.
Unless American bankers recognize that availability and production rate are just as important market drivers as demand and price the US will soon fall behind permanently in its ability to support high technology industries and any green revolution will be dependent on imported natural resources and technologies.
(This space is supposed to be occupied by the chart put out by the USGS lisitng the import reliance of the USA in 2008 for selected metals and minerals. You can find it at http://www.nma.org/pdf/m_reliance.pdf )
A great deal has been written in the last month about China reducing its export allocation of the rare earths, of which it today is the world’s sole supplier. The global investment community has responded to China’s determination to be self sufficient in supplying and developing its domestic high and green technology base by running up the share prices of the few rare earth mines in development outside of China
I call on institutional investors to underwrite the development of natural resources by assigning a risk of future production factor to selected mining opportunities and securitizing off-take agreements negotiated with the best of the mines to be developed, so that such securities may be traded and priced to develop a basis for planning by industry and government for security of supply of the rare metals critical for the future of green technology.
I offer to assemble a committee of mining experts and economists to create a new metric for assigning risk to such securities, and to start the process with a study of the world’s rare earth mining opportunities. Are there any interested parties out there?
There is no way to set the USA “On The Green Road” without secure access to the raw materials critical for green technologies to be manufactured in such quantities so as to be pervasive.
Introducing "On The Green Road." My talk at the Annual General Meeting of Great Western Minerals Group in Saskatoon, SK, on September 10, 2009
I have now in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, introduced a concept that I intend to develop as a documentary film series and also to use, from now on, to define the importance and the order of priority of the supply chain basics that include and begin with hard rock mining for rare metals and go on from there to list all of of the processes required to manufacture the high technology devices from them, upon which our technological civilization is more and more dependent, and without which rare metals most of those high technology devices simply could not be built.
I call the concept the journey "On The Green Road" to the sustainable energy future.
I formally introduced this concept last Thursday, Sep. 10, 2009, at the annual general meeting of Canada's Great Western Minerals Group (GWG.V) in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. Great Western's report to its shareholders, delivered to them before my talk, by its Chairman, Gary Billingsley, and its President, Jim Engdahl, were a revelation to me of just how far GWMG has come on its own path since the grim days of early 2009.
Not only has GWMG come back from a financial near death experience, but it has been reborn with its debt under control; its shares trading at a velocity such that its entire float has turned over in the last 60 days (nearly 200 million shares traded when GWMG has a total of just that issued and authorized); and an outstanding portfolio of high grade rare earth deposits in Canada, The Republic of South Africa, and the United States that positons it, in my opinion, to be the first non Chinese mining company ever to produce the heavy rare earths dysprosium and terbium outside of China. As I have told you before another very fine Canadain miner, Avalon Rare Metals (AVL.TO) is also going to produce those heavy rare earths within 3 years, and I did write this summer that I thought that Avalon would be the first in the world, outside of China, to do so, but GWMG may well have taken the lead now. I will shortly write you a report on the GWMG annual general meeting announcements that lead me to this handicapping conclusion, but today I want to direct you to the 3 videos now posted on YouTube of my talk at that meeting.
I promise in the videos to publish my definiton of the "Green Road, which I read to the Saskatoon audience, and I will do that tomorrow, Sunday, Sep. 13, 2009, along with some of the text of that talk, which I think I would like you to be able to ponder leisurely.
The following videos are from just the one talk, but the rules of the Internet rquired that they be broken into segments of 10 minutes or less. I thank Gord Dent, the communications director of GWMG for posting them, and I thank Ron Malashewski, GWMG's Investor Relations Manager for his participation in that decision.
If occasionally my civility slips for a moment when i am talking about the national governments of the USA and Canada I apologize. I also mean no disrespect to the very skilled chemical engineers and metallurgists who work at producing rare earths in the USA; they are very good at what they do and among the world's best in their profession.
1. http://video.google.com/videosearch?hl=en&source=hp&q=%22Jack%20Lifton%22&um=1&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=wv#
2. http://video.google.com/videosearch?hl=en&source=hp&q=%22Jack%20Lifton%22&um=1&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=wv#
3. http://video.google.com/videosearch?hl=en&source=hp&q=%22Jack%20Lifton%22&um=1&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=wv#
Is The Rare Earth Supply Crisis Due to Peak Production Capability or Capacity?