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I have been investing since 1998 (age 16) when I saved nearly all my money from working on my winter break from high school, and invested it according to the value investing principles I had read about in Warren Buffett’s shareholder letters and books about value investing. After high school,... More
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  • August 2009 Investment – IMS Health, Inc. – Ticker: RX – BUY:
    Executive Summary
    Ø       Attractive and Sustainable Return on Invested Capital
    o        Exceeded 100% over the past ten years
    o        High customer switching costs should help sustain returns on invested capital over a long time period
    Ø       Management Team Focused on Delivering Value to Shareholders
    o        CEO has meaningful equity ownership in the Company
    o        The Company has consistently delivered excess cash flow back to shareholders through dividends, stock buybacks, and paying down debt
    Ø       Attractive Valuation
    o        Current stock price implies an 18% normalized free cash flow yield
    o        Market is mistaking the impact from the recession with a long-term secular decline in the Company’s free cash flow
     
    Is IMS Health a Good Company?
    The IMS Health, Inc. (“IMS”, “RX”, or the “Company”) provides mission critical information to pharmaceutical companies globally, such as sales territory reporting and prescription tracking. In other words, the Company tells pharmaceutical companies where their products are being sold. The Company was founded in 1954, and is headquartered in Norwalk, Connecticut.
    Information and Analytics (77% of 2008 Revenue)
    IMS gathers data from pharmacies, wholesalers, prescription benefit managers (“PBM”s), and doctors to determine which doctors prescribe particular drugs.  Pharmaceutical companies pay millions of dollars each year for this data to (i) compensate their sales force, (ii) allocate resources (advertising dollars, sales force members, etc.) appropriately to optimize sales, (iii) and provide information to Wall Street analysts regarding market share and unit sales data. 
     
    Consulting (23% of 2008 Revenue)
    IMS uses the above referenced data to provide consulting services, such as forecasting demand for particular drugs, advice for optimizing marketing spend, and selling reports to healthcare industry analysts. Economic downturns and other events that negatively impact the pharmaceutical industry’s profitability impact this portion of the business more than the information and analytics business, as these services are normally not as critical to pharmaceutical companies.
     
    As of December 31, 2008, IMS employed approximately 7,500 people.  None of the employees are represented by a union.  The Company’s capital expenditures are primarily related to developing software tools and upgrading information technology to better gather and analyze prescription data.
     
    Over the past 10 years, the Company has earned excellent returns on capital, exceeding 100% every year. Below I will discuss the factors that drive such high returns on invested capital, and why I believe those returns can be preserved over long periods of time. 
     
    The prescription information and analytics market is characterized by limited competition from the following major companies, (i) IMS Health, (ii) SDI, (iii) Taylor Nelson, (iv) Cegedim, and (v) Wolters Kluwer. Note that IMS is the only company that offers pharmaceutical sales information globally. The market possesses relatively high barriers to entry with only one company attempting to compete globally during the past 10 years. Based on conversations with former employees and customers, the Company’s global footprint provides a critical benefit to customers, as data is consistent across geographic territories and pricing is lower buying a single global solution versus buying several individual market reports from IMS’s competitors. Further, once a customer subscribes to data from a particular provider, the pharmaceutical company will not likely to switch to an alternate provider, because the customers’ sales force is compensated based on that data, and therefore customers need to make sure the data is consistent and accurate to avoid compensation disputes with the sales force. Since customers are unlikely to switch, IMS buys more data than its competitors at higher prices from its data suppliers, as IMS can spread those costs over several large pharmaceutical company budgets, which allows them to obtain 70% of all prescription related data globally. Further, IMS signs supplier agreements that include most favored nation (“MFN”) clauses that stipulate that IMS receives the lowest price for the information it buys. These clauses effectively make it more difficult for smaller competitors to compete. For example, let’s say IMS pays $10MM to a pharmaceutical chain in Italy for its prescription drug sales data. A competitor would need to offer at least $5MM to the same chain to make selling data to it worthwhile, as IMS would reduce its payments from $10MM to $5MM under the MFN clause of the contract. This example does not account for the administration burden of providing the information to two providers. The competitor may not be able to offer $5MM, because it has fewer and smaller customers. Lastly, IMS possesses the largest and longest historical set of pharmaceutical sales data in the industry, which has enabled it to create superior algorithms (100+ patented algorithms) that help estimate the remaining 30% of prescriptions written where IMS does not receive the actual data. The Company is also able to utilize its algorithms for other commercial purposes, such as projecting future drug sales.
     
    Risks to Cash Flows
    There are several risks to the Company’s cash flows, including: (i) the increasing prevalence of generic drugs, as generic manufacturers do not use the Company’s services, because marketing is deemphasized by these companies in order to maintain a cost advantage over branded drugs, (ii) potential future consolidation of the pharmaceutical industry would create less customers, which could increase customer bargaining power over time, and (iii) any healthcare reforms that would decrease the profitability of the drug companies in the future could put pressure on the Company’s consulting business, as pharmaceutical companies tighten selling expense budgets. 
     
    While large pharmaceutical companies’ pipeline of new drugs is dwindling, and their existing drugs are increasingly coming off patent (and therefore subject to generic competition), I view this development as a temporary phenomenon. Over the long-term, new drugs will be invented by both large pharmaceutical companies and smaller biotechnology firms that will fuel the new drug pipeline, and increase demand for IMS’s services. In my opinion, most Wall Street analysts are focused on this issue, because their time horizon is less than mine. Further, given the lack of alternatives for global data and the high customer switching costs, IMS should be able to maintain its pricing power despite pharmaceutical industry consolidation.
     
    While single-payor reform in the U.S. would likely negatively impact pharmaceutical profits, the amount of selling expense spent on IMS products is relatively small (under 2% of large pharmaceutical companies’ budgets), and IMS’s market position should allow them to maintain pricing. Additionally, it is important to note that 60%+ of the Company’s revenues are generated outside the United States (including several countries with state run healthcare). Further, some Wall Street analysts seem focused on the fact that New Hampshire recently passed a law banning linking prescriptions written to the doctors who wrote them. However, the New Hampshire decision has not impacted the price IMS charges for those sales territories, as companies like IMS are still able to link back sales data to the sales representatives’ territory. Further, the movement to pass these laws is dwindling with only three states still considering this type of law compared to 23 at the beginning of the year.
     
    Does IMS have a Good Management Team?
    The IMS management team is lead by David Carlucci. He has been Chief Executive Officer since January 2005.  Prior to becoming CEO, he was COO of IMS. Prior to IMS, David held senior management roles at IBM. David has grown ROIC consistently since he became CEO, and has returned substantially all free cash flow to shareholders through dividends, share buybacks, and paying down debt, as the Company does not require large amounts of capital to grow. David owns $5.2MM worth of IMS common stock or ~6x his base salary, ensuring that he will continue to keep a shareholder mindset.
     
    Can IMS be Bought at a Cheap Price?
    After examining the past 10 years of financial information, I believe that normalized pre-tax equity free cash flow is ~$430MM. At Wednesday’s closing per share price of $13.08, IMS’s market capitalization is ~$2,386MM, which means the stock has an 18% pre-tax equity free cash flow yield. If IMS trades at a 7% pre-tax equity free cash flow yield, which would be appropriate for this high quality Company with a potential emerging markets growth story, the stock will rise to ~$34 without any earnings growth, making the stock a compelling buy at $13.08. Please note that Wall Street appears to be assuming that the Company’s free cash flow is in secular decline, rather than just going through a cyclical decline. However, due to tightening budgets in the healthcare industry during times of extreme economic duress, the Company has always lost consulting revenue during recessions, and I believe the Company will return to pre-recession free cash flow levels, as the Company has historically done after prior periods of economic difficulty.
     
    As always, please feel free to contact with any questions, or if you would like to discuss my research further.
     
    Thank you,
     
    Matt Darrah
     
    Tags: RX, Value investing, investment newsletter, return on invested capital, free cash flow yield
    Aug 19 10:45 pm | Link | Comment!
  • May 14th, 2009 Investment – STARZ Group. – Ticker: LSTZA (Pending) – BUY:
    Executive Summary
    o   &... Extremely cheap valuation
    §   &... You can purchase LSTZA for less than its cash balance net of debt
    o   &... LSTZA currently earns high returns on invested capital, but there are serious threats to those returns
    §   &... However, returns on invested capital will likely erode slowly
    o   &... I can’t yet assess management’s capital allocation skills, but a major shareholder has historically been a wise capital allocator

    Overview of STARZ Group

     

    The STARZ Group (“STARZ” or “LSTZA”) operates the cable movie channels STARZ and Encore. The Company is headquartered in Englewood, Colorado, and has ~900 employees. STARZ is not currently publically traded, however, by establishing a long position in one public company and a short position in another, you can effectively create a holding in LSTZA. I will discuss how to do this in more detail in the sections below.
    STARZ and Encore are cable movie channels that have obtained exclusive rights to show certain Sony and Disney films during a set period of time after a movie is released. STARZ’s contract with Sony expires in 2016 and Disney expires in 2012. 
    The STARZ and Encore channels are typically included as part of a basic digital cable or satellite dish package (Comcast is the only exception, where subscribers can pay an additional amount per month to have STARZ’s channels). Cable and satellite dish companies enter into long term contracts that pay STARZ on a per subscriber basis. STARZ’s networks have over 200MM subscribers. The contracts also contain inflationary price escalators. Since the Company has approximately half of the studio relationships that HBO does, and lacks extensive original programming, STARZ receives a much lower price per subscriber compared to HBO and other Tier 1 channels. That said, STARZ is working with its sister company, STARZ Media, to develop original programming. Liberty Media owns STARZ media, and STARZ Media will not be split-off with STARZ. Two of the Company’s contracts with cable companies expire this year, which creates uncertainty around the Company’s cash flows. The Company occupies the #1, #2, and #3 HD video-on-demand (“VOD”) positions in terms of minutes watched and the #2, #3, and #4 positions for non-HD VOD. 
     
    Note the Company also owns 32% of Wildblue, a provider of internet services to primarily rural customers. However, the value of Wildblue is not material to STARZ, and thus will not be discussed thoroughly in this report.
     
    While complete balance sheet information is unavailable, based on income statement data, capital expenditure data, and by examining competitors’ balance sheets, I know that returns on invested capital have historically exceeded my 25% threshold. However, I am concerned that certain factors may erode those returns over time, which is why we must buy the stock at an extremely low price.
     
    My primary concern relates to the fact that STARZ and Encore appear to simply be acting as “middle-men” between the cable companies and Sony and Disney. While the aggregation of content is valuable, I don’t believe that such high returns on invested capital can be earned over long periods of time from this activity. Sony and Disney may try to publish their content directly with their own network, or cable or dish networks may buy content directly to Sony and Disney. Perhaps Sony and Disney will just continue charging higher rates for their content, which will erode cash flows over time. While I am concerned about these risks, and would not pay a price that did not reflect these concerns, from discussing this issue with numerous industry contacts, I believe it is unlikely that STARZ will not be dis-intermediated.&... and MGM are trying to establish their own cable channel right now, but have been unable to gain even one distribution contract with a cable company or dish provider, because the cable line-up is already so crowded (you know the old joke about having 300 channels, but nothing being on). You might ask that if the cable line-up is so crowded, why not eliminate STARZ? The reason cable companies will not terminate their relationship with STARZ is that their competitors (satellite companies) would likely still continue to carry STARZ to lure cable subscribers to satellite. The cost per subscriber of carrying STARZ is ~$2.80, but as you can imagine, the cable companies losing a customer costs much more than $2.80.

     

    Does STARZ have a Good Management Team?
    The STARZ management team is lead by Robert Clasen. He has been Chief Executive Officer since January 2002.  Robert previously held executive positions at Comcast.  Industry sources tell me that the STARZ management team is earnest and smart. While I am impressed by Robert’s ability to double the subscriber base since he took over, cash flow has actually declined over that same period of time (primarily due to higher programming cost). Further, I can not yet assess Robert’s capital allocation discipline, as STARZ has not historically been a separate, publicly traded entity. Again, this fact pattern requires a low valuation in order to protect ourselves from unwise capital allocation decisions.That said, Liberty Media’s chairman John Malone will hold a substantial position of STARZ stock after the split-off (~5% ownership). Histo... John Malone has created wealth for his shareholders at Tele-Communications, Inc. and Liberty Media, and I believe his ownership provides some protection against management making unwise capital allocation decisions.

     

    How Do You Buy LSTZA if it is Not Publically Traded?
     

    Liberty Media (“LMDIA”) currently owns 100% of STARZ Group, 32% of WildBlue, 54% of DirecTV, 65% of FUN Technologies (online gaming company), 50% of the Game Show Network, and 100% of three regional sports networks. On September 3rd, 2008, Liberty Media announced it was splitting up these assets into two publically traded companies, STARZ Group and Liberty Entertainment (“LEI”).&a... Group will own the STARZ and Encore Networks, as well as the 32% interest in Wild Blue. Additionally, STARZ will have $650MM in case and $52MM of debt. The remaining assets will be held by LEI. For every one share of LMDIA you own, you will receive 0.9 shares of LEI and 0.1 shares of LSTZA.

    On May 4th, DirectTV (“DTV”) announced it will merge with LEI after the split-off occurs. For every one share of LEI you own, you will receive 1.1 shares of DTV in the merger. Therefore, if you owned one share of LMDIA before the split, you would own 0.9 shares of LEI after the split, which would be converted into 1 share of DTV (1.1 times 0.9). This means that for every one share of LMDIA that you own, you will receive 0.1 shares of LSTZA and 1 share of DTV after the split-off and merger.

    Since you know that when the merger is completed you will receive one share of DTV for every one share of LMDIA, you can buy 1 share of LMDIA and short one share of DTV, and those positions will cancel each other out after the merger, because you will then be long one share of DTV and short one share of DTV. Rather than provide a long primer about shorting stocks in the newsletter, give me a call or send me an e-mail if you would like to learn more about shorting, and how the trade will work. Since the shares of DTV and LEI cancel each other out, you will be left holding 0.1 shares of LSTZA, which is what I am recommending you buy this month.

    I would like to note a few problems/risks to creating LSTZA.

    First, the merger between DTV and LEI might fall through. In that case, the price of the target (LMDIA) would fall and the price of the acquirer DTV would rise, and you would thus lose money on both your long position in LMDIA and your short position in DTV. A common way to assess your downside if a deal falls through is to ask how much you would lose if the shares of both stocks reverted to what each was trading at before the deal was announced.  This methodology implies a 6% loss. That said, I don’t think the deal will fall through, as John Malone already controls DirectTV through Liberty Media, so antitrust regulators and the FCC should not be concerned about the change in structure.  Further, the split-off was already approved by the FCC. Also, I believe shareholders will approve the transactions, because they realize that this transaction is the best way to maximize value.  Post transaction, investors will able to more appropriately value both companies (at higher values), because right now it is difficult to value a company like LMDIA with such diverse assets and cash flows streams.

    Another challenge to this investment is that you have to outlay ~$24.90 (share price of LMDIA) to obtain just $0.36 of LSTZA (see more details in the section below). While this dynamic is frustrating, I still believe the trade is worth executing given the low valuation of LSTZA that I will discuss in the below section. Given the low downside risk to the long LMDIA/ short DTV trade, I would encourage a larger than usual position in this investment, so that you can own a material position in LSTZA at the low valuation I will discuss below.
     
    Furthermore, LSTZA is a tracking stock, which means that the stock of LSTZA does not technically represent an ownership interest in LSTZA, as LMDIA retains ownership of LSTZA, but the LSTZA tracking stock receives the cash flows associated with the LSTZA assets. Note that this type of security normally trades in the public market at a discount to a typical common stock.
     
    Can LSTZA be Bought at a Cheap Price?
    By purchasing one share of LMDIA and shorting one share of DTV at yesterday’s closing price, you create 0.1 share of LSTZA for $0.36 or $3.60 per share. $3.60 per share implies a $186MM market capitalization, but LSTZA has $600MM of cash net of debt on its books, so essentially you get to buy $600MM of cash and STARZ for $186MM. Last year STARZ generated ~$270MM of pre-tax cash flow, and I expect that to increase in 2009. This implied valuation is ridiculously cheap, which is why I can get comfortable with all the difficulty in executing the trade and the risks to LSTZA’s cash flows.
    As always, please feel free to contact with any questions, or if you would like to discuss my research further.  Note that if you are having trouble visualizing this, I have some charts that may be helpful.  Please subscribe to my monthly newsletter and I will send you a copy.
     
    Thank you,
     
    Matt Darrah
    Dallas, TX
    972-974-1633
     
    Disclosure:  Long LMDIA, Short DTV

     

    Note:   This publication is a free newsletter and not a solicitation to buy or sell securities. The publication may be forwarded to other people, as long as the forwarder does not alter this document in any way and includes the headers and footers. Anyone interested in joining the distribution list can contact Matt Darrah at www.mdcapitalmanagemen...
     
    © Matthew Darrah, 2009.

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Tags: LMDIA, DTV, Value Investing, Investment Newsletter
    May 14 09:22 am | Link | Comment!
  • April 23rd, 2009 Investment Idea: Lorillard, Inc. – Ticker: LO – BUY

    Executive Summary

    Ø       Negative Invested Capital Business
    o        Because the Company is paid by customers immediately, but is able to pay its suppliers over time, the Company does not need additional capital to grow
    o        Brand loyalty and the Company’s proven ability to raise prices should sustain its current level of pre-tax cash flow over a long time period
    Ø       Management Team Focused on Delivering Value to Shareholders
    o        Management has stated their goal of returning all free cash flow to shareholders, and has done so for the past five years
    o        Lowest cost operator in the industry
    Ø       Attractive Valuation
    o        Current stock price implies a 14% normalized free cash flow yield
    o        Market is concerned about the prospect of FDA regulation and the recently announced increase in Federal Excise Tax on cigarettes (“FET”).
     
    Is Lorillard a Good Company?
    Lorillard, Inc. (“Lorillard”, “LO”, or the “Company”) manufactures and markets the #1 menthol cigarette brand, Newport. The Newport brand accounted for 94% of sales in 2008. The Company sells its products primarily through wholesale distributors to grocery, convenience, and other retail locations. The Company was founded in 1760, and is headquartered in Greensboro, North Carolina. 
    Each year, the cigarette market experiences decreases in the number of cigarettes sold, as customers quit smoking. Further, some consumers switch to discount brands, as cigarettes become more expensive due to increased taxes and legal settlement costs that are passed along to the consumer. The number of cigarettes sold has declined at a ~4% compounded annual growth rate since 2004. However, cigarette companies have grown revenues over this same time period through price increases. Additionally, both premium brands and menthol have increased their share of the overall market since 2002 (premium brands have gone from 68% of the market in 2002 to 73% of the market in 2008, while menthol cigarettes have gone from 26% of the market in 2002 to 29% in 2008). Additionally, Newports have steadily increased their share of the menthol market from 28.6% in 2002 to 33.7% in 2008.

     

    Lorillard purchases 80%+ of its leaf tobacco (~35% of cost of goods sold) from Alliance One, however alternative suppliers are available. Reynolds manufactures 100% of its reconstituted tobacco (~15% of cost of goods sold), however alternative suppliers for this process are available.  As of December 31, 2008, Lorillard employed approximately 2,800 people.  Three unions represent approximately 1,000 of Lorillard’s employees. The Company spends capital expenditures on replacing/modernizing manufacturing equipment (few growth related capital expenditures necessary).

    The Company has consistently operated with negative capital requirements, as the Company requires customers to pay them immediately, but pays vendors over longer, commercially standard terms. Further, the Company operates out of a single facility in Greensboro, North Carolina, which is considered best-in-class in terms of efficiency. Further, those in the industry regard management as the most cost conscious in the industry, and therefore corporate costs are lower than its competitors. All of these factors result in Lorillard having the lowest cost/highest operating profit per pack of cigarettes in the industry.

    Below I will discuss the factors that will allow the Company to continue earning at least its current level of free cash flow over long periods of time. Note that the economic slowdown has not materially impacted free cash flows, but free cash flow has fluctuated historically due to legal settlement costs. Further, the Company’s stock frequently falls in and out of favor due to pending regulatory or legal matters. 

    The domestic menthol cigarette market is characterized by limited price competition from the following major companies: (i) Lorillard, (ii) Phillip Morris USA, and (iii) Reynolds America. The market possesses high barriers to entry with no new companies entering the market since the 1920s due to strong end customer brand loyalty. This brand loyalty results not only from simple brand recognition and habit, but also from the taste preference of each end customer. Due to this brand loyalty, retail locations must carry premium brands, and cannot opt for private label brands like they have with other products. Further, the major brands historically increase prices at least annually in order to offset the impact of litigation/state settlement payments, excise taxes, and volume declines. Interestingly, as the government increases excise taxes on cigarettes, the increased excise tax actually reduces the percentage difference between a discount and premium brand, so the federal government’s recently announced 61 cent increase in the federal excise tax from $0.39 to $1.00 to fund children’s health insurance will only serve to narrow the price difference between premium and discount brands. To illustrate this point, let’s say a pack of Newports are priced at $5.00, and let’s say a discount brand charges $2.50 prior to the excise tax increase, meaning the consumer saves 50% by switching to the discount brand. After the excise tax increase, Newports cost $5.61 (12% increase), while the discount brand is now $3.31 (24% increase), which means the customer only saves 40% now. While some investors are concerned that cigarette end customers will simply quit buying cigarettes at the higher prices, any change in behavior like that would likely result in less discount brand volume, not lower premium brand volume.

     

    Item of Note:

    Lorillard announces Q1 2009 earnings Monday, April 27th. As I said before with McGraw Hill, I don’t know if earnings will beat or miss Wall Street expectations, but I do believe that Lorillard is a great company trading at a cheap price, and if held over time will represent an attractive investment. Again, I neither encourage nor discourage you from investing in Lorillard today before the earnings announcement. However, I will not wait for the earnings announcement before buying.

     
    As always, please feel free to contact with any questions, or if you would like to discuss my research further.
     
    Thank you,
     
    Matt Darrah

    Note:   This publication is a free newsletter and not a solicitation to buy or sell securities. The publication may be forwarded to other people, as long as the forwarder does not alter this document in any way and includes the headers and footers. Anyone interested in joining the distribution list can contact Matt Darrah at matt.darrah@mdcapitalmanagment.net.

    © Matthew Darrah, 2009.

    Risks to Cash Flows
    Regulation and litigation pose the largest risks to owning tobacco companies. For several decades, the tobacco companies have had to contend with the risks associated with large damage awards during litigation that are eventually overturned. The fact that punitive damages must bear a relationship to actual damages largely protects the tobacco companies from large damage awards. Note that juries often award $100MM+ verdicts against the cigarette companies with almost all of the damages being punitive damages, which are later overturned during the appellate process for this reason. Historically, the one area of litigation where tobacco companies have not succeeded relates to the reimbursement of state funding for the healthcare cost of smokers. However, the states settled with industry in 1998 in exchange for billions of dollars in annual payments (which were effectively passed along to consumers). While I am sure the tobacco companies would rather not be making those payments, these payments create a favorable political dynamic that will likely prevent tobacco companies from ever being regulated out of existence, as state and the federal governments now depend on tobacco companies for a stable source of revenue from these annual settlement payments and excise taxes.
     
    Does Lorillard have a Good Management Team?
    Martin Orlowsky leads the Lorillard management team. He has been Chief Executive Officer since September 1999. Since Martin became CEO, he has faced the challenges of a difficult industry environment declining volume, the settlement with the states, and increasing excise taxes, and he has performed wonderfully. As mentioned above, Lorillard maintains the lowest cost per pack/most profitability per pack despite the fact that its two major competitors are much larger (so they should benefit from greater economies of scale). Lorillard is the leanest company in the industry, which I believe is a strong indication of a great management team. 
    Further, the Company has consistently distributed 100% (or more) of the free cash flow it generates to shareholders. Additionally, the Company is actively working on borrowing up to $1Bn to buyback shares at their currently attractive prices. I am comfortable with this additional leverage as the transaction would result in debt at a level that could be repaid in approximately one year by the Company using their free cash flow.
     
    Can Lorillard be Bought at a Cheap Price?
    After examining the past several years’ free cash flow, I believe that normalized pre-tax equity free cash flow is ~$1.3Bn. At Wednesday’s closing price of $62.60, Lorillard’s market capitalization less net cash is ~$9.3Bn, which means the stock has a 14% pre-tax equity free cash flow yield. If Lorillard trades at a 7% pre-tax equity free cash flow yield, which would be appropriate for this high quality business, the stock will rise to ~$118 without any earnings growth, making the stock a compelling buy at $62.60. Further, the Company has a 5.9% dividend yield at $62.60 per share, which I find very attractive.
    Tags: LO, Value Investing, Investment Newsletter
    Apr 23 09:49 am | Link | Comment!
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