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    <title>One Family's Blog's Instablog</title>
    <description>Previously a professional in the software industry and currently focused on absolute returns based on investment research and analysis associated with our personal portfolio.  </description>
    <author>
      <name>One Family's Blog</name>
    </author>
    <link>http://seekingalpha.com</link>
    <item>
      <title>Half Baked CNN Coverage of Berkshire Hathaway's latest stake adjustments</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/106657-one-family-s-blog/207319-half-baked-cnn-coverage-of-berkshire-hathaway-s-latest-stake-adjustments?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">207319</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[CNN Money ran an article on 08/15/11 titled &ldquo;Buffet Adds $58 Million  Stake in Dollar General&rdquo; with the opening line &ldquo;If you want to invest  like Warren Buffett, start by adding Dollar General to your portfolio  and offloading shares of Kraft&rdquo;. Anyone glancing at the headline and the  first lines would gather Warren Buffet to be mighty bullish on Dollar  General and bearish on Kraft. The complete truth however went largely  missing. There is no denying $58 million is a solid chunk of change &ndash;  but it pales in comparison to Buffet&rsquo;s investment portfolio size which  towers at over $115 Billion (~$48B Cash, ~$67B Equity). This brings the  value of the new stake in Dollar General to be just 0.05% of his total  investments. It is also a fact that Buffet bid adieu to six million  shares of Kraft during the second quarter. The article conveniently  omitted to mention that his remaining stake of 99.5 Million Shares of  Kraft is valued at around $3.5 Billion which is around 3% of the value  of his total investments. The naked truth is that Berkshire Hathaway&rsquo;s  current stake in Kraft is valued at over sixty times the value of his  new Dollar General stake. The article naively implies getting rid of  Kraft and buying Dollar General is a sure bet to be an investor like  Buffet. <br> <br> Rather than quoting large numbers, let us cut to the chase and  compare how changes in the share price of Dollar General and Kraft will  impact Berkshire Hathaway&rsquo;s overall portfolio value. The task at hand is  to have a 1% impact on Berkshire Hathaway&rsquo;s investment portfolio, and  for that the overall portfolio value has to increase or decrease by  around $1.15B. The table below shows how Dollar General&rsquo;s (DG) and  Kraft&rsquo;s (KFT) stock prices should move to have the 1% impact on  Berkshire Hathaway&rsquo;s portfolio: <br><div><div><br> <table border="1" >              <tr>             <td>Stock</td>             <td>Berkshire Hathaway Holdings Value</td>             <td>Current Price per Share</td>             <td>Projected Price Per Share for 1% Performance Imapct</td>         </tr>         <tr>             <td>Dollar General (DG)</td>             <td>$58M</td>             <td>$32.19</td>             <td>$670.44</td>         </tr>         <tr>             <td>Kraft (KFT)</td>             <td>$3.5B</td>             <td>$34.68</td>             <td>$46.07</td>         </tr>      </table></div> <br> Dollar General&rsquo;s price per share has to go up to $670.44 from the  current share price of $32.19 for Berkshire Hathaway&rsquo;s Dollar General  Holdings to have a 1% positive performance impact on the overall  portfolio. By the same token Kraft&rsquo;s price per share only needs to go up  from $34.68 to $46.07 to have the same impact. To summarize, the CNN  articles&rsquo; premise is completely misleading - the portfolio adjustments  in the second quarter 2011 are very minor compared to the overall  portfolio size to warrant any such judgment call. Furthermore, Berkshire  Hathaway&rsquo;s 2nd quarter 2011 adjustments may have nothing to do with  Warren Buffet&rsquo;s stock selection. It is highly likely that the Dollar  General (DG) pick was by Todd Combs, the hedge fund manager Buffet  tapped in late 2010, as the amount involved is comparatively little.  While the<a href="http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/15/news/companies/buffett_investing_portfolio/index.htm?source=yahoo_quote" target="_blank" rel="nofollow"> article by CNN Money</a> did a  disservice to the investing community, articles from <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-15/berkshire-adds-dollar-general-stake-as-buffett-builds-retailer-investments.html?cmpid=yhoo" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">Bloomberg </a>and  <a href="http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=391621" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">Morningstar </a>did convey reputable information. Readers can also find the information by comparing <a href="http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&amp;CIK=0001067983&amp;owner=include&amp;count=40" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">Berkshire Hathaway&rsquo;s latest 13F  SEC filing</a> with their previous filing. <br> <br> &nbsp;</div>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Thu, 18 Aug 2011 07:15:39 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[CNN Money ran an article on 08/15/11 titled &ldquo;Buffet Adds $58 Million  Stake in Dollar General&rdquo; with the opening line &ldquo;If you want to invest  like Warren Buffett, start by adding Dollar General to your portfolio  and offloading shares of Kraft&rdquo;. Anyone glancing at the headline and the  first lines would gather Warren Buffet to be mighty bullish on Dollar  General and bearish on Kraft. The complete truth however went largely  missing. There is no denying $58 million is a solid chunk of change &ndash;  but it pales in comparison to Buffet&rsquo;s investment portfolio size which  towers at over $115 Billion (~$48B Cash, ~$67B Equity). This brings the  value of the new stake in Dollar General to be just 0.05% of his total  investments. It is also a fact that Buffet bid adieu to six million  shares of Kraft during the second quarter. The article conveniently  omitted to mention that his remaining stake of 99.5 Million Shares of  Kraft is valued at around $3.5 Billion which is around 3% of the value  of his total investments. The naked truth is that Berkshire Hathaway&rsquo;s  current stake in Kraft is valued at over sixty times the value of his  new Dollar General stake. The article naively implies getting rid of  Kraft and buying Dollar General is a sure bet to be an investor like  Buffet. <br> <br> Rather than quoting large numbers, let us cut to the chase and  compare how changes in the share price of Dollar General and Kraft will  impact Berkshire Hathaway&rsquo;s overall portfolio value. The task at hand is  to have a 1% impact on Berkshire Hathaway&rsquo;s investment portfolio, and  for that the overall portfolio value has to increase or decrease by  around $1.15B. The table below shows how Dollar General&rsquo;s (DG) and  Kraft&rsquo;s (KFT) stock prices should move to have the 1% impact on  Berkshire Hathaway&rsquo;s portfolio: <br><div><div><br> <table border="1" >              <tr>             <td>Stock</td>             <td>Berkshire Hathaway Holdings Value</td>             <td>Current Price per Share</td>             <td>Projected Price Per Share for 1% Performance Imapct</td>         </tr>         <tr>             <td>Dollar General (DG)</td>             <td>$58M</td>             <td>$32.19</td>             <td>$670.44</td>         </tr>         <tr>             <td>Kraft (KFT)</td>             <td>$3.5B</td>             <td>$34.68</td>             <td>$46.07</td>         </tr>      </table></div> <br> Dollar General&rsquo;s price per share has to go up to $670.44 from the  current share price of $32.19 for Berkshire Hathaway&rsquo;s Dollar General  Holdings to have a 1% positive performance impact on the overall  portfolio. By the same token Kraft&rsquo;s price per share only needs to go up  from $34.68 to $46.07 to have the same impact. To summarize, the CNN  articles&rsquo; premise is completely misleading - the portfolio adjustments  in the second quarter 2011 are very minor compared to the overall  portfolio size to warrant any such judgment call. Furthermore, Berkshire  Hathaway&rsquo;s 2nd quarter 2011 adjustments may have nothing to do with  Warren Buffet&rsquo;s stock selection. It is highly likely that the Dollar  General (DG) pick was by Todd Combs, the hedge fund manager Buffet  tapped in late 2010, as the amount involved is comparatively little.  While the<a href="http://money.cnn.com/2011/08/15/news/companies/buffett_investing_portfolio/index.htm?source=yahoo_quote" target="_blank" rel="nofollow"> article by CNN Money</a> did a  disservice to the investing community, articles from <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-15/berkshire-adds-dollar-general-stake-as-buffett-builds-retailer-investments.html?cmpid=yhoo" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">Bloomberg </a>and  <a href="http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=391621" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">Morningstar </a>did convey reputable information. Readers can also find the information by comparing <a href="http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&amp;CIK=0001067983&amp;owner=include&amp;count=40" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">Berkshire Hathaway&rsquo;s latest 13F  SEC filing</a> with their previous filing. <br> <br> &nbsp;</div>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/mdlz/instablogs">mdlz</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/dg/instablogs">dg</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/tag/Berkshire Hathaway">Berkshire Hathaway</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/tag/Warren Buffet">Warren Buffet</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/tag/Todd Combs">Todd Combs</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Triple Leveraged ETFs - An Introduction</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/106657-one-family-s-blog/204796-triple-leveraged-etfs-an-introduction?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">204796</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[The Triple Leveraged ETFs which debuted in November 2008 is still  considered as a relatively new product from Direxion. Direxion is a 1997  private enterprise focused in specialized investment products. Below is  a list of some of the most popular Direxion Triple Leveraged ETFs:<br> <br> <div><br> <div><br> <table border="1" > <tr> <td>Product</td><td>Ticker Symbol</td><td>Performance Benchmark</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direxion Energy Bear 3X Shares</td><td>ERY</td><td>300% the inverse of the return of an investment in the Russell 1000 Energy Index.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direxion Energy Bull 3X Shares</td><td>ERX</td><td>300% the return of an investment in the Russell 1000 Energy Index.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direxion Financial Bear 3X Shares</td><td>FAZ</td><td>300% the inverse of the return of an investment in the Russell 1000 Financial Services Index.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direxion Financial Bull 3X Shares</td><td>FAS</td><td>300% of the return of an investment in the Russell 1000 Financial Services Index.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direxion Large Cap Bear 3X Shares</td><td>BGZ</td><td>300% the inverse of the return of an investment in the Russell 1000 large-cap index.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direxion Large Cap Bull 3X Shares</td><td>BGU</td><td>300% of the return of an investment in the Russell 1000 large-cap index.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direxion Small Cap Bear 3X Shares</td><td>TZA</td><td>300% the inverse of the return of an investment in the Russell 2000 small-cap index.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direxion Small Cap Bull 3X Shares</td><td>TNA</td><td>300% of the return of an investment in the Russell 2000 small-cap index.</td> </tr>  </table></div><br> The 300% leverage is achieved by using futures contracts and swap  contracts. Below is a look at how the expenses associated with leverage  affects the overall performance (taken from Direxion leveraged fund  introduction sheet):<br> <br> <br> <div><br> <table border="1" > <tr> <td>Product</td><td>Formula</td><td>Expected Return Sample</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3X Bull Funds</td><td>Daily Benchmark Return * Daily Beta - Daily Interest Expense &ndash; Daily Fund Expense Ratio</td><td>2.00% * 3.0 - 0.03% - 0.005% = 5.965%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3X Bear Funds</td><td>Daily Benchmark Return * Daily Beta + Daily Investment Income &ndash; Daily Fund Expense Ratio</td><td>2.00% * 3.0 + 0.06% + 0.005% = 6.065%</td> </tr>  </table></div><br> The expected return sample assumes a benchmark return of 2% for the bull  fund and a -2% return for the bear fund. As shown, the impact of  expenses is minimal on a daily basis &ndash; in fact, for the bear fund, there  is investment income associated with creating the leverage as opposed  to an expense for the bull fund because, the bear fund uses  short-selling which realizes income that can be invested to produce  daily income.<br> <br> The question to help figure out the risk associated with the leverage  is: What happens to an investment in one of these funds (either bull or  bear), if the associated index goes up more than 33.34% one day and  follows it up with a 33.34% down day? &ndash; The answer is that your  investment will go to zero &ndash; <strong>the up-day will wipe out the bear fund while the down-day will wipe out the bull fund</strong>.  Such an outcome is unlikely but helps demonstrate the fact that in  volatile markets that lack direction, these investment options can lose  value very quickly. A more realistic example in a market that lacks  direction using FAS and FAZ and assuming FAS and FAZ along with the  associated index value is all at 100 at the start of the first trading  day:<br> <br> <br> <div><br> <table border="1" > <tr> <td><br> End of Day</td><td>Index Performance Percentage</td><td>Index Value</td><td>FAS Value</td><td>FAZ Value</td> </tr> <tr> <td>One</td><td>-3.00</td><td>97.00</td><td>91.00</td><td>109.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Two</td><td>+3.00</td><td>99.91</td><td>99.19</td><td>99.19</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Three</td><td>-5.00</td><td>94.91</td><td>84.30</td><td>114.07</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Four</td><td>+10.00</td><td>104.41</td><td>109.59</td><td>79.85</td> </tr>  </table></div><br> So, over the course of just 4-days, there is an underperformance - FAS  should have been at 113.23 and FAZ should have been at 86.77. Another  example that uses FAS and the same assumptions in a market that is in a  steady up-trend follows:<br> <br> <br> <div><br> <table border="1" > <tr> <td>End of Day</td><td>Index Performance Percentage</td><td>Index Value</td><td>FAS Value</td><td>FAZ Value</td> </tr> <tr> <td>One</td><td>+3.00</td><td>103.00</td><td>109.00</td><td>91.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Two</td><td>+2.00</td><td>105.06</td><td>115.54</td><td>85.54</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Three</td><td>+5.00</td><td>110.31</td><td>132.87</td><td>72.71</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Four</td><td>+4.00</td><td>114.72</td><td>148.81</td><td>63.98</td> </tr>  </table></div><br> In this scenario, there is an outperformance when compared to the target  index value at the end of the fourth day &ndash; FAS should have been 144.16  and FAZ should have been at 55.84. Similar outperformance exists in a  steady down-market as well.<br> <br> <strong>Summary:</strong><br> <br> It is critical to understand the use of leverage and how it impacts the  performance of the funds over a period of time. Since these funds track  the performance of the associated index at <strong>3 X (or inverse) leverage on a DAILY basis</strong>,  it is not possible to mimic the performance of the associated index  over a period of time. As the latter spreadsheets indicate, if one can  guess the market direction correctly, the funds can provide  outperformance over the period of time anticipated. Conversely, in a  market that lacks direction, these funds are unsuitable.<br> <br> The legitimate question that begs is if one can get 3X leverage using  these funds, why not funds that have leverage 5X, 10X, 100X, etc.  Presumably, one can strike gold overnight by guessing the market  direction correctly for a single day by holding a 100X leveraged fund.  While the advantage is undeniable, technically it is impossible to  increase leverage much further &ndash; margin requirements limit the amount of  leverage possible. A commonly overlooked factor is that the chances of  these funds going to zero over a short period of time increases as the  leverage increases. Looking at the performance of FAZ/FAZ since its  inception should make this pretty obvious - both these indexes show  large negative returns over the few years since inception, indicating a  strong possibility of both going to zero eventually.<br> <br> We have nibbled a few times on FAS/FAZ on a short-term basis realizing small profits. Our opinion is  that these products are suitable for the following scenarios:<br> <ol><li>The benchmark index is at extremely overbought levels. Entering  the bear-funds at such levels should prove beneficial over the  short-term (a few days).</li><li>The benchmark index is at extremely oversold levels. Entering the  bull-funds at such levels should prove beneficial over the short-term (a  few days).</li><li>You anticipate a steady bull/bear market for the benchmark index.  Entering the bull/bear funds during such market conditions should prove  beneficial over the anticipated period (longer term).</li><li>Day trading &ndash; when the benchmark index is extremely volatile, there  is an opportunity to do roundtrips to realize small profits (intra-day).</li></ol><br> Because of the leverage and associated risks, the above strategies  should only be used with small portions of your overall portfolio. But,  the risk-reward ratio is good assuming your strategies are sound and  comfortable to work with.<br><br><br> </div>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Aug 2011 01:43:49 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[The Triple Leveraged ETFs which debuted in November 2008 is still  considered as a relatively new product from Direxion. Direxion is a 1997  private enterprise focused in specialized investment products. Below is  a list of some of the most popular Direxion Triple Leveraged ETFs:<br> <br> <div><br> <div><br> <table border="1" > <tr> <td>Product</td><td>Ticker Symbol</td><td>Performance Benchmark</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direxion Energy Bear 3X Shares</td><td>ERY</td><td>300% the inverse of the return of an investment in the Russell 1000 Energy Index.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direxion Energy Bull 3X Shares</td><td>ERX</td><td>300% the return of an investment in the Russell 1000 Energy Index.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direxion Financial Bear 3X Shares</td><td>FAZ</td><td>300% the inverse of the return of an investment in the Russell 1000 Financial Services Index.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direxion Financial Bull 3X Shares</td><td>FAS</td><td>300% of the return of an investment in the Russell 1000 Financial Services Index.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direxion Large Cap Bear 3X Shares</td><td>BGZ</td><td>300% the inverse of the return of an investment in the Russell 1000 large-cap index.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direxion Large Cap Bull 3X Shares</td><td>BGU</td><td>300% of the return of an investment in the Russell 1000 large-cap index.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direxion Small Cap Bear 3X Shares</td><td>TZA</td><td>300% the inverse of the return of an investment in the Russell 2000 small-cap index.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direxion Small Cap Bull 3X Shares</td><td>TNA</td><td>300% of the return of an investment in the Russell 2000 small-cap index.</td> </tr>  </table></div><br> The 300% leverage is achieved by using futures contracts and swap  contracts. Below is a look at how the expenses associated with leverage  affects the overall performance (taken from Direxion leveraged fund  introduction sheet):<br> <br> <br> <div><br> <table border="1" > <tr> <td>Product</td><td>Formula</td><td>Expected Return Sample</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3X Bull Funds</td><td>Daily Benchmark Return * Daily Beta - Daily Interest Expense &ndash; Daily Fund Expense Ratio</td><td>2.00% * 3.0 - 0.03% - 0.005% = 5.965%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3X Bear Funds</td><td>Daily Benchmark Return * Daily Beta + Daily Investment Income &ndash; Daily Fund Expense Ratio</td><td>2.00% * 3.0 + 0.06% + 0.005% = 6.065%</td> </tr>  </table></div><br> The expected return sample assumes a benchmark return of 2% for the bull  fund and a -2% return for the bear fund. As shown, the impact of  expenses is minimal on a daily basis &ndash; in fact, for the bear fund, there  is investment income associated with creating the leverage as opposed  to an expense for the bull fund because, the bear fund uses  short-selling which realizes income that can be invested to produce  daily income.<br> <br> The question to help figure out the risk associated with the leverage  is: What happens to an investment in one of these funds (either bull or  bear), if the associated index goes up more than 33.34% one day and  follows it up with a 33.34% down day? &ndash; The answer is that your  investment will go to zero &ndash; <strong>the up-day will wipe out the bear fund while the down-day will wipe out the bull fund</strong>.  Such an outcome is unlikely but helps demonstrate the fact that in  volatile markets that lack direction, these investment options can lose  value very quickly. A more realistic example in a market that lacks  direction using FAS and FAZ and assuming FAS and FAZ along with the  associated index value is all at 100 at the start of the first trading  day:<br> <br> <br> <div><br> <table border="1" > <tr> <td><br> End of Day</td><td>Index Performance Percentage</td><td>Index Value</td><td>FAS Value</td><td>FAZ Value</td> </tr> <tr> <td>One</td><td>-3.00</td><td>97.00</td><td>91.00</td><td>109.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Two</td><td>+3.00</td><td>99.91</td><td>99.19</td><td>99.19</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Three</td><td>-5.00</td><td>94.91</td><td>84.30</td><td>114.07</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Four</td><td>+10.00</td><td>104.41</td><td>109.59</td><td>79.85</td> </tr>  </table></div><br> So, over the course of just 4-days, there is an underperformance - FAS  should have been at 113.23 and FAZ should have been at 86.77. Another  example that uses FAS and the same assumptions in a market that is in a  steady up-trend follows:<br> <br> <br> <div><br> <table border="1" > <tr> <td>End of Day</td><td>Index Performance Percentage</td><td>Index Value</td><td>FAS Value</td><td>FAZ Value</td> </tr> <tr> <td>One</td><td>+3.00</td><td>103.00</td><td>109.00</td><td>91.00</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Two</td><td>+2.00</td><td>105.06</td><td>115.54</td><td>85.54</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Three</td><td>+5.00</td><td>110.31</td><td>132.87</td><td>72.71</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Four</td><td>+4.00</td><td>114.72</td><td>148.81</td><td>63.98</td> </tr>  </table></div><br> In this scenario, there is an outperformance when compared to the target  index value at the end of the fourth day &ndash; FAS should have been 144.16  and FAZ should have been at 55.84. Similar outperformance exists in a  steady down-market as well.<br> <br> <strong>Summary:</strong><br> <br> It is critical to understand the use of leverage and how it impacts the  performance of the funds over a period of time. Since these funds track  the performance of the associated index at <strong>3 X (or inverse) leverage on a DAILY basis</strong>,  it is not possible to mimic the performance of the associated index  over a period of time. As the latter spreadsheets indicate, if one can  guess the market direction correctly, the funds can provide  outperformance over the period of time anticipated. Conversely, in a  market that lacks direction, these funds are unsuitable.<br> <br> The legitimate question that begs is if one can get 3X leverage using  these funds, why not funds that have leverage 5X, 10X, 100X, etc.  Presumably, one can strike gold overnight by guessing the market  direction correctly for a single day by holding a 100X leveraged fund.  While the advantage is undeniable, technically it is impossible to  increase leverage much further &ndash; margin requirements limit the amount of  leverage possible. A commonly overlooked factor is that the chances of  these funds going to zero over a short period of time increases as the  leverage increases. Looking at the performance of FAZ/FAZ since its  inception should make this pretty obvious - both these indexes show  large negative returns over the few years since inception, indicating a  strong possibility of both going to zero eventually.<br> <br> We have nibbled a few times on FAS/FAZ on a short-term basis realizing small profits. Our opinion is  that these products are suitable for the following scenarios:<br> <ol><li>The benchmark index is at extremely overbought levels. Entering  the bear-funds at such levels should prove beneficial over the  short-term (a few days).</li><li>The benchmark index is at extremely oversold levels. Entering the  bull-funds at such levels should prove beneficial over the short-term (a  few days).</li><li>You anticipate a steady bull/bear market for the benchmark index.  Entering the bull/bear funds during such market conditions should prove  beneficial over the anticipated period (longer term).</li><li>Day trading &ndash; when the benchmark index is extremely volatile, there  is an opportunity to do roundtrips to realize small profits (intra-day).</li></ol><br> Because of the leverage and associated risks, the above strategies  should only be used with small portions of your overall portfolio. But,  the risk-reward ratio is good assuming your strategies are sound and  comfortable to work with.<br><br><br> </div>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/fas/instablogs">fas</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/symbol/faz/instablogs">faz</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/tag/ETF">ETF</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/tag/Triple Leverage">Triple Leverage</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Exec-proofing &#8211; Avoiding Companies That Suffer From Excessive Executive Pay</title>
      <link>http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/106657-one-family-s-blog/204792-exec-proofing-avoiding-companies-that-suffer-from-excessive-executive-pay?source=feed</link>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">204792</guid>
      <content>
        <![CDATA[The raison d'&ecirc;tre behind this approach is to ensure that we steer clear  of companies that experience diminished shareholder returns when company  executives and the board of directors work together to augment  themselves as opposed to the company&rsquo;s shareholders. <a href="http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/paywatch/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">Executive compensation and the excessive nature of it</a>  is a very complex topic and numerous factors guide executive  compensation up at a much faster pace than that of rank-and-file workers  on an average basis. Further, the base numbers are hundred-fold higher  for executives as compared to average workers in corporations.<br> <br> Below is a look at several popular alternatives for gauging executive  pay and how they come up short when it comes to effectiveness. This is  also an attempt to debunk several myths about executive compensation:<br> <ol><li><strong>Let market forces determine the level of compensation</strong>:  This alternative essentially makes the argument that there is no  problem as market forces guide compensation. Should that be true, the  counter point would be that the bigger and more profitable companies  would always have at their helm the highest skilled CEO&rsquo;s, a point that  can easily be refuted.</li><li><strong>CEO pay should parallel company performance</strong>: Getting paid a significant percentage from the earnings generated is presumably valid. However, <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YuOg1nMzy3k" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">there is a huge misunderstanding in such a thought process</a>  &ndash; the individual concerned usually owns a significant portion of the  company&rsquo;s outstanding shares making it possible for them to participate  at that level on the company&rsquo;s earnings anyway. Issuing salary  commensurate with earnings or its growth there of is essentially double  dipping on a very large scale. This is especially true when the CEO  happens to be a founder.</li><li><strong>Use the CEO&rsquo;s track record as a measure of pay</strong>:  While it is common for Wall Street to label CEO&rsquo;s as &ldquo;turnaround stars&rdquo;  and &ldquo;growth stars&rdquo; the problem is usually that such &ldquo;stars&rdquo; usually  demand (and get) a premium that far exceeds the additional value that  their track record brings to the company.</li><li><strong>Compare the ratio of the average executive pay to the CEO compensation in the company</strong>:  This is counter-intuitive as the executive team generally holds an  unfair edge compared to rank and file workers. Therefore, in the  companies that have a problem with excess compensation, it is highly  likely to find a correlation where the other executives are also  enjoying excessive compensation making it a bigger problem as far as  shareholder value goes.</li></ol>A gauge of executive compensation that makes a lot of sense to us  is comparing CEO compensation with the average pay across the company -  the higher that number, the more the company has a problem with  excessive compensation. This gauge ignores such factors as the size of  the company, profitability, and earnings growth but instead focuses on  the disparity of pay. The main idea with this gauge is recognizing that,  in an ideal world, all employees get to participate in the success of  the company they work for, albeit on a scale that is commensurate with  skill-level.<br> <br> The gauge favors companies that encourage a career path that ends at the  CEO level as opposed to hiring from outside - the SEC filings for the  last five years can be used to come up with a figure for average annual  CEO compensation and divide it with the average compensation of the rest  of the employees in the company. Needless to say, such an exercise is  time consuming to compile. A similar measure that has most of the  characteristics of this but less difficult to compile is to compare CEO  compensation with the <a href="http://www.kyklosproductions.com/articles/wages.html" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">average worker wage</a> of roughly $20/hour.<br><br> <br>]]>
      </content>
      <pubDate>Fri, 12 Aug 2011 01:19:33 -0400</pubDate>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[The raison d'&ecirc;tre behind this approach is to ensure that we steer clear  of companies that experience diminished shareholder returns when company  executives and the board of directors work together to augment  themselves as opposed to the company&rsquo;s shareholders. <a href="http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/paywatch/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">Executive compensation and the excessive nature of it</a>  is a very complex topic and numerous factors guide executive  compensation up at a much faster pace than that of rank-and-file workers  on an average basis. Further, the base numbers are hundred-fold higher  for executives as compared to average workers in corporations.<br> <br> Below is a look at several popular alternatives for gauging executive  pay and how they come up short when it comes to effectiveness. This is  also an attempt to debunk several myths about executive compensation:<br> <ol><li><strong>Let market forces determine the level of compensation</strong>:  This alternative essentially makes the argument that there is no  problem as market forces guide compensation. Should that be true, the  counter point would be that the bigger and more profitable companies  would always have at their helm the highest skilled CEO&rsquo;s, a point that  can easily be refuted.</li><li><strong>CEO pay should parallel company performance</strong>: Getting paid a significant percentage from the earnings generated is presumably valid. However, <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YuOg1nMzy3k" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">there is a huge misunderstanding in such a thought process</a>  &ndash; the individual concerned usually owns a significant portion of the  company&rsquo;s outstanding shares making it possible for them to participate  at that level on the company&rsquo;s earnings anyway. Issuing salary  commensurate with earnings or its growth there of is essentially double  dipping on a very large scale. This is especially true when the CEO  happens to be a founder.</li><li><strong>Use the CEO&rsquo;s track record as a measure of pay</strong>:  While it is common for Wall Street to label CEO&rsquo;s as &ldquo;turnaround stars&rdquo;  and &ldquo;growth stars&rdquo; the problem is usually that such &ldquo;stars&rdquo; usually  demand (and get) a premium that far exceeds the additional value that  their track record brings to the company.</li><li><strong>Compare the ratio of the average executive pay to the CEO compensation in the company</strong>:  This is counter-intuitive as the executive team generally holds an  unfair edge compared to rank and file workers. Therefore, in the  companies that have a problem with excess compensation, it is highly  likely to find a correlation where the other executives are also  enjoying excessive compensation making it a bigger problem as far as  shareholder value goes.</li></ol>A gauge of executive compensation that makes a lot of sense to us  is comparing CEO compensation with the average pay across the company -  the higher that number, the more the company has a problem with  excessive compensation. This gauge ignores such factors as the size of  the company, profitability, and earnings growth but instead focuses on  the disparity of pay. The main idea with this gauge is recognizing that,  in an ideal world, all employees get to participate in the success of  the company they work for, albeit on a scale that is commensurate with  skill-level.<br> <br> The gauge favors companies that encourage a career path that ends at the  CEO level as opposed to hiring from outside - the SEC filings for the  last five years can be used to come up with a figure for average annual  CEO compensation and divide it with the average compensation of the rest  of the employees in the company. Needless to say, such an exercise is  time consuming to compile. A similar measure that has most of the  characteristics of this but less difficult to compile is to compare CEO  compensation with the <a href="http://www.kyklosproductions.com/articles/wages.html" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">average worker wage</a> of roughly $20/hour.<br><br> <br>]]>
      </description>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/tag/executive compensation">executive compensation</category>
      <category type="symbol" link="http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/tag/CEO compensation">CEO compensation</category>
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