Philip Gvinter

Tier 1 Capital Ratios of Large U.S. Banks

Tier 1 is also subject to risk weights assigned to assets. As we are clearly seeing during this credit crisis these weights are oftentimes not appropriately set and these risks are not properly measured. The retained earnings are also subject to manipulation. One easy trick is to use a decline in the market value of a bank's debt as income (Morgan Stanley did this at the beginning of the year)

Tier 1 Capital Ratios of Large U.S. Banks

Two problems here.

1. The Tier 1 ratio does not include massive off balance sheet liabilities which can account for as much as 75% of some banks' assets.

2. Tier 1 ratios can be (and in my opinion are) manipulated by including intangible assets such as good will as well as retained earnings to boost said ratios.

A much better measure of bank health is tangible common equity. The banks above have very low TCE ratios.

Rating the Top 12 U.S. Banks - From Hidden Gems to Zombies

$15B - $11B = $4B. $4B + $35B = $39B. So instead of buying WFC at a 40 P/E they pay the low low price of a 2- p/e when industry average is 12. In a good market. They overpaid and will get buried by the losses from the Golden West portfolio as well as WB's home equity and construction loans. Also keep in mind that WFC was one of the biggest buyers of high FICO but otherwise sloppily underwritten Jumbo loans which were really ALT-As. These loans were mostly stated income and done at near conforming rates in 2006 and 2007 way past the peak of property values. I do not think that WFC are anywhere near as conservative as their reputation suggests. They also had a substantial subprime wholesale mortgage operation and there have to be some reps and warrants from those loans leading to some serious losses.


On Feb 20 12:01 PM 360877 wrote:

> You forget that Wells Fargo also got a $11B tax write off. The effect
> on their balance sheet was zero. Wells Fargo will continue to post
> a profit through 2009. Kovasavich and Stumpf run a tight ship and
> are very conservative in their approach. This message runs strong
> throughout the company.
>
>
> On Feb 19 09:31 PM Philip Gvinter wrote:

Rating the Top 12 U.S. Banks - From Hidden Gems to Zombies

Wells paid $15B and agreed to absorb losses. This is a bad deal for Wells if the losses taken are significantly greater than the future revenue that the purchase will generate. For example if they have to take an additional $35B of losses the total purchase price would be $50B. This would mean that they must somehow turn what they bought into more than $50B. This can come from future earnings or the sale of the assets they got as part of the deal. I do not see how Wachovia's operations can be expected to earn anything near what they used to given the demise of the free for all mentality in the securitization markets which drove a large percentage of those earnings. My estimates are that Wachovia's operations are capable of producing the kind of earnings that a bank of similar size was able to produce around 2001 or 2002. That would be about a 50% haircut from the peak achieved in 2005 and 2006. At that rate it would take WFC over 25 years to recoup their investment. To me that represents too low of a yield on the investment.

Rating the Top 12 U.S. Banks - From Hidden Gems to Zombies

I have to disagree strongly on USB. They were a very active subprime lender in the wholesale market and continued to do subprime loans all the way into Q2 2008. At that point there was no secondary market for the subprime loans as the securitization process had locked out subprime during the summer of 2007 and ALT-A by fall 2007. This means that a substantial portion of their subprime originations which were done by third party brokers are in their own loan portfolio. I would also be willing to guess that the same decision making process and lack of appropriate risk management which lead to making subprime portfolio loans also probably lead to other credit policy mistakes. One very telling thing that set the initial red flags off for me was when management repeatedly talked about growth at the expense of weaker competitors during Q1 and Q2 08. This growth was most likely fueled by what turned out to be overly risky deals which looked much better before the reality of what was upon us truly made itself obvious to everyone. To its credit USB has avoided the ill conceived mergers like BAC-CFC, BAC-ML, WB-Golden West, WFC-WB, or even to some degree JPM-WM, JPM-BSC and PNC-NCC. At the same time I have a feeling that their loan portfolio has much more hidden risk than is currently assumed and that management stayed in certain niche lending markets far too long.

Trust, Confidence, the Markets and the Federal Government

There is plenty of blame to go around but the biggest failure was at the regulatory level. The regulators are executive appointments and therefore have been around since 04 and some since 00 when Bush took office.

The Duplicitous Sheila Bair

This is the absolutely worst thing that the FDIC could have done. At its core this is a crisis of confidence as credit by its very nature is a form of confidence. For the FDIC to lose any confidence in its influence as a force of market stability by playing favorites and backing out of a deal with C one of the most prominent and important financial institutions on the street in order to renegotiate a deal and walk away from taking losses is a very short sighted and ill conceived move.

Maybe Wells Fargo Will Buy Citi and Wachovia

The issue with this argument is that the sale of the toxic assets at anything near real value would result in a minimum of a $20B hit up front. I am of the opinion that the TARP was established for the insolvent and not for the solvent. It is an alternative to disorderly bankruptcies and the buildup of a further glut for these toxic securities as bankruptcy courts would force asset sales into a frozen market. The most confusing thing about WFC's involvement here is that they are grossly overpaying for WB. Even a modest 20% loss on the option ARM portfolio translates into $25B, a 70% loss as described above would translate to over $85B, that is not a hit that WFC could take even temporarily. This says nothing about the credit card or second mortgage portfolios, construction loans or other credit losses lurking on WB's balance sheet. This also assumes that WFC can somehow continue to avoid credit loss on its own portfolio and continue to report a default rate of below 1% on its own mortgage portfolio which contains a significant amount of ALT-A and Jumbo Prime loans with stated income documentation and thin asset reserves documented by the borrowers. Many of these loans were 5year interest only ARMs originated in 2005 and 2006.