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Equities: As Good as it Gets?
After a stunning six-month rally in equities, commodities and corporate bonds, we are reaching a critical juncture for markets, which have swung from despondency to euphoria since March. Incoming data have moved the investment debate from whether a recovery is imminent to how strong and durable it will prove. I said back on March 10th that:
'Equities are now cheaper than for several decades on a cyclically adjusted earnings basis (and versus bonds) and stand at an extreme oversold level only seen a few times in the last century'
The depression/deflation panic was clearly misplaced and I predicted a 40-50% trough to peak rally as deflation fears abated. Indeed 10 year inflation expectations in the TIPS market had jumped back to near 2% by June, driving the first leg of the risk asset rally. The six leading global economies this time around have applied 300% more fiscal stimulus and 500% more much monetary stimulus relative to GDP as occurred in the 1930's, and that was always going to be hugely reflationary.
Key factors that turned a hoped-for recovery in 1930 into the disaster of the Great Depression were a sharp hike in interest rates in October 1931 and a decline in the overall price level of 10% per year in 1931 and 1932. History isn't going to repeat and indeed the Bernanke Fed is loathe to risk tightening policy before any recovery is self-sustaining as reflected in capacity utilization climbing to at least 75-80% (ie not before end 2010 if markets don't force their hand). In fact, reflating asset markets was a crucial objective of public policy as much as avoiding CPI deflation, as balance sheets were so dangerously stretched in the US and Europe, and it has proved successful. Three factors have proved supportive of the ongoing risk asset rally in recent weeks.
Firstly, not only is the cycle bottoming earlier than seemed likely back in March, but the recovery is increasingly synchronized on a global scale (with Q3 marking the inflection point for the US and UK, and Europe already modestly rebounding as are the key Asian exporters). Secondly, central banks from the Fed to BOE, far from removing the punch bowl of monetary stimulus, are raiding the drinks cabinet for any leftover monetary hooch they can thrown into the mix to keep the party going. Thirdly, 10 year government bonds have sold off modestly so far, supported by a natural bid from commercial banks seeking to flatter their capital ratios, and central bank's own buying as well as still declining CPI inflation.
However, a number of risks loom large in coming months to unnerve complacent sentiment.
On the one hand, there is a risk that the early stages of recovery prove unexpectedly robust, and precious central bank credibility comes into question, leading to a flight from bonds and indeed the dollar. A full-blooded cyclical recovery may prove far riskier than the consensus anemic affair. Despite most equity indices at their highest since the Lehman debacle, 10 year bond yields remain very modest, and well off the highs seen in the June inflation scare. Would that calm survive a not inconceivable 5% quarterly GDP print for Q1 or Q2 2010?
Alternatively, if inventory restocking, particularly in Asia, has already run its course (and inventory to sales ratios are back to long-term averages, having undershot considerably), then it's possible that indicators like the Baltic Freight Index are signalling that a brief economic 'sugar high' is already subsiding and bullish survey data is misleading.
China, which has been a cornerstone of the bull case, has flattered to deceive in terms of reported growth figures and reckless lending fuelling commodity, real-estate and stock market speculation. Policy is now tightening by stealth and as that becomes increasingly apparent, and as China seeks to diversify its dollar exposure (possibly via surprise measures to partially open the capital account) it will inject volatility into markets.
Finally, the US and European (notably Germany, Switzerland and UK) banking sectors remain dangerously leveraged and undercapitalized, and vulnerable to a further round of write-downs from commercial real-estate and private equity loans as we see the refinancing schedule for boom-time loans surge in 2010/11.
A sustained zero interest rate policy prods investors along the risk curve, but also prods consumers to spend. On balance a weaker rather than stronger outcome seems more likely, but leading cyclical indicators suggest the strongest near-term rebound since 1983. Watch the next set of US savings data for a lead on which scenario will play out ie an upside or downside growth surprise in Q4.
Three secular trends will define the investment landscape for the next decade in the developed markets; they are the rising marginal cost of energy, demographic decline, and ongoing balance sheet deleveraging. All of these are negatives for sustained growth rates. However strong a reflex rebound, once the US stimulus expires, and budget deficits start to narrow, global demand will settle at a new lower level defined by real consumer income growth and productivity. Under those circumstances, the world economy cannot sustainably return to 2003-7 levels of growth, or anything close. That reality will define the investment outlook, and at this point it argues for a strategy of hedging downside portfolio risk rather than increasing upside exposure as we approach 1100 on the S&P.
Disclosure: None
CFTC Belatedly Discovers Speculative Oil Bubble...
Last month, an International Energy Agency (IEA) report said: "The cumulative amount invested by various funds in commodity indices quadrupled from about $75bn in January 2006 to almost $300bn last July, with crude futures taking a large portion of that amount." What kind of economist or regulator can't understand simple supply and demand? Whether prime real estate in the Hamptons or oil, any asset class in very finite short-term supply will see its price pushed higher by a surge of new cash seeking to gain exposure. Just this week we have seen oil slump 6% in a day on dreadful demand fundamentals (US distillate inventory at a 25 year high etc), only to soar 5% the next day on rising equities as investors bid oil higher as a reflation trade. In fact, the correlation of daily oil and equity movements in recent months has been at unprecedented highs, regardless of near-term fundamentals which are undeniably grim.
The argument of the believers in market fundamentals was that speculators invest in futures, rather than in physical supplies of oil so every month, they must trade contracts that are about to fall due for ones that will not mature for several months. That makes them big sellers of oil for prompt delivery and so they have no net inpact on prices. Nonsense. Buyers and sellers of futures which can be physically delivered, can buy or sell the spot / future (or a mix of the two) because they are exactly the same thing, just with a different delivery dates. The actual position where futures players "invest" (front month or further along the curve) is immaterial. What matters is the "net exposure" of their investments ie if a pension fund is now long $1bn of oil futures as a long-term investment, how they manage that exposure from futures expiry to expiry is less important than the fact that the demand curve for oil has shifted up by that $1bn on an ongoing basis. Rolling the position which consists of a buy and a sell order to keep the investment in the futures market, isn't the issue; it is only at initiation of the new position that the demand for the underlying commodity has increased. As more and more "investors" globally added commodities to their portfolios in 2007/8, from giant pension funds like Calpers to retail investors via energy ETFs, the "net exposure", net demand, and the equilibrium price for oil all soared.
I wouldn't hold my breath for radical action from the CFTC despite its belated recognition of the problem, as it is being heavily lobbied by Goldman Sachs and the other major commodity players (and the chairman is, of course, ex GS). At best, some restriction on open ended ETF positions in the energy markets and stricter reporting requirements are likely to result, rather than the position limits that apply in agricultural commodities, leaving us vulnerable to another surge in prices as economic recovery takes hold in 2010 and beyond and the current 4-5m b/d oil supply margin gets eroded. After all the US has long ceased to be a country where banks were subservient to the needs of the broader economy; indeed, quite the opposite.
Disclosure: None
China: Monetary Policy Spirals Out of Control...
Are Chinese officials about to panic and rein in the reckless bank lending that has fuelled nascent bubbles in local real estate and equity markets, and indeed artificially boosting commodities such as copper? While investors have cheered China's latest Q2 GDP growth of 7.9% as evidence of the country's policy success, they may be missing a hugely destabilizing spiral in monetary policy that is generating it. The country looks set this year to generate new bank lending equivalent to over 30% of GDP, or twice official targets, while money supply is growing at an annualized 26%. That's enough to make even Alan Greenspan in his bubble blowing heyday blush, and bubbles are blowing aplenty in China.
The quality of most of these rapid fire loans dictated by Beijing is surely abysmal. About $170 billion of Chinese bank loans are estimated to have been funneled into the Shanghai stock market in the first five months of 2009, or 20% of the total new loans banks made in that time period. Is it any surprise that China has just surpassed Japan to become the world's second largest equity market, and the best performing this year? I suspect another large chunk of that lending has found its way into speculative commodity stockpiling, as well as the real estate market. It's a bit rich that Chinese officials are criticizing US economic policy when they are are essentially following the easy money credit boom model in order to forestall a cyclical economic recession. China can certainly achieve its talismanic 8% growth target by throwing vast resources into mechanical short-term growth objectives, but the question is whether these policies are sustainable or simply delay the necessary re-balancing of the economy away from manufacturing and infrastructure investment toward domestic consumption. Investment productivity is appalling, and has been declining for a decade; it is very likely much of the stimulus spending will be a total waste. Far from 'leading' a global recovery (unlikely anyway as it only comprises 8% of global GDP, China will be among the last countries to escape from the effects of the global crisis, being trapped in a deflationary trap of chronic export overcapacity as its foreign consumers deleverage over the next few years. It seems doomed to repeat Japanese policies of the early 1990's, which left that country carpeted in concrete but still mired in recession.
Meanwhile, foreign reserves surged to a record US$2.13 trillion at the end of June making it likely that speculative capital is flooding in to bet on rising asset prices and a quick economic recovery (and even an eventual Yuan revaluation). Most of the increase was driven by the very large trade surplus and declining but still high net FDI inflows, plus of course returns on the existing overseas portfolio but speculative capital betting on a Yuan revaluation is back for the first time since last Summer, evading strict controls on the capital account. Despite often confused media commentary on the dollar and China's role in its fate, China doesn't fund the US fiscal deficit; it funds the US current account deficit, and it has no choice but to fund it because of the dollars generated by its trade surplus with the US which it doesn't want to repatriate to avoid boosting the Yuan. Simplistically, if the US wants China to buy, say $500bn of new bonds, all it has to do is ensure that the US runs a $500bn trade deficit with China that year. Reserves rose US$178 billion in the second quarter, the biggest quarterly increase on record and up from the US$1.95 trillion Yuan at the end of March.
So called 'hot money' flows, notably via Singapore and Taiwan (via falsified trade passing through the current account intensify Chinese growth in the short term, even as they complicate the PboC's job. The PBoC must recycle the net surplus on the current account and the capital account and with the very high current account surplus, China is creating a huge amount of domestic money from that source alone. Many commentators rightly worry about the Fed's exit strategy from current policies, but China's future policy options are even more ominous. The Chinese economy right now is enjoying a huge sugar high created by the combined effects of a lending boom, money supply growth, and speculative capital inflows, as well as nearly $600bn in fiscal spending, and the asset bubbles all these are helping to generate. However, as the consequences of current policies come home to roost in 2010 and beyond, from soaring bank write-offs to inflation, China will likely become the problem, not the hoped for solution. Any sudden reversal in official policy (eg by requiring higher bank reserves) will have negative implications for Asian equities and commodities such as copper and oil.
Disclosure: None