Spencer Ross

Growth, special situations, long only
Spencer Ross
Growth, special situations, long only
Contributor since: 2012
If you're worried about highly accretive acquisitions at attractive values and high PE values which really aren't (see Hunstman at 31), maybe you should consider a good shrink.
Just wondering why you left that quote out. Now I understand why: inventories went from $262K to $559K and advanced payments from customers went from $75K to $232K. FKWL has averaged north of $5M per quarter over the last 3 years. The increases you point out when seen in context are nearly irrelevant, seems like normal quarterly variability and most clearly do not lend credence to the notion of a Verizon Medadeal.
In addition, if this deal has been in the works for several months, then company insiders and employees would have been buying tons of shares and then telling all their friends about it. A quick look at the volume of historical prices over the last 6 months shows no evidence of real share accumulation.
And finally, there is no mention of Verizon in their 10Q filings nor their press releases. A deal of this size would certainly be in company interest to let investors know unless they were trying to conceal it in order to accumulate more shares which we have already shown has not occurred.
Sounds dubious - unless you are able to company source the increase in doubling of inventory and tripling of advance payments that you cited.
Excellent article demonstrating the inherent mispricing in Lakshore amidst the current gold averse market sentiment. Your more detailed article mirrors a comment I made on a Rangold Resources article nearly a month ago. See here: http://seekingalpha.co...
If prices stay this low it's just a matter of time before a gold major or China PE firm takes out LSG at a multiple.
very informative article. a few questions:
1.how much does grade impact pricing. For example, Mason is predicting a 27% grade over the 22 years. What if the grade were only half of that. Can you give a rule of thumb of grade/pricing to help model this?
2. How would you compare the market opportunities of Northern Graphite (NGC.V) and Focus Graphite (FMS.V) to Mason's prospects?
3. Can you explain the decline in graphite prices from the 2011 highs and the lack of price movement in the last 6 months?
See this current and informative Bloomberg story to understand what's currently happening from an investment standpoint in wastewater fracking space: http://bloom.bg/1cDCTDO
You still have not addressed the main issue: why IEVM's key product, via machines or liquids, has achieved virtually no market penetration in the fracking industry 4 years after its introduction in one of the hottest growth markets of the US and globally. There have been plenty of very successful CEO's in one business who bomb in other venues. If the product is inferior, no CEO can create a turn around. Great investment stories in potential are usually associated with rapid or at least incremental growth of which there is no evidence of as yet in IEVM.
Your thesis is highly suspect. A quick look back into company history will shed light on what's really going on. I strongly urge any investor considering this company have a look back at their press releases over the last 4 years. From late 2009 until mid 2010 the company already achieved the 10 bagger promise you are currently predicting going from around $0.06 to 0.65 (see 5 year chart) on the back of the promise of exploiting the nascent market opportunity in fracking with the Excelyte product you have described above. Four years later even as fracking revenues have exploded, IEVM's stock price has fallen back to where it was, now at $0.10 on almost non-existent revenue. If Excelyte was the product you claimed, i.e. more effective than anything out there and cheaper than the industry standard, why has there been virtually no market penetration to the scores of oil and gas companies? Given the geometric rise in the fracking industry one would have expected a dramatic adoption of this technology especially in light of growing environmental pressures.
In addition, if the core product was indeed effective as you claim, why would the initial and exclusive purchaser of the 19 Ecaflow machines, Benchmark Performance Group, a specialized water treatment services company, have been willing to part with this 'game changing' opportunity and sell those machines back? Curiously, it seems the President of Benchmark, Wayne Kinsey, also happens to the single largest holder of IEVM stock with 56 million shares which equal about 25% of shares outstanding. Maybe you can explain this to investors.
Yes, the market opportunities you describe are truly large. Maybe IEVM products are really the solution. I would be thrilled to see some real market adoption (not one company deal as you reference) and some real numbers hit the board, but until that happens, it seems that thus far, the major industry players have clearly weighed in, by their very absence, that the company's products are simply not up to snuff.
I am sure there are still a number of investors who got in 4 years ago at high prices when the promise of the technology was truly compelling and instead find themselves carrying around this thinly traded water-logged issue in the hope of it becoming 'the greatest story i'd like to sell'
Lakeshore Gold (NYSE:LSG) recently announced their 2014 forecast of all-in sustaining cost per ounce sold between US$950 and US$1,050 which appears to make them the low cost producer on your list. They also raised their production estimates by 20,000 ounces. Yesterday they announced an extension on their line of credit maturity by almost a full year and also paid down $5M of debt. With the recent consolidation in the gold space picking up recently (Brigus NYSE:BRD yesterday and TO:PMV today) Lakeshore looks a prime candidate for some of the gold majors or Chinese PE with insatiable AU needs.
Thanks for the update on the big picture down South.
Given the strong 9.7% agricultural number, do you think the other factors weighing on the Brazilian economy, inflation and slowed growth (especially with China) will eventually spill over into agr. or are there other specific factors at work that will provide for continued economic sector immunity?