Stanislav Oleynikov's Instablog Stanislav Oleynikov, CFA is an investment professional from Russia with over 10 years experience in US markets. Stanislav Oleynikov http://seekingalpha.com Excel Maritime reports a loss of $0.13 per share ex. items http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/328677-stanislav-oleynikov/5599-excel-maritime-reports-a-loss-of-0-13-per-share-ex-items?source=feed 5599     Last Thursday, Excel Maritime posted an extremely confusing earnings report, again. The report is filled with a great number of usual non-cash items, unusual non-cash items and other extraordinary gains and expenses.

    The most confusing part of the report is “Time Charter fair value amortization” in the income statement, which makes up the majority of revenues.
 
    Favorable and unfavorable time charters appeared in the balance sheet of the company after acquisition of Quintana Maritime a year ago. Some of Quintana vessels had long-term contracts at rates, significantly lower than prevailing market at the time of the acquisition. As a result, those vessels were bought for a lower price than similar charter-free ships.
 
    Instead of simply recording bought vessels at the paid price, Excel Maritime elected to record them at the market price of contract-free ships, while a the same creating a liability called “fair value of unfavorable time charters”, for the difference. This liability would amortize over the duration of below-the-market contracts.
 
    Such accounting is in compliance with GAAP and does make some economic sense in the environment of stable charter rates and ship values. In a stable world, after the expiration of an “unfavorable charter”, the vessel should start earning higher cash revenue, while at the same time keeping its market value. The reality turned out to be quite different.
 
    Since the time of Quintana acquisition, market charter rates went down by 75%, while ship values reduced by about 65%. What used to be below-the-market contracts, recorded as liabilities, had become significantly above-the-market charters. Amortization of “unfavorable charters” lost any economic sense whatsoever.
 
    The absurdity of the gain resulting from such amortization can be clearly seen in case of the accelerated amortization of the time charter value of M/V Sandra and M/V Coal Pride, shown in the latest report.
 
    A long-term contract for M/V Sandra at $39,000 a day was cancelled and the new contract was signed at weighted average rate of $26,500 a day. Does not look like great news. What was the accounting result of these operations in the latest quarterly report? A gain of $51.5 mln.! The reason is that cancelling an “unfavorable charter” should have resulted in signing the new one at a higher rate. However, current market is quite different.
 
    Why is it happening, does proper GAAP accounting really produce such incoherent results? The answer is no, if used correctly. The problem lies in inflated value of long-lived assets in the balance sheet with an offsetting “unfavorable charter” liability. Under FASB 144 statement, the company should have impaired the value of long-lived assets. Unfortunately, requirements for the impairment are too loose and subjective, so the management preferred to keep the book value at a way too inflated level.
 
    Interpreting financial statements of Excel Maritime has become a difficult task for a lot of investors. The majority of analysts exclude time charter fair value amortization from their revenue and earnings estimates, but the company does not openly disclose the resulting numbers excluding adjustments. It does provide all the necessary information to calculate it, though. Here is a quote from the press release:
 
“The Company reported net income for the quarter of $118.0 million or $2.57 per weighted average number of share as compared to net income of $35.1 million or $1.76 per weighted average number of share for the first quarter of 2008.
 
The results for the first quarter of 2009 include a non-cash item of $6.7 million relating to the unrealized gain from the valuation of interest rate swaps and $0.1 million gain on sale of a vessel. Net income, excluding the above items, for the quarter would amount to $111.2 million or $2.42 per weighted average diluted share.
 
Included in the above adjusted net income are also the amortization of favorable and unfavorable time charters that were fair valued upon acquiring Quintana on April 15, 2008 amounting to a net income of $67.8 million ($1.48 per weighted average diluted share), a non-cash gain of $51.5 million ($1.12 per weighted average diluted share) related to the accelerated amortization of the time charter value of M/V Sandra and M/V Coal Pride assumed upon Quintana Maritime Limited ("Quintana") acquisition due to their termination and the amortization of stock based compensation expense of $2.4 million ($0.05 per weighted average diluted share).”
 
Since the management prefers not to show the final result, we have to calculate it.
 
$2.42 - $1.48 - $1.12 + $0.05 = -$0.13
 
So, the company posted a loss of $0.13 per share excluding one-time items.
 

Disclosure: Short EXM

 

]]> Mon, 25 May 2009 11:30:55 -0400     Last Thursday, Excel Maritime posted an extremely confusing earnings report, again. The report is filled with a great number of usual non-cash items, unusual non-cash items and other extraordinary gains and expenses.

    The most confusing part of the report is “Time Charter fair value amortization” in the income statement, which makes up the majority of revenues.
 
    Favorable and unfavorable time charters appeared in the balance sheet of the company after acquisition of Quintana Maritime a year ago. Some of Quintana vessels had long-term contracts at rates, significantly lower than prevailing market at the time of the acquisition. As a result, those vessels were bought for a lower price than similar charter-free ships.
 
    Instead of simply recording bought vessels at the paid price, Excel Maritime elected to record them at the market price of contract-free ships, while a the same creating a liability called “fair value of unfavorable time charters”, for the difference. This liability would amortize over the duration of below-the-market contracts.
 
    Such accounting is in compliance with GAAP and does make some economic sense in the environment of stable charter rates and ship values. In a stable world, after the expiration of an “unfavorable charter”, the vessel should start earning higher cash revenue, while at the same time keeping its market value. The reality turned out to be quite different.
 
    Since the time of Quintana acquisition, market charter rates went down by 75%, while ship values reduced by about 65%. What used to be below-the-market contracts, recorded as liabilities, had become significantly above-the-market charters. Amortization of “unfavorable charters” lost any economic sense whatsoever.
 
    The absurdity of the gain resulting from such amortization can be clearly seen in case of the accelerated amortization of the time charter value of M/V Sandra and M/V Coal Pride, shown in the latest report.
 
    A long-term contract for M/V Sandra at $39,000 a day was cancelled and the new contract was signed at weighted average rate of $26,500 a day. Does not look like great news. What was the accounting result of these operations in the latest quarterly report? A gain of $51.5 mln.! The reason is that cancelling an “unfavorable charter” should have resulted in signing the new one at a higher rate. However, current market is quite different.
 
    Why is it happening, does proper GAAP accounting really produce such incoherent results? The answer is no, if used correctly. The problem lies in inflated value of long-lived assets in the balance sheet with an offsetting “unfavorable charter” liability. Under FASB 144 statement, the company should have impaired the value of long-lived assets. Unfortunately, requirements for the impairment are too loose and subjective, so the management preferred to keep the book value at a way too inflated level.
 
    Interpreting financial statements of Excel Maritime has become a difficult task for a lot of investors. The majority of analysts exclude time charter fair value amortization from their revenue and earnings estimates, but the company does not openly disclose the resulting numbers excluding adjustments. It does provide all the necessary information to calculate it, though. Here is a quote from the press release:
 
“The Company reported net income for the quarter of $118.0 million or $2.57 per weighted average number of share as compared to net income of $35.1 million or $1.76 per weighted average number of share for the first quarter of 2008.
 
The results for the first quarter of 2009 include a non-cash item of $6.7 million relating to the unrealized gain from the valuation of interest rate swaps and $0.1 million gain on sale of a vessel. Net income, excluding the above items, for the quarter would amount to $111.2 million or $2.42 per weighted average diluted share.
 
Included in the above adjusted net income are also the amortization of favorable and unfavorable time charters that were fair valued upon acquiring Quintana on April 15, 2008 amounting to a net income of $67.8 million ($1.48 per weighted average diluted share), a non-cash gain of $51.5 million ($1.12 per weighted average diluted share) related to the accelerated amortization of the time charter value of M/V Sandra and M/V Coal Pride assumed upon Quintana Maritime Limited ("Quintana") acquisition due to their termination and the amortization of stock based compensation expense of $2.4 million ($0.05 per weighted average diluted share).”
 
Since the management prefers not to show the final result, we have to calculate it.
 
$2.42 - $1.48 - $1.12 + $0.05 = -$0.13
 
So, the company posted a loss of $0.13 per share excluding one-time items.
 

Disclosure: Short EXM

 

]]> exm A fresh look at valuations of dry bulk shipping companies http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/328677-stanislav-oleynikov/4719-a-fresh-look-at-valuations-of-dry-bulk-shipping-companies?source=feed 4719  

A fresh look at valuations of dry bulk shipping companies
 
Stocks of dry bulk shipping companies had a huge run up recently. How expensive have they become from fundamental perspective? Below is a table with key parameters for some of the most actively traded pure-play companies in this segment.
 

Stock
GNK
EGLE
EXM
DSX
SBLK
Recent price per share
18.17
6.59
9.17
15.20
3.48
Shares outstanding (in mln.)
31.7
47
71.8
75.4
60.3
Market capitalization (in $ mln.)
576
309.7
658.4
1146.1
209.8
Fleet market value (in $ mln.)
1137.7
1314.9
1302.8
875.2
364.2
Fair value of above the market charters (in $ mln.)
328.1
227.4
207.3
280
251.3
Net debt (in $ mln.)
1260
1328.3
1420.3
257
250.3
NAV per share
6.49
4.55
1.25
11.91
6.06
Enterprise value/ Charter adjusted fleet value
1.25
1.1
1.38
1.21
0.75

 
    Detailed calculation of the data presented above is available at seekingalpha.com/autho...
 
Fleet values include ordered newbuild vessels. Net debt was calculated as the difference between liabilities and assets, excluding book value of the fleet and advances for new vessels. Non-cash accounting items, such as the value of above and below the market charters, fair value of interest rate swaps and other similar records were also excluded from assets and liabilities. The debt was increased by the amount of the remaining payments under the contracts to acquire new vessels.
    The data for GNK, EGLE and DSX are based on Q1/09 quarterly report, while for EXM and SBLK on annual 2008 report. However, market values for vessels and above the markets charters were adjusted to include expected cash flow for the quarter. So, the market value for a 2005 supramax is assumed a little higher for EXM, than for EGLE.
    As can be seen from the table, most dry bulk companies trade at a significant premium to NAV. A notable exception is Star Bulk Carriers Corp. However, a great deal of its fortunes is tied to profitable long-term charters it signed last year. Apparently, investors are very worried about counterparty risks. Nonetheless, SBLK looks like the most attractively valued company in dry-bulk segment.
   The most overvalued company has surprisingly become EXM. Even GNK, which historically had premium valuation due to supposedly good corporate governance, is left far behind.
The most obvious reason is confusion with recent equity infusion. Excel Maritime sold 25.7 mln. shares for $1.75 per share. Also, the seller, who is, by chance, the chairman of the board, got 5.5 mln. warrants with an exercise price of $3.50 per warrant, free. As a result, the number of shares outstanding increased by almost 60%. It looks, like EXM stock price has not adjusted to this new number yet.
   What lies ahead for the dry bulk shipping industry? I believe that the prospects are bleak. Huge orderbook is going to keep the rates quite low for several years. This issue is debatable, however. What is quite clear is that some companies in this sector are overvalued in comparison to others. Such discrepancies usually disappear over time.
 

Disclosure: Short EXM

]]> Mon, 18 May 2009 14:16:32 -0400  

A fresh look at valuations of dry bulk shipping companies
 
Stocks of dry bulk shipping companies had a huge run up recently. How expensive have they become from fundamental perspective? Below is a table with key parameters for some of the most actively traded pure-play companies in this segment.
 

Stock
GNK
EGLE
EXM
DSX
SBLK
Recent price per share
18.17
6.59
9.17
15.20
3.48
Shares outstanding (in mln.)
31.7
47
71.8
75.4
60.3
Market capitalization (in $ mln.)
576
309.7
658.4
1146.1
209.8
Fleet market value (in $ mln.)
1137.7
1314.9
1302.8
875.2
364.2
Fair value of above the market charters (in $ mln.)
328.1
227.4
207.3
280
251.3
Net debt (in $ mln.)
1260
1328.3
1420.3
257
250.3
NAV per share
6.49
4.55
1.25
11.91
6.06
Enterprise value/ Charter adjusted fleet value
1.25
1.1
1.38
1.21
0.75

 
    Detailed calculation of the data presented above is available at seekingalpha.com/autho...
 
Fleet values include ordered newbuild vessels. Net debt was calculated as the difference between liabilities and assets, excluding book value of the fleet and advances for new vessels. Non-cash accounting items, such as the value of above and below the market charters, fair value of interest rate swaps and other similar records were also excluded from assets and liabilities. The debt was increased by the amount of the remaining payments under the contracts to acquire new vessels.
    The data for GNK, EGLE and DSX are based on Q1/09 quarterly report, while for EXM and SBLK on annual 2008 report. However, market values for vessels and above the markets charters were adjusted to include expected cash flow for the quarter. So, the market value for a 2005 supramax is assumed a little higher for EXM, than for EGLE.
    As can be seen from the table, most dry bulk companies trade at a significant premium to NAV. A notable exception is Star Bulk Carriers Corp. However, a great deal of its fortunes is tied to profitable long-term charters it signed last year. Apparently, investors are very worried about counterparty risks. Nonetheless, SBLK looks like the most attractively valued company in dry-bulk segment.
   The most overvalued company has surprisingly become EXM. Even GNK, which historically had premium valuation due to supposedly good corporate governance, is left far behind.
The most obvious reason is confusion with recent equity infusion. Excel Maritime sold 25.7 mln. shares for $1.75 per share. Also, the seller, who is, by chance, the chairman of the board, got 5.5 mln. warrants with an exercise price of $3.50 per warrant, free. As a result, the number of shares outstanding increased by almost 60%. It looks, like EXM stock price has not adjusted to this new number yet.
   What lies ahead for the dry bulk shipping industry? I believe that the prospects are bleak. Huge orderbook is going to keep the rates quite low for several years. This issue is debatable, however. What is quite clear is that some companies in this sector are overvalued in comparison to others. Such discrepancies usually disappear over time.
 

Disclosure: Short EXM

]]> gnk exm dsx egle nm drys SBLK: Calculation of NAV per share http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/328677-stanislav-oleynikov/3676-sblk-calculation-of-nav-per-share?source=feed 3676  

SBLK fleet
 
Ship
type
Name
 
Year
 
Market
value
Charter value
Capesize
Star Alpha
1992
37,2
0,0
Capesize
Star Beta
1993
39,6
3,7
Capesize
Star Sigma
1991
34,8
41,5
Capesize
Star Ypsilon
1991
34,8
60,5
Supramax
Star Gamma
2002
26,9
26,4
Supramax
Star Delta
2000
25,2
-1,0
Supramax
Star Epsilon
2001
26,0
30,5
Supramax
Star Zeta
2003
27,7
23,1
Supramax
Star Theta
2003
27,7
0,0
Supramax
Star Kappa
2001
26,0
22,8
Supramax
Star Omicron
2005
29,2
22,8
Supramax
Star Cosmo
2005
29,2
21,0
 
 
 
364,2
251,3
 
 
 Calculation of net debt
 
As of 12/31/2008, SBLK had:
 
Current assets ... $42.3 mln.
Restricted cash   ... $12 mln.
 
Current liabilities  ... $57.3 mln.
Long-term debt  ...  $247.3 mln.
 
 
 
Net debt:   ... 247.3+57.3-42.3-12 = 250.3
Shares outstanding: ... 60,301,279
 
NAV per share = (364.2+251.3-250.3)/60.3 = $6.06
 
 

 

]]> Sun, 10 May 2009 15:03:37 -0400  

SBLK fleet
 
Ship
type
Name
 
Year
 
Market
value
Charter value
Capesize
Star Alpha
1992
37,2
0,0
Capesize
Star Beta
1993
39,6
3,7
Capesize
Star Sigma
1991
34,8
41,5
Capesize
Star Ypsilon
1991
34,8
60,5
Supramax
Star Gamma
2002
26,9
26,4
Supramax
Star Delta
2000
25,2
-1,0
Supramax
Star Epsilon
2001
26,0
30,5
Supramax
Star Zeta
2003
27,7
23,1
Supramax
Star Theta
2003
27,7
0,0
Supramax
Star Kappa
2001
26,0
22,8
Supramax
Star Omicron
2005
29,2
22,8
Supramax
Star Cosmo
2005
29,2
21,0
 
 
 
364,2
251,3
 
 
 Calculation of net debt
 
As of 12/31/2008, SBLK had:
 
Current assets ... $42.3 mln.
Restricted cash   ... $12 mln.
 
Current liabilities  ... $57.3 mln.
Long-term debt  ...  $247.3 mln.
 
 
 
Net debt:   ... 247.3+57.3-42.3-12 = 250.3
Shares outstanding: ... 60,301,279
 
NAV per share = (364.2+251.3-250.3)/60.3 = $6.06
 
 

 

]]> sblk EXM: Calculation of NAV per share http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/328677-stanislav-oleynikov/3675-exm-calculation-of-nav-per-share?source=feed 3675  

 
Fleet data
 

Ship type
Name
Year
 
Market   value
 
Charter value
Capesize
Lowlands Beilun
1999
 
51,8
 
5,3
Capesize
Iron Miner
2007
 
65,1
 
16,0
Capesize
Kirmar
2001
 
55,4
 
33,5
Capesize
Iron Beauty
2001
 
55,4
 
5,2
Capesize
Sandra
2008
 
66,6
 
4,9
Capesize
Christine (1)
2010
 
27,0
 
0,8
Capesize
Lillie (1)
2010
 
31,5
 
2,5
Capesize
Hope (1)
2010
 
31,2
 
0,0
Panamax
Iron Manolis
2007
 
34,6
 
2,9
Panamax
Iron Brooke
2007
 
34,6
 
2,9
Panamax
Iron Lindrew
2007
 
34,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Iron Knight
2004
 
31,5
 
5,5
Panamax
Coal Hunter
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Coal Gypsy
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Pascha
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Iron Anne
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Iron Vassilis
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Iron Bill
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Santa Barbara
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Ore Hansa
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Iron Kalypso
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Iron Fuzeyya
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Iron Bradyn
2005
 
32,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Grain Harvester
2004
 
31,5
 
3,8
Panamax
Grain Express
2004
 
31,5
 
5,5
Panamax
Coal Pride
1999
 
26,3
 
0,7
Panamax
Iron Man (2)
1997
 
0,0
 
-0,7
Panamax
Coal Age (2)
1997
 
0,0
 
-2,4
Panamax
Fearless I (2)
1997
 
0,0
 
-2,4
Panamax
Barbara (2)
1997
 
0,0
 
-2,4
Panamax
Linda Leah (2)
1997
 
0,0
 
0,1
Panamax
King Coal (2)
1997
 
0,0
 
30,7
Panamax
Coal Glory (2)
1997
 
0,0
 
-2,0
Panamax
Isminaki
1998
 
25,2
 
2,7
Panamax
Angela Star
1998
 
25,2
 
0,0
Panamax
Powerful
1994
 
20,5
 
4,5
Panamax
First Endeavour
1994
 
20,5
 
8,4
Panamax
Happy Day
1997
 
24,0
 
0,0
Panamax
Renuar
1993
 
19,3
 
0,0
Panamax
Rodon
1993
 
19,3
 
0,0
Panamax
Fortezza
1993
 
19,3
 
0,0
Panamax
Elinakos
1997
 
24,0
 
11,9
Panamax
Birthday
1993
 
19,3
 
0,0
Supramax
July M
2005
 
29,2
 
0,0
Supramax
Mairouli
2005
 
29,2
 
0,0
Handymax
Princess I
1994
 
13,5
 
3,6
Handymax
Marybelle
1987
 
7,1
 
0,0
Handymax
Lady
1985
 
4,9
 
0,0
Handymax
Emerald
1998
 
16,7
 
0,0
Handymax
Attractive
1985
 
4,9
 
0,0
Handymax
Swift
1984
 
3,8
 
0,0
Total
 
 
 
1302,8
 
207,3

 
Notes:
  1. The company has 42.8% interest in Christine and 50% interest in Lillie and Hope. Values of vessels and charters reflect appropriate percent of ownership.
  2. Iron Man, Coal Age, Fearless I, Barbara, Linda Leah, King Coal and Coal Glory are chartered-in on bareboat basis. Charter values reflect the difference in fare value between charter-in and charter-out rates.
  3. Vessels ordered at Korea Shipyard are excluded from all calculations, because no payments were made under this contract and it is unlikely that these ships will materialize.
 
 
 
Calculation of net debt
 
As of 12/31/2008, Excel Maritime had:
 
Current assets  &nbs... $127 mln.
Restricted cash   ... $24.9 mln.
Oceanaut receivable  ... $5.2 mln
 
 
Current liabilities, less current portion of interest rate swaps   ...          $274.8 mln.
Long-term debt, less the debt of consolidated joint-ventures
of $29.1 mln, relating to the interest of other parties  &nb... $1274.9 mln.
 
Remaining payments, relating to the part of the company in the newbuildings:   $72.7 mln.
 
Proceeds from the private offering of 25.7 mln. shares  &nbs... $45 mln.
 
 
Net debt:   ... 274.8+1274.9+72.7-45-127-24.9-5.2 = 1420.3
Shares outstanding: &nbs... 71,789,899
 
NAV per share = (1302.8+207.3-1420.3)/... = $1.25
 
 
]]> Sun, 10 May 2009 15:01:10 -0400  

 
Fleet data
 

Ship type
Name
Year
 
Market   value
 
Charter value
Capesize
Lowlands Beilun
1999
 
51,8
 
5,3
Capesize
Iron Miner
2007
 
65,1
 
16,0
Capesize
Kirmar
2001
 
55,4
 
33,5
Capesize
Iron Beauty
2001
 
55,4
 
5,2
Capesize
Sandra
2008
 
66,6
 
4,9
Capesize
Christine (1)
2010
 
27,0
 
0,8
Capesize
Lillie (1)
2010
 
31,5
 
2,5
Capesize
Hope (1)
2010
 
31,2
 
0,0
Panamax
Iron Manolis
2007
 
34,6
 
2,9
Panamax
Iron Brooke
2007
 
34,6
 
2,9
Panamax
Iron Lindrew
2007
 
34,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Iron Knight
2004
 
31,5
 
5,5
Panamax
Coal Hunter
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Coal Gypsy
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Pascha
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Iron Anne
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Iron Vassilis
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Iron Bill
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Santa Barbara
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Ore Hansa
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Iron Kalypso
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Iron Fuzeyya
2006
 
33,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Iron Bradyn
2005
 
32,6
 
5,5
Panamax
Grain Harvester
2004
 
31,5
 
3,8
Panamax
Grain Express
2004
 
31,5
 
5,5
Panamax
Coal Pride
1999
 
26,3
 
0,7
Panamax
Iron Man (2)
1997
 
0,0
 
-0,7
Panamax
Coal Age (2)
1997
 
0,0
 
-2,4
Panamax
Fearless I (2)
1997
 
0,0
 
-2,4
Panamax
Barbara (2)
1997
 
0,0
 
-2,4
Panamax
Linda Leah (2)
1997
 
0,0
 
0,1
Panamax
King Coal (2)
1997
 
0,0
 
30,7
Panamax
Coal Glory (2)
1997
 
0,0
 
-2,0
Panamax
Isminaki
1998
 
25,2
 
2,7
Panamax
Angela Star
1998
 
25,2
 
0,0
Panamax
Powerful
1994
 
20,5
 
4,5
Panamax
First Endeavour
1994
 
20,5
 
8,4
Panamax
Happy Day
1997
 
24,0
 
0,0
Panamax
Renuar
1993
 
19,3
 
0,0
Panamax
Rodon
1993
 
19,3
 
0,0
Panamax
Fortezza
1993
 
19,3
 
0,0
Panamax
Elinakos
1997
 
24,0
 
11,9
Panamax
Birthday
1993
 
19,3
 
0,0
Supramax
July M
2005
 
29,2
 
0,0
Supramax
Mairouli
2005
 
29,2
 
0,0
Handymax
Princess I
1994
 
13,5
 
3,6
Handymax
Marybelle
1987
 
7,1
 
0,0
Handymax
Lady
1985
 
4,9
 
0,0
Handymax
Emerald
1998
 
16,7
 
0,0
Handymax
Attractive
1985
 
4,9
 
0,0
Handymax
Swift
1984
 
3,8
 
0,0
Total
 
 
 
1302,8
 
207,3

 
Notes:
  1. The company has 42.8% interest in Christine and 50% interest in Lillie and Hope. Values of vessels and charters reflect appropriate percent of ownership.
  2. Iron Man, Coal Age, Fearless I, Barbara, Linda Leah, King Coal and Coal Glory are chartered-in on bareboat basis. Charter values reflect the difference in fare value between charter-in and charter-out rates.
  3. Vessels ordered at Korea Shipyard are excluded from all calculations, because no payments were made under this contract and it is unlikely that these ships will materialize.
 
 
 
Calculation of net debt
 
As of 12/31/2008, Excel Maritime had:
 
Current assets  &nbs... $127 mln.
Restricted cash   ... $24.9 mln.
Oceanaut receivable  ... $5.2 mln
 
 
Current liabilities, less current portion of interest rate swaps   ...          $274.8 mln.
Long-term debt, less the debt of consolidated joint-ventures
of $29.1 mln, relating to the interest of other parties  &nb... $1274.9 mln.
 
Remaining payments, relating to the part of the company in the newbuildings:   $72.7 mln.
 
Proceeds from the private offering of 25.7 mln. shares  &nbs... $45 mln.
 
 
Net debt:   ... 274.8+1274.9+72.7-45-127-24.9-5.2 = 1420.3
Shares outstanding: &nbs... 71,789,899
 
NAV per share = (1302.8+207.3-1420.3)/... = $1.25
 
 
]]> exm EGLE: Calculation of NAV per share http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/328677-stanislav-oleynikov/3673-egle-calculation-of-nav-per-share?source=feed 3673  

EGLE fleet
 

Ship type

 
 
Name
 
Year
 
 
Market value
 
 
Charter value
 
Handymax
Griffon
1995
 
13,8
 
-0,2
Handymax
Kite
1997
 
15,3
 
-0,1
Handymax
Sparrow
2000
 
17,6
 
0,0
Supramax
Merlin
2001
 
25,0
 
7,2
Supramax
Peregrine
2001
 
25,0
 
-1,8
Supramax
Condor
2001
 
25,0
 
3,5
Supramax
Falcon
2001
 
25,0
 
9,9
Supramax
Harrier
2001
 
25,0
 
0,9
Supramax
Hawk I
2001
 
25,0
 
-0,1
Supramax
Heron
2001
 
25,0
 
8,4
Supramax
Osprey I
2002
 
25,8
 
3,0
Supramax
Kittiwake
2002
 
25,8
 
5,0
Supramax
Goldeneye
2002
 
25,8
 
2,8
Supramax
Tern
2003
 
26,6
 
-1,8
Supramax
Shrike
2003
 
26,6
 
4,7
Supramax
Skua
2003
 
26,6
 
0,6
Supramax
Jaeger
2004
 
27,4
 
-1,1
Supramax
Kestrel I
2004
 
27,4
 
-0,8
Supramax
Cardinal
2004
 
27,4
 
-0,4
Supramax
Redwing
2007
 
29,6
 
5,4
Supramax
Woodstar
2008
 
30,4
 
13,0
Supramax
Wren
2008
 
30,4
 
17,3
Supramax
Crowned Eagle
2008
 
30,4
 
0,4
Supramax
Stellar Eagle
2009
 
31,1
 
-0,5
Supramax
Bittern
2009
 
31,0
 
12,4
Supramax
Canary
2009
 
31,0
 
12,3
Supramax
Thrasher
2009
 
30,9
 
12,2
Supramax
Crane
2009
 
30,9
 
12,2
Supramax
Avocet
2009
 
30,9
 
12,1
Supramax
Egret
2009
 
30,9
 
4,7
Supramax
Crested Eagle
2009
 
31,1
 
-1,1
Supramax
Martin
2010
 
30,7
 
9,4
Supramax
Thrush
2010
 
30,6
 
0,0
Supramax
Golden Eagle
2010
 
30,8
 
0,0
Supramax
Imperial Eagle
2010
 
30,8
 
0,0
Supramax
Gannet
2010
 
30,8
 
4,7
Supramax
Grebe
2010
 
30,8
 
4,7
Supramax
Ibis
2010
 
30,7
 
4,6
Supramax
Jay
2010
 
30,7
 
11,5
Supramax
Kingfisher
2010
 
30,7
 
12,1
Supramax
Nighthawk
2011
 
30,0
 
8,6
Supramax
Oriole
2011
 
29,8
 
8,2
Supramax
Owl
2011
 
29,8
 
8,3
Supramax
Petrel
2011
 
29,8
 
3,6
Supramax
Puffin
2011
 
29,6
 
3,9
Supramax
Roadrunner
2011
 
29,6
 
3,9
Supramax
Sandpiper
2011
 
29,6
 
3,8
Total
 
 
 
1314,9
 
227,4

 

 
Calculation of net debt
 
As of  03/31/2009, EGLE had:
 
Current assets   &nbs...  $31 mln.
Restricted cash     $12.8 mln.
 
Current liabilities less fair value of time charters acquired of $16.7 mln:    $20.6 mln.
 
Long-term debt:     $802.5 mln.
 
Remaining payments for newbuildings:    $549 mln.
 
Net debt:   802.... = 1328.3
Shares outstanding:    47,031,300
 
NAV per share = (1314.9+227.4-1328.3) / 47.03 = $4.55
 
 
]]> Sun, 10 May 2009 14:55:09 -0400  

EGLE fleet
 

Ship type

 
 
Name
 
Year
 
 
Market value
 
 
Charter value
 
Handymax
Griffon
1995
 
13,8
 
-0,2
Handymax
Kite
1997
 
15,3
 
-0,1
Handymax
Sparrow
2000
 
17,6
 
0,0
Supramax
Merlin
2001
 
25,0
 
7,2
Supramax
Peregrine
2001
 
25,0
 
-1,8
Supramax
Condor
2001
 
25,0
 
3,5
Supramax
Falcon
2001
 
25,0
 
9,9
Supramax
Harrier
2001
 
25,0
 
0,9
Supramax
Hawk I
2001
 
25,0
 
-0,1
Supramax
Heron
2001
 
25,0
 
8,4
Supramax
Osprey I
2002
 
25,8
 
3,0
Supramax
Kittiwake
2002
 
25,8
 
5,0
Supramax
Goldeneye
2002
 
25,8
 
2,8
Supramax
Tern
2003
 
26,6
 
-1,8
Supramax
Shrike
2003
 
26,6
 
4,7
Supramax
Skua
2003
 
26,6
 
0,6
Supramax
Jaeger
2004
 
27,4
 
-1,1
Supramax
Kestrel I
2004
 
27,4
 
-0,8
Supramax
Cardinal
2004
 
27,4
 
-0,4
Supramax
Redwing
2007
 
29,6
 
5,4
Supramax
Woodstar
2008
 
30,4
 
13,0
Supramax
Wren
2008
 
30,4
 
17,3
Supramax
Crowned Eagle
2008
 
30,4
 
0,4
Supramax
Stellar Eagle
2009
 
31,1
 
-0,5
Supramax
Bittern
2009
 
31,0
 
12,4
Supramax
Canary
2009
 
31,0
 
12,3
Supramax
Thrasher
2009
 
30,9
 
12,2
Supramax
Crane
2009
 
30,9
 
12,2
Supramax
Avocet
2009
 
30,9
 
12,1
Supramax
Egret
2009
 
30,9
 
4,7
Supramax
Crested Eagle
2009
 
31,1
 
-1,1
Supramax
Martin
2010
 
30,7
 
9,4
Supramax
Thrush
2010
 
30,6
 
0,0
Supramax
Golden Eagle
2010
 
30,8
 
0,0
Supramax
Imperial Eagle
2010
 
30,8
 
0,0
Supramax
Gannet
2010
 
30,8
 
4,7
Supramax
Grebe
2010
 
30,8
 
4,7
Supramax
Ibis
2010
 
30,7
 
4,6
Supramax
Jay
2010
 
30,7
 
11,5
Supramax
Kingfisher
2010
 
30,7
 
12,1
Supramax
Nighthawk
2011
 
30,0
 
8,6
Supramax
Oriole
2011
 
29,8
 
8,2
Supramax
Owl
2011
 
29,8
 
8,3
Supramax
Petrel
2011
 
29,8
 
3,6
Supramax
Puffin
2011
 
29,6
 
3,9
Supramax
Roadrunner
2011
 
29,6
 
3,9
Supramax
Sandpiper
2011
 
29,6
 
3,8
Total
 
 
 
1314,9
 
227,4

 

 
Calculation of net debt
 
As of  03/31/2009, EGLE had:
 
Current assets   &nbs...  $31 mln.
Restricted cash     $12.8 mln.
 
Current liabilities less fair value of time charters acquired of $16.7 mln:    $20.6 mln.
 
Long-term debt:     $802.5 mln.
 
Remaining payments for newbuildings:    $549 mln.
 
Net debt:   802.... = 1328.3
Shares outstanding:    47,031,300
 
NAV per share = (1314.9+227.4-1328.3) / 47.03 = $4.55
 
 
]]> egle DSX: Calculation of NAV per share http://seekingalpha.com/instablog/328677-stanislav-oleynikov/3672-dsx-calculation-of-nav-per-share?source=feed 3672  

DSX fleet
 

Ship type
 
Name
Year
 
Market value
 
Charter value
Capesize
Sideris
2006
 
61,6
 
3,6
Capesize
Aliki
2005
 
60,1
 
13,5
Capesize
Semirio
2007
 
63,2
 
6,6
Capesize
Salt Lake City
2005
 
60,1
 
30,8
Capesize
Norfolk
2002
 
55,3
 
56,1
Capesize
Boston
2007
 
63,2
 
22,8
Capesize
Hull H1107
2010
 
63,0
 
27,8
Capesize
Hull H1138
2009
 
64,1
 
42,0
Panamax
Nirefs
2001
 
27,5
 
15,1
Panamax
Alcyon
2001
 
27,5
 
23,1
Panamax
Triton
2001
 
27,5
 
2,2
Panamax
Oceanis
2001
 
27,5
 
3,1
Panamax
Dione
2001
 
27,5
 
-1,0
Panamax
Danae
2001
 
27,5
 
-1,6
Panamax
Protefs
2004
 
30,5
 
36,6
Panamax
Calipso
2005
 
31,5
 
-1,6
Panamax
Clio
2005
 
31,5
 
-1,1
Panamax
Thetis
2004
 
30,5
 
-1,2
Panamax
Naias
2006
 
32,5
 
3,0
Panamax
Erato
2004
 
30,5
 
0,3
Panamax
Coronis
2006
 
32,5
 
0,0
 
 
 
 
875,2
 
280,0

 
 
Calculation of net debt
 
As of 03/31/2009, DSX had:
 
Current assets  ... $111 mln.
 
Current liabilities  ... $43 mln.
Long-term debt   ... $214 mln.
 
Remaining payments for newbuildings $96 mln.
 
Payment under the agreement to exchange newbuildings ... $15 mln.
 
Net debt:    214+43+96+15-111 = 257
Shares outstanding: 75,428,366
 
NAV per share = (875.2+280-257)/75.4 = $11.91
 
 
]]> Sun, 10 May 2009 14:51:36 -0400  

DSX fleet
 

Ship type
 
Name
Year
 
Market value
 
Charter value
Capesize
Sideris
2006
 
61,6
 
3,6
Capesize
Aliki
2005
 
60,1
 
13,5
Capesize
Semirio
2007
 
63,2
 
6,6
Capesize
Salt Lake City
2005
 
60,1
 
30,8
Capesize
Norfolk
2002
 
55,3
 
56,1
Capesize
Boston
2007
 
63,2
 
22,8
Capesize
Hull H1107
2010
 
63,0
 
27,8
Capesize
Hull H1138
2009
 
64,1
 
42,0
Panamax
Nirefs
2001
 
27,5
 
15,1
Panamax
Alcyon
2001
 
27,5
 
23,1
Panamax
Triton
2001
 
27,5
 
2,2
Panamax
Oceanis
2001
 
27,5
 
3,1
Panamax
Dione
2001
 
27,5
 
-1,0
Panamax
Danae
2001
 
27,5
 
-1,6
Panamax
Protefs
2004
 
30,5
 
36,6
Panamax
Calipso
2005
 
31,5
 
-1,6
Panamax
Clio
2005
 
31,5
 
-1,1
Panamax
Thetis
2004
 
30,5
 
-1,2
Panamax
Naias
2006
 
32,5
 
3,0
Panamax
Erato
2004
 
30,5
 
0,3
Panamax
Coronis
2006
 
32,5
 
0,0
 
 
 
 
875,2
 
280,0

 
 
Calculation of net debt
 
As of 03/31/2009, DSX had:
 
Current assets  ... $111 mln.
 
Current liabilities  ... $43 mln.
Long-term debt   ... $214 mln.
 
Remaining payments for newbuildings $96 mln.
 
Payment under the agreement to exchange newbuildings ... $15 mln.
 
Net debt:    214+43+96+15-111 = 257
Shares outstanding: 75,428,366
 
NAV per share = (875.2+280-257)/75.4 = $11.91
 
 
]]> dsx