Timeless Wealth

Timeless Wealth
Contributor since: 2010
Company: Timeless Wealth
Per the CEO's comments on their Q3 conference call, Teva is in fact looking to "expand and invest in other companies right now". See SA's transcript section.
Can you provide a link(s) to substantiate any of this?
"no physician in their right mind would prescribe generic clomifene due to litigation risk"
UPDATE: Oculus priced an offering of 3.5 Million shares at a weighted average of $0.90 this morning, discounted >23% from last week's close. Investors got the short end of the stick with 100% warrant coverage on top. http://bit.ly/I60I9d
Len, this is very well written. NovaBay has a very unique product offering in a segment that most investors do not yet understand. Analysts' discounted cash flow models suggest a valuation north of $2/share on the conservative end. There's also validation on the end of a partnership with Galderma - a global leader in dermatology who has effectively committed over $62 million to develop NovaBay's Aganocide for the treatment of Impetigo (see http://bit.ly/vNchdH).
Whichever way you look at this company, it seems grossly undervalued.
Oculus's dividend history isn't an "argument", it's fact. For many investors dividends make up a sizeable portion of total return. Inevitably, the only thing Oculus's investors have realized to-date are [large] capital losses. In FY2012 Oculus will only add to a growing $130MM+ deficit. Solvency has perpetually plagued the company; growth is pegged to a single distributor; and there is a massive amount of dilutive overhang.
When exactly are they "on the way to turn into net-positive earnings" given that expenses have largely offset growth in sales - not to mention that the growth was partially due to a one-time gain in royalty?
You (and investors, in general) should find it troubling that management felt the need to regurgitate month-old news in a release this morning. http://yhoo.it/GIJ593
"[...]I took advantage of figuring out that nothing has changed at OCLS". -- Precisely why it should concern investors.
The folly in investing before researching a company is that information has a tendency of surfacing at the worst possible time. And yet the facts summarized in our report have been available to the public for quite some time. We highlighted material risks that have not been factored into the price (yet). Of course we only grazed the surface, and there are other risks (not highlighted in this report) that make this company unattractive on a risk/reward basis.
Qnexa, not Qnesa, will be viewed by the FDA on a balance of benefits to risk(s). The risks, briefly described in this article http://bit.ly/wq6a5u, are minor when weighed with the potency of Qnexa as a weight-loss drug. The FDA is 'safety-biased' if you will, but they also understand obesity leads to often fatal diseases and inevitably a poorer quality of life. The FDA is also well aware of the growing costs of a redundant healthcare system and the need for drastic change. It’s very speculative to dismiss the approval or suggest a CV study will be asked of Vivus before product approval.
The tendency for shares of Vivus to rise as an FDA decision looms is exaggerated by the large unmet need for an efficacious, prescription weight-loss medication. Post-approval it becomes a lot clearer - particularly once the momentum crowd fades - if the company is worth $30 per share, more, or less. Dendreon saw the same thing when its immunotherapy drug for prostate cancer was approved by the FDA. Shares soared on optimism, which, as it turns out, was premature - the product took longer than expected to reach end-users because of a run-in with reimbursement and the learning curve that comes with launching your first commercial product.
The intent was to demonstrate that Arena and Orexigen are derivative of a speculative case, in itself. Therefore their large shifts in price were fundamentally flawed.
You've missed the point: after Wednesday's news, shares of these equities were overbought. Short-sellers created alpha by taking advantage of temporarily mispriced market(s). Naturally, all three stocks corrected in the ensuing trading session. Arena forfeited all of its earlier gains (suggesting weakness and lack of confidence on the part of its investors) and Orexigen has further downside.
Excellent piece.
An initial osteoarthritis-in-the-... trial in Australia enrolled and tested Ampion in a three-arm, 60 patient study. Ampio then launched a study for Ampion as a stand-alone therapy versus placebo in a randomized, double-blinded study at Centers for Allergy and Asthma in Denver, Colorado for nasal inflammation, which enrolled an additional 20 patients. Positive data from the initial osteoarthritis-in-the-... trial gave Ampio the validation and safety data needed to test Ampio as a stand-alone therapeutic in the 40-patient follow-on trial we're now discussing.
In aggregate, at least 120 patients received Ampion in clinical trials. No adverse events related to treatment with Ampion were reported. Ampion's innate composition, a naturally occurring human molecule, itself, suggests it is well-tolerated as a therapy.
Last week ImmunoCellular traded for less than $1 per share. And two years ago, shares went for half of today's price. Prices continually change in the marketplace. A form S-1 was filed in November, so investors were well aware that the company would be raising capital and could dilute shareholder value. But more importantly, when investors invest in the company, they're not just buying an interest in its shares, they're also helping fund a therapy that betters the lives of brain cancer patients. This year, among other things, ImmunoCellular Therapeutics will report interim data from a highly-anticipated Phase II study of ICT-107 in patients with glioblastoma. Strong data would signal a very significant pivot in value for the company and its shareholders.
That piece was an analysis of sentiment from someone observing from the sidelines. It was geared towards a potential trading opportunity. Of course, Ian, anyone can seem brilliant after the fact.
The mention was in response to what we felt was an apples to oranges comparison made earlier.
Fundamental questions regarding Zertane were addressed in this interview - you're encouraged to review the content (above).
There's good reason to believe that the 2.22M shares investors recently purchased will give institutional investors an allocation in this company.
Wishful thinking, Andrew. Your comment aside, there's nothing that suggests that's the case.
According to Exhibit 10.2 to the form 8-k filed by Ampio on December 21:
"The Investor represents that (i) it has had full access to the Time of Sale Disclosure Package prior to or in connection with its receipt of this agreement and is relying only on such information and documents in making its decision to purchase the Shares, and (ii) it is acquiring the Shares for its own account, or an account over which it has investment discretion, and does not have any agreement or understanding, directly or indirectly, with any person or entity to distribute any of the Shares."
There is a longer disclosure that pertains specifically to what you called "an assumption". Therefore your suggestion is an impossibility.
What the closing price on 12/20 doesn't tell you is that Ampio traded under $5 for the majority of that day. Shares jumped to a $5.31 close in the last 10 minutes of trading. The financing was officially announced the following day, around 10:30 am. However, shares gapped down at the open and traded $4.70 before any official announcement was made.
Now let's think outside the box. If investors perceived the market price to be around $5, then they only sought a 15% margin of safety. Of course, these investors, are well aware that this is a volatile issue. So they likely understood that shares could fluctuate 15% or more in as little as one trading session. *Poof* -- just like that their margin of safety is gone.
The important part is that Ampio's financiers have skin in the game. And they've made a bold statement buying shares at the stated price. What this implies is that they believe in the longevity of this company. It also means these financiers think Ampio is worth a lot more than $4.25 (otherwise they would channeled their investment dollars elsewhere).
Conservatively speaking, Christopher Holterhoff at Oppenheimer & Co. provided a good estimate of the future value from LibiGel. The market, however, reacted to the trial data as if that value was magnified nearly 5x.
Thanks for adding that Ladenberg-Thalmann reinterated their buy recommendation.
According to the latest data available on NASDAQ.com, there were at least 1.77 Million shares short, which would take 12 sessions to cover.
"You are of course aware that the very best time-tested method to produce a roaring hail-Mary rally is none other than an enormous short covering run-up. To do that, it always helps to have an enormous short interest."
We initiated a long position in Antares on Thursday, in line with the unreasonably large decline in share price. Ampio is prone to significant volatility but should perform well over the course of the next year.
In no way related.
faustius, how insightful. The intent, of course, was to point out some of the glaring inconsistencies which formed the basis of the earlier short-bias article. It's rarely a good idea to rely on another's research without first verifying the facts (as we proceeded to do in this write-up).
The 'act first, think later' mentality is meaningful for traders who try and capitalize on fluctuations in stock prices. For investors, however, the opposite is true. There's a reason Buffet analyzes a company's fundamentals before checking a given issue's market price. What he tries to do is estimate what the company is worth before the market price varies his analysis. Emotion plays an enormous role in how we act. So invariably, seeing a bearish argument coupled with a sharp sell-off in the market, investors panicked and reversed roles with traders (on Tuesday), acting first, and carefully considering their trades later.

What we try to do is research a company before forming an opinion. Our long position is based on that research.

Thanks for leaving your thoughts with us.
Would you kindly provide a source that clarifies what your question is in reference to (asking thrice does not suffice clarification)?
In the meanwhile, I thought I would provide you with an interesting statistic from NASDAQ.COM:
Short interest stands at 1,771,923 shares (11/30/2011), which, given the avg share volume, would take in excess of 12 sessions to cover.
InVivo Therapeutics (NVIV.OB) offers an interesting value proposition in that sense: the company anticipates their biopolymer scaffolding device (BSD) could be on the market in a little over a year if it shows efficacy in human trials planned for the beginning of next year. Dr. Edward Wirth adds a good deal of credibility in leaving Geron for InVivo to lead this trial.
On the surface it would appear investors discounted Geron's oncology programs when they sold off the company's shares (which crept still lower in AH on Tuesday).
But the reaction was justified. In fact, investors who stuck with the company wanted to see these products through to fruition. Geron's move essentially wrote off hundreds of millions of dollars in R&D. And there's nothing tangible to show for it.
As far as partnering these assets goes - it may have just been the best way management could justify burning through shareholder dollars. The rest is yet to be determined.
"InVivo has an exclusive, worldwide license to a broad suite of patents, co-owned by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard's Children's Hospital (the "CMCC License").The CMCC License previously covered a wide range of biopolymers to treat spinal cord injury and to promote the survival and proliferation of cells in the spinal cord. The CMCC License includes 10 issued U.S. patents and 3 pending U.S. patents as well as 67 international patents and 34 pending international patents."
In June the company also reported that it had "expanded the 'Field of Use' of its existing patent license to include parts of the peripheral nervous system, the cavernous nerve surrounding the prostate, the brain, the retina and cranial nerves".
Addressing two inaccuracies in your statement:
(1) Firms with emerging technologies commonly experience sharp rises and declines in their stock price (otherwise coined ‘volatility’) on a day-to-day basis. Celldex and ImmunoCellular Therapeutics are inclusive in this generalization. More specifically, shares of CLDX have declined roughly the same amount as IMUC, in the period you referred to.
(2) Furthermore, as value is tied to the long-term success of ImmunoCellular’s ICT-107, among other pipeline technologies, investors cannot be expected to fairly value the company’s common stock over the short-term. In other words, while day-to-day price movements may be imperative to traders, investors measure returns over a broader horizon (i.e. performance over the past 24 months, see chart above).
Press releases and briefings (or overviews) supplement detailed information available in regulatory filings and analyst research reports. ImmunoCellular Therapeutics (IMUC) has presented at numerous conferences, including annual meetings of the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO). In June, the company presented an abstract titled, "Glioma-associated antigens associated with prolonged survival in a phase I study of ICT-107 for patients with newly diagnosed glioblastoma" (Abstract #2042). Ironically, a press release (http://bit.ly/nmlmdn) reveals this information (contrary to your statement that the company has neither presented at meaningful conferences nor provided posters or abstracts).
I would disagree on the valuation end - certainly the argument tends towards shares of ImmunoCellular Therapeutics trading at attractive levels, relative to competitors like CellDex (CLDX). Adjusting for volatility in day-to-day trading, if the market consisted purely of IMUC and CLDX, it would appear investors sold CellDex (which is down 40% year-to-date) to buy ImmunoCellular (which, despite forfeiting gains along with the broader healthcare sector, is up double digits in the same time frame).
The ICT-107 and CDX-110 studies engage a homogeneous patient population - those who have received standard-of-care (SOC) treatment. If you read through the trial design carefully, Celldex Therapeutics is actually excluding patients who have failed to respond to chemotherapy. For reference, see the second item listed under 'criteria' here: http://1.usa.gov/ncmvrV
The comparison drawn is, therefore, relevant and meaningful.